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Abstract Garren Mulloy
This thesis investigates Japan Self-Defense Forces (JSDF) overseas deployment 
operations (ODO) of the 1990s to evaluate whether the JSDF were effective 
international actors. This study fills a significant gap in extant literature concerning 
operational effectiveness, most studies having concentrated upon constitutionality and 
legality. This study places operational evaluations within the context of international 
actors during the vital decade of the 1990s, and within the broader context of Japanese 
security policies.
JSDF performance is studied in four mission variants: UN peacekeeping, allied 
support, humanitarian assistance, and disaster relief operations. A four-stage analytical 
framework is utilised, evaluating JSDF effectiveness, efficiency, and quality, comparing 
between missions, mission variants, and with other international actors, thereby 
cross-referencing evaluations and analyses.
The historical development of the JSDF profoundly affected their configuration and 
ability to conduct operations, not least the mechanisms of civilian control, the
constitution, and mediated passage of ODO-related laws. However, these factors have 
not prevented the development of significant JSDF ODO-capabilities, and their 
development is traced through the target decade, and linked to the successful 
completion of post-2001 operations in Iraq and East Timor. 
It is found that although JSDF ODO in the 1990s provided effective, quality services,
operational efficiency was frequently compromised by lack of investment in key 
capabilities and limited scales of dispatch, despite the relative cost-effectiveness of 
ODO. Compared to other armed forces, JSDF capabilities developed well in the early 
1990s but the Forces failed to comprehensively capitalise upon their achievements 
unlike a diverse range of international ODO actors.
The JSDF during the 1990s thereby developed as an effective, albeit narrow-spectrum, 
ODO actor, highly capable and well respected, yet compromised by investment, 
restrictions, and culture. This operational development matched the development of 
security policies that increasingly attempted to link military, diplomatic, and 
non-traditional security elements within an emergent Japanese strategy.
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Note on Citations and Translations
Throughout this thesis, Japanese names have been written in ‘standard’ Romanised 
form, with family name first, with other names cited by fore-name followed by 
family-name format in the main text. To reduce the possibilities of confusion between 
Asian and other names, the form of ‘family-name, fore-name’ has been utilised in the 
footnotes as well as the bibliography, for all names (e.g. Tanaka, Taro and Smith, John). 
British spelling has been utilised, unless when quoting from texts that have used 
alternate spellings. Japanese standard Romanised spelling has been used for place 
names (e.g. Tokyo), while Japanese titles and names have been translated into English 
with the Japanese Romanised version italicised in brackets, e.g. “Regional Armies 
(Houmentai)”; “Ebata, Kensuke, Information and the State (Jouhou to kokka)”. Those 
Japanese terms and names not in common usage have been italicised.
Where Japanese translations have been provided by the author or publisher, these 
have been utilised, even when not literal translations of titles. For example: “Hikotani, 
Takako, ‘Civil-Military Relations in Japan: Past, Present, and Future’ (Shibirian 
kontrouru no shourai)”: literally, “the future of civilian control.”
Where no translations have been provided, these are cited as direct translations by the 
author of this thesis. For example: “Miyajima, Shigeki, Ah, Magnificent JSDF (Aa, 
doudou no jieitai).
This thesis has depended heavily upon interviews with JSDF members and civil 
servants. Most of these were provided in confidence, upon condition that their names 
not be released. A full list of interviews is available for confidential confirmation of 
sources.
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Chapter 1 Introduction
1  Aims and Parameters
The commencement of peacekeeping operations by the Japan Self-Defense Forces in 
1992 introduced a new element into Japanese security policy. For some observers this 
signified a break with the past, a shock to the post-war pacifist order, while others saw a 
degree of continuity, yet the pre- and post-1992 periods are clearly distinctive. Japanese 
policymakers had finally accepted not only that peacekeeping was a legitimate tool 
available to Japan, as to other United Nations members, but also that the most 
appropriate agents to represent Japan in United Nations peacekeeping operations 
(UNPKO) were the Japan Self-Defense Forces (JSDF). Perhaps finally the JSDF had 
emerged from the constitutional shadows to be recognised as legitimate actors. The 
confluence of the rebirth of UNPKO, the birth of JSDF PKO, and the proliferation of 
UN nation-building and peace-enforcement operations placed JSDF overseas 
deployments within a far greater context than domestic politics. While Japan had 
seemingly ‘opted out’ of international (and many domestic) security responsibilities 
during the Cold War, JSDF peacekeeping indicated a significant change and assumption 
of international security responsibilities. This could be characterized as a shift from 
security ‘cheap-riding’ to ‘burden-sharing’.
This thesis focuses on JSDF Overseas Dispatch Operations (ODO), encompassing 
UNPKO, humanitarian aid, and disaster relief operations. While the symbolism of JSDF 
ODO is important, the performance of the Forces has been largely neglected. What tasks 
did the JSDF perform overseas? Were these operations effective or efficient, what 
factors contributed to JSDF performance, and how did they compare to ODO of other 
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national militaries? Most importantly, how effective were the JSDF as national actors in 
overseas dispatch operations? These are relevant questions which this thesis shall 
answer while also evaluating JSDF operations in the broader context of evolving 
Japanese security policy. Overall assessments of mission ‘success’, however, are not 
within the scope of this thesis, as they are dependent upon myriad factors beyond JSDF 
control, such as mandates, resources, conflict environments, and leadership issues. 
The study of JSDF ODO during the 1990s provides several interesting perspectives 
on Japan’s foreign and security policies for the researcher. It potentially provides 
insights into changes in Japan’s assumption of international responsibilities, the 
evolving boundaries of socio-political tolerances, and the perceptions of risk during the 
decade. It provides a case study of how multiple factors in Japanese security policy 
exercise interwoven influences with US alliance, UN-centric policies, and regional 
interests balanced and complemented by military dispatch and traditional 
liberal-mercantilist devices of trade and aid. ODO/PKO have also been used to measure 
how far Japan ‘normalised’, ‘reverted’, or ‘foundered’ during her supposed ‘lost decade’ 
of the 1990s, all problematic terms by definition. These terms are also inexorably linked 
with the Japanese constitution, primarily Article 9, the ‘peace clause’, and the notions 
and norms of identity and policy thus derived. The very existence of the JSDF has been 
considered problematic, at best, in light of the prohibition of military forces and 
belligerency in Article 9. The dispatch of those Forces overseas, for potentially 
hazardous duties, naturally focused minds upon constitutional and legal imperatives, 
including the Japanese government’s (partial) rejection of the right of collective security. 
In a multitude of ways, JSDF ODO have been regarded as signifying a ‘litmus test’, ‘red 
line issue’, or a ‘membership entitlement’ to leading institutions, such as the United 
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Nations Security Council (UNSC). While this study will focus on the operational 
performance and capabilities of the JSDF, any meaningful analysis of these matters 
requires an understanding of the prevailing context of research on Japanese security and 
international relations.  
Most studies of JSDF ODO have focused upon the broader security, political, and 
legal aspects as previously outlined. The most common approaches have been those 
regarding developments as indicators of changing policy priorities and the importance 
of normative factors upon state behaviour (Peter J. Katzenstein, Hugo Dobson), or the 
increasing importance of bilateralism in Japanese security through the US-Japan 
alliance (Richard J. Samuels, Kenneth B. Pyle), while others have emphasized particular 
theoretical points, such as identity theory, in determining the scale of changes (Amy L. 
Catalinac).1 Glenn D. Hook, Thomas U. Berger, and many Japanese commentators 
critical of the military establishment have tended to view overseas movements of 
military forces as potentially indicating signs of ‘reversion’ to militaristic ways. They 
have been highly critical of the militaristic manner of Japanese ODO/PKO contributions, 
strongly emphasizing constitutional and legal issues and the anti-militarist, pacifist 
socio-political norms that have dominated domestic security discourse since the 1950s.2
                                                   
1 Katzenstein, Peter J., Cultural Norms and National Security: police and military in post-war 
Japan (New York: Cornell University Press, 1996); Dobson, Hugo, Japan and United Nations 
Peacekeeping: new pressures, new responses (London: RoutledgeCurzon, 2003); Samuels, R. J., 
Securing Japan: Tokyo’s Grand Strategy and the Future of East Asia (Ithaca, NY.: Cornell 
University Press, 2007); Pyle, Kenneth B., Japan Rising: The Resurgence of Japanese Power and 
Purpose (New York: Public Affairs, 2007); Catalinac, Amy L., ‘Identity Theory and Foreign Policy: 
Explaining Japan's Responses to the 1991 Gulf War and the 2003 U.S. War in Iraq’, Politics & 
Policy 35-1 (2007): 58–100.
2 Hook, Glenn D., Militarization and Demilitarization in Contemporary Japan (London: Routledge, 
1996); Berger, Thomas U., Cultures of Anti-militarism: National Security in Germany and Japan
(Baltimore, MD.: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1998); Maeda, Tetsuo, The Hidden Army: The 
Untold Story of Japan’s Military Forces (Carol Stream, IL.: edition q, 1995).
Chris W. Hughes and others have utilized ODO as one element in assessing Japan’s 
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re-emergence as a ‘normal’ power, while Reinhard Drifte has examined PKO as one of 
several factors in Japan’s efforts to secure a permanent seat on the UNSC.3 Even when 
research has focused directly upon one of the Forces, ODO has usually formed only a 
subsidiary element, such as in Peter J. Woolley’s study of the Maritime Self-Defense 
Force (MSDF), and usually as an indicator of other trends, such as the effect of ODO on 
the bilateral relationships with the United States and the US Navy (USN).4
Despite increased interest in the JSDF, their overseas dispatch, and peace operations, 
there remains little qualitative research, and the extant literature on JSDF ODO is 
extremely limited in its coverage of operational issues, even among serving or retired
JSDF authors. The main variants are the coverage of UNPKO operational matters with 
reference to JSDF practice, such as Seki Hajime et al, brief surveys of JSDF operations 
in the 1990s in order to examine 21
This thesis focuses upon the operational performance of the JSDF in ODO, but such 
analysis also sheds light upon broader security policy aspects raised by previous authors. 
These aspects will be considered primarily in Chapter Seven, in an assessment of how 
JSDF ODO impacted upon Japan’s relationships, policies, and notions of self-identity, 
and how these were seen to have been affected from the perspective of external 
interested parties. ODO will also be examined as how it they have been considered to 
have contributed towards an emergent Japanese security strategy.
st
                                                   
3 Hughes, Christopher W., Japan’s Re-emergence as a ‘Normal’ Military Power, Adelphi Paper 
368-9 (London/Oxford: International Institute for Strategic Studies (IISS)/Routledge, 2005); 
Heinrich, L. William Jr., Soeya, Yoshihide, Shibata, Akiho, United Nations Peace-keeping 
Operations by Japan: A Guide to Japanese Policies (Tokyo: United Nations University (UNU),
1999); Drifte, Reinhard, Japan’s Quest for a Permanent Security Seat: A Matter of Pride or Justice
(London: St. Antony’s Series/Macmillan, 2000).
4 Woolley, Peter J., Japan’s Navy: Politics and Paradox, 1971-2000 (Boulder, CO.: Lynne Rienner, 
2000).
century dispatches, such as Isobe Koichi, and
journalistic reportage, such as Miyajima Shigeki, providing insight into dispatches but 
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little on operational effectiveness or efficiency.5 Maeda Tetsuo has utilised verbatim 
interviews within a limited operational study, and ODO veterans have further detailed 
their experiences in occasional papers, such as Watanabe Takashi, or through defence 
journals, such as Securitarian, while the most detailed single work by the Military 
History Society of Japan compiled such experiences within a peacekeeping survey.6
This thesis aims to provide the first systematic evaluation of JSDF ODO of the 1990s, 
encompassing all three Forces, and all overseas operations of the period. Due to the 
chronic lack of public-domain documentation, it has been dependent upon extensive 
meetings with current and former JSDF members and officials. In this, the author has 
been assisted by experience in Japan, as well as experience in the British Army. Military 
experience is extremely rare among Japanese researchers, and JSDF and official 
personnel have often been put at ease and felt more able to express themselves to an 
‘outsider’ without vested or political interest, who may contribute informed comment 
and comparative examples. Certain issues, highly controversial within Japan, could be 
examined in interview without fear of the interviewee being exposed to risk, or 
misunderstood for want of military knowledge. Such matters as recourse to collective 
security in ODO, relevant security training, and rules and procedures regarding use of 
weapons were all discussed in this professional context, removed from the usual 
                                                   
5 Seki, Hajime, Ochiai, Taosa, and Suginoo, Yoshio, The Truth About PKO: Everything Ignored 
About JSDF Overseas Dispatch (PKO no shinjitsu: shirarezaru jieitai kaigai haken no subete) 
(Tokyo: Keizaikai, 2004); Isobe, Koichi, ‘Self-Defense Forces and Overseas Missions: Review of 
Past Operations and Future Challenges’ (Kokusai niimu to jieitai: koremade no rebyuu to kongou no 
kadai), The Journal of International Security (Kokusai anzenhoshou) 36-1 (2008): 21-40; Miyajima, 
Shigeki, Ah, Magnificent JSDF (Aa, doudou no jieitai) (Tokyo: Shoudensha, 2003).
6 Maeda, Tetsuo, JSDF and PKO Verification (Kenshou PKO to jietai), (Tokyo: Iwanami, 1996); 
Watanabe, Takashi, The PKO in Cambodia-Lessons Learned: The Japanese Perspective,
International Symposium of Security Affairs 2003 (Tokyo: National Institute for Defense Studies, 
2003); Nakano, Shegenori, ‘Mozambique Life Diary’ (Mozanbiiku seikatsu nikki), Securitarian
(September 1993): 35-39; Military History Society of Japan (ed.), The Historical Verification of 
PKO (PKO no shite kikenshou) (Tokyo: Nishikitadashisha, 2007).
6 
 
pre-occupation with constitutional issues and pacifist norms. This thesis has aimed to 
provide a unique operational evaluation, and thereby to determine if the JSDF have been 
able to demonstrate their capabilities to perform as effective international actors.
JSDF ODO has rarely been considered as the case-study demonstration of capabilities 
by a state actor. Due to the controversial status of the JSDF, and by extension the Japan 
Defense Agency (JDA)/Ministry of Defense (MOD), in contrast to the Ministry of 
Foreign Affairs (MoFA) or Japan International Cooperation Agency (JICA), the JSDF 
has largely existed in the shadows of public acceptance and consciousness, and on the 
fringes of legitimacy. JSDF operations have therefore often appeared ‘tainted’ and 
thereby have rarely been analysed for their effectiveness or efficiency. They have 
reached public consciousness through exceptional circumstances, such as the 
controversial dispatches to Cambodia and Iraq, or performance in disaster relief, such as 
following the Hanshin Earthquake. While emotional reactions to military deployments 
are not unique to Japan, the degree to which JSDF operational performance has been 
largely neglected by policymakers and sections of the defence establishment is 
remarkable. 
This thesis aims to assess JSDF performance and capabilities and therefore considers 
the constitutional controversy and related issues only to the degree in which they impact 
upon the JSDF and operational duties. The constitution continues to exercise a strong 
ambient influence upon the configuration, culture, and conduct of the JSDF, and these 
aspects shall be examined as and when relevant. However, the technical and political 
nature of the constitutional controversy shall not be allowed to encumber a rational 
operational evaluation. The period selected for this study, the 1990s, encompasses the 
initial UNPKO, while excluding the range of missions conducted since 2001. These 
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later operations are worthy of a separate study, yet differ significantly in type, legal 
basis, and conduct, primarily in being largely non-UN operations, conducted for allied 
and anti-terrorism support, and with practice based upon experiences in the 1990s.
While much of ODO experience was neglected by government, a combination of 
valuable field-level operational experience, international relationship-building, and a 
lessening of ‘civilian control’ tensions regarding JSDF ODO contributed to operational 
effectiveness in the 21st century. This thesis, while examining the operational 
progression from UNPKO to later operations does not propose that this represented an 
obvious and inevitable progression. Experiences in Cambodia did not lead to the Iraq 
dispatch, but experience in the 1990s provided the base to make possible the effective 
conduct of later operations. The first ODO also required careful mediation between 
contrasting political and legal influences, therefore the distinction between operational,
political, and legal issues is both apparent and necessary. 
The choice of the 1990s is, as outlined above, based upon the emergence of JSDF 
ODO during the decade. New security norms emerged in Asia in the 1990s, as well as 
fundamental changes in Japanese society, with significant cultural and political shifts of 
extant post-war norms. While the 1990s provide a convenient starting point, with the 
Gulf War controversies leading to the Cambodia dispatch, they do not provide an 
equally neat conclusion. This study includes the UN Disengagement Force (UNDOF) in 
the Golan Heights, despite continuing beyond the 1990s, while the operations in East 
Timor from 2002 are considered only as a comparative indicator of later developments.
In addition, the non-peacekeeping ODO, such as humanitarian and disaster relief 
missions that fall within the target decade are included, providing a sufficient body of 
comparatives. 
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Significant changes in public opinion concerning the JSDF and Japan’s security status 
occurred between 1991 and 2001. These were partly due to natural disasters and 
accidents, as well as North Korean actions, rising Chinese power, and terrorism. What 
did not, and has not, changed significantly is the widespread view of JSDF ODO as 
something judged largely in political or legal terms, rather than professional or 
utilitarian terms. As this study is primarily an examination of the performance of the 
JSDF operations, to evaluate the capabilities of the Forces criteria are required. The 
criteria include those utilised by the United Nations Department of Peacekeeping 
Operations (UNDPKO), PKO training centres, and training and doctrine development
institutions, such as the British Development, Concepts and Doctrine Centre (DCDC), 
and from wider research and practice.7 Operational effectiveness, efficiency, and quality 
cannot be as readily identified and isolated as in financial and business models. The 
JSDF have participated in vastly complex multinational, multi-agency operations, where 
the outcome has been extremely difficult to evaluate. The JSDF and JDA/MOD have 
also been reticent to release data from their dispatch histories (hakenshi), and while 
media coverage was extensive in Cambodia it was thereafter rather limited. The 
difficulty of evaluation does not detract from its worth however, for without a process of 
post-operational analysis there can be no systematic lessons-learned recycling of 
experience. This study will illustrate just how limited was this lessons-learned process
for the JSDF, and how it hampered operational effectiveness. The ability of the JSDF to 
eventually develop lessons-learned capabilities and apply them to later operations 
further reinforces the value of the effort.
                                                   
7 Until April 2006, the Joint Doctrine and Concepts Centre (JDCC) 
(http://www.mod.uk/DefenceInternet/MicroSite/DCDC/WhatWeDo 12 July 2008).
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2  Methodology in the Study of ODO
This study will rely upon a comparison of JSDF UN and non-UN operations, and 
with the ODO of other militaries providing a triangulation of comparative operational 
analysis. This predominantly empirical study cannot aim to compare JSDF ODO with 
all other aspects of JSDF duties, nor with every overseas military operation, but it shall 
endeavour to provide representative qualitative comparatives through the methodology 
of an analytical framework.
In assessing the JSDF PKO in the field, a framework is necessary for systematic 
assessment of each operation, and to provide a comparative element between 
operational variants. The four elements of the analytical framework are the examination 
of the mission context, preparation and logistical support, JSDF performance in the 
mission, and the overall Japanese contribution to the mission. 
The mission context relates to mission selection, the degree of Japanese involvement, 
including peace processes, and the security environment of the host country/region. This 
represents an examination of mission aspects affecting JSDF operations, beyond their 
control.
ODO preparation and logistics include the survey and mission selection processes, 
general and mission-specific training, the lead-in phase, dispatches, logistical support 
(integral to the JSDF and provided by Japanese and/or foreign, civil and/or military 
sources), and post-operational return to Japan. This section also includes analyses of the 
scale and types of JSDF deployment, assessing both quantitative and qualitative 
contributions.
JSDF performance indicators are naturally complex: difficult to isolate and analyse. 
In the literature on military operations degrees of success or failure are often ascribed, 
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yet while considerable effort is placed on operational analysis of ‘success’, such as 
operational ‘lessons-learned’ (John Nagl), and ‘joining-up’ civilian and military 
commands (Frank Kitson, and Jennifer Morrison Taw and John Peters), there are few 
references to qualitative indicators.8 Corporate studies have identified such qualitative 
indicators, and these have been incorporated into elements of peacekeeping through 
civil institutions, such as studies conducted by public aid providers, NGOs, and police 
contingent providers.9 R.J. O’Brien has produced one of the few studies utilising such 
indicators for peacekeeping, in assessing Australian police performance in Cyprus. The 
indicators applied were effectiveness, efficiency, and quality providing qualitative 
analysis of mission performance.10
                                                   
8 Nagl, John A., Learning to Eat Soup with a Knife: Counterinsurgency Lessons from Malaya and 
Vietnam (Chicago: University of Chicago, 2005): 177-181; Kitson, Frank, Low Intensity Operations: 
Subversion, Insurgency, Peacekeeping (London: Faber, 1971): 50; Morrison Taw, Jennifer, and 
Peters, John E., Operations Other Than War: Implications for the U.S. Army (Santa Monica, CA.: 
RAND, 1995): 18-19.
These indicators shall be used in this section (and 
Chapter Six) to evaluate JSDF performance in their mandated tasks (assigned prior to 
dispatch), and how they were able to adapt to changed circumstances and tasks beyond 
those initially assigned. 
The JSDF mission contribution factor is an overall assessment of how the JSDF 
personnel and units contributed to the completion of the mission. In some missions 
there may be viable comparisons with non-military bodies, but while useful in a 
single-mission context uniform inter-mission comparison is not possible. 
9 Chapman, Nick, and Vaillant, Charlotte, Synthesis of Country Programme Evaluations Conducted 
in Fragile States, Evaluation Report EV709 (London: Department for International Development
(DfID), 2010), 
(http://www.dfid.gov.uk/Documents/publications1/evaluation/syn-cnty-prog-evals-frag-sts.pdf , 10 
July 2010); 21st Century Aid: Recognising success and tackling failure, Oxfam Briefing Paper 137
(Oxford: Oxfam International, 2010) 
(http://www.oxfam.org/sites/www.oxfam.org/files/bp-137-21st-century-aid.pdf, 10 July 2010).
10 O'Brien, R.J., Police as peacekeepers: an evaluation of the performance of Australian police 
peacekeeping on Cyprus 1964 – 1998, PhD thesis (Adelaide: University of South Australia, 2001).
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Using this analytical framework each mission element will be examined in isolation, 
and also in comparison with other mission elements, enabling systematic comparisons 
between JSDF and other militaries’ performance. The limited extant literature in English 
and Japanese will be utilised, as well as access to unpublished papers, and interviews 
with civilian and JSDF personnel, aided by the author’s experience of military 
institutions and cultures.
The interviews, upon which this thesis is largely based, were conducted between 
mid-1998 and late 2010. The range of over 300 interviewees was broad, including 
politicians, public officials, serving and retired JSDF personnel, academics and 
researchers, journalists, business people, and private individuals, with approximately 
250 being of direct use in production of this thesis. As the emphasis is upon JSDF 
operational matters, thus the interviewees selected were those with the greatest 
contribution to make within this area. Relatively few politicians were able to make 
significant contributions, hence the emphasis was placed upon those who could, 
resulting in only a handful of political figures, but including over fifty JSDF members. 
Likewise, the balance with JSDF interviewees was approximately 15% ASDF, and 25% 
MSDF, with just over 60% being GSDF, reflecting the larger numbers of ‘land’
personnel engaged in ODO in the 1990s. This was also reflected in the greater numbers 
of JDA/MOD and Cabinet Office personnel interviewed compared with MoFA, and the 
large numbers of interviewees from the NDA and NIDS, while the large and prestigious
Waseda University provided only one interviewee. The numbers of people able (and 
willing) to contribute to this thesis was extremely small, with most security specialists 
being concentrated within a small, informal community.
Most interviews were conducted by prior arrangement, in formal contexts, with 
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written notes. Some with public officials involved the official recording of minutes by 
an assistant, and these were almost always conducted in Japanese. Some interviewees 
preferred to speak in English, particularly when discussing matters of some sensitivity 
when in the workplace. If possible, the initial interview would be followed up with a 
second, clarification meeting, most fully achieved with certain NIDS researchers, who 
agreed to meet four or five times in their offices. However, as access to certain public 
and uniformed officials was difficult to achieve, not least due to job rotation, some 
interviews were conducted in informal circumstances. These included between sessions 
at conferences and research meetings, at embassy receptions, or during public lectures. 
The Japanese tradition of bonding by social-intercourse, the nomikai (drink-meeting), is 
very strong, and several public servants preferred to speak in such situations, and these 
informal situations often resulted in the most interesting results, albeit with the potential 
collateral damage to accurate notation. 
Among the most famous subjects, such as Ogata Sadako and Akashi Yasushi, the 
interviews lasted for less than 10 minutes, and were conducted in opportunistic manner 
during UN University events in Tokyo. Others, such as with Yamazaki Hiroto, lasted for 
over two hours, one to one, in private. These interviewees had the confidence to be ‘on 
the record’ while many public servants and JSDF active personnel, even during minuted 
interviews, tended to be ‘off the record’ with occasional bursts of ‘on the record’
comments. Many researchers, academics, and retired officers also preferred not to be 
explicitly named in case their critical comments resulted in damaged relations with 
current or former colleagues, or hindered promotion prospects within institutions. 
The results of interviews were compared with the available textual sources, and with 
each other to identify trends and aberrations, with these further investigated through 
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follow-up interviews or by telephone or e-mail communication. This checking process 
was instituted in order to verify criticisms or compliments easily dispensed during 
conversation, and to attempt to identify and isolate personal or institutional prejudices, 
such as the commonly stated JSDF disdain for MoFA pre-dispatch briefings, which 
through further investigation did not equate with general disdain for the Ministry or its 
personnel. 
The further analysis of interview results through the two stage methodological 
framework allowed for the maximum utilisation of valuable assets while minimizing the 
risks of prejudicial contamination. This methodology could then be even further 
reinforced by the utilisation of appropriate international relations theory for analysis.
3  Theory in the Study of ODO
While this thesis primarily relies upon empirical research reinforced with a two-stage 
methodological framework, IR theory also shall be utilised to reinforce the utility and 
accuracy of the research. Naturally, the methodology of security or peacekeeping 
studies does not depend upon a singular theoretical approach. A.J.R. Groom has 
indicated how in international security studies theoretical approaches can effectively 
pre-determine the conclusion of research, not invalidating theory but rendering 
cognisance of the theoretical underpinning vital for effective evaluation of research.11
                                                   
11 Groom, A.J.R., ‘Paradigms in Conflict: The Strategist, the Conflict Researcher, and the Peace 
Researcher’, Review of International Studies 14 (1988): 71-98.
Glenn D. Hook et al state that in examining Japanese policy it is useful, “to provide a 
theoretical framework in order to methodically examine the essential factors and 
motivations,” while also stating that the most valuable examination can be achieved 
through a blend of Realist, Liberalist, and Constructivist approaches, with the addition 
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of other approaches as appropriate. 12 In effect, the proposition is to ‘triangulate’
approaches in order to ensure accurate understanding through theory. Similarly, J.S. 
Gaddis rejects notions that, “…suggest we jettison the scientific approach to the study 
of international relations; only that we bring it up to date by recognizing that good 
scientists, like...good historians, make use of all the tools at their disposal.”13
There have been efforts to create application-specific theories of peacekeeping. Some 
have focused upon providing theoretical foundations for operational conduct to prevent 
the repetition of mistakes by practitioners, such as by the adaptation of contingency 
theory (A.B. Fetherston).
In this 
vein, theory shall be utilized when and how it is able to enhance understanding, or 
provide alternative avenues of analysis. 
14 Other studies have attempted to place peacekeeping within 
existing theories, examining PKO through the analytical prism of international relations 
(IR) theories. The absence of complete success is unsurprising given that peacekeeping 
has often been, “an ad hoc response to international conflict and as such has little or no 
conceptual basis.”15
Classic IR theoretical approaches provide lessons for the construction of a theoretical 
framework, even in the event that they may eventually prove inappropriate in 
application. Realism, based in classical forms upon military ‘hard power’ determining 
action within an anarchic ‘system’ of states, clearly is of limited utility to UNPKO, as it 
denies significant variations to the monopoly of state power, and raises the question of 
why states cooperate for abstract goals? Realism as an IR theory, as expounded by Hans 
                                                   
12 Hook, Glenn D., Gilson, Julie, Hughes, Christopher W., Dobson, Hugo, Japan’s International 
Relations: Politics, Economics, and Security, second edition (Oxford: Routledge, 2005): 41-43.
13 Gaddis, J.S., ‘International Relations Theory and the End of the Cold War’, International Security
17-3 (1992): 5-58, 37.
14 Fetherston, A.B., Towards a Theory of UN Peacekeeping (London: Macmillan, 1994).
15 Fetherston, A.B., Towards a Theory of UN Peacekeeping: 88.
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Morgenthau, was as much an attempt to understand the onset of World War Two as the 
Cold War, and has long been considered the ‘standard’ theoretical approach to statecraft 
from Thucydides through Machiavelli to the present.16 Its lack of flexibility, particularly 
in considering influences beyond the state-level, or outside traditional ‘security’, makes 
it a blunt tool for examining multinational cooperative conflict-containment or 
humanitarian-assistance operations. The dispatch of forces to areas not of significant 
national interest, at significant cost and risk, seems to defy Realist norms. For Japan, a 
perceived international security threat could be countered by investment in the JSDF, 
but not sending troops to build infrastructure in Cambodia. Neo-Realism (Kenneth 
Waltz) provided a greater appreciation of the limits of ‘hard power’ through a greater 
appreciation of international systems and limitations on state action in the post-modern 
era.17
The main counterpoint to Realism has been provided by Liberalism. This theoretical 
approach has emphasised the utility of cooperation for mutual benefit, whereby states 
may not only consort, but also construct systems and institutions constituting 
meta-bodies of regional or global governance. Liberalism also emphasises the 
The Neo-Realist analysis of JSDF ODO would be either as a quid pro quo to 
secure advantage in another (more important) sphere, or as an extension of alliance with 
the United States. That these analyses can be seen as partly valid does not fully validate 
either approach, but does illustrate the perils of endorsing or dismissing a single theory 
in entirety. Japan did hope ODO would provide leverage for UNSC membership, and 
did respond to US pressure in 1990-1992. For a study of JSDF ODO, however, Realism 
has limited utility.
                                                   
16 Morgenthau, Hans J., Politics Among Nations: The Struggle for Power and Peace, Fifth Edition 
(New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1978).
17 Waltz, Kenneth N., Theory of International Politics (New York: McGraw Hill, 1979).
16 
 
non-military aspects of power, including Neo-Liberalism`s ‘soft power’ (Joseph S. Nye) 
whereby states, cultures, or sub-cultures appeal and exert influence through cultural and 
communicative means, such as media, arts, and commerce. 18
For Japanese ODO, Liberalism would reject or lessen the value of JSDF ODO being 
tied to such imperatives as the US alliance or UNSC permanent membership, despite
strong evidence to the contrary. However, Liberalism sits easily with overt Japanese 
UN-centred policies and broader international peace cooperation approaches promoting
human security. It also reflects the importance of ‘national image’ for a number of 
UNPKO contributor nations, such as Canada, Sweden, and Ireland. Its multi-layered, 
Thereby, 
Non-governmental Organisations (NGO), corporations, and other groups may 
consciously or unconsciously become actors in a trans-national system over which 
states exert limited control. Liberalism does not envisage the displacement of the nation 
state as the primary actor, and thus remains ‘Westphalian’ in core principles, with 
globalization possibly as the panacea of Liberalism, whereby interdependence increases 
national interest in the maintenance of international peace and security. Peacekeeping 
blends easily into Liberalism, emphasizing multi-lateral, multi-agency approaches, yet 
UNPKO remains a phenomenon dominated by uniformed state actors associated with 
‘hard-power’, and mission selection, participation, and conduct are dominated by the 
UN members, particularly the policy ‘gatekeepers’ (the UNSC P5), the largest financial 
contributors (the P5, plus Japan and Germany), and the largest troop contributors 
(Pakistan, India, and Bangladesh). Liberalism also struggles to accommodate human 
agency choosing conflict over cooperation, as in Bosnia and Kosovo, and other forms of 
ethnic or religious conflict. 
                                                   
18 Nye, Joseph S., Soft power: the means to success in world politics (New York: Public Affairs, 
2004).
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multi-agency assumption emphasizes a pluralist core, and in contrast to Realism 
provides an insight into the factions, interest groups, and ebbing and flowing influences 
upon Japanese policy, as illustrated by Karel Van Wolfren’s counter to monolithic 
depictions of Japanese power.19
Identity being the core of Constructivism, the hesitancy of countries such as Japan 
and Germany during the early Cold War to be proactive in security matters is explained 
by identities formed in the aftermath of war, and under US patronage, focused upon 
economic recovery and social stability. The drawback of such an exposition is that it has 
Compared to Realism, Liberalism is also in harmony 
with the enduring socio-political norms of anti-militarism and non-belligerency in 
Japanese socio-political studies, and thus is an avenue to Constructivism.
Constructivism offers much that Realism lacks in the understanding of norms, 
standards, and cognitive processes that frame much of practice and policy. Elements of 
peacekeeping can be effectively examined through Constructivism, particularly learning 
processes. It is also, unlike Liberalism, ‘behaviour neutral’, not assigning cooperative, 
harmonious qualities to human agency, or a quest for domination or power as in 
Realism. The desires and methods of states are fundamentally complexes of 
socio-cultural influences, predominantly norms derived from identities that frame 
perceptions of justice, practice, and product. Within a state, multiple actors and forces 
influence debate, policy, and doctrine such as the influences exercised over Japanese 
security policies by ministries, media, political parties, interest groups, and industry. 
Compared to Liberalism there is no a priori assumption of nation-state primacy, and 
Constructivism is sometimes regarded as a complement to other theories rather than a 
unit replacement. 
                                                   
19 Van Wolferen, Karel, The Enigma of Japanese Power (New York: Knopf, 1989).
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limited interest identification and forecasting potential, such as the re-emergence of 
UNPKO amidst post-Cold War flux, countering many well established security, political, 
and social norms. ODO for Japan, and Germany, challenged some of the strongest 
socio-political norms, deeply based in identities which if not overtly anti-military were 
disinclined to sanction military dispatch and potential belligerency. Constructivism does 
not clearly provide for realising why and how these norms and identities change other 
than the understandable yet inevitably amorphous ‘shift in the complex of influences’, 
although it does provide a valuable framework for understanding how norms and 
identities act as brakes upon change, such as the attempts of ‘revisionists’ and ‘realists’ 
from Japanese Prime Ministers Kishi through to Nakasone to radically alter the 
Japanese security norm to accommodate greater ‘burden sharing’.
This thesis shall not assume the superiority of any single theoretical base, nor attempt 
to create a ‘hybrid’, as Izumikawa Yasuhiro attempts between Realism and 
Constructivism, and shall draw upon a variety of means most appropriate to the 
particular subject matter.20
Some scholars attempted to find a ‘middle way.’ A.B. Fetherston constructed 
contingency theory models in an attempt to square the circle of power-norms-human 
A study of the Cold War Yoshida Doctrine, of economic 
primacy within the US alliance, for example may resort to Realist views of power 
(military alliance, husbanding resources), Liberal views of plurality and multilateralism 
(security debate leading to de facto compromise, forging foreign relations through trade), 
or Constructivism (democratic, ‘western’, pacifist identity dominating policy discourse). 
In isolation, each could be critiqued for gaps and flaws, yet a triangulation provides 
insight not otherwise possible. 
                                                   
20 Izumikawa, Yasuhiro, ‘Explaining Japanese Antimilitarism: Normative and Realist Constraints on 
Japan’s Security Policy’, International Security 35-2 (2010): 123-160. 
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agency, while C.W. Kegley proposed, “Realism with a human face,” to enable the 
transition from ‘power’ to justice and broader security.21 Scholars have attempted to 
navigate such theoretical possibilities and combine or synthesize elements within a 
single coherent pattern. Hugo Dobson in his study of Japanese PKO utilized elements of 
traditional IR theory with normative patterns, such as anti-militarism, US bilateralism, 
and East Asianism, providing a valuable analytical comparative.22 Peter J. Katzenstein 
and Nobuo Okawara, and Glenn D. Hook et al, weaved ‘middle paths’ through 
seemingly competing theories by embracing ‘analytical eclecticism’, and it is this 
balanced approach that is utilised in this thesis.23
This naturally entails a degree of comparison with other nations, including those 
A theoretical eclecticism, as a 
multi-purpose ‘tool kit’ for the analysis JSDF ODO, shall provide a context of 
understanding for operational evaluations.
4  Evaluation Criteria
JSDF ODO have often been judged as successful or not based upon criteria largely 
divorced from operational performance. The raising of national profile, loyalty to the 
United Nations, or to the US alliance have been among the most commonly assumed 
measures for evaluating Japanese ODO. This study focuses on the overseas operations 
in the 1990s and assesses if the JSDF have demonstrated effectiveness as national actors 
in multinational missions, and as agents of Japanese policy. 
                                                   
21 Kegley, C.W., ‘The Neoidealist Moment in International Studies? Realist myths and the new
international realities’, International Studies Quarterly 37-1 (1993): 131-146, 142.
22 Dobson, Hugo, Japan and United Nations Peacekeeping: New Pressures, New Responses
(London: Sheffield Centre for Japanese Studies/Routledge Curzon, 2003).
23 Katzenstein, Peter J., and Okawara, Nobuo, Japan, ‘Asian-Pacific Security, and the Case for 
Analytical Eclecticism’, in Katzenstein, Peter J. (ed.), Rethinking Japanese Security: Internal and 
External Dimensions (Abingdon: Routledge, 2008): 32-55; Hook, Glenn D., et al, Japan’s 
International Relations: 41-43.
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similarly emerging into the peacekeeping community, such as Germany and Korea, and 
veteran actors, such as Austria, Finland, and Canada, as well as ‘natural allies’, such as 
Australia and the United Kingdom. The United States provides such a contrast in scale, 
power, and doctrines that comparisons are of limited relevance. In this comparative 
process the JSDF will be referred to as the de facto Japanese military, despite not being 
so in legal and constitutional terms.24 This does not represent a prescriptive position or 
judgment regarding the constitution and the JSDF. It is a de facto recognition of 
like-for-like, akin to comparisons between coastguard forces, despite their 
military-civilian status depending upon the country.25
The definitions of ‘effective, efficient, and quality’ are naturally problematic. The 
completion of the mandate would be a UN definition, while the minimum cost in ‘blood 
and gold’ would be a domestic socio-political standard of ‘success’. Politicians would 
naturally prioritise the political cost, with a lack of criticism almost as valued as 
indicators of effectiveness. In the 21
In a unilateral form this thesis charts the learning curves of the JSDF from their
initial ODO and how they have adapted to the diverse challenges of mission variants 
within ODO. It will provide answers to whether the JSDF have demonstrated the 
capacity to perform effectively, efficiently, and with quality as national actors 
representing Japan overseas.
st
                                                   
24 JSDF members are designated as ‘special public servants’. There are no military tribunals, or 
courts martial, and personnel cannot be compelled to serve overseas.
25 The Japan Coastguard (JCG) is civilian, as is that of Canada, while the US Coastguard is a branch 
of the military. 
century, Japanese governments increasingly 
regarded the inherent value of ‘showing the flag’ as in itself a matter for celebration, 
often isolated from operational criteria. The most consistent governmental measure of 
utility for JSDF ODO has been the ability to demonstrate loyalty and burden sharing to 
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Japan’s allies. While these standards are related to JSDF performance, they rely only 
upon the ability to adequately complete certain limited tasks and avoid embarrassing 
incidents and casualties. This, however, presumes that the JSDF have been conducting 
operations to non-professional standards, and to a purely domestic audience, which has 
not been the case. JSDF ODO have demonstrated examples of effectiveness, efficiency, 
and operational quality that have been valued by other contingents and nations and are 
worthy of detailed examination. R.J. O’Brien’s models of evaluation shall be adapted 
and applied in this thesis.26
In studies of peacekeeping, conflict resolution theories are often utilised. These are 
of limited application to JSDF operations (concentrating upon infrastructure support 
rather than peacekeeping or peace-making), but elements can be effectively applied, 
such as Morton Deutsch’s analysis of basic peacekeeping skills: building working 
relationships, cultivating group identity, and knowledge of the mission context.27
Other aspects have been, at least partly, within the remit of the JSDF. The JSDF 
These 
skills are rarely taught, and often the JSDF have been ignorant of their existence, 
reflecting the poverty of Japanese doctrinal development. 
Operational experience has demonstrated that despite great progress, there remain 
significant ‘hardware’ and ‘software’ problems within and affecting the JSDF. These 
cannot be limited to a default critique based upon Article 9 of the constitution, as 
important as that is, beyond JSDF control, as are the range of duties they are required to 
conduct, and the degree to which ‘civilian control’ became an inflexible form of 
‘bureaucratic control’, limiting professional military advice. 
                                                   
26 O'Brien, R.J., Police as peacekeepers. 
27 Deutsch, Morton, ‘Subjective Features of Conflict Resolution: Psychological, Social, and Cultural 
Influences’, in Varyrnen, Raimo (ed.), New Directions in Conflict Theory: Conflict Resolution and 
Conflict Transformation (London: Sage, 1991): 26-56.
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remained largely wedded to the concepts of the ‘modern military age’: the notions of an 
industrial military. One criteria of evaluation for JSDF ODO effectiveness is how the 
Forces have been able to adapt to the range of ‘new operations’ characterized as 
Operations Other Than War (OOTW), or Post-Modern Military Operations (PMMO). 
While Rupert Smith has shown how most military forces remain locked in a traditional 
mindset the security challenges for Japan since 1990, together with the nature of the 
JSDF as a professional, well-resourced military, make this Cold War intellectual legacy 
difficult to understand.28
Peacekeeping and other overseas deployment operations have provided the main
operational arena in which the JSDF are required and able to utilise their professional 
capabilities. Whether they can be measured as fit for such tasks, depends upon the forms 
these operations take and the level of urgency required to undertake them. While in the 
public, and large sections of the political community, ‘PKO’ has been seen as a
singularly amorphous blanket term, the reality is a diverse range of missions with varied 
requirements in hardware and software. To measure utility for such operations, the 
Territorial and resource claims, and security tensions in East 
Asia may render a conventional defence continuum appealing, but the regional security 
challenges are not primarily conventional military threats best countered by ‘industrial’ 
forces. There are legitimate questions as to what roles the JSDF realistically envisage 
for themselves other than ODO, and why resources for ODO-supportive ‘hardware’ 
(equipment, logistics) and ‘software’ (doctrine, training) remain so limited compared to 
‘industrial military’ investment? The investments in ‘front heavy’ high-intensity warfare 
forces seem to suggest that conventional considerations continue to dominate in the 
JSDF. 
                                                   
28 Smith, Rupert, The Utility of Force: The Art of War in the Modern World (London: Penguin, 
2006).
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‘PKO’ term requires further examination and definition, as does the degree of 
preparation provided by the JSDF to perform in such operations.
5  Structure
This thesis commences with an examination of the emergence and maturing of the 
JSDF in Chapter Two, their origins and constitutional position. Their political and social 
status will be probed, particularly the general lack of interest in military matters other 
than constitutional terms. Consequently, their Cold War roles will be examined, 
including command, control, and intelligence, defence procurement, and the 
configuration of the Forces into the 1990s. This will provide the context within which 
UNPKO dispatch was considered and how prepared the JSDF were for ODO, and for 
the specific missions selected.
Chapter Three provides a context for peacekeeping in terms of concepts and practice, 
from the nature of operations, the history and variety of definitions, the path towards 
Japanese participation entailing complex mediation of political, social, and legal factors, 
and the political and legal developments of Japanese PKO/ODO. 
Chapter Four examines the three UN PKO deployments undertaken within the subject 
decade, in Cambodia, Mozambique, and the Golan Heights. It details the main 
operational and institutional challenges, and provides preliminary points of analysis 
within the four-point analytical framework.
Chapter Five examines the ‘Non-UN Operations’ integral to Japanese ‘International 
Peace Cooperation’ (IPC) policy: humanitarian assistance, and disaster relief operations, 
with the first JSDF ODO, the MSDF allied support minesweeping mission. While quite 
different to UNPKO, they are presented together in policy as constituting a single bloc. 
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They provide a useful comparative to UNPKO, subject to the same analytical 
framework, and link JDA IPC efforts with broader governmental human security 
approaches. 
Chapter Six provides the main evaluation of JSDF performance. Critical comparisons 
are made of JSDF performance, and a cross-mission examination made of each Force’s 
achievements and weaknesses, as well as more fundamental aspects of the Japanese 
defence establishment, with a particular reference to the four main framework areas: 
mission context, preparation and logistics, performance, and contribution to mission. 
The effectiveness, efficiency, and quality of JSDF contributions will provide constant 
focal points as the main evaluation criteria. 
The final evaluation, in Chapter Seven, will determine whether the JSDF 
demonstrated sufficient effectiveness, efficiency, and quality in ODO to be considered 
as effective international actors, with the additional examination of what such findings 
indicate for Japanese security policy. This final stage shall expand the range of 
consideration from JSDF ODO in the 1990s to encompass broader political and social 
issues, up to the present. It shall examine Japanese military tolerances, the factors of 
normalising and militarising, and the internal and external policy drivers that have led to 
re-evaluations of Japanese strategy and security.
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Chapter 2 The Emergence and Maturing of the JSDF
1 Introduction: Emergence
When analysing the performance of most armed forces it is not usually necessary to 
investigate their founding. The rearmament of the Federal Republic of Germany from 
1955 was controversial, but the controversy did not linger, partly, as Karl Deutsch and 
others indicated, (Western) Germany rearmed within a ‘pluralistic security community’, 
the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO), accommodating both norms of 
armed-defence and peaceful-coexistence.29
The JSDF have often been utilised as reference points in wider political and 
diplomatic issues, and have rarely been analysed in terms of operational effectiveness, 
The JSDF, however, have been controversial 
due to their very existence. Born from para-military forces into a strident 
war-renouncing, anti-militarist culture, JSDF development and deployments overseas 
were affected by controversies concerning their status and legitimacy.
This chapter charts the emergence of the JSDF from the roots of post-war 
demilitarization, Cold War development, and maturation in the 1990s. While the limits 
imposed by the constitution and laws will be examined in Chapter Three, the ethos of 
the Forces, their training, management, leadership, and assigned roles are important for 
understanding ODO performance. Without this understanding it is difficult to evaluate
how the JSDF could behave so differently from other armed forces.
A Status
                                                   
29 Deutsch, Karl W., Burrell, S.A., Kann, R.A., Lee, M. Jr., Lichterman, M., Lindgren, R.E., 
Loewenheim, F.L., and van Wagenen, R.W., Political Community and the North Atlantic Area; 
International Organization in the Light of Historical Experience (Princeton, NJ.:, Princeton 
University Press, 1957).  
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efficiency, and quality. While not officially referred to as a military, they have also not 
been evaluated as such.
The fundamental problems of JSDF status relate to:
1 De facto military status and the imperial legacy.
2 Constitutional status in relation to Article 9.
3 Assigned roles: national defence, civil cooperation, and ‘miscellaneous 
duties’.
The effects of the perceived legacy from the imperial era are pertinent to JSDF ODO. 
The continuity was limited, but most pronounced between the Imperial Japanese Navy 
(IJN) and the MSDF, while the GSDF eventually inherited some Imperial Japanese 
Army (IJA) personnel but little else. Whatever the actual continuity, for many in Japan, 
China, and Korea, JSDF ODO were disturbing phenomena. The principle that Japan 
could repeat previous mistakes, compounded by the failure of Japanese leaders to 
adequately atone for colonial and wartime aggression, and JSDF Cold War military 
growth, characterised by some as ‘remilitarisation’, disturbed many observers.30 China 
perceived this as, in Soeya, Welch, and Wang’s words, “an ominous shift toward its 
nightmare scenario.”31 Reinhard Drifte has described how many Chinese observers have 
noted that even if there is less fear of Japan’s ‘reversion’, there is concern that the US 
and Japan will attempt to ‘contain’ China.32
The JSDF and the ‘peace constitution’, will be considered in detail in Chapter Three.
At this juncture it is sufficient to indicate that while successive Japanese governments 
                                                   
30 Hughes, Christopher W., Japan’s Remilitarisation (Abingdon: IISS/Routledge, 2009).
31 Soeya, Yoshihide, Wang, Jianwei, Welch, David A., ‘A New Look at the US-Japan-China 
Triangle: Toward Building a Stable Framework’, Asian Perspective 27-3 (2003): 177-219, 181.
32 Drifte, Reinhard, Japan’s Security Relations with China since 1989: From balancing to 
bandwagoning? (Abingdon: RoutledgeCurzon, 2003): 38-40, 93-101.
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have interpreted Article 9 as allowing the JSDF it remains a significant limiting factor. 
Constitutional revision has been increasingly touted in the 21st
The roles assigned to the JSDF are clearly linked to the preceding points. Successive
Japanese governments have broadened the ‘legitimate’ roles to be played by the JSDF, 
usually in accordance with the Cabinet Legislative Bureau (CLB), the body responsible 
for providing supposedly independent advice to political leaders.
century, yet with little 
progress.
33
While a Brookings Institute Visiting Fellow (2000), Sugawa Kiyoshi, a current 
Democratic Party of Japan (DPJ) Policy Advisor, presented three rationales concerning 
Japanese attitudes towards the JSDF. “The first being “anchoring the United States in 
the Alliance” (Alliance Supremacists); the second, “international contribution” (the 
Initial 
internal-security roles were expanded to national (and adjacent maritime and aviation) 
defence, and thence to sea-lane security, regional security, and ODO. Gradually, the 
notion of purely national defence was diluted, often within the context of UN
responsibilities.
While US forces in Japan maintained their impressive military presence, the JSDF 
avoided overt ‘militarism.’ ‘Belligerent’ weapons (bombers, aircraft carriers) were 
obviated by ‘defensive defence’ (senshu bouei the minimum for security). The 
incremental ‘militarisation’ or ‘normalisation’ of the JSDF has proved effective in 
circumventing domestic resistance but has not altogether increased confidence in the 
JSDF, nor in their political masters. Investment patterns have also done little to instil 
confidence, being expensive yet failing to provide many capabilities required for 
expanding post-Cold War roles. 
                                                   
33 Samuels, Richard J., Politics, Security Policy, and Japan’s Cabinet Legislation Bureau: Who 
Elected these Guys, Anyway? Japan Policy Research Institute, Working Paper 99 (2004).
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United Nations Believers); and the third, the “maximization of security options” (New 
Realists).” He assessed each concerning JSDF UN peace operations:
Alliance Supremacists: “Japan will be willing to participate in UN 
peacekeeping and peace enforcement operations when the U.S. is ready to get 
involved. When the UN is paralyzed by Security Council disagreement, Japan 
under this rationale would act almost unconditionally with the U.S.”
UN Believers: “Based on a faith in the UN system as a legitimate conflict 
resolution mechanism and a strong aspiration to make a contribution to the UN, 
the international contribution rationale would theoretically push Japan to 
dramatically expand its support for UN operations, both peacekeeping and 
peace enforcement.” 
New Realists: “would support UN peace operations that demand the overt use 
of force to the extent that such operations would address critical Japanese 
national interests.” Some would claim that, “Japan should have the option to 
participate in multilateral military operations even without UN authorization, 
as long as a Japanese vital interest is at stake.”34
While the overt Japanese government position is both ‘UN Believer’ and ‘Alliance 
Supremacist’, this analysis illustrates the issues facing a rational consideration of JSDF 
ODO. Not only are the political-constitutional debates significant, but operational duties 
are often interpreted as signifying something of far greater import than actually stated. 
In considering JSDF ODO almost nothing is accepted at face value, for almost 
everything has a symbolic cultural and/or political aspect. 
                                                   
34 Sugawa, Kiyoshi, Time to Pop the Cork: Three Scenarios to Refine Japanese Use of Force,
Center for Northeast Asian Policy Studies, Working Paper, Brookings Institute (2000) 
(http://www.brook.edu/fp/cnaps/papers/2000_sugawa.htm 12 November 2008).
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B Japan’s Security Status: Post-War to Cold War
The immediate post-war period was essentially one of abdication of security policy. 
During the occupation, however, the US shifted its stance from liberalisation to 
stabilization, and securitisation. The eventual step was independence and the formation 
of the JSDF under US tutelage within its Cold War communist containment strategy.
The Supreme Command Allied Powers (SCAP) assumed Japanese foreign and 
security responsibilities. This limited Japanese roles to host-nation support, and 
(gradually) police administration.35 There was little deviation from SCAP policy other 
than Prime Minister Yoshida Shigeru attempting to balance between the PRC and 
RoC. 36 The new constitution, initially drafted by SCAP, succeeded the Meiji 
constitution in April 1947. It greatly limited Japanese belligerent potential, and was 
generally embraced by Yoshida and his successors. This approach, most often referred 
to as the Yoshida Doctrine, “embracing defeat”, in John Dower’s terms, demonstrated 
both commitment to democracy and an indivisible loyalty to the US.37 As Yoshida 
stated in 1946; “Many recent conflicts have occurred under the guise of self-defense. 
Thus the recognition of self-defense will only invite war.”38
American policy subtly changed during the SCAP-era. The 1947 Truman Doctrine 
and 1948-1949 Berlin Airlift demonstrated the emergence of Cold War and Secretary of 
the Army, Kenneth Royall, in 1948 praised Japan’s military-industrial capacity, and 
                                                   
35 Buckley, Roger, Occupation Diplomacy: Britain, the United States and Japan 1945-1952
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1982); Takemae, Eiji, The Allied Occupation of Japan
(New York: Continuum, 2002 reprint).
36 Hosoya, Chihiro, ‘From the Yoshida Letter to the Nixon Shock’, in Iriye, Akira, and Cohen, 
Warren I. (eds.), The United States and Japan in the Cold War World (Lexington, KY.: The 
University Press of Kentucky, 1989): 21-35.
37 Dower, John, Embracing Defeat: Japan in the Wake of World War 2 (New York: Norton/New 
Press, 1999).
38 House of Representatives, 28 June 1946, quoted in, Nishi, Osamu, The Constitution and the 
National Defense Law System in Japan (Tokyo: Seibundo, 1987): 5.
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suggested it might be utilised by the US.39 In March 1948, George Kennan, US Policy 
Planning Chief and architect of ‘containment’, visited Tokyo, known as the ‘Kennan 
Restoration’ or ‘reverse course’: the change of emphasis from reform, to the utilisation 
of Japan within US strategy.40 1948 witnessed the increased use of Japanese police force 
during the summer of discontent, supported by US troops.41
This assertiveness contrasted with previous SCAP restraint, demobilizing 6,983,000 
personnel, and halving and localising police forces by 1946.42
Foreign Minister Ashida Hitoshi subsequently produced his ‘memorandum’ on 
independence, containing the novel idea of a security agreement whereby Japan 
assumed responsibility for Japanese internal security and the US external security. This 
discussion paper was, as Qingxin Ken Wang stated, “the first express official Japanese 
proposal to ask for an American guarantee of Japan’s security”.
SCAP refused Yoshida’s 
requests for police reform in 1947, but even the first Japan Socialist Party (JSP)-Liberal 
Party government (Katayama Tetsu), appreciated that police reinforcements were 
required.
43
                                                   
39 Takemae, Eiji, The Allied Occupation of Japan: 458.
40 Takemae, Eiji, The Allied Occupation of Japan: 458-462.
41 Hasegawa, Kenji, ‘Anti-Americanism in the early Zengakuren and Japanese Communist Party’, 
Bulletin Paper, Yokohama National University Exchange Student Center Bulletin (Yokohama 
kokuritsu daigaku ryugakusei sentaa kiyou) 12 (2005): 111-131,114. 
42 Weinstein, Martin, Japan’s Postwar Defense Policy, 1947-1968, (New York: Columbia University 
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Takemae, Eiji, The Allied Occupation of Japan: 299.
43 Wang, Qingxin Ken, Hegemonic Cooperation and Conflict: Postwar Japan’s China Policy and
the United States (Westport, CT.: Praeger, 2000): 36.
Robert Eldridge 
highlighted the several scarcely altering versions, and Martin E. Weinstein indicated that 
the memorandum set the basis for the Japan-US Security Alliance, US guarantees for
Japanese security, and Japanese guarantees for internal stability in a ‘mutual security’ 
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arrangement.44
Tsuchiyama Jitsuo has described the Ashida memorandum as recognising the newly 
established norm of Article 9 within the discussion of Japan’s peace treaty.45 Japans
independence and yet dependence “was not only a strategically calculated move but also 
a normatively appropriate option.”46
The conclusion of SCAP was preceded by the September 1951 Security Treaty and 
February 1952 agreement on US bases in Japan, including the US desire that Japan 
would, “increasingly assume responsibility for its own defense…always avoiding 
armament which would be an offensive threat.” Unsurprisingly, the San Francisco peace 
treaty explicitly stated Japanese rights of collective security.
Events from 1948 prompted the emergence of 
another norm, the ‘Yoshida doctrine’ recognising the constitution as a pre-existing norm, 
but not the sole security consideration. Japan’s renunciation of force was no longer 
absolute but conditional, the conditions gradually loosening under US influence.
47
The First Demobilization Ministry abolished the IJA, and the Second Demobilization 
Ministry scrapped the IJN fleet while simultaneously operating over 300 ex-IJN 
minesweepers, later under the Maritime Safety Agency (MSA).
Japan was being recruited 
to a Cold War alliance.
48
                                                   
44 Eldridge, Robert, The Origins of the Bilateral Okinawa Problem: Okinawa in Postwar 
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Postwar Defense Policy: 24-31.
45 Tsuchiyama, Jitsuo, ‘War Renunciation, Article 9, and Security Policy’, in Berger, Thomas U., 
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46 Tsuchiyama, Jitsuo, ‘War Renunciation, Article 9, and Security Policy’: 57.
47 Storry, Richard, A History of Modern Japan (London: Penguin, 1982): 258.
In 1950, the USN 
48 SCAP Directive No. 2 (3 September 1945): Auer, James, E., The Post-War Rearmament of 
Japanese Maritime Forces, 1945-1971 (New York: Praeger, 1973): 42; MacArthur, Douglas, 
(General) and staff, Reports of General MacArthur, MacArthur in Japan: The Occupation Phase, 
Volume I Supplement,
(http://www.history.army.mil/books/wwii/macarthur%20reports/macarthur%20v1%20sup/ch9.htm, 2 
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dispatched MSA armed minesweepers to Korea without consulting the Japanese 
cabinet. 49 Despite Yoshida’s legal misgivings, Japanese ships “manned by the 
hardworking and loyal enemy aliens” greatly contributed to the Inchon landings.50 A
Japanese sailor was killed and MS14 sunk by December 1950.51
A 1947 Police Law, expanded forces under central control, extended during the 
Korean War.
Japan’s first post-war 
ODO demonstrated that the US regarded Japan as a Cold War asset despite Article 9, 
and that Yoshida would accede to US demands, contextualised as securing ‘peace for 
Japan’, with war-renunciation norms providing a fragile barrier to ODO.
52 Colonel Frank Kowalski, SCAP Deputy-Chief of Civil Affairs, was 
tasked with developing a National Police Reserve (NPR), US-trained and equipped,
under nominal Japanese control.53 Despite dissent, it was obvious that politics had been 
drastically altered by the North Korean invasion.54 There was significant confusion over 
what the NPR signified, one founder assuming that it was a constabulary.55 Maeda 
Tetsuo asserts the August 1950 law defines the NPR as “a peacekeeping force that deals 
with civil unrest” under prime ministerial control with limited armament. 56
                                                   
49 Hirama, Yoichi, Japan's Value in the Korean War: Issues Surrounding the Dispatch of 
Minesweepers, The Third Korean-Japan Security Shuttle Paper, (Seoul/Tokyo: The New Asia 
Research Institute/The Okazaki Institute, 1997): 2-23, 3.
 The 
‘peacekeeping force’ (heiwaijitai) expanded into a shadow military for national defence.
50 Auer, James, E., The Post-War Rearmament of Japanese Maritime Forces: 66; Field, James A., Jr., 
History of United States Naval Operations: Korea (Washington DC.: Department of the Navy, 1962) 
(http://www.history.navy.mil/books/field/ch7a.htm, 28 April 2010).
51 Tajiri, Seitsukasa, 1950 Wonsan Special Maritime Safety Memoire (1950nenwonsan 
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MacArthur, Douglas, (General) and staff, Reports of General MacArthur, MacArthur in Japan: 266.
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From 1952 the National Safety Forces (NSF), under a National Safety Board (NSB,
later Agency), and expanded from 75,000 to 110,000 personnel, by 1954 it had acquired 
artillery, aircraft, and tanks (designated ‘special vehicles’: tokubetsu sharyou). The 
Coastal Security Force (CSF Kaijou keibitai), later the Maritime Safety Force (MSF 
Keibitai), received 18 US frigates from 1953.57 The NSF became a small, conventional 
military, under the NSB and Prime Minister’s Office (PMO). It was a brief interlude 
before the founding of the JSDF in 1954, with the JDA (Boueichou), and Defense 
Facilities Administration Agency (DFAA Bouei shisetsuchou), and independent 
National Police Agency (NPA).58
The founding of the JSDF was determined by changing perceptions of the Cold War 
and the US relationship. Based on the 1948 US Senate Vandenberg Resolution, aiding 
allied security efforts, the U.S.-Japan Mutual Defense Assistance (MDA) Agreement of 
8
The three JSDF broke with the imperial past and conformed to US patterns, providing
each Force with a ‘senior service’ partner, most fully realized by the ASDF and MSDF,
the GSDF struggling to establish an equivalent US partnership. The JSDF were closely 
integrated into a Cold War relationship generally subordinate to US security priorities.
C JSDF and Cold War Security Policy 
th March 1954 provided Japan access to MDA.59
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Japan’s position was significantly 
different from that of NATO members which had maintained or re-established military 
capabilities. In Japan, domestic sentiments hindered security reform, with gradual 
revisions side-stepping negative public reaction. Despite Dulles and Robertson’s 
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demands to expand the JSDF to 325,000 personnel, they grew gradually from 110,000 
to 180,000 GSDF personnel, sanctioned as the maximum acceptable to the public and 
minimum to placate the Americans, in an early example of mediation.60However, Tokyo 
offered the requested naval and air forces, and increased civilian staff.61
The National Defense Policy Outline (NDPO) of 20th
(1) To support the activities of the United Nations and promote international 
cooperation, thereby contributing to world peace.
(2) To promote public welfare and enhance the people's love for the country, 
thereby establishing the sound basis for Japan's security.
(3) To incrementally develop the capabilities necessary for self-defence, with 
regard to the nation's resources and prevailing domestic situation.
(4) To deal with external aggression on the basis of the Japan-U.S. security 
arrangements, pending the effective functioning of the United Nations...in 
deterring and repelling such aggression.
May 1957 was the first attempt 
to provide strategic direction for security policy and JSDF roles, largely unchanged for 
40 years, with four (overtly idealistic) key policies:
62
These themes remained constant: stated ‘UN-centricity’, peace norms within security 
policy, gradual expansion of JSDF, and reliance upon the US alliance. The inclusion of 
UN references was a continuation of attempts to ‘sell’ the 1951 Security Treaty to the 
Japanese public, particularly US bases in Japan. The UN-centric references were used, 
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as Yoshida remarked, like “a ‘silk hat’ to dress up this unattractive reality.”63 Reinhard 
Drifte has illustrated how Yoshida used such UN-centric notions to both win domestic 
support and to emphasise the restraints on his government when under US pressure.64
Ann Sherif has illustrated how imperative this became after the Lucky Dragon No.5
(Daigo fukuryou-maru) nuclear-test contamination incident energised ‘peace 
activism’.65 From 1957, the JDA, with few policymaking powers, seconded-officials, 
and rigorous ‘civilian control’, administered rather than governed defence.66
The pattern of the ‘Build-up Phase’ of the JSDF can be seen as continued US 
leadership in strategy. Strategy and priorities were set by the US, and there was little 
support either within the US or Japan for overseas operations in support of the UN. The 
The 1957 Outline clearly united military alliance, JSDF, and international peace and 
cooperation, building upon the 1956 Basic Atomic Energy Law, limiting nuclear power 
to peaceful purposes. This could be viewed as a pragmatic or cynical Yoshida 
demonstration that despite re-armament Japan remained dedicated to pacifist norms. 
This seemingly illogical duality of ‘armed-pacifism’ was the ‘least-worst’ solution for a 
country critically divided, and from 1955 became embedded with Liberal-Democratic 
Party (LDP) administrations opposed by the JSP.㩷
D The Defence Build-up Phase: Cold War and the JSDF
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US regarded them as peripheral, while Japan didn’t develop an independent strategy 
beyond the US alliance. The JSDF during the Cold War, like in NATO militaries, 
became largely embedded in single-scenario alliance missions.
American pressure and encouragement continued for Japan to assume an ever greater 
share of the ‘western’ burden. The US provided substantial resources, initially surplus 
but increasingly new, sophisticated equipment, even funding destroyer construction in 
1957.67 Richard J. Samuels has illustrated how even machine-tools and log-books were 
provided to domestically produce F86F and F104J jet-fighters. 68 The GSDF 
domestically designed tanks and armoured personnel carriers (APC) from 1960.69 The 
emphasis upon domestic production (kokusan) was logical given Japan’s fragile 
economy and exchange rates (until 1966 ¥360/$).70
While each defence build-up plan was significant, there was little sense of a massive 
‘remilitarisation’, as defence budgets remained slight, yet developments were 
remarkable. MSDF tonnage reached 100,000 tonnes in 1961 and 300,000 tonnes by 
1990, with 244 GSDF tanks in 1952, 1000 by 1966, and over 1200 by 1992.
JSDF strengthening would not 
impair the ‘dash for growth.’
71
The JSDF resembled a NATO military for ‘hedgehog’ defence: making invasion 
The 
qualitative improvement was even more noticeable, particularly in aircraft, though with 
consequently reduced quantity.
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prohibitively expensive. However, despite the Guidelines and build-up, the country still 
had, in James Auer’s terms, “a non-policy”, on defence planning and strategy in order to 
avoid domestic conflict, the JSDF being unable to conduct operations, “other than 
perhaps to sweep mines, which there was a capability for before the SDF.”72 Togo 
Kazuhiko has similarly decried the lack of a strategic consideration in Japan, matched 
by a lack of consideration for ODO.73
The tumult prior to the 1960 Japan-United States Treaty of Mutual Peace and 
Security and ‘economy first’ policies excluded overseas operations, but increasing JSDF 
capability and post-Vietnam US force reductions brought increasing pressures. Thus the 
‘Defense and Security Framework’ discussions began, resulting in the 1976 NDPO, and 
1978 ‘Guidelines’. Although based upon a report of the ‘Group to think about defence’ 
(Bouei wo kangaerukai), as Mike Mochizuki noted, the JDA announced, “a force 
structure that pretty much reflected the current levels of the Self-Defense Force” with 
minor reshuffling.74 There was clearly little original thought in Japanese defence, being 
politically, in Kent Calder’s phrase, “an orphan”.75
The MSDF had become critical in USN Pacific policy providing ‘niche capabilities’ 
in minesweeping and anti-submarine warfare (ASW), the Japanese archipelago and 
MSDF ‘gatekeepers’ penning the Soviet Pacific Fleet in Vladivostok.76
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The ASDF 
provided air-superiority, while the GSDF provided the holding force, to repel an 
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unlikely invasion of Hokkaido. All three Forces were de facto supporting arms of the 
US Pacific Fleet.
The roles of the JSDF, increasingly integrated into US strategies, suited their status. 
As Ralf Dahrendorf expounded in the late 1950s, status is often a major factor in 
determining to whom actors see themselves allied and opposed, and the tendency for 
alliances to also breed mutual enmities.77 The JSDF, through emulating and cooperating 
with the US, were able to gain an elevation of status unavailable domestically. Karl 
Deutsch and David Singer illustrated in 1964 that in a multi-polar world, within bipolar 
relationships, there is a “limited attention capability of each nation in the system” so 
that relationships rarely maintain a steady degree of engagement.78
Japan was chided for its US balance of payments surplus, was criticised by the 
Reagan Administration regarding defence budgets at the 1981 US-Japan Security 
Conference, and was called upon to assert an international presence at the Williamsburg
Summit of May 1983.
As with other US 
‘special relationships’ that with Japan experienced fluctuations not always ameliorated 
by military cooperation.
79
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Congressional criticism continued throughout the 1980s, 
extending beyond ‘welcome gaiatsu’, whereby external pressure allows a ministry to 
overcome domestic opposition. As John P. Tuman and Jonathan R. Strand comment, 
“foreign pressure is more likely to succeed in influencing Japanese policy when a key 
ministerial agency – usually Gaimusho – relies on such pressure as a justification for a 
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policy already favoured.” 80 Miyashita Akitoshi has detailed how Japan has paid 
particular attention to US wishes, and how these have been represented in policy.81 This 
gaiatsu had a cumulative effect and may well have contributed to overcoming domestic 
opposition to JSDF ODO. However, Japan’s partial compliance underwhelmed
Washington, and gave Japan little room for manoeuvre during the Gulf War crisis. 
Nishihara Masashi estimated that it would require over a decade to meet US 
expectations under the 1976 NDPO. 82
Expansion of the JSDF was driven by the Cold War, US pressure, increased wealth, 
and political leadership, particularly Nakasone Yasuhiro. The 1970s in Asia included
turmoil in China and Indo-China, US military reductions, and Soviet military 
expansion.
It would actually take a new security 
environment, and new security imperatives for ODO ‘burden sharing.’ 
83 The MSDF developed within the context of increased Soviet Pacific Fleet 
activity, prompting sea-lane defence to 1000 miles from 1982, affecting ASDF 
operations, as did ‘scrambles’ fearing Soviet Backfire bombers. 84 GSDF forces 
concentrated in Hokkaido intended firepower to compensate for manpower shortages.85
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(1983): 180-205, 183.
83 In 1988, the JDA registered 625 incidents of Soviet naval vessels requiring investigation.
National Defense Handbook 1989 (Bouei handobukku Heiseigannenban), (Tokyo: 
Asagumoshinbunsha, 1989): 137-138.
84 Heginbotham, Eric, ‘The Fall and Rise of Navies in East Asia: Military Organizations, Domestic 
Politics, and Grand Strategy’, International Security 27-2 (2002): 86-125, 88; Takeda, Junichi, 
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over-flown by Soviet aircraft: interviews, Mergel, Edward J., Daito Bunka University (USAF, 
Wakkanai, 1971-1973) (2004-2005); Defense of Japan 1982 (Tokyo: Japan Times/JDA, 1982): 6-7.
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While some militaries conducted overseas operations, the JSDF had no such alternative 
operational scenarios, the GSDF being particularly poorly prepared for ODO 
challenges.
2 Maturing: JSDF Configuration and Roles
It is necessary to appreciate JSDF configuration and roles in order to evaluate how
they adapted to and performed in ODO. What major factors drove defence policy, and 
influenced command, control, and intelligence?  How were the forces organised, 
managed, led, and jointly coordinated? Examining these will provide an appreciation of 
the tasks facing military and civilian leaders in JSDF ODO in the 1990s.
A Command, Control, and Intelligence
While the military power of the JSDF grew during the Cold War, the command, 
control, and intelligence capabilities developed more slowly. The normative
anti-militarist demands of ‘civilian control’ limited the scope for the defence community 
to influence its own capabilities and operations.
a  JSDF Command and Control
The JSDF have been subject to restrictive command and control procedures due to 
the overriding need to demonstrate ‘civilian control’. Morris Janowitz defined the 
democratic civilian control as “Military leaders obey the government because they 
accept the basic national and political goals of a democracy”.86
                                                   
86 Janowitz, Morris, Military Institutions and Coercion in the Developing Nations, (Chicago: 
University of Chicago, 1977, Midway reprint 1988): 79.
Civilian control in Japan 
has greatly elevated civilian officials over uniformed servants, with the JDA under the 
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PMO.87 Hikotani Takako suggests that Japanese ‘civilian control’ (bunmin tousei)
compares well with other countries in preventing military dominance of government, 
but poorly in leadership-accountability. She suggests that the weak positions of 
ministers, in relation to political parties and ministries, seriously limits their leadership, 
with collusion between parties and bureaucracy limiting defence transparency.88
The effects have been to marginalise the JSDF in advice on defence policy, with 
conventions and laws providing few opportunities for professional officers to exercise 
initiative (see Chapter Three).89 While successful in preventing ‘militaristic reversion’, 
it has also retarded contingency planning, training, and doctrinal development, and 
resulted in JSDF officers being forced to retire for protocol breaches, such as GSDF 
General Kurisu Hiroomi, Joint Staff Council (JSC tougou bakuryou kaigi) Chairman, in 
1978. 90 The effects were seen in the slow JSDF response to the 1995 Hanshin 
Earthquake, and lack of ODO preparation in 1992.91 However, ASDF Chief of Staff 
Tamogami Toshio’s outspoken comments in 2008 reinforced perceptions for the need 
for strict civilian control. 92
                                                   
87 Sebata, Takao, ‘Is Japan Becoming a “Normal State” in Civil-Military Relations?’, East-West 
Research (Touyou kenkyuu) 20-1 (2008): 195-221.
88 Hikotani, Takako, ‘Civil-Military Relations in Japan: Past, Present, and Future’ (Shibirian 
kontrouru no shourai), The Journal of International Affairs 32-1 (2004): 21-48, 27-29.
89 Yamaguchi, Noboru, ‘Study of the military in politics’ (Seiji ni okeru gunji no kenkyuu), 
Chuuoukouron (August 1991): 158-170.
90 Maeda, Tetsuo, The Hidden Army: 216-219; Olsen, Edward A., U.S.-Japan Strategic Reciprocity: 
A Neo-Internationalist View (Palo Alto, CA.: Hoover Institute, 1985): 86.
Even former Defense Vice-Minister Natsume Haruo 
commented that a “growing number of Japanese have started supporting the SDF after 
seeing their activities overseas” resulting in some JSDF officers becoming “excessively 
91 Maeda, Tetsuo, JSDF and PKO Verification: 175-181; ‘‘Thinking of the Constitution’: incapable 
of function or authority, contingencies and risk management’ (‘kenpou wo kangaeru’ kikikan riyuujin 
isokuou dekinu kinou, kengen), Sankei Shimbun (4 May 1995) 
(http://nippon.zaidan.info/seikabutsu/2002/01257/contents/531.htm, 2 January 2010).
92 ‘ASDF backed essay competition / Top officer called for submissions in contest that saw 
Tamogami lose post’, Yomiuri Shimbun (16 November 2008), 
(http://www.yomiuri.co.jp/dy/national/20081116TDY02310.htm, 29 November 2008).
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self-confident” and “arrogant”.93
The basic policy outline and roles of the JSDF were, from 1957, national defence, 
domestic support, and miscellaneous duties. 94 While the first duty appears 
straightforward, ‘defensive defence’ made certain capabilities controversial. The second 
duty covered disaster relief and police-support role duties. The third category eventually 
covered ODO, sporting, and cultural events. The 1996 NDPO, redefined secondary
duties as “response to large-scale disasters and various other situations”, third-line
duties as “creation of a more stable security environment” without further definition.95
The 1998 defence white paper stated that IPC duties “are characterized as an incidental, 
not a primary, mission of the SDF” and would remain so until the Ministry of Defense 
(MOD) was established in 2007 (see Chapter Three).96
Leadership-accountability problems hindered JSDF command and control. Command 
was exercised by the Prime Minister issuing directives to the DG-JDA, who issued 
orders to the JSDF through his Senior-Vice-Minister for Defense (SVMD bouei fuku 
chouchou). The SVMD’s office (and JDA Internal Bureaux (naibu bukyoku)) gained 
power, with most DG-JDA appointed for a year or less, and the JSC treated merely as an 
adjunct to, rather than command of, the Forces. The failure to prepare for ODO cannot 
be blamed on this system, but it contributed to professional military advice and 
cooperation being marginalised.97
The lack of influence of the JSDF has been aggravated by their separateness, more 
                                                   
93 ‘SDF's rise in '90s behind Tamogami's challenge’, Kyodo News/ The Japan Times (28 November 
2008) (http://search.japantimes.co.jp/cgi-bin/nn20081128f1.html, 29 November 2008).
94
Role of The Ground Self-Defense Force, GSDF/JDA
(http://www.jda.go.jp/jgsdf/message/meaning_e.html, 31 July 2002).
95
Defense of Japan 2002 (Tokyo: Urban Connections/JDA, 2002): 101-103.
96
Defense of Japan 1998 (Tokyo: Japan Times/JDA, 1998): 150.
97 Matsushima, Yusuke, JSDF Seen From the Inside (Uchigawa kara mita jieitai) (Tokyo: 
Gentoushabunko, 2008): 22-23.
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interested in ‘special relationships’ with US services. The JSDF ‘joint approach’ was 
embodied in the JSC, however, the development of individual Forces was prioritised
and only from the 1980s did joint working practices emerge. The Joint Staff College 
(Tougou bakuryou gakkou) established in 1961 continued education beyond the (joint) 
National Defense Academy (NDA), but from the 1980s administrative reforms signified 
a creeping increase of joint considerations.98
The JSC and Joint Staff Office (JSO Tougou bakuryou mukyoku) were established in 
1954, with staff sections (J1-J5).99 The Operational Analysis Office (Bunseki shitsu)
was founded within J5 in 1985, the Research Office (Kenkyuu shitsu) within the Joint 
Staff College in 1988, and two logistics offices (within J4) in 1989. The Defense 
Intelligence Headquarters (DIH: Jouhou honbu) replaced J2 (Intelligence), but not until 
1999 did J3 receive a Command and Coordination operational groups, and (2002) 
Foreign Liaison section, with Foreign Plans and Policy in J5. In late March 2004, the 
Joint Operations and Planning Office (JOPO Tougou bakuryou kanbu) was formed in 
J5.100
Despite this, the OCHA (UN Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs) 
situation report indicated JSDF ‘joint’ problems, and NIDS researchers have also found 
JSDF ‘jointery’ unimpressive, with no effort made to utilise ASDF-MSDF officers in 
GSDF-led ODO until 2003.
The net effect allowed the JSDF develop plan, command, and control its first joint 
operation, the Indonesia disaster-relief dispatch, 2005.
101
                                                   
98
History of Joint Staff, Joint Staff (
Contrary views have been expressed by JSDF members, 
http://www.mod.go.jp/jso/e_history.htm, 12 January 2010).
99 NATO ‘Staff Sections’ are denoted as ‘S’ (staff), or ‘J’ (joint staff): 1, General Affairs 
(accounts/personnel); 2, Intelligence; 3, Operations (exercises/deployments); 4, Logistics; 5, Plans 
and Policy; 6, Command, Control, Communications, Computers (see Appendix Three, p.408).
100
JSO, MOD, (http://www.mod.go.jp/jso/english/e-organization.htm, 12 January 2010).
101
Disaster Relief Activities by Japan Self-Defense Force (JSDF) in Indonesia (Jakarta: Embassy of 
Japan, 23 January 2005), (http://www.id.emb-japan.go.jp/news05_11e.html, 13 August 2007); 
OCHA Situation Report No. 23 Earthquake and Tsunami Indonesia, Maldives, Sri Lanka (2 February 
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and also by Alessio Patalano (King’s College) who has stated that the joint NDA 
provides a unique opportunity for developing working relations.102
Confusion between joint (national) and combined (international) training/operations 
is common, Ebata Keisuke expressing dismay at JSDF officers confusing the terms.
While valid, there 
remains limited JSDF joint training and basing. 
103
USN officers seconded to NIDS have disappointedly noted that the JSDF suffer from
US-like ‘stovepipes’, with services vertically but not laterally connected.104
The first ODO-related Joint Command Post Exercise (Tougou zujou enshuu)
conducted in February 2008. It was innovative for the participants included Japanese 
and overseas, military and civilian, official and NGO, with independent observers 
providing critical comments and suggestions for improvements. 105 This 
military-civil-NGO engagement was proposed by Kusano Atsushi in 1998.106
In ODO, JSDF commanders have been greatly limited by a highly restrictive civilian 
control culture with little notion of professional trust, starkly contrasting with British 
civil-military culture.
Conclusion
107
                                                                                                                                                     
2005) (
This lack of trust entails regular consultations during ODO, 
http://www.undp.org/cpr/disred/documents/tsunami/ocha/sitrep23.pdf , 13 August 2007);
interviews with NIDS researchers, NIDS, Tokyo (July/August 2008).
102 Patalano, Alessio, presentations, From Kaigun to Kaiji: Seapower and National Security in 
Post-Cold War Japan, Aoyama Gakuin University, Tokyo (24 July 2007); Beyond the Alliance’s 
Horizon? Japan’s International Security Engagement, Temple University, Tokyo (2 April 2010).
103 Maeda, Tetsuo, The Hidden Army: 261; Ebata, Keisuke, presentation, Keio University
(November 2001).
104 Conversations with USN officers at NIDS, Tokyo (July 2007); presentation, Rann, David, 
(Colonel, USMC Attaché), Keio University, SFC, (June 2002).
105 Joint Chiefs of Staff, press release, (21 February 2008), 
(http://www.mod.go.jp/jso/press/p20080221.pdf, 29 April 2008); ‘The Progress of Effective Joint 
Investment’, (Tougou unyou no jikkousei no koujou), Innovation 2020, (Tokyo: JGSDF, 2009): 3.
106 Conversations with Kusano Atsushi (2002-2003).
107 See Mulloy, Garren, ‘Swords and Ploughshares: Military-civilian Interface in PKO’, Keio SFC 
Journal 1-1 (2002): 168-193; Mulloy, Garren, ‘A British Way in War and Peace: UK Post-Cold War 
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with the JDA/MOD, the IPCH, local Japanese representatives (Ambassador, 
MoFA/JICA, JDA/MOD), and visiting VIPs, despite contrary UN guidelines. The JSDF 
is not unique in this, but the lack of operational command experience, the inability of 
the JSO to command, lack of planning cells, and the restrictions imposed upon 
commanders greatly complicated ODO in the 1990s.
b  Japanese Intelligence
Intelligence gathering has been a longstanding JSDF weakness, with little intrinsic 
intelligence gathering capability, and limited capacity to utilise US resources compared 
with Britain, Canada, and Australia. The main intelligence gathering bodies are the JDA,
JSDF, the NPA, the MSA, MoFA, and the Ministry of Justice (MoJ), under nominal 
Cabinet Secretariat management. There are no direct equivalents of the British Security 
or Secret Services, and capabilities, particularly human intelligence (HUMINT), have 
been weak. Japan particularly lacks African and the Middle Eastern capabilities, and 
civil resources, such as SOAS and l’Institut du Monde Arabe.108 Japan’s intelligence 
capabilities have been affected by what Kotani Ken has described as “rampant 
sectionalism” within ministries/agencies, and poor information security.109 The value of 
intelligence to ODO has seemingly been little understood and neglected.110
The JDA’s main intelligence division is the Defense Intelligence Headquarters (DIH), 
which reports to the JSC. With 2400 personnel, it is the largest intelligence institution,
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108 Dorril, Stephen, MI6: fifty years of special operations (London: Fourth Estate, 2000): 761.
109 Kotani, Ken, ‘Current State of Intelligence and Intelligence Issues in Japan’, National Institute of 
Defense Studies News 100 (2006), 
(http://www.nids.go.jp/english/publication/briefing/pdf/2006/100.pdf, 15 August 2010): 2.
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with particular signals intelligence (SIGINT) responsibilities. 111 JSDF ‘military 
information gathering’, is to, “gather, sort, and analyze military radio waves…reaching 
Japan from abroad…to obtain information necessary for national defense” with little 
capacity to support ODO, with extreme Japanese sensitivity over intelligence for 
ODO. 112 Martin Rudner has illustrated how, “peace support operations require 
Information and Intelligence capabilities” and that “capabilities for peace support and 
other OOTW missions must relate to operational situations of far greater complexity 
and...ambiguity compared to...traditional combat operations”.113
Outside of the JDA, the Cabinet Office National Public Safety Commission (NPSC 
Kokka koan iinkai), supervises the NPA, and under Prime Minister Nakasone the 
Cabinet Intelligence Research Office (CIRO) (Naikaku jouhou chousa shitsu) was 
established in 1986, with a Director of Cabinet Intelligence (DCI) from 1997. The 
Cabinet Information Center (1996) and Cabinet Satellite Intelligence Center (CSIC 
Naikaku eisei jouhou sentaa) (2001) consolidated the Cabinet Office’s coordination role, 
but despite its many intelligence functions, it cannot effectively manage intelligence,
The 46 JSDF Defense Attachés in 35 countries (2002) pass all intelligence-related
communications through MoFA, with direct JSDF/JDA/MOD communications 
prohibited. Their role is ‘information gathering’, and for ODO their responsibilities
mainly entail building relations with prospective partners.
                                                   
111 ‘US tip-off warned of ‘spy’ ships’, The Daily Yomiuri (27 December 2001): 1; Defense 
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remaining an intelligence consumer, heavily reliant upon MoFA briefings.
Within MoFA the only dedicated intelligence organ is the Intelligence and Analysis 
Bureau, but it is limited to matters not covered by regional or specialist bureaux.114
Since 1952, the Public Security Intelligence Agency (PSIA Kouan chosacho) has 
supported MoJ anti-subversion activities, but has few resources and many duties,
including monitoring international terrorist threats.
MoFA Bureaux hoard intelligence, and there is little overall analysis.
115 PSIA support for the JSDF is 
limited by resources, and has conflicted with the NPA, which shares anti-terrorism roles 
and also has representatives in Japanese embassies providing useful intelligence 
resources.116
The 1969 House of Representatives resolution “Concerning the Principle of the 
Development and Utilization of Space”, like the three non-nuclear principles, came to 
assume a major symbolic importance.
The pattern of non-defence intelligence is diverse efforts with little coordination, and 
jealousy, leading to retention of data within one ministry/agency/bureau. This 
patchwork is also clear in Japanese satellite intelligence. 
117 Definitions of the “peaceful use” encompassed 
“non-military usage of space”.118
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(http://www.jaxa.jp/library/space_law/chapter_1/1-1-1-5_j.html, 14 May 2010).
118 Aoki, Setsuko, Significance of 1969 Diet Resolution on Peaceful Uses of Outer Space in the Era 
of Weaponization (Tekihona uchuu no gunji riyou kettei kijun toshite no kokkaiketsu ginoyuu yousei),
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JSDF were prohibited from acquiring them, and there was no agreement to access US 
material. Suzuki Kazuto has stated the JSDF became starkly aware of their lack of 
capabilities for ODO and monitoring North Korea.119 This resulted in the CSIC, the 
launching of four intelligence satellites (2003-2007), and the partial abandonment of 
‘non-military space principles’ in 2008.120
Despite the obvious central functions of the Cabinet Office and PMO, there is no 
centralized intelligence office, and insufficient use made of gathered intelligence. There 
was, “no system to integrate intelligence collected by each agency/ministry at the PM’s 
Official Residence...and...the Cabinet Secretariat has limited access to such 
information.” 121 The JIC (Joint Intelligence Committee) lacks the checking and
counter-analysis processes of UK JIC, without a permanent staff or specialists found in 
the UK, so that raw data remains unprocessed.122 The British model was found wanting 
in 2003, as system-management had failed, not the structure.123
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intelligence architecture can fail, it prompts questions regarding the effectiveness of 
Japanese systems.
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There are also significant problems in the retention of information, with US AEGIS
files passed to Russian and Chinese sources.124 Yanai Shinsaku, a former intelligence 
officer commented that, “the authorities try to play it down...[because] they will really 
be discredited in the eyes of the Americans.”125
intelligence sharing with Japan contrasts sharply with the increasingly close 
relationships we have enjoyed with our NATO partners in this area. 
…peacekeeping and peacemaking require greater cooperation and integration 
of allied intelligence capabilities…[and] Tokyo has made it clear that existing 
U.S.-Japan intelligence ties do not meet its needs.
Without courts martial or severe civil 
sentences, some fear Japan is regarded as a security liability. Richard L. Armitage stated 
in 2000:
126
Ebata Keisuke has conjectured that Japan faces being excluded from high-level 
intelligence, becoming like Denmark in the Iraq War, receiving only intelligence 
summaries and consequently participating in a war it might have avoided with better 
intelligence access and analytical capabilities.127
Due to civilian control priorities, and mediation between ministries, JSDF 
Conclusion
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command and control systems allowed little of either by uniformed professionals, and 
an intelligence community that contributed little to ODO. The degree to which 
operational capabilities were simply not considered valid might seem extraordinary 
were it not for all the actors in the system having become quite familiar with the 
constraints and limitations within which they have operated. 
B Fundamental Force Posture
Force posture policies have had an enduring effect on the JSDF, fundamentally 
affecting ‘Force culture’ and therefore ability and willingness to conduct ODO. In 1988, 
the JSDF numbered 247,191 (156,216 GSDF, 44,410 MSDF, 46,405 ASDF), 25,000 
below establishment-strength.128 Matching operational requirements with skills was the 
challenge, and without recourse to reservists, as newly established GSDF Ready and 
Volunteer Reserves (1998-2001) could not be deployed overseas, despite including vital 
linguists.129 Female personnel increased to 10,000 by 2002, despite career barriers and 
discrimination, and, in accordance with UN Resolution 1325, JSDF women have 
participated in ODO, in small numbers, from 2002.130 JDA personnel declined to 1994 
(18,043), rising thereafter (23,262: 2007), but civilian support to the JSDF remained 
one-third the proportional establishment of Australia.131
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challenges of matching personnel and equipment with tasks, and overcoming
institutional norms.
a  GSDF
The GSDF have provided most personnel for Japanese ODO, and while with 
hindsight their abilities may seem natural, confidence was not altogether high prior to 
1992. The reasons that interviewees provide are the lack of operational experience and 
Cold War configuration. 
The GSDF has been configured as a conventional army with Infantry, Armour, and 
Artillery, and since the 1990s the Aviation and Chemical Branches (shokushu)
dominating staff ranks.132
Branch 
However, the Quartermaster and Transport Corps have seen 
extensive ODO service.
Table 2.1 GSDF Branches
Japanese
Infantry Futsuuka
Artillery
(Field) Yasentokka
(Air-Defence) Koushatokka
Armour Kikouka
Engineers Shisetsuka
Aviation Koukuuka
Signals Tsushinka
Chemical  Kagakuka
Medical Eiseika
Quartermaster Juhinka
Ordnance Bukika
Transport Yusouka
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Military Police Keimuka
Finance Kaikeika
Bands Ongakuka
Among the five GSDF Regional Armies (Houmentai), the Northern Army (Hokkaido) 
is the largest and best-equipped, and remains the GSDF ‘centre’, partly as its Type-90
main battle tanks (MBT) cannot be easily transported.133 Each Army is tasked to repel 
invasion, provide disaster relief, and supply ODO units on a rotation basis.134
From March 2007, the Central Readiness Force (CRF Chuuou sokuou shuudan) has 
provided a rapid-reaction capability and acted as both ‘force consumer’ and ‘force 
provider’ for ODO. The CRF acts as a broker, requesting Army forces for the MOD and 
International Peace Cooperation Headquarters (IPCH Kokusai Heiwa Kyouryoku 
Jimukyouku), preparing and dispatching them for ODO. The previous rotation system 
prevented the accumulation of ODO ‘lessons-learned’ capabilities, such duties 
considered temporary burdens rather than primary roles. The foundation of the CRF 
provided focus for ODO-related training and a ‘home’ for specialist units, such as 
special and airborne forces, and from 2008 the International Peace Cooperation 
Activities Training Unit (Kukokusai katsudou kyouikutai). 135
The abilities of all of the Armies to provide quality engineering, medical, sanitation, 
water treatment, and other units for ODO is notable, with competence based upon 
domestic disaster relief experience. However, the GSDF and JDA appeared reluctant to 
The CRF is a 
demonstration of the increased attention paid to ODO by the GSDF.
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devote resources to ODO-specific applications, particularly training and doctrinal 
development, and considering GSDF aviation contributions to ODO, perhaps indicating 
that ODO were considered more suitable for low-tech ‘supporting’ rather than high-tech 
‘frontline’ branches.
b  MSDF
The MSDF Districts were reduced from ten to five between 1995 and 2010, greater 
emphasis being placed upon the Naval Aviation, Fleet Escort, and Submarine Forces 
administered through the Self-Defense Fleet, with lesser escorts and minesweepers 
under District control.136 The MSDF adheres to Cold War practice of full flotilla 
anti-submarine warfare (ASW) training.137
Quantitatively escorts have been reduced by approximately 10% since 1995, offset by 
qualitative improvements, and minesweeping reduced from two flotillas to one, while
naval aviation remains remarkably strong.138 For this study, the rise of amphibious and 
expeditionary capabilities were the most significant change in the 1990s, with the 1st
The MSDF training cycle has included overseas training or defence diplomacy 
deployments, interrupted by minesweeping or domestic disaster relief, including island 
support, such as the evacuation of Miyakejima in 2000.
Transport Force (1TF Daiichi yusoutai), Kure, operating (from 1998) the Oosumi-class
amphibious landing vessels, with one at immediate readiness, another in refit, and the 
third working-up.
139
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transport by 1TF, and fast combat-support (AOE) ships detached from ASW flotillas.140
The MSDF ability to support ODO grew after 1998, but from a low base. In 1992 the 
GSDF partly deployed to Cambodia in two MSDF ships, cramped, slow, and 
uncomfortable, yet able to complete the tasks required. The AOE provided highly 
effective support, but was one of only four designated for 62 escorts.141
The ASDF maintains three Air Forces, and a Composite Air Division (Okinawa) 
within the Air Defense Command (ADC Koukuu soutai) which oversees the BADGE 
system of air threat management.
With refits, the 
MSDF would normally have only two such vessels available, constituting a vital yet 
slender resource normally, indicative of MSDF emphasis upon combat forces and 
relative neglect of ‘capability multiplying’ support resources.
c  ASDF
142 Transport forces reside within Air Support 
Command (ASC Koukuu shien shuudan), particularly the 1st Tactical Airlift Group 
(1TAG) based at Komaki (Nagoya).143 While the transport services of the ASDF have 
lesser budget priority, they and the search and rescue forces are the only elements to 
have seen operational deployment. Frustration at being equipped with aircraft ill-suited 
to JSDF ODO was somewhat relieved by the entry into service of the first strategic 
freighter-tanker KC-767 in May 2009.144
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Boeing-747 aircraft operated primarily as VIP transports. The ASC while technically 
adept proved to be an ODO logistics bottleneck.
C Defence Investment
In all countries, defence budgets are difficult to evaluate for efficiency and 
effectiveness. Japan is unique for the political value attached to spending at a certain 
level of GNP, Prime Minister Miki announcing a 1%/GNP ceiling in 1976, partly to 
balance projected defence budget increases.145 This non-legislative ceiling recognized
pacifist norms, illustrated by protests when the Nakasone government increased budgets 
to 1.01%.146
Defence budgeting in Japan has been characterised by John Creighton Campbell as 
detached from security requirements, but dependent upon internal and external 
balancing. Campbell identified ‘budget balancing’ between and within 
ministries/agencies, as a post-war norm, so “that balance is an important value in 
itself”.147
Commentators have suggested that the true defence budget is higher than published, 
particularly if judged by NATO standards. Richard J. Samuels proposed a figure of 2% 
Therefore, budgets have not been based upon need-assessments, but on 
institutional-balancing and mediation. 
                                                   
145 ‘Japan Defense Budget May Exceed Limit’, AP/Los Angeles Times (19 September 1985) 
(http://articles.latimes.com/1985-09-19/news/mn-1823_1, 23 March 2010); Japan changed the base 
of calculations from GNP to GDP in 1993. Japan Almanac 1998 (Tokyo: Asahi Shimbun, 1998): 
80-81.
146 Interview with Jameson, Sam, Tokyo (29 May 2010).
147 Campbell, John Creighton, ‘Japanese Budget Baransu’, in Vogel, Ezra, F. (ed.), Modern 
Japanese Organization and Decision Making (Berkley/Los Angeles: University of California, 1975): 
71-100, 81.
56 
 
of GNP for the late 1980s.148 Chris Hughes has suggested 1.2-1.3% throughout the 
1990s.149 Samuels has included the JCG, “a fourth branch of the Japanese military”, 
while NATO from 2004 has excluded forces not “realistically deployable”.150
The defence budget peaked in 1997 (¥4.94 trillion).
The 
Hughes estimates, with satellite and JCG elements, would appear to provide an 
equitable basis for research.
151 The GSDF spent the lowest 
proportion on equipment, as it struggled to recruit and retain personnel, while the 
MSDF struggled to man equipment. 152 All three Forces also concentrated their
procurement budgets on expensive, conventional combat technologies, mainly kokusan,
even when cost implications have been immense.153
This procurement focus was driven by JSDF commitment to RMA (Revolution in 
Military Affairs) Concepts, and RMA-centered technologies. As the National Institute 
for Defense Studies (NIDS) East Asia Strategic Review 2001 stated, Japanese RMA 
lacked a graduated conflict approach, and wasn’t applied to PKO/ODO, unlike US 
RMA-concepts.154
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ODO-specific training, with little use made of international PKO training 
establishments. 
a  GSDF
Japan produced original armoured vehicle designs, but resources, capabilities, and 
needs have not been well balanced. As Ebata Kensuke commented, Japan developed 
three MBTs (Types-61, 74, and 90) each late, costly, and lacking upgrades, despite the 
importance of upgrading within NATO armoured forces. 155 Modernised Canadian 
Leopard-1 MBTs, were deployed to Afghanistan (2006) in an effective and efficient use 
of ‘legacy’ resources for ODO.156 In 2011, the Type-74 remains un-modernised, while 
the Type-90 cannot be readily transported outside of Hokkaido. 157 Immediate 
land-threats, poor civilian control, and legacy systems do not explain the GSDF 
‘armourization’, nor the relative MBT-obsession and APC- neglect.158
APC proved valuable in ODO for protection and deterrence of ‘spoilers’. However, 
the logistical effort required to transport them has proved beyond many countries, and 
political sensitivities have also affected dispatch.159
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militaries adapted to ‘unconventional’ operations with shrinking budgets and legacy 
materiel. The Type-89 armoured infantry fighting vehicle (AIFV 89shiki soukou 
senntousha) resembles Warrior (UK), which provided a niche asset in Bosnia 
(1992-1995), as “size...and numbers impress.” 160 The Type-89 has not been 
operationally deployed overseas, appearing overly combative, 26.5 tonnes being 
difficult to transport, and tremendously expensive due to drip-feed production.161
The Type-82 six-wheeled armoured command-control vehicle (tsuushinsha) and the 
Type-87 armoured reconnaissance vehicle (ARV teisatsu keikaisha) have been deployed 
overseas despite being large and lacking modern sensors.162 The effective Type-96
eight-wheel APC (sourin soukousha) was deployed to Iraq to support the Light 
Armoured Vehicle (LAV) (keisoudou kidousha).163 The LAV is the culmination of limited 
GSDF APC development for ODO, with 150-200 vehicles per year (2001-2008), each
costing only ¥35 million, 28% of the Type-96, and a third of the US M114, and being 
easily air-portable.164 In a rare case of superior Japanese military design, the LAV was 
praised by allied personnel in Iraq.165
GSDF niche capabilities have been demonstrated by soft-skinned specialist vehicles,
including cranes and bulldozers. Water-purification vehicles developed for domestic 
disaster relief roles have become among the most valued ODO assets, with air-mobile 
‘one piece’ field kitchens, laundries, and water purification trailer-sets.166
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Lt.-General Yamaguchi Noboru commenting on the need to learn from experiences in 
China.167
The GSDF has also retained much equipment that is of dubious value, with a 
reluctance to reduce quantity in order to improve quality. Anti-tank weapons (Type-60)
remained in service despite having no discernible value, while kokusan missiles 
provided high-cost, low-rate replacements.
The 2.5 tonne High Mobility Vehicle (HMV Koukidou kuruma) from 1994 
gave the GSDF a utility vehicle ideal for air-lifted ODO. However, GSDF ODO-related 
investment, although resulting in effective vehicles, appears not to have been a priority.
168 Even the Type-89 5.56mm rifle was too 
expensive for standardisation.169
MSDF investment has concentrated upon the war-fighting Fleet, such as the Kongo
and Atago-class AEGIS destroyers, for conventional and missile defence roles.
b  MSDF
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to avoid the conclusion that combat hull numbers were prioritised over actual 
operational capability.171
Sea-lift was limited until 1998 to the six Atsumi-class and Miura-class LST 
(Landing Ship, Tank), small, with poor sea-keeping and speed, even smaller and less 
capable than the ex-USN Namsemond County (Oosumi) they replaced.172 The MSDF 
Designs Office proposed a 5,500 tonne helicopter-capable LST in 1989, without 
success. 173 The 8,900 tonne Oosumi was ordered in 1993, after the MSDF had
designated it as vital to ODO-support.174 The DDH-16-class, despite a flush flight-deck 
emerged as a combat vessel, with limited transport-support capabilities. The 
Oosumi-class have also been utilised for minesweeping helicopters, and MSDF 
priorities remain unclear.175
ASDF procurement similarly reveals devotion to combat forces, with relatively little 
devoted to ODO requirements. The expensive F-15 and F-2 are respectively 
outstanding and adequate, but despite the end of the Cold War bringing reductions in 
‘scrambles’, there have been few equivalent investment adjustments. The ASDF didn’t 
purchase a new type of large transport aircraft from the 1980s until 2005, from 1990 to 
1996 relying upon a force of 10-12 C-130H aircraft, equivalent to Malaysia or 
Belgium.
c  ASDF
176
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deploy more personnel, and heavier equipment, further, and faster. The ASDF record up 
until 2006 was minimal air-lift investment, relying upon 1TAG determination and 
professionalism to maintain operational support.
d  ODO Strategic Capabilities 
Most countries attempted to acquire greater air/sea-lift capacity to match operational 
deployments in the 1990s, through commercial leasing, capital purchase/leasing, or 
cooperation. Japan undertook little capability augmentation beyond ad hoc commercial
charters, and ordering three Oosumi-class between 1994 and 2000. This failure was 
understandable given the unique nature of ODO in 1992, but considering explicit ODO 
and US Alliance support within the 1994 Higuchi Report, the first to integrate ODO into 
overall security concepts, the neglect is problematic.177
The GSDF made efforts to develop some readily-deployable systems but most 
engineering, medical, and logistical equipment dispatched in the 1990s required heavy 
lift resources. While the Dutch and Canadians could airlift heavy armoured vehicles to 
Afghanistan, Japan could not airlift engineering equipment to Cambodia.178
The MSDF, due to OEF-MIO, ordered two Mashuu-class AOE. Oosumi had been 
the logical (if controversial) development of ODO requirements and equivalent to 
Spanish-Dutch, French, and British vessels.179 The Royal Navy adopted Dutch designs, 
and Roll-on/Roll-off (Ro-Ro) vehicle/container ships, including one built in Japan.180
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Denmark and Germany developed four ‘ARK’ Ro-Ro vessels, while NATO coordinated 
leasing.181 Meanwhile, Japan was forced to lease ferries for GSDF domestic training in 
2010.182
The ASDF did little to augment air-lift, maintaining 16 C-130H by 2000 and the 
Boeing KC-767J transport-tanker aircraft from 2008.183 The Special Airlift Group (SAG
tokubetsu koukuu yusoutai) operates two Boeing-747, mainly for the Imperial family 
and ministers, first dispatched for ODO support in 2003.184 Other countries have 
augmented airlift capabilities, including ‘SALIS’ within NATO.185 Canada compared 
new/used procurement, charters, and multi-lateral/bilateral cooperation. 186 The US 
General Accounting Office (GAO) and the MoD and National Audit Office (NAO) in 
Britain have conducted similar studies.187 Japan has augmented existing capacity, 
‘balancing’ rather than re-evaluating, and ASDF officers have suggested that the 
KC-767J transport-tankers were procured more for F-15 aerial-refuelling capabilities 
than for airlift. 188
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Strategic airlift, sealift and naval logistical support act as vital capability multipliers 
by increasing the range and speed of ODO options, and it is clear that the single Force 
investment priorities have seriously limited Japanese strategic capabilities in this area.
3 Conclusion
The JSDF have matured from emergency para-military forces to become advanced,
professional armed forces, training to high standards, and providing highly effective 
disaster relief. In contrast to fears concerning ‘reversion’, the Forces have conducted 
themselves with discipline and dignity with few civilian control ‘incidents’. The 
constitutionality of the Forces remains doubtful, but few can doubt their professional 
qualities. For an organisation founded in such unpromising circumstances, the JSDF 
have developed beyond most expectations.
There remain doubts, however, over whether the Forces have represented effective or 
efficient capabilities. Despite tremendous defence budgets and limited ODO in the 
1990s, logistics and skills were thinly stretched. Conventional RMA-centric 
procurement policies raise questions concerning strategic and practical considerations
given by JSDF personnel, bureaucrats, and politicians. Despite the only operational 
deployments of JSDF personnel having been ODO and domestic emergencies, much 
‘software’ and ‘hardware’ support for ODO appeared to be lacking. The JSDF emulated 
other militaries in largely ‘making do’ with surplus capacity, while the investments 
required for ODO were relatively minor.
Crucial capability gaps remained in air-lift, sea-lift, doctrine, languages, ‘jointery’,
and intelligence, despite operational experience. From 2007, steps were taken to 
improve training, and the ability to develop and interpret doctrine. The need for such 
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ODO-focused training and doctrine is all the more urgent due to the legal, constitutional, 
and political restrictions within which the JSDF have operated. The development of 
these constraints is the subject of Chapter Three.
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Chapter 3 Background to Japanese deployments: 
PKO, ODO, and Article 9
Introduction
Having considered the founding and development of the JSDF Chapter Two, the legal 
background to Japanese ODO and their political mediation will be considered in this 
chapter. The three main subjects are the nature of multinational operations termed 
‘PKO’, the nature of JSDF ODO relative to these operations, and ODO-related issues 
which required extensive mediation to enable overseas dispatch. Prominent among these 
issues are the Japanese constitution and laws. Many studies have taken the 
constitutional issue to be the central subject for examination, as it has undoubtedly 
loomed large, dominating narratives and norms since 1947.189
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However, this study 
offers an alternative operational analytical narrative, with JSDF ODO as the central 
subject, therefore the constitution will be only one of several factors considered, 
including ODO-related laws. By considering PKO, ODO, the constitution, and laws, as 
well as political mediation, it is hoped that a comprehensive understanding of the 
challenges, limitations, and pressures facing the JSDF in the 1990s may be gained. With 
this understanding it will be possible to fully appreciate and analyse the operational 
performance of JSDF ODO.
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1 The Nature of Peacekeeping: History and Definitions
In considering Japanese Overseas Dispatch Operations it is essential to first consider 
peacekeeping. Japanese deployments regardless of actual configuration or role have 
often been characterized as ‘PKO’.190
There is a range of activities or spectrum which is often referred to as ‘peacekeeping’ 
or ‘PKO’, and differentiating between variants can be problematic. A.B. Fetherston, in 
her pioneering work on theories of peacekeeping, illustrated how attempts at clean, 
sequential, and compartmentalized definitions have not married well with operational 
It is peacekeeping that has become centrally 
associated with JSDF overseas deployments, and it is the development of peacekeeping 
that has been the most radical change in military practice since the Cold War. Although 
much literature utilizes the term ‘PKO’ to refer to various multinational peace 
operations, the operations, and the manner of their conduct, contain such diversity that 
further refinement and definitions are required. There is also a need to understand the 
historical context of missions and how their form and conduct changed during the 
period of this study. The most prominent, largest, and longest JSDF ODO have been 
officially labelled as ‘PKO’, and it must be examined if this label is appropriate, and the 
relative status of ‘operations other than peacekeeping’.
A What is PKO?
a. Definitions
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analyses.191 There have been varied attempts to define the variants of this peacekeeping 
spectrum. The most famous were produced by UN officers. In June 1992, UNSG 
Boutros Boutros-Ghali published An Agenda For Peace.192
There is no single, generally accepted definition of peacekeeping. There is a 
need to develop a common understanding of peacekeeping, proceeding from 
the definitions and concepts of peacekeeping contained in the relevant UN and 
CSCE documents, including the UN Secretary-General’s Agenda for Peace. 
Traditionally, peacekeeping has been used to describe operations based on 
Chapter VI of the UN Charter. Operations similar to those conducted under 
Chapter VI may be carried out under the authority of the CSCE on the basis of 
the 1992 Helsinki Document. Operations based on recent extensions of the 
concept of peacekeeping, aimed at the protection or establishment of peace and 
based on Chapter VII of the UN Charter, have been carried out under the 
authority of the UN Security Council.
Within this plan, five types 
of peacekeeping activity were implicitly described, and four labelled although not 
clearly differentiated. His efforts, while laudable, were essentially an effort to build a 
framework of understanding around the activities that his representatives were 
developing and conducting in the field. Doctrine, policy, and theory were attempting to 
keep pace with practice. 
The UN was not the only institution attempting to understand the nature of 
peacekeeping. The Organisation for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE),
NATO, and Western European Union (WEU), were among the bodies attempting to 
define and plan for peace operations. The NATO North Atlantic Cooperation Council 
(NACC) noted the complexity of the task in what became known as the 1993 Athens 
Report:
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While the vagueness was apparent, the key elements were clear. The UN Charter was 
considered the key underpinning document for peacekeeping. The UN and other 
institutions, such as CSCE, were considered the legitimate providers of PKO 
authorizations, and that the role of NATO and UN members was to provide means by 
which the aims of the UN Charter, the securing of international peace, could be realized. 
It is perhaps surprising that there was so little discussion of the nature of peacekeeping 
considering how dramatically PKO increased at this time. The UN approach to PKO 
was established almost by default, based upon practices of the 1940s and 1950s. As 
PKO ‘existed’, and had become an accepted international security norm, so it was 
picked-up and adapted as an all-purpose tool when complex international security 
problems arose.
However, the definition of peacekeeping operations, rather than norms, remained a 
work of description amidst a process of transformation. The original ‘peacekeeping’ 
configuration had been ‘peace observing’, small contingents of unarmed military 
observers (MOs), evaluating ceasefire and peace treaty compliance. They were not 
primarily military in nature, and have proven the most enduring and least costly and 
controversial operations. The second category became known as ‘classical peacekeeping’ 
and were of the intervention type, composed of armed military units and MOs, intended 
to provide a confidence-building space between conflicting parties where ceasefire 
violations were common, or where fear of reversion to conflict was heightened. As 
William J. Durch commented in 1993, “peacekeeping is a confidence building measure, 
providing a means for nations or factions who are tired of war, but wary of one another, 
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to live in relative peace and eventual comity.”194 Such missions as post-1956 Sinai 
(UNEF), Cyprus (UNFICYP) from the 1960s, and Lebanon (UNIFIL) from the 1970s 
were classical PKO.195
These two forms of peace operation were conducted under Chapter VI of the UN 
Charter, the Chapter devoted to peaceful settlement of international conflicts. Only one 
UNPKO was conducted during the Cold War under Chapter VII, in Congo, 1960-1964, 
and such was the traumatic effect upon the participants and the UN that the practice 
wasn’t repeated, although non-binding resolutions were passed under Chapter VII 
throughout the period.
They did not participate in conflicts, or impose settlements, but 
built confidence through local security and stability until political settlements could be 
realised. That each of the three PKO forces listed remains (in some form) decades after 
establishment is a testament to the continued value of UNPKO, and to the intrinsic 
limitations of PKO conflict resolution.
196 Durch insists that peacekeepers could only use force for 
self-defence, and only in ways that could not irreparably antagonise parties, and with 
the almost total consent of the host nation.197
PKO during the Cold War had been seen in rather limited terms. It was considered to 
be a military operation, even though it was usually controlled by a civilian Special 
Representative of the Secretary-General (SRSG), with significant civilian elements. It 
was a buffer force, and as such was to be neutral to the dispute, only utilizing military 
force in extreme cases, for self-defence. While seemingly simple, the actual events of 
However, increasingly in the 1990s, host 
nation consent became regarded as a desirable rather than an essential quality. 
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PKO throughout the Cold War were far from clear, and the casualties during ‘classical’ 
operations demonstrated how complex they had become before ‘new peacekeeping’ 
emerged in the post-Cold War period.198
Marrack Goulding, a senior UNPKO manager, suggested in 1993 that since 
peacekeeping had expanded by a factor of five, then peacekeeping ‘evolution’ was 
highly inaccurate, referring to the “forced development of peacekeeping”.199 Goulding 
viewed UNPKO as distinctive from ‘allied-coalitions’ by being UN-administered under 
an SRSG, providing “United Nationsness”.200 They were impartial, with host nation 
consent, with volunteer staff, no mechanism for compulsion, and minimal use of force, 
although with an implicit understanding that force could be used to preserve the mission, 
rarely utilised. 
Goulding’s definition of pre-1988 PKO is:
Field operations established by the United Nations, with the consent of the 
parties concerned, to help control and resolve conflicts between them, under 
United Nations command and control, at the expense collectively of the 
member states, and with military and other personnel and equipment provided 
voluntarily by them, acting impartially between the parties and using force to 
the minimum extent necessary. 201
1 Preventive Deployment.
Goulding defines the operations after 1988 as being within six variants:
2 Traditional Peacekeeping (Cyprus).
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3 Implementation of a Comprehensive Settlement (Cambodia).
4 Protection of Humanitarian Supplies (Bosnia 1992).
5 Deployments Where the Institutions of States Have Collapsed (Somalia)
6 Ceasefire Enforcement (Bosnia 1995).202
The August 2000 Report of the Panel on United Nations Peacekeeping Operations, the 
Brahimi Report (panel chairman, Lakhdar Brahimi) identified only three forms of 
peacekeeping activity: Peace Making, Peacekeeping, and Peace Building.203 While the 
Brahimi Report continued much of value regarding mission security, management, and 
communications, problems result from the reduction of defined variants to three 
missions. For Japan, diplomatically, ‘Peacekeeping’ was seen as helpful, treating JSDF 
efforts equally with other nations’, despite being limited capability. However, politically
and operationally, ‘Brahimi PKO’ could be troublesome, as the JSDF were specifically 
barred from conducting most of the tasks, particularly Chapter VII enforcement within 
‘Brahimi Peacekeeping’. The definition was later re-clarified as consisting of ‘complex’ 
and ‘classic’ PKO. The UK was one country that continued to differentiate between the 
concepts of Peacekeeping and Peace Enforcement, with the British parliament 
recognising that forces configured and equipped for PKO would find it highly 
problematic to then perform PEO duties. 204
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Peacekeeping Operations Principles and Guidelines”, referred to as the ‘Capstone 
Doctrine’.205
For these reasons, the Boutros-Ghali definitions, refined in 1995, appear most 
appropriate for analysis of Japanese ‘PKO’:
This ‘multi-dimensional’ term has received common usage, although 
perhaps more for the general descriptive value than for specificity. 
206
Peace operations are conducted by a broad range of personnel. PKO, PSO, and PEO 
Peacemaking (PMO): peace processes.
Peacekeeping (PKO): monitoring ceasefire.
Peace-enforcing (PEO): ensuring compliance.
Peace-supporting (PSO): non-combative support.
Peace-building (PBO): post-conflict civil society support.
Japan’s ‘PKO’ have been explicitly PSO, with infrastructure and supporting services 
to the mission and local populations. The Boutros-Ghali variants will be utilised 
throughout this thesis, with the understanding that these defined variants are neither 
perfect nor exhaustive. The terms ‘peacekeeping’ and ‘PKO’ will be used in their 
generally accepted senses (for various peace operations), and also in the more specific 
sense within the five mission variants. As previously explained, the term ODO will be 
utilised when referring to the entire range of Japanese operations, with PKO and PSO 
for specific forms of operational tasks. ‘Japanese PKO’ is often referred to, but shall be 
accepted as covering a portion of JSDF ODO. Indeed, several JSDF ODO were not 
UNPKO, but bilateral disaster or humanitarian relief activities.
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are usually highly militarised, although (usually) under a civilian SRSG, with civilian 
support. It is clear that John Hillen’s statement that, “”Peacekeeping” is the military 
technique most often associated with UN military operations”, both correctly explains 
the widespread perception, and yet also misleads with the notion that peacekeeping is 
merely a technique and solely military.207
A further element of confusion in the study of JSDF operations has been the 
widespread Japanese use of the term ‘International Peace Cooperation’ (IPC Kokusai 
heiwa kyoryoku), covering a broad range of activities. The frequent references to the 
IPC Law (IPCL), or ‘PKO Law’, are also potentially confusing as the IPCL is actually 
the “
It is a complex and multi-agency policy 
approach, which even when considered solely for its military elements can never be 
defined as a ‘technique’. Peacekeeping requires training and familiarization with a range 
of tasks and approaches, and the ability to ‘swing’ between peace-supporting roles and 
traditional military tasks.
Act on Cooperation for United Nations Peacekeeping Operations and Other 
Operations” (Kokusai rengou heiwa iji katsudou tou ni taisuru kyouryoku ni kansuru 
houritsu).208 The three basic forms of IPC identified by the Japanese government have 
been UN Peacekeeping (civilian policing, military observer, infrastructure and medical 
support, unit security, and military and civilian staff work), International Humanitarian 
Relief Operations (assistance to refugees and victims of conflict), and International 
Election Observation Operations (civilian, staff support, aid-in-kind, transport, technical 
support). 209
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calamities), were enabled by amending the Law Concerning the Dispatch of Japan 
Disaster Relief Teams (JDRT), 1987, allowing JSDF participation in and/or support of 
previously civilian JDRT.210 Since the terrorist attacks of 11th
Peacekeeping has been traced back to the 1038 ‘Peace League of Bourges’, a 
conflict-preventing intervention force based upon normative principles enshrined in 
canonical law.
September 2001, these 
missions have been further supplemented by ad hoc operations not contained within the 
previous definitions. The JSDF dispatch to Iraq, the MSDF Indian Ocean support to 
OEF-MIO, and the MSDF Gulf of Aden anti-piracy mission have been included within 
IPC, but cannot be included within this study due to being outside the target period. This 
thesis considers the three forms of IPC conducted by the JSDF during the 1990s, plus 
the 1991 MSDF minesweeping dispatch, considered in the context of these missions. 
b. History and Basis of Peacekeeping
211 The first modern peacekeepers can be traced to 19th century practice of 
dispatching neutral military observers to ensure treaty compliance, expanded under the 
League of Nations by administering elections and plebiscites, as in the Saar region in 
1935. 212 Usuki Eiichi convincingly argues that the League of Nations Leticia 
Commission, 1933-1934, provided the prototype for UNPKO, with a civilian-directed 
operation assuming control of a disputed area between Peru and Columbia, and 
allowing for a peaceful withdrawal of forces.213
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The first UN peacekeeping missions were established as small observer forces in the 
late 1940s: ‘minimal peacekeeping’ efforts: small, cheap, MO forces, reporting to the 
UN Secretariat. The first established was UNSCOB, UN Special Committee on the 
Balkans, reporting on the Greek Civil War, 1947-1951.214 However, the UN Consular 
Commission in Java received its first MO a month before UNSCOB.215 These were 
followed by UNTSO (UN Truce Supervision Organization) monitoring the ceasefire 
along Israel’s border from 1948, and the UN Military Observer Group in India and 
Pakistan (UNMOGIP) from 1949, setting the standard for minimal peacekeeping, and 
operational today.216
The second stage came with UN looking for a mechanism to extricate the British, 
French, and Israeli militaries from Egypt after their 1956 Suez invasion. Lester Pearson, 
Canada’s Minister of External Affairs, and UNSG Dag Hammarskjold proposed a UN 
Emergency Force (UNEF) of troops separating the militaries and supervising a peaceful 
withdrawal.217
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The details of force membership, codes of conduct, insignia details, 
indeed practically all of the elements that became standardised, were devised in a few 
weeks by Ralph Bunche, UN Under-Secretary for Special Political Affairs, and his 
small staff. Bunche was aware that UNEF would form the basis of a new genre of 
international mission, and that the details would need to be carefully considered and 
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rapidly enacted. 218 The deployment of 6000 troops from 10 countries was 
unprecedented and, “was generally recognized as a remarkable practical success as well 
as a triumph of innovative improvisation.”219 As Brian Urquhart commented, UNEF 
“was the model for all future peacekeeping operations” and only slightly complicated by 
not being within the UN Charter.220 Hammarskjold is said to have joked that it was 
conducted under ‘Chapter Six and a half.’221
With the end of the Cold War operations greatly increased in number, scale, and 
scope. The previous two incarnations were both widely referred to as comprising first 
and second generation peacekeeping, while the consequent operations, despite their 
diversity, have been referred to as ‘third generation’ peacekeeping. The first of these 
‘new age’ UNPKO was in Namibia, as UNTAG (UN Transition Assistance Group), 
established by UNSC Resolution 435 in 1978, had 11 years to organize the, mandates, 
structure, and working practices before assuming its duties in 1989.222 This mission set
the pattern for nation-building, with 4500 troops, and police and civil administration 
managing an election and transfer of authority from the colonial power (South Africa) to 
a newly independent nation. Its success was due to years of preparation, and the SRSG, 
(future Finnish President) Martti Ahtisaari. UNTAG established the principle and 
provided a role model for the multi-faceted third-generation mission. As Perez de 
Cuellar stated, it had demonstrated, “the executive ability of the United Nations in 
successfully managing a complex operation.”223
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Williams have detailed how the mission suffered from poor communications with the 
UN, a troubled military-civilian relationship, and a lack of intelligence, locally and in 
New York.224
Goulding stated about the highly complex PKO in Cambodia, that, “[I]n concept, it 
was the child of UNTAG.”
In both positive and negative ways UNTAG would set the pattern for UN 
‘complex’ peacekeeping throughout the 1990s.
225 The UN Transitional Authority in Cambodia (UNTAC) 
was, however, even more complex. The UN not only developed a parallel 
administration, it also supervised existing government and managed every element of 
elections, from voter registration, including displaced citizens, through to vote 
counting.226
For Japan, it was the litmus test, the watershed. The JSDF deployed to Cambodia and 
demonstrated that they could perform admirably, receive international praise, and return 
to greater public praise than they were dispatched with. That the mission had seemed 
imperilled by resurfacing conflict, that the NPA would never again dispatch police units, 
and that two Japanese were killed was placed to one side. From 1993 to 2002, Japan’s 
government would be looking for ‘UNTAC-like’ operations into which it could insert 
JSDF participation. Interviews with JDA and JSDF personnel are replete with tales of 
MoFA briefings assuring that a proposed mission would be ‘UNTAC-like’, inferring 
A major task in any country, Cambodia had been devastated by war, 
genocide, and invasion. That it did not end in disaster is testament to the hard work of 
the mission personnel and of the Cambodian people. It has never been regarded as an 
outstanding success, unlike Namibia, but it was a relative success. 
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safe, fixed-term, PSO, operating as independent units.227
While Japan was concentrating upon PSO, peace enforcement operations (PEO) 
re-emerged within UN operational practice, without well-developed doctrine or 
substantial operational analysis, indicating significant problems concerning the use of 
force in pursuit of mandated missions. The main catalysts for the re-emergence of PEO 
were events in Bosnia, where UNPROFOR (UN Protection Force) operated amidst civil 
war, Somalia, when UNOSOM II (UN Operation in Somalia) became embroiled in 
factional violence, and Rwanda, where genocide was perpetrated amidst a small, 
classical UNPKO force, UNAMIR (UN Assistance Mission for Rwanda). The 
international community reacted in disparate, contradictory ways, increasing 
UNPROFOR use-of-force (incrementally revised mandates: ‘mandate creep’), including 
air-strikes, and then passing responsibility to a NATO PEO. UNOSOM II was 
transformed from PSO to PKO, then PEO, and subsequently reduced, and withdrawn. 
UNAMIR was deprived of resources by UN members while being chided for not 
preventing genocide, to be replaced by a unilateral French intervention force, and an ad
hoc non-UN humanitarian relief mission.
Despite such re-assurances, no 
such missions were conducted until East Timor in 2002. 
228
The JSDF (and Japanese NGO) operated in parallel to this latter operation, but did 
not directly address the issues raised regarding peacekeeping and the use of force. PEO 
emerged from this period, but not as a new or fully revived mission form, rather as a 
level of escalation available to deal with ‘spoiling’ forces opposing the UN mandate. 
One of the most important aspects of the Brahami Report was this issue of spoilers, and 
the use of force to overcome such obstacles. The issue of use of force is problematic not 
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only due to the sensitivities and legal complications facing states such as Japan, but also 
as the authority for UN peacekeeping has a vague relationship to the UN Charter.
b.1 UN Charter
Chapters VI and VII of the UN Charter deal with conflict management. Chapter VI, 
Article 33 states:
1. The parties to any dispute, the continuance of which is likely to endanger the 
maintenance of international peace and security, shall, first of all, seek a 
solution by negotiation, enquiry, mediation, conciliation, arbitration, judicial 
settlement, resort to regional agencies or arrangements, or other peaceful 
means of their own choice. 
2. The Security Council shall, when it deems necessary, call upon the parties to 
settle their dispute by such means.
Chapter VII, Article 42 states:
… the Security Council … may take such action by air, sea, or land forces as may be 
necessary to maintain or restore international peace and security. Such action may 
include demonstrations, blockade, and other operations by air, sea, or land forces of 
Members of the United Nations.
Most peacekeeping operations have existed in this grey zone between Chapter VI 
and Chapter VII, while authorised under Chapter VI. Many Chapter VII resolutions 
demand compliance without sanctioning the use of force, such as UNSC Resolution 502 
demanding, “an immediate withdrawal of all Argentine forces”, and a negotiated 
settlement to the 1982 Falklands conflict.229
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Many operations have also been undertaken without a UNSC or UN General 
Assembly (UNGA) resolution, including the NATO Kosovo aerial-bombing in 1999, 
and the 2003 invasion of Iraq. These cannot be termed peacekeeping, although PKO 
have been conducted by NATO, the European Union (EU), and the African Union (AU),
as prescribed within Chapter VIII of the UN Charter. PKO provided a means by which 
the international community could tangibly act. It is the flexible mechanism by which 
nation states cooperate to attempt to bring peace to troubled areas, and provides the
security mechanism required to allow conflicting parties to desist. One of the more 
problematic elements within this largely positive picture has naturally been the use of 
force.
b.2 Use of Force
Consent and minimal use of force have been the cornerstones of peacekeeping, but it 
has been a somewhat unhappy relationship between military forces trained for combat 
and the operational demands that they almost never utilise such capabilities. The UN 
Secretariat acknowledged cases where human rights violations had been committed and 
UN forces considered themselves unable to intervene, dissuaded by the leadership and 
institutional culture of the UN. Due to the operational nature of UNFICYP established 
in 1964, there was a very detailed description of use of force ‘in self defence’ by the 
UNSG.230
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their responsibilities as ordered by their commanders.”231 After 1973, when Syrian and 
Israeli forces inflicted casualties among peacekeepers, the UN Secretariat altered the 
standing nature of ‘force protection’ to ‘defence of the mission,’ thus applying the 
standard to all missions. Although Findlay and other observers have noted that there 
was little operational change, there were signs that in missions, certain contingents were 
prepared to act as deterrents to state or non-state spoilers.232
They must have broad political support and a broad base in the world 
community. Force can only be used in self-defense, and therefore our 
peacekeeping operations are lightly-armed. Our peacekeepers must remain 
above the conflict; they must never become part of it.
UN guidelines were clearly 
dependent upon interpretation and application as contingents developed modes of 
operational mediation.
Brian Urquhart, UN Under-Secretary General, described the UN position on the use 
of force in 1987 as being not only minimal in order to ensure consensus, but also as a 
matter of security for the peacekeepers themselves. In 1983, he contrasted UNIFIL in 
Lebanon with the Multinational Force (MNF), which:
is militarily far more powerful...than any UN operation. At this moment it has 
the support of at least three aircraft carriers. But it also has much less flexibility, 
less capacity to act, and is far more vulnerable when things go wrong.
By contrast, he asserted that the principles of UN PKO were relatively simple:
233
Urquhart did not always find such attitudes among his own contingents, such as the 
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French Colonel referring to Lebanese factions as “the enemy”, but the degree to which 
limited use of force became an accepted norm is striking.234 Bellamy, Williams, and 
Griffin have characterized “the ‘holy trinity’ of consent, impartiality and the minimum 
use of force”, as the defining characteristics of what they label ‘traditional 
peacekeeping’.235
One of the reasons why the use of force became such a defining quality for three 
decades was the seminal experience in Congo, 1960-1964. ONUC (UN Operation in the 
Congo) attempted to replicate the inter-state conflict management success of UNEF in 
an intra-state conflict. UN ‘peacekeepers’ employing artillery and bombers against 
separatists was not welcomed by UN members. As General MacKenzie stated, “few 
countries are prepared to sacrifice their sons and daughters on the altar of someone 
else’s human rights.”
While it could initially appear that the increased incidence of PEO 
would have altered the sanctity of this trinity, both UN doctrine and operational practice 
appear to indicate otherwise. The difference is that no longer are these conditions 
considered absolute.
236
The 1990s provided the greatest single challenge to peacekeeping practices and 
doctrine, and use of force was the most problematic issue. There was a seemingly 
contradictory trend both to view the use of force by peacekeepers as an option on an 
inclining scale, while also avoiding deploying contingents to the most dangerous areas, 
Ireland and Sweden found themselves in the unusual position of 
combatants in (relatively) high-intensity combat. From 1964 to 1992, UNPKO would be 
(relatively) quiet and low-risk.
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in a ‘conflict avoiding-coercion considering’ approach. As Aoi Chiyuki has commented,
no longer is the use of armed force seen as a taboo, and consent the constant factor:
…rather, consent is a variable that can affect the level of authority of the PSO. 
Consent is something to be managed and built by a PSO mission through the 
use of credible force and civilian support activities. The principle of no use of 
force (in Bosnia, this was minimum force) gave way to minimum force 
necessary, including coercive force vis-a-vis “spoilers” of peace.237
Bellamy and Williams have similarly classified ‘variable consent’, ‘multi-layered 
consent’, and ‘malleable consent’ within PSO doctrine, whereby fixed lines are avoided 
by dialogue, actions, and multi-level considerations.238
With selective application of force, increased attention has been paid to non-PKO 
experiences in Afghanistan and Iraq, with OOTW and ‘Operations Other Than 
Peacekeeping’ (OOTP) increasingly converging. Hans Binnendijk and Stuart Johnson 
have noted a gap between actual and required stability and reconstruction resources in 
Iraq, Kosovo, and Cambodia, connecting both use of force for security and PSO 
resources for security building.239 These issues of consent, use of force, and military 
operations other than national defence were controversial issues, and contributed to 
uncertainty concerning JSDF ODO in the 1990s.
                                                   
237 Aoi, Chiyuki, Peace Support Operations: Contemporary Challenges and the Role of Japan,
RIPS’ Policy Perspectives 3 (Tokyo: RIPS, 2007).
238 Bellamy, Alex J., and Williams, Paul D., Understanding Peacekeeping, Second edition 
(Cambridge: Polity, 2010): 282.
239 Binnendijk, Hans, and Johnson, Stuart E., (eds.), Transforming for Stabilization and 
Reconstruction Operations (Washington, DC.: National Defense University, 2004).
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2 The Path Towards Japanese Peacekeeping
A Characteristics of Japanese ‘PKO’
Definitions, as previously observed, are vital to an understanding of peace 
operations in a Japanese context. JSDF ‘PKO’, could be most accurately defined as PSO, 
with other elements gradually attached. Even in their mission in Cambodia, the GSDF 
gradually incorporated elements of broader PKO practice, but these have been the 
exceptions. This PSO-centric approach has married well with broader Japanese IPC 
policies and JSDF operations have been noted for their sympathetic work with and for 
people in need, continued into non-UNPKO.
One distinctive aspect of the ‘Japanese way’ is the emphasis upon placing ODO 
within a broader context, as one of the three pillars of human security initiatives: IPC, 
Official Development Assistance (ODA), and international intellectual contribution. 
Japan was one of the leading proponents of human security, defining it as “to protect 
people from critical and pervasive threats to human lives, livelihoods and dignity, and to 
enhance human fulfilment”, emphasizing its posture as a peaceful country with an 
impressive ODA record.240 Since Prime Minister Obuchi Keizo’s 1998 ‘Human Security’ 
speech in Hanoi, Japan has supported the UN Trust Fund on Human Security, proposed 
the UN Commission on Human Security, and integrated such concepts into its ODA 
Charter. 241
                                                   
240
The Trust Fund for Human Security: for the human centered 21
st
century (Tokyo: MOFA: 2009), 
(
The 2003 Charter states that, “the objectives of Japan’s ODA are to 
http://www.mofa.go.jp/policy/human_secu/t_fund21.pdf 8 October 2010); Japanese grant 
assistance for grass-roots human security projects, peaked in project numbers in 2001, and grant 
disbursements in 2005: Grant Assistance for Grass-roots Human Security Projects (Tokyo: MoFA, 
2006), (http://www.mofa.go.jp/POLICY/oda/white/2007/ODA2007/html/box/bx01004.htm, 12 
December 2008).
241
Japan’s Efforts on Peacebuilding: Towards Consolidation of Peace and Nation Building (Tokyo: 
MoFA, 2007) (http://www.mofa.go.jp/policy/un/pko/effort0704.pdf , 12 December 2008): 12-13; 
85 
 
contribute to the peace and development of the international community thereby 
ensuring Japan’s security and prosperity”.242 These aims are essentially equivalent for 
Japanese ODO. Even as Japanese ODA has reduced, as Watanabe Makiko has 
illustrated, the proportion allocated to human security-related efforts has significantly 
increased.243 In this sense, Japan can be seen as ahead of the OECD (Organisation for 
Economic Cooperation) “Whole of Government Approach” (WGA), where, 
“development and military actors are…aware of the fact that short-term, ad hoc
responses in which national and international policies lack coherence and co-ordination 
will not be successful. As a result, the focus has now shifted to improving state-building 
capacities through better joined-up working.”244 This is in keeping with a broad policy 
approach representing Japanese liberal-internationalist values, and is in contrast with 
Canada, which “quietly dropped human security as a central theme of foreign policy” in 
2000.245
Within ‘human security’ the 2005 The Responsibility to Protect, has obvious 
implications for peacekeeping contingents, with all national bodies mandated to prevent 
harm to humanity wherever it may be threatened.246
                                                                                                                                                     
Hoshino, Toshiya, ‘Japan’s Peace and Security and the United Nations’ (Nihon no anzen hoshou to 
kokuren), in Akaneya, Tatsuo, and Ochiai, Koutarou, (eds.), Japan’s Security (Nihon no 
anzenhoshou) (Tokyo: Yuhikaku, 2004): 213-250, 236.
The Responsibility to Protect and 
the development and climate action aims of the High Level Panel on Threats, 
242
Japan’s Official Development Assistance Charter, MoFA (29 August 2003) 
(http://www.mofa.go.jp/policy/oda/reform/revision0308.pdf, 2 December 2008): 1.
243 In 2001, Japan’s human security projects accounted for 2.1% of ODA, and 2004-2005, 9.4%. 
Watanabe, Makiko, ‘Japan’s humanitarian assistance’, Human Practice Network 26 (2004) 
(http://www.odihpn.org/report.asp?id=2617, 12 March 2008).
244
Whole of Government Approach to Fragile States (Paris: OECD, 2006) 
(http://www.oecd.org/dataoecd/15/24/37826256.pdf, 19 June 2010): 17.
245 Hataley, T. S., and Nossal, Kim Richard, ‘The Limits of the Human Security Agenda:
The Case of Canada’s Response to the Timor Crisis’, Global Change, Peace & Security 16-1 (2004): 
5-17, 7. 
246
UN Summit Outcome Document, UN document, A/Res./60 (24 October 2005).
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Challenges, and Change, place PKO actors to the fore of the most radical human 
security initiatives to date.247
Japan’s human security approaches were aided by key UN appointments. In 2001, 
former UNHCR, Ogata Sadako, expressed her view of militaries as essential for 
humanitarian operations, as only they could dispatch resources globally, with heavy 
engineering equipment and logistics support, able to operate in the harshest conditions,
for the cause of human security.
A dilemma facing a contingent commander is to what 
degree he/she is willing to risk the lives of personnel for the protection of others? For 
the JSDF, this is particularly poignant, as contingents operate within tight legal 
restrictions on use of force, and Japan appears to have an exceedingly low threshold for 
casualties, even while pursuing human security.
248 She strongly encouraged JSDF dispatch to Cambodia 
and saw no fundamental contradiction in refugee aid and military involvement. Further 
weight was provided by the appointment of Akashi Yasushi as UNTAC SRSG. Ogata
and Akashi were the highest profile appointments of Japanese nationals to positions of 
responsibility within the UN. Some regarded Akashi as part of a quid pro quo regarding 
dispatch of the JSDF to Cambodia. Marrack Goulding had an alternative view, that 
“Boutros-Ghali had decided to abolish Akashi’s existing post as 
Under-Secretary-General [USG] for disarmament, knew that Japan, as the second 
largest contributor to the budget, must have at least one USG and wanted Japan to play 
a larger role in peacekeeping; so sending Akashi to Cambodia was an obvious move.”249
                                                   
247
Report of the Secretary-General’s High Level Panel on Threats, Challenges, and Change, UN 
Document A/59/565 (2 December 2004) (
This rather contrasts with views in Japan, with one commentator asking if Akashi would 
http://www.un.org/secureworld/, 17 December 2008).
248 Ogata, Sadako, Fridtjof Nansen Memorial Lecture, United Nations University (UNU), Tokyo (12 
December 2001).
249 Goulding, Marrack, Peacemonger: 255.
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be “Cambodia’s MacArthur”.250
The positions granted to Ogata and Akashi, however, cannot be regarded as steps in 
an inevitable process towards JSDF UNPKO and broader ODO. There were many 
commentators and even JSDF personnel who lacked confidence in the capabilities of 
the Forces to conduct these operations. Some commentators have noted that former 
colonial powers have been able to draw upon their imperial experiences and utilize them 
for peacekeeping operations. That Japan in 1992 felt itself unable to do so was perhaps 
inevitable, and there were certainly limited lessons that could be learned from IJA/IJN 
experiences (other than water purification). Kimberly Marten Zisk has conjectured that 
practically only such ex-colonial powers have the ability to conduct full-spectrum 
peacekeeping, for only imperial powers have acquired the military and political skills 
required for complex peace operations.251
Article 9 of the constitution is often seen as a defining point in discussions of JSDF 
ODO and their limitations. It is the oldest extant unaltered constitution, and the only 
The JSDF model is one of learning from 
limited experience, and attempting to execute missions likely to be within the range of 
their capabilities. That Japan has not attempted to become a full-spectrum peacekeeper 
is significant, but does not validate Zisk’s point. It merely illustrates the limitations of 
JSDF practice and aspirations. Among limiting factors, the constitution is one of the 
most conspicuous. 
a. The Constitutional Limits
                                                   
250 Aoki, Junichiro, ‘’The MacArthur of Cambodia’: first impressions of representative Akashi 
Yasushi’ (‘Kanbojia no makkaasaa’ wo kidori hajimeta Akashi Yasushi daihyou), in Jieikan 110 ban 
(ed.), Troop Dispatch Reader: 194-202.
251 Zisk Marten, Kimberly, Enforcing the Peace: Learning From the Imperial Past (New York: 
Columbia University Press, 2004); conversations with author, Tokyo, (November 2002).
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constitution of a major nation which outlaws both belligerence and the possession of 
military forces. This study is not primarily concerned with arguments concerning 
constitutional wording, translation, or interpretation, but such matters have obviously 
been important in shaping views of Japanese ODO.252
As Glenn D. Hook and Gavan McCormack have stated, it is Article 9 “which provides 
the basis for state pacifism”, and for restrictions not explicitly stated in the constitution, 
such as the self-denial of the right of collective security.
Article 9 has been the main spur 
to pacifist norms, as it clearly states that Japan shall not possess a military, which it does, 
by another name: the JSDF.
Aspiring sincerely to an international peace based on justice and order, the 
Japanese people forever renounce war as a sovereign right of the nation and the 
threat or use of force as means of settling international disputes. 
In order to accomplish the aim of the preceding paragraph, land, sea, and air 
forces, as well as other war potential, will never be maintained. The right of 
belligerency of the state will not be recognized.
253
                                                   
252 Inoue, Kyoko, MacArthur’s Japanese Constitution: A Linguistic and Cultural Study of its 
Making (Chicago: University of Chicago, 1991).
253 Hook, Glenn D., and McCormack, Gavan, Japan’s Contested Constitution: documents and 
analysis (London: Routledge, 2001): 8.
What is also clear though is 
that the Japanese people largely accept, if not warmly embrace, the JSDF, and do not 
wish to see them abolished. Although Abe Shinzou became Prime Minister in 2006 with 
a clear revisionist agenda, he was not forced from office on this point. The contrast with 
1993 is stark, when Foreign Minister Watanabe Michio was forced to withdraw 
comments on constitutional revision, and DG-JDA Nakanishi Keisuke was forced to 
resign and retract his earlier comment that, “it is wrong to cling with religious zeal to a 
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document written half a century ago.”254
While the discussion of Article 9 has moved beyond the shadows of taboos, there is 
little zeal for revision. That would seem to indicate that most Japanese recognise the 
contradiction of the JSDF, and that they prefer a contradiction to a battle over 
constitutional revision. As Katahara Eiichi has stated, from the 1980s, Japan 
experienced “the emergence of a greater public consensus on the fundamentals of 
Japan’s security policy- namely its maintenance of the SDF and the Japan-US security 
arrangements” despite widespread respect for Article 9.255 The 2004 Araki Report, and 
many Japanese security policy experts, have emphasised the need to concentrate upon 
policy reform within the bounds of interpretations of the constitution.256
While there are many who regard the revision of the constitution as vital to the future 
success of Japanese ODO, including former Prime Ministers and a leading newspaper, 
there are scholars who consider the issue as peripheral.257 Aoi Chiyuki has stated her 
view of the Five Conditions of PKO participation and Rules of Engagement (ROE) for 
JSDF ODO as being too restrictive for fully effective peacekeeping, but that these could 
be reformed, “within the framework of the present constitution.”258
                                                   
254 Pitman, Joanna, ‘Miyazawa rattled by minister's breach of the military taboo; Japan’, The Times
(19 January 1993): 11; Pitman, Joanna, ‘Fighting talk sinks Japan's embattled defence minister’, The 
Times (3 December 1993): 17; Sanger, David, E., ‘Japan Aide Ousted; He'd Criticized Arms Role’, 
The New York Times (3 December 1993)
(http://www.nytimes.com/1993/12/03/world/japan-aide-ousted-he-d-criticized-arms-role.html?scp=3
5&sq=Japan%20peacekeeping&st=cse, 8 June 2010).
255 Katahara, Eiichi, ‘Japan from Containment to Normalization’, in Alagappa, Muthiah (ed.), 
Coercion and governance: the declining political role of the military in Asia (Palo Alto, CA.: 
Stanford University Press, 2001): 69-91, 70.
256
The Council on Security and Defense Capabilities Report–Japan’s Visions for Future Security 
and Defense Capabilities (The Araki Report) (2004): 52-53; Conversations with Tadokoro, 
Masayuki, Soeya, Yoshihide, and Aoi, Chiyuki.
257 The Yomiuri Shimbun published constitutional revision proposals (1994, 2000, 2004), including 
establishment of armed forces in a revised Article 9 (proposed Article 11): ‘2004 Yomiuri Shimbun 
Proposal for Constitutional Revision’, The Daily Yomiuri (3 May 2004): 14-16.
258 Aoi, Chiyuki, Peace Support Operations.
Many researchers of 
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the National Institute for Defense Studies (NIDS), the JDA/MOD research institute, 
have privately voiced their concerns that constitutional revision is unhelpful, as it 
threatens politicising security policy, and is not an operational priority. Some have 
expressed opinions that constitutional reform for effective ODO is a blind alley. There 
appears to be more concern that legal, rather than constitutional, issues require urgent 
attention, such as a general law on overseas dispatch, replacing ad hoc legal instruments 
for each dispatch, with the attendant delays and impact upon preparations.259
ODO can be seen as a clear demonstration of Japanese burden-sharing and of the 
end of ‘bandwaggoning’ or ‘free riding’. It seemed designed to answer criticisms that 
Japan was willing to join coalitions only as long as Japanese were not at risk. The 
prolonged and troublesome emergence of Japanese overseas dispatch was prompted by 
the Gulf War, when, as US Ambassador Armacost commented, “Japan’s conduct 
distressed its friends and angered its critics”, being labelled by The Economist as “The 
Scrooge of Asia”.
The nature of Article 9 and its normative legacy for Japanese society and policy has 
profoundly influenced politics, law, and the processes of mediation required to enable 
the development of JSDF ODO.
b. Political Development, Utility, and Mediation
260
                                                   
259 Shimura, Hisako, ‘Should Japan participate in UN peacekeeping operations?’ Asia-Pacific 
Review 3-1 (1996): 137-144.
260 Armacost, Michael H., Friends or Rivals: The Insider’s Account of US-Japan Relations (New 
York: Columbia, 1996): 107; ‘The Scrooge of Asia’, The Economist (1 September 1990).
Togo Kazuhiko characterised the events as, “Japan’s defeat in 1991” 
as its closest allies and main oil providers derided the slow and seemingly grudging 
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offers of financial aid and insistence that it could not dispatch troops.261 The critique by 
US Secretary of State Baker that Japan’s “‘checkbook diplomacy,’ like our ‘dollar 
diplomacy’ of an earlier era, is clearly too narrow” concerning the $13 billion 
contribution to the Gulf War allies was keenly felt. 262 It led to efforts to pass a 
peacekeeping-enabling bill avoiding JSDF participation (despite Ozawa Ichiro’s efforts),
that eventually fell with the Kaifu administration, and the feeling was of Japan “falling 
short” of Korean and other contributions of non-combat personnel.263 The 1991 MSDF 
minesweeping dispatch and ODO dispatches from 1992 did much to ameliorate 
criticism. The ultimate political utility towards bilateralism was seen in the deployment 
of JSDF personnel to Iraq, their first complex non-UN PSO-role.264 Despite strong 
domestic opposition to the Iraq dispatch, there was little doubt that the priority was as a 
demonstration of allegiance to the US, by the Cabinet and Prime Minister Koizumi 
personally, rather than specific interests in Iraq. 265
                                                   
261 Togo, Kazuhiko, Japan’s Foreign Policy 1945-2003: 77.
The political development of 
Japanese ODO was prolonged, while the operations demonstrated political utility in 
deflecting criticism of Japan. The degree of mediation required between the conflicting 
influences of domestic opinion, international criticism, and long-standing norms and 
interpretations of Japanese law and the constitution, however, was such that there was 
initially little confidence in success.
262 Weisman, Steven R., ‘Confrontation in the Gulf; Japan Defends Aid in Mideast Effort’ The New 
York Times, (14 September 1990) 
(http://www.nytimes.com/1990/09/14/world/confrontation-in-the-gulf-japan-defends-aid-in-mideast-
effort.html?scp=53&sq=Japan%20peacekeeping&st=cse, 10 December 2009); Friedman, Thomas L., 
‘Baker Asks Japan to Broaden Role’, The New York Times (12 November 1991)
(http://www.nytimes.com/1991/11/12/world/baker-asks-japan-to-broaden-role.html?scp=61&sq=Jap
an%20peacekeeping&st=cse&pagewanted=2, 19 July 2010).
263 Funabashi, Yoichi, ‘Japan and the New World Order’, Foreign Affairs (Winter 1991): 58-74, 58.
264 Shinoda, Tomohito, Koizumi Diplomacy: Japan’s Kantei Approach to Foreign and Defense 
Affairs (Seattle, WA., University of Washington, 2007).
265 Okamoto, Yukio, ‘Toward Reconstruction Aid for Iraq: A Path via the Indian Ocean and the Nile’, 
Gaiko Forum (Summer 2003): 7.
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The ODO undertaken in the 1990s, while tracing their immediate origins to the 
traumatic political consequences of the Gulf War were also part of a much broader and 
longer continuum of Japanese diplomatic efforts. Japan was not simply dragged from a 
position of detached pacifism and presented with an unwarranted and surprising demand 
for military deployments. Japan’s political leaders had agitated to gain acceptance from 
the United Nations during the 1950s, as stated explicitly in the 1951 San Francisco 
peace treaty.266
Japan was first elected a non-permanent member of the UNSC in 1958, serving a 
further five two-year terms before being re-elected in 1992. The period from 1952 until 
1961 was one when Japan’s foreign policy seemed to reach a peak of ‘UN centricity’, 
despite the previously stated pragmatism for invoking UN principles in domestic 
politics. The first issue of Japanese participation in UNPKO arose from a request by 
UNSG Dag Hammarskjold to send 10 JSDF observers to the new UN Observation 
Group in Lebanon (UNOGIL), which Japan had helped establish in 1958. DG-JDA Sato 
Gisen seemed supportive, and suggested personnel could be dispatched for ‘training’ 
under the SDF Law (as with MSDF cruises), but Foreign Minister Fujiyama stated that 
Japan would not consider dispatch without a provision for peacekeeping under Article 3 
of the SDF Law.
Membership from 1956, the year UNEF was deployed, brought the 
immediate issue of participation in UN missions into focus.
267
                                                   
266 “Japan for its part declares its intention to apply for membership in the United Nations and in all 
circumstances to conform to the principles of the Charter of the United Nations”, Treaty of Peace 
with Japan (San Francisco, 8 September 1951), UCLA Center for East Asian Studies 
(
A dispatch-supporting Diet member countered that, “to refuse the 
SDF dispatch to UNOGIL… was to tarnish Japan’s authority as a member of the UN 
and the Security Council. … To join UNOGIL is not for warfare but for peace and for 
http://www.international.ucla.edu/eas/documents/peace1951.htm, 11 April 2010).
267 Henrich, L. William Jr. et al, United Nations Peace-keeping Operations: 9; Pan, Liang, The 
United Nations in Japan’s Foreign and Security Policymaking, 1945-1992 (Cambridge, MA.: 
Harvard University, 2005): 186.
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preventive measures.”268 The Kishi government had stated in 1958 that it hoped for
Japan to increase its status in the world as an honest broker in disputes, and that the UN 
provided an opportunity to demonstrate policy independence from the US.269
The Kishi government feared domestic opposition to JSDF overseas dispatch (even 
unarmed), and saw it as a controversy potentially imperilling more important matters, 
primarily the 1960 US-Japan Security Treaty.
Japan had 
advocated UNOGIL as a newly founded international security norm, asserting its liberal 
credentials as a neutral actor, while also acting as a loyal ally aiding US withdrawal 
from Lebanon. 
270
If the UN police activities are conducted in an ideal form…when a country 
that disrupted order within the UN system is to be punished…and if a unitary 
force under the United Nations is created with the participation of personnel 
dispatched by member states, then [Japan’s participation in such a force] would 
not be an act of a sovereign nation. Also there is the possibility of a peaceful 
police force which does not conduct military activities. These possibilities 
The controversy over UNOGIL led to a 
certain deflation of Japan’s status and ambitions at the UN. This was complicated by the 
1961 “Matsudaira Statement”, when Ambassador to the UN Matsudaira Koto was 
reported to have stated that Japan’s refusal to send observers had compromised his 
position and Japan’s ‘UN centric foreign policy’. This caused a controversy in the Diet 
only resolved by his retraction and apology. CLB Director-General Hayashi Shuzo, 
stated:
                                                   
268 Kozai Shigeru, UN Peacekeeping Operations (Kokuren no heiwa iji katsudou) (Tokyo: 
Yuhikaku, 1991): 485.
269
The Present Condition of Japan’s Foreign Policy (Waga gaikou no kinkyou) (Tokyo: MoFA, 
1958): 8. 
270 Murakami, Tomoaki, ‘The UN Foreign Policy of the Kishi Administration: the Lebanon crisis as 
Japan’s first PKO opportunity’ (Kishi naikaku to kokuren gaikou-PKO gentaiken toshite no Lebanon 
kiki), Journal of International Cooperation Studies (September 2003): 141-163, 155.
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would not pose problems relating to the First Clause of Article 9.271
Therefore, Japan began to distinguish between ‘military elements’ of a UN operation 
that would likely be tasked with duties leading to the potential use of armed force, and 
‘other elements’ unlikely ever to be placed in such positions. PKF and PKO became the 
terms utilised to facilitate potential Japanese participation in PKO, with PKF 
(Peacekeeping Force) the preserve of countries not so legally and morally encumbered 
as Japan concerning the use of force. The obvious problem of differentiating between a 
‘force’ and an ‘operation’ was not addressed, with the terminology continuing into the 
1990s. This perceived need to differentiate between sending forces overseas for 
‘military operations’, and those for ‘peace operations’ led to the use of the term haken,
or dispatch. This neutral term contrasted to hahei, dispatch of soldiers that had become 
associated with the wars in China and the Pacific.272
Japan has taken PKO initiatives and was a founding member of the UNGA ‘Special
Committee on Peacekeeping Operations’ from 18th February 1965.273 When re-elected 
to the UNSC in 1966 MoFA drew up a ‘United Nations Cooperation Bill’ for JSDF 
PKO dispatch, but the prevailing socio-political atmosphere in the wake of the anti-US 
Treaty demonstrations and events in Vietnam made implementation impractical.274
                                                   
271 Tanaka, Akihiko, ‘The Domestic Context: Japanese Politics and UN Peacekeeping’, in Harrison, 
S. Selig, and Nishihara, Masashi, (eds.) UN Peacekeeping: Japanese and American Context 
(Washington DC.: Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 1995): 89-108, 90-91.
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Bouei kenkyuukai (Association of Defense Studies), Japan Defense Agency, Japan Defense 
Force: History and Organization (Boueichou jieitai) (Tokyo: Kayashoubou, New Edition, 1996): 
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This 
false start appeared to indicate the end of initial ODO initiatives. 
273
Comprehensive review of the whole question of peace-keeping operations in all their aspects ,
1330th plenary meeting (18 February 1965)  
(http://daccess-dds-ny.un.org/doc/RESOLUTION/GEN/NR0/211/00/IMG/NR021100.pdf?OpenEle
ment, 28 December 2009).
274 MoFA, Issues Related to UN Peace Cooperation (Kokuren kyoryoku hoan ni tsuite), MoFA, (27 
January 1966), declassified documents.
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The number of MoFA UN Bureau divisions increased thereafter, as Japan became 
more integrated in UN procedures, and made efforts to promote participation in 
international missions short of JSDF dispatch. Prime Minister Sato Eisaku referred to 
such deployments in a potential PKO in South-East Asia in 1969.275 This was part of a 
MoFA UN Bureau effort as part of the grander plan for the reform of the UNSC, with 
Japan beginning to pressure for a permanent seat on the Security Council.276 These 
efforts came to nought as Japan failed to be re-elected to the UNSC. However, there 
were initiatives reported within MoFA to provide civilian electoral observers to 
missions, such as UNTAG, to which Japan eventually dispatched 31 staff, and even a 
proposal to send JSDF officers, ‘temporarily’ on reserve list, as unarmed observers.277
Reinhard Drifte has indicated how the 1960s marked the point from which Japan’s 
‘UN-centric’ foreign policy went into steep decline, displaced by the strengthened 
alliance with the United States and the increasingly significant diplomatic value of 
Japanese economic development aid.278
                                                   
275 ‘Speech of Prime Minister Sato Eisaku at the National Press Club’ (Nashonaru puresu kurabu ni 
okeru Sato Eisaku souri-daijin enzetsu) (11 November 1969), Blue Book (Gaikoseisho) (Tokyo: 
MoFA, 1970): 369-376.
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277 Interview, Policy Advisor, Legislative Office, Cabinet Secretariat, Tokyo (May 2009).
278 Drifte, Reinhard, Japan’s Quest for a Permanent Security Council Seat: 16-18.
Despite this, MoFA continued to press for a 
more pro-active stance in the 1970s, including on PKO. As the nature of UNPKO 
settled into a ‘classical’ pattern and with only three new missions from 1970-1988, there 
were many who saw limited scope for Japanese participation. It was hoped that UN
legitimacy and Japan’s ‘pacifist norms’ would permit a limited reinterpretation of the 
constitution sufficient for JSDF dispatch within the liberal context of UNPKO. This was 
aided by the lessening of anti-military activism after the Vietnam War, and the 
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increasing notion of Japan assuming a world position matching her economy.279 Japan, 
from 1981, proposed initiatives at the UN to improve UN fact-finding capabilities to 
enhance preventive diplomacy capacities.280 Ronald Dore states that the 1985 UN
Group of 18 reform panel was established by Japanese initiative, and both he and 
Watanabe Hirotaka emphasize the importance of Prime Minister Takeshita and MoFA in 
framing Japan’s preventive diplomacy initiatives of 1988.281 A MoFA official in an 
interview with Reinhard Drifte indicated that in 1989 the MoFA UN Bureau Director 
decided that Japanese staff should be sent to every civilian UN electoral mission,
frustrated by a lack of suitable opportunities.282
Murakami Tomoaki, however, has posed the question, “how and why did Japanese 
governments change policy so rapidly, and why when faced with difficult choices did 
they choose UNPKO?”
Despite early enthusiasm, constitutional 
reinterpretation for ODO was shelved awaiting a clear political imperative. The events 
of the Gulf War brought such an imperative.
283
                                                   
279 Observations made by two MoFA diplomats, Fujisawa, Kanagawa, (August 2008).
280
Prevention and removal of threats to peace and of situations which may lead to international 
friction or give rise to a dispute, Working Paper, A/AC.182.L.38, GA (39) Suppl., 33-34, (Repertory 
Supplement 6), III (1979-1984) 
This is a question posed all too infrequently but is worthwhile, 
not least concerning the utility of ODO. UNSC membership was an issue of importance 
to MoFA and certain Prime Ministers, and ameliorating US criticism of Japan was 
another motivation. For the JSDF, international cooperation had long been seen as a 
way to improve skills and status, and cooperation with the US military in particular was 
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always seen as a priority. For all agencies of government, however, there were domestic 
political and social considerations, that the previous purely civilian, mercantilist 
approach had run its course and been found wanting in the new post-Cold War 
environment, including the norms associated with Japanese pacifism. However, the 
option of UNPKO dispatch was first mooted in response to US demands to contribute 
personnel to Operation Desert Shield. There was no direct logical progression from 
participation, even as non-combatants, in desert warfare to UNPKO in Cambodia. JSDF
ODO provided a mediation device offering utility between domestic and foreign 
pressures.
Japanese ODO in the 1990s, like those of Germany, were widely seen as enhancing 
Japanese chances of gaining permanent membership of the UNSC. By demonstrating 
that both nations were willing to challenge domestic political-security norms and 
embrace the burdens of UN membership, it was hoped that participation would 
complement financial largess in gaining permanent membership of a reformed, enlarged 
UNSC.284 As the British Foreign Secretary Douglas Hurd said to Prime Minister 
Miyazawa in 1993, “Any permanent member of the Security Council needs to take a 
full part in UN Peacekeeping Activities.”285 UNSG Boutros-Ghali was reported to have 
stated in December 1993 that Japan needed to increase its efforts to dispatch troops 
overseas if its UNSC membership application were to be well received.286
                                                   
284 Drifte, Reinhard, Japan’s Quest for a Permanent Security Council Seat.
285 ‘UN Accept Macedonia’, The Guardian (8 April 1993): 5. 
286 ‘Weekly Announcement (December 19~25)’ (Shuukan houkoku (12gatsu 19nichi~12gatsu
25nichi)), Asahi Shimbun (27 December 1993): 5.
Interviewees 
in a Nikkei Shimbun article in January 1993, agreed that Japanese plans to revise ODO 
legislation were “in part intended to help Japan's bid to get a permanent seat on the 
United Nations Security Council as Japan's role is growing on the international political 
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scene.”287
This thesis aims to illustrate that while Japan’s armed forces operate under restrictive 
legal structures, as do most armed forces, they have managed to conduct meaningful 
operations. While legal and constitutional concerns have impinged upon operational 
effectiveness, this has been a matter of degrees rather than absolutes, connected with the 
process of mediation. Richard J. Samuels has illustrated how crucial the CLB has been 
in shaping security-related constitutional interpretations, somewhat at loggerheads with 
politicians, indicating the key battle was mediating the interpretation, not the letter of 
the (basic) law, as the most obvious part of the mediation process.
UNPKO was one tangible means of demonstrating Japanese assertiveness on 
the world stage with consequently less emphasis placed on operational performance 
than apparent success.
UNPKO can also be seen as one battle in the domestic struggle over the national 
conscience as overseas dispatch became the ‘proxy battlefield’ for pacifism and 
revisionism, or between supporters of post-war security norms and the proponents of 
new post-Cold War security norms. This struggle was closely tied with constitutional 
controversies, yet the constitution and its revision can be regarded as irrelevant to JSDF 
ODO in the 1990s if the operations conducted (and JSDF) are accepted as having been 
within constitutional boundaries. 
288
                                                   
287 ‘Gov't to review UN peacekeeping law’, Nikkei Shimbun (5 January 1993)
UNPKO as the 
harbinger of constitutional revision is one of many theses. It is not, however, the main 
thrust of this thesis, for the matter of the constitution, while significant, is too often a 
distraction from the primary issue of how Japan can or should contribute to international 
(http://telecom21.nikkei.co.jp/nt21/service/ENGD021/ENGD241?cid=NDJEDB1993010500101029
&madr=TOP&kdt=19930105&dk=8ab2414c&reservedtp=ENGD021g6ir2iik&ftrmode=ENGD031
&hltid=206chh4opa2e0, 7 March 2010).
288 Samuels, Richard J, Politics, Security Policy, and Japan’s Cabinet Legislation Bureau.
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security. 
c. Military Utility, Opportunity, and Distraction
ODO provided the JSDF with additional senses of purpose in the post-Cold War 
period. ODO provide the means to improve institutional and personal skills, both 
military and civil, expose the JSDF to international best-practice, and provide a variety 
of tasks and environmental challenges not possible in domestic training regimes.
ODO have boosted JSDF popularity from a low base, one commentator noting “for 
decades the Self-Defense Forces were considered people who “live under a rock””.289
UNTAC and later missions led to a significant improvement in their profile and public 
opinion ratings in Japan.290 ODO have become legitimising roles for the JSDF, helping 
to establish the legitimacy and utility of the JSDF, and possibly the right of Japan to 
possess a de jure military. The elevation of the JDA to the MOD in January 2007 was 
considered unacceptable 15 years before, and partly justified by the increased 
operational tempo of JSDF ODO. As the 2008 defence white paper stated, “these roles 
[such as] international peace cooperation activities … have increasingly become the 
focus of defense capability.”291
                                                   
289 Green, Michael J., ‘Reviving Japan’s Military’, The Wall Street Journal (15 January 2007), 
(
Furthermore, the MOD status change was directly 
linked with the change of the primary mission statement of the JSDF: “The two major 
steps of making the transition to the MOD and stipulation of international peace 
cooperation activities as the primary mission of the SDF were carried out in order to 
respond more precisely to today’s important challenge of coping with the issues of 
http://online.wsj.com/public/article/SB116881980420076629.html, 17 January 2007).
290
Defense of Japan 1994 (Tokyo: JDA/Japan Times, 1994): 190-195, 264-269.
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Defense of Japan, 2008: 115.
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security and crisis management.”292
Watanabe Takashi, the first contingent commander of the JSDF in Cambodia stated 
“I firmly believe that operations in the field are the most important component in 
PKOs.”293
Some elements of the JSDF have utilised ODO experience to enhance their hardware 
and software capabilities. MSDF proposals for enhanced amphibious vessels were 
rejected, yet an even more capable class was approved in the wake of UNTAC.
His view is that the interface of the JSDF with international military and 
civilian personnel provides a vital professional development experiences. This view has 
been reiterated by a number of JSDF personnel with direct ODO experience, and by 
JDA/MOD civilian staff. 
294
The majority of JSDF personnel interviewed, however, including those who valued 
their own ODO experiences, have noted how many colleagues viewed ODO in the 
1990s as primarily a PR exercise. The overwhelming view was that nothing should be 
seen to go wrong, so that they could return to ‘real’ (national defence) roles. A GSDF 
artillery officer, taken from service in Hokkaido, sent to Cambodia, and then returning 
to Hokkaido, was neither debriefed nor encouraged to consider his experience within a
career development pathway.
The 
GSDF developed APCs more suited to ODO, and were unusually able to rapidly 
procure large numbers, proving successful in operations. 
295
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Defense of Japan, 2008: 114
293 Watanabe, Takashi, The PKO in Cambodia-Lessons Learned: 102.
294 The Oosumi-class. Conversations with Rear-Admiral, MSDF, and Captain, MSDF, Tokyo (3
February 2009).
295 Interview with GSDF Lt.-Colonel, Tokyo (June 2009).
One GSDF armoured specialist serving at the JDA 
summed up his view of ODO as providing a break from regimental duties, but
wondered whether ODO would provoke a down-grading of armoured forces, with 
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subsequent career implications.296
Japanese personnel have been dispatched overseas for operations through four 
mechanisms: ODA legislation, the founding legislation of each ministry (establishment 
laws), disaster relief legislation, and IPC legislation. Only the latter allows for the 
dispatch of formed units and large numbers of personnel, while the ministry 
establishment laws allow only for dispatch of individuals, for specific purposes, limited 
in numbers and periods of time. Establishment laws provide for defence attaché staff 
(bouei chuuzaikan seido) dispatched by the JDA from the 1960s, increasing from 22 in 
1979 to 42 personnel in 32 countries by 1998, and the first UN election monitors by 
MoFA from 1989.
Compared to politicians, it is clear that the view of many JSDF personnel was more 
ambivalent towards ODO in the 1990s. Many worried that ODO could serve as a 
distraction from their main missions, and that the controversy may not be worthwhile.
The Iraq dispatch was often viewed in this light, as public opposition was a significant 
obstacle. Even more notable since the Iraq dispatch has been the reluctance of the 
GSDF to consider further complex ODO without a significant legal review, with a 
general (dispatch) law (ippanhou). This has been commented on by many sources and
seems to be based on both a general dissatisfaction with MoFA security briefings, often 
contradicted by experience, and the fear that Japanese personnel could be embarrassed 
and put at risk by legal restrictions.
d. Political and Legal Development of the IPCL
297
                                                   
296 Interview with GSDF Lt-Colonel, Tokyo (March 2002).
297
Defence Handbook 1989: 443; Defence Handbook 1999: 229; UN Peacekeeping Operations
(Tokyo: MoFA, 2000), (http://www.mofa.go.jp/policy/un/pamph2000_archive/pko.html, 23 August 
2007).
This has also been the basis for the dispatch of JSDF members for 
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training exercises overseas.298
Foreign Minister Aichi Kiichi stated in 1969, that, with reference to South-East Asia 
it was clear that “a simple transfer of peace-keeping responsibilities in Asia from the 
United States to Japan is out of the question.” He continued that “Japanese public 
opinion is simply not prepared for such an undertaking... [and] any ill-conceived 
Japanese military contribution to Asian stability would accomplish little except to 
squander Japan’s security capabilities, and our painstakingly built-up good will in Asian 
countries, as well as domestic support for the Self-Defense Forces.”
The reluctance of the Japanese government to consider 
revising laws to allow for overseas operations is indicative of both the perceived legal 
and constitutional problems and of the scale of socio-political opposition to JSDF 
overseas dispatch during the Cold War. While this study is centred upon operational 
considerations of the JSDF, these must be understood within the context of the 
development of legal instruments by which ODO were enabled, and how these legal 
instruments developed and affected operational performance.
299 The issue was, 
and has continued to be, whether JSDF personnel are appropriate national actors, 
whether they should utilise force, and how that might be legally and constitutionally 
accommodated? This was confirmed by Kudoh Atsuo, CLB Director-General, on 5th
December 1991, could not state, “either to affirm or deny the possibility,” of whether 
JSDF personnel could be dispatched for UN operations.300
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December 1991): 4. Quoted in Yamamoto, Ryo, ‘Legal Issues Concerning Japanese Participation in 
United Nations Peace-Keeping Operations (1991-2003)’, The Japanese Annual of International Law
47 (2004): 136-167, 139.
PM Miyazawa stated in 
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December 1991 that:
UN peace-keeping operations do not aim to restore international peace by 
compulsory means. The participation of the SDF in the operations is not considered 
to involve the use of force. Therefore the dispatch of the SDF abroad on the basis of 
this bill does not entail any constitutional problem.301
The 1954 Resolution of the House of Councillors upon the founding of the JSDF stated 
that, “the dispatch abroad of the SDF should not be put into practice.” PM Miyazawa 
disregarded the Resolution when it was raised during debates in December 1991, 
considering the House could reinterpret any House Resolution, an example of mediation 
through pre-existing norms.302 However, Ogata Sadako has reported that at the 37th
UNGA in 1982, Japan proposed a resolution “to undertake technical studies regarding 
the expansion and strengthening of United Nations peace-keeping functions.”303
Such disharmonies would be intensified after the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait, as the 
pressure upon Japan to contribute to allied efforts intensified, primarily measured in 
Tokyo’s willingness to dispatch Forces. The Bill on Cooperation with United Nations 
Peacekeeping Operations was submitted to the Diet on 16
It 
would seem that the domestic and international tones of Japanese discourse on 
peacekeeping were somewhat at odds.
th
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Minutes of the Plenary Session of the House of Councillors, 122
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Session, 5, (4 December 
1991): 17. Yamamoto, Ryo, ‘Legal Issues Concerning Japanese Participation in United Nations 
Peace-Keeping Operations’: 140.
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Minutes of the Plenary Session, House of Councillors, 19
th
Session, 57, (2 June 1954): 34-35;
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nd
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Peace-Keeping Operations’: 143-144.
303 Ogata, Sadako, ‘Japan's United Nations Policy in the 1980s’, Note verbale (25 June 1982), Asian 
Survey: 1987: 957-972, 957.
October 1990 by the Kaifu 
administration. William Heinrich and Murakami Tomoaki have stated that a MoFA 
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Draft Bill was prepared in the 1960s, but without further progress.304 Under the 1990 
UN Peacekeeping Bill, a 2000 strong Peacekeeping Contingent would have been 
formed (from JSDF personnel as ‘civilian volunteers’) to undertake PKO duties rather 
than the more controversial dispatch of JSDF formed units, although there were many 
politicians who preferred the dispatch of a volunteer force distinct from the JSDF.305
During the Gulf War crisis, MoFA Administrative Vice-Minister Kuriyama Shouichi 
insisted that it would be sufficient to dispatch civilian personnel to UNPKO, while the 
Head of the Treaty Bureau, Yanai Shunji strongly disagreed, and insisted that the only 
satisfactory actors were the JSDF.306 Yamaguchi Jiro contends that Ozawa Ichiro’s 
attempts to force the bill through the Diet, despite significant JSP and even LDP 
opposition, to wake up the “peace-fogged Japanese people”, made matters worse. The 
proposal was withdrawn and Kaifu fell, replaced by the diplomatic Miyazawa.307
Failure to reach agreement with opponents rather than the innate impracticalities of 
the bill led to its downfall, and the eventual passage of the IPCL under the Miyazawa 
administration on 15th
                                                   
304 Heinrich, L. William Jr., et al, United Nations Peace-keeping Operations: 13; Interview, 
Murakami Tomoaki, 2009.
June 1992, despite sustained JSP opposition, including ‘ox-walk’ 
delaying tactics. The IPCL had been relabelled during the passage process, from a 
‘UNPKO’ bill, as the term was considered tainted by the previous failure. Nobuo 
Ishihara, Deputy-chief Cabinet Secretary, announced that the new name would be “Law 
Concerning Cooperation for United Nations Peacekeeping Operations and Other 
305 ‘SDF officers on leave should work in PKO, Ouchi says’, Nikkei Shimbun (13 May 1991) 
(http://telecom21.nikkei.co.jp/nt21/service/ENGD021/ENGD241?cid=NDJEDB1991051300101448
&madr=TOP&kdt=19910513&dk=e57f3c9&reservedtp=ENGD021g6iskv47&ftrmode=ENGD031&
hltid=206chh4opa2e0, 10 March 2010).
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Foreign Policy, Former MoFA Administrative Vice-minister Yanai Shunji (90 nendai no shougen, 
gaikou gekihen, moto gaimushou jimujikan Yanai Shunji) (Tokyo: Asahishimbunsha, 2007): 52-53.
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Operations” in order to have a broader appeal.308
Public opinion during the debate over the Bill reflected the turmoil within political 
circles. The liberal Asahi Shimbun newspaper indicated that 41.6% of those polled 
favoured the bill, whilst 36.9% were opposed, yet that 50.3% found it constitutionally 
problematic.309 In contrast, the pro-deployment Yomiuri Shimbun in response to “How 
should Japan contribute to international security?” found PKO ranked fourth, a mere 
23.9% compared to 60.4% who favoured “personnel for disaster relief and helping 
refugees”.310 A survey of Japanese high school students in May 1992 found that less 
than 19% supported JSDF dispatch with 51% opposed, whereas a March 1993 NHK 
survey of adults found over 40% support, with 33% opposed.311 The fact that the LDP 
managed to retrieve upper-house Diet seats in the July 1992 elections was not 
necessarily indicative of support for the IPCL. However, the ‘piggybacking’ of the IPCL 
with the Disaster Relief Reform Bill, and the ODA Charter of June 1992 (barring aid for 
military use, and considering military exports, environmental, and human rights factors 
for aid disbursement), did provide a liberal context.312
                                                   
308 ‘Japan's U.N. peacekeeping law has name changed’, Nikkei Shimbun (3 July 1992) 
That (retroactive) Diet approval 
would be required placated some opponents. Additionally, the Disaster Relief Law of 
1987 was revised in June 1992 allowing JSDF relief participation at short notice on 
Prime Minister’s orders, ratified or revoked post facto by the Diet. As stated, this 
linkage of Peacekeeping and Disaster Relief (a popular and long-standing function of 
the JSDF) helped emphasize (or exaggerate) the liberal hue of the IPCL. According to 
(http://telecom21.nikkei.co.jp/nt21/service/ENGD021/ENGD241?cid=NDJEDB1992070300101577
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Yanai Shunji, the JDA and JSDF were passive observers of the intense debate, merely 
awaiting orders to dispatch or not.313
The IPCL re-instated the JSDF as the designated representatives, although indirectly, 
as they were assigned during ODO service to the International Peace Cooperation Corps 
(IPCC), with IPCC insignia, somewhat diluted by police and public officials, allaying 
concerns over the militaristic nature of Japan’s efforts.314 The IPCC was administered 
by the IPCH, established by the IPCL within the PMO.315
                                                   
313 Iokibe, Makoto, et al, Witness of the 90s: 57-58.
Despite the new roles and 
responsibilities provided by the IPCL, the Forces would continue to operate within tight 
limitations, some specifically stated, others of a far more complex and ephemeral nature, 
based upon socio-political norms associated with Article 9 of the constitution.
e. Legal Limitations
Article 9 has undoubtedly had a great effect upon the drafting and interpretation of 
ODO-related laws. Fear of being considered to be breaching the spirit of the 
constitution is also an important consideration, and how this has affected JSDF 
operations. This is most apparent when examining the SDF and IPC Laws. 
e.1 SDF Law
The SDF Law has been the basic instrument for governing the JSDF, and stated 
clearly from 1954 to 2007 that the JSDF had three main tasks:
314
International Peace Cooperation Corps
(http://www.pko.go.jp/PKO_E/organization/organization02.html, 6 January 2010).
315 From January 2001, the Prime Minister’s Office merged with the Cabinet Office (naikakufu),
consolidating management of the IPCH and JDA under Prime Ministerial control: Samuels, Richard 
J., Securing Japan: 74.
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1 National Defence
2 Support for the civil power, including law and order support roles
3 Miscellaneous duties.
The third tier responsibilities, including preparing the snow for the Nagano Winter 
Olympics and building Sapporo Ice Festival sculptures was the domicile of Japanese 
ODO until the January 2007 revision.316 This rather indicates the priority it received 
within the cabinet and JDA, but also within elements of the JSDF. There was an implicit 
understanding that the JSDF existed as the smallest possible force to secure national 
defence. This was institutionalised in the approach of the NDPO of 1976, when the 
influential JDA official Kubo Takuya circulated a ‘KB’ paper. Kubo’s KB referred to 
‘kibanteki boueiryoku’, ‘standard defence capability’, as the guiding principle, as 
opposed to the existing ‘shoyo boueiryoku’, ‘required defence capability’. This 
minimalist interpretation was somewhat called into question by defence estimates, but 
was symptomatic of the efforts of LDP Yoshida-wing politicians, such as Sakata 
Michita, DG-JDA 1975-76, and MOF officials who wished to reduce expenditure.317
As the Araki Report stated, “international peace cooperation has been regarded as an 
incidental duty of the SDF, but given the growing importance of such cooperative 
efforts, they should be redefined as one of its primary missions.”318 With the founding 
of the MOD in 2007, the government simultaneously mainstreamed ODO as a JSDF 
“primary role”, although the tangible change was less dramatic as national defence 
remained a “primary mission” while ODO, contingency missions, and civil-support 
roles were collectively termed “secondary missions”, within the “primary role”.319
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Prime Minister Abe stated: “While adhering to the principles of the Constitution, 
Japanese will no longer shy away from carrying out overseas activities involving the 
SDF, if it is for the sake of international peace and stability.”320 However, the 2008 
defence white paper stated that MOD status, “does not assign new missions to the SDF 
nor does it alter the nature... of SDF activities”.321
JSDF IPCL roles are stipulated under Chapter 8 of the SDF Law governing 
miscellaneous duties.
e.2 IPC Law
322 The IPCL is an umbrella enabling instrument, not a ‘general 
law’. Diet approval is required for each IPCL dispatch and mission-renewal after two 
years. 323 Furthermore, conditions for Japanese ODO have been highly restrictive, 
expressing political caution, desire for civilian control, and the need to avoid casualties. 
The government strongly differentiated between Hontai gyomu, ‘main body’ PKF, and 
Kohochiiki shien, ‘rear-area support’: PSO. The IPCL, therefore, provides specific tasks 
that may be conducted, drafted with little reference to JSDF professionals. There are 
five ‘principles’ or ‘conditions’ that must be met, the ‘Five Conditions for PKO 
Participation’ (PKO sanka gogensoku):324
4 Self-Defence (minimal force)
1 Ceasefire (peace process with ceasefire)
2 Consent (host nation and parties’ agreement)
3 Impartiality (neutral mission-stance)
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5 Suspension and termination ( if conditions breached)
While the ‘Five Conditions’ can be considered limiting, UNHCR Ogata Sadako stated 
during the UNTAC dispatch that she did not consider the JSDF’s work to have been 
affected by them.325
6 Assisting prisoner-of-war exchange
The ‘frozen activities’ precluded JSDF personnel from participating 
in ‘core peacekeeping tasks’: 
1 Disarmament processes 
2 Collection, storage, or disposal of weapons
3 Stationing and patrolling in buffer zones 
4 Inspection or monitoring of weapon imports/exports
5 Designation of ceasefire or other conflict boundary lines 
326
In themselves seemingly innocuous to experienced peacekeepers, they were 
considered too closely linked to combat and thus potentially drawing the JSDF into 
belligerency. The Japanese government position was that JSDF personnel assigned to 
PKF could carry out “PKF Logistics Support” but not “Assignments for core units of 
PKF” until the core activities were ‘unfrozen’ in 2001.327 The 1992 IPCL stated that the 
PKF core activities would require that “these assignments are separately prescribed in 
law.” 328
The frozen duties were proscribed activities, not conducted by the JSDF, and as such 
It was clear that the JSDF were to be specifically prevented from conducting 
any duties not explicitly listed in statutory instruments, as an overseas extension of 
‘civilian control’.
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not unique in ODO. German and Italian troops may not be used in law-enforcement 
duties, such as crowd control, while British troops may not use firearms in defending 
property.329 However, the JSDF were restricted by the extremely detailed provisions of 
the IPCL stating which tasks they could undertake, certain tasks being solely civilian, 
others ‘frozen’. Hirano Ryuichi refers to the “Pojiristo” and “Negaristo”: the ‘positive’ 
and ‘negative list’ activities limiting ODO.330
                                                   
329 Mulloy, Garren, Adapting Militaries to Peacekeeping and Policing Roles: The Effects of 
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to sono kadai), Overseas Affairs (Kaigaikotojou) (May 2009): 18-36, 28.
“‘International Peace Cooperation Assignments’ shall mean the following 
tasks…conducted Overseas:
(a) Monitoring the observance of cessation of armed conflict or the implementation 
of relocation, withdrawal or demobilization of armed forces as agreed upon among 
the Parties to Armed Conflict;
(b) Stationing and patrol in buffer zones and other areas demarcated for preventing 
the occurrence of armed conflict;
(c) Inspection or identification of weapons and/or their parts carried in or out by 
vehicle, by other means of transportation, or by passersby;
(d) Collection, storage or disposal of abandoned weapons and/or their parts;
(e) Assistance in the designation of cease-fire lines or any other similar boundaries 
by the Parties to Armed Conflict;
(f) Assistance in the exchange of prisoners-of-war among the Parties to Armed 
Conflict;
(g) Observation or management of fair execution of congressional elections, 
plebiscites or any other similar election or voting events;
(h) Provision of advice or guidance and supervision related to police administrative 
matters;
(i) Provision of advice or guidance related to administrative matters not covered by 
(h) above;
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(j) Medical care including sanitation measures;
(k) Search or rescue of Afflicted People or assistance in their repatriation;
(l) Distribution of food, clothing, medical supplies and other daily necessities to 
Afflicted People;
(m) Installation of facilities or equipment to accommodate Afflicted People;
(n) Measures for the repair or maintenance of facilities or equipment damaged by 
Conflicts, which are necessary for the daily life of Afflicted People;
(o) Measures for the restoration of natural environment subjected to pollution and 
other damage by Conflicts;
(p) Transportation, storage or reserve, communication, construction, or installation, 
inspection or repair of machines and apparatus in addition to what is listed in (a) to 
(o) above.
(q) Other tasks similar to those listed in (a) to (p) above, as specified by a Cabinet 
Order.331
One of the most contentious issues, the issuing and use of weapons by the JSDF was 
strictly limited in the IPCL. Weapons were to be issued only by the IPCH (borrowed 
from the JSDF, while in practice the JSDF managed them) and in a highly restrictive 
manner.
Duties (a)-(f) were ‘frozen’, (g)-(i) were civilian, and (j)-(p) were JSDF ODO
including International Humanitarian Relief, while (q) provided a catch-all exception, 
utilised during UNTAC.
332
…may use such small arms and light weapons within the limits judged reasonably 
necessary according to the circumstances, when reasonable grounds are found for 
the unavoidable necessity to protect the lives or bodies of themselves, [or] other 
Article 24 of the IPCL provided for weapons to be stored, and if issued, their 
use would be under the control of each JSDF member, not superiors. JSDF unit 
members:
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Corps Personnel who are with them on the scene.333
Following IPCL passage and SDF Law revision there was something of a hiatus. 
Revision of the IPCL was due in 1995, but delayed until the 1998 revision allowed local 
commanders to authorise use of force. As the 1998 white paper stated, “it is expected 
that members of the SDF contingents will be relieved of their psychological burden 
which was felt under the previous provisions.”
Force could only be utilised to the minimum degree required to ensure self-defence, 
under Articles 36-37, 1907 Penal Code. While all military forces are subject to 
restrictions on the use of small arms the Japanese rules of 1992 were not only strict, but 
contradicted the basic premise of armed forces: officers and NCOs providing direction 
and orders. JSDF senior officers insist that they have no Rules of Engagement (ROE), 
merely (confidential) guidelines, but interviews have revealed that beyond restrictions 
was the fear of being considered in violation of rules, and the stigma of being the first 
Japanese to use force. The IPCL prohibited ‘defence of the mission’ activities, under 
UN ROE.
334 This provided a more manageable 
system, and JSDF cooperation was also permitted for election monitoring activities, 
allowing the Law to catch up with UNTAC operational practice in 1993. A more radical 
revision was permission for JSDF humanitarian missions without requiring 
confirmation of a ceasefire.335
Discussions began for the ‘unfreezing’ of duties after UNTAC yet most senior civil 
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Act on Cooperation for United Nations Peacekeeping Operations and Other Operations: 12.
334
Defense of Japan 1998: 150.
335 ‘Japan's Diet To Approve Revisions To PKO Law’, Nikkei Shimbun (4 June 1998) 
(http://telecom21.nikkei.co.jp/nt21/service/ENGD021/ENGD241?cid=NDJEDB1998060400101471
&madr=TOP&kdt=19980604&dk=7ad121aa&nhpjnl=&reservedtp=ENGD025g6istatw&ftrmode=E
NGD031&hltid=206chh68apmvc, 10 March 2010).
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servants and politicians were opposed. Prime Minister Obuchi Keizou, speaking before 
a House of Representatives Committee in December 1998, acknowledged that the 
reform of the IPCL and the unfreezing of the ‘frozen’ activities would not be prevented 
by constitutional or other issues.336 Hatoyama Yukio, Acting DPJ Secretary-General, 
added that the issue of frozen activities required an overall revision of security policies. 
In January 1999, DPJ policy chief Itou Hidenari began discussions on security policy 
reform. 337 The duties were not eventually ‘unfrozen’ until November 2001, with 
opposition DPJ support, indicating the changes in security norms during the 1990s.338
While the events of 9/11 injected a degree of pragmatism into reconsidering the IPCL, 
there was emerging consensus before September 2001, with JSDF ODO performance 
enhancement and raising national profile cited as important factors.339 This was also the 
case with revision of the ‘Law on Working Conditions of Defense Agency Officials 
Dispatched to International Organizations’ in November 2001, with one GSDF officer 
dispatched to the UNDPKO Military Planning Section.340
Shinoda Tomohito has stated that, “a legal framework has been slowly but surely 
established and strengthened since the 1990s, with the 1992 International Peace 
                                                   
336 ‘The Issue of PKF Main Force Frozen Duties: the statement of position and opinions of various 
parties’ (Iwayuru PKF hontaigyoumu no touketsu kaijo no mondai ni tsukimashite wa...samazamana 
tachibakara no goiken ga shimesarete oruko to moshouchi wo itashite orimasu); Minutes of the 
144th Meeting of the Special Committee on Fiscal Structural Reform of the House of Representatives, 
5 (Dai 144kai Shuugiin zaisei kouzou kaikaku ni kansuru tokubetsu iinkaikai giroku dai5gou) (8
December 1998): 7.
337 ‘PKF Frozen Activities, Hatoyama looking positive’ (PKF touketsu kaijo,Yushi ga maemuki),
Nikkei Shimbun (9 January 1999): 2.
338 ‘DPJ to back expansion of PKO law: Limits on SDF Arms Use to Ease’, The Japan Times (29 
October 2001) (http://search.japantimes.co.jp/cgi-bin/nn20011029a1.html,10 March 2010).
339 Shinoda, Tomohito, Koizumi Diplomacy: 91-98; ‘Law Revision To Expand UN PKF Role 
Imminent: LDP's Yamasaki’, Nikkei Shimbun (1 June 2001) 
(http://telecom21.nikkei.co.jp/nt21/service/ENGD021/ENGD241?cid=NDJEDB2001060100101656
&madr=TOP&kdt=20010601&dk=d397b754&nhpjnl=&reservedtp=ENGD021g6iwbm3k&ftrmode
=ENGD031&hltid=201chh8r9u5dc, 10 March 2010); ‘Bill revising SDF role gets only two cheers’, 
The Nikkei Weekly (26 November 2001): 7. 
340
Defense of Japan 2008: 288-289.
114 
 
Cooperation Law, the 1999 Regional Crisis Law, the 2001 anti-terrorism law, the 2003 
emergency law, and the 2003 Iraq law.”341 While there is no clear legal connection 
between the Cambodia and Iraq ODO, there is a sense by which the controversies 
surrounding the first, and the subsequent perception of success, paved the way for the 
passage of later controversial laws. It is difficult to imagine an Iraq dispatch without a 
string of successful ODO deployments during the 1990s. Although Bhubhindar Singh’s 
suggestion that the ODO of the 1990s led directly to the expansion of the JSDF 
operational area in support of US forces in Asia overstates the case, tolerance for JSDF 
dispatch was raised by perceptions of operational success, particularly as missions were 
presented in a liberal, international context.342 This is clear from the October 2004 
Cabinet Office poll, with 51.9% of respondents considering ‘contribution to 
international peace’ as the most important consideration for Japan’s foreign policy. 14 
years earlier the figure had been less than 35%.343
It is clear that the complexity and varied development of UN peace operations has 
been matched by the development of JSDF ODO into a variety of mission types.  
While Japan did not attempt to become a ‘full spectrum’ peacekeeper, it did engage in a 
range of mission types, and also gradually learned from UN experience and the 
In general, the legal changes affecting 
JSDF ODO appeared to have kept pace with the developments in Japanese public 
opinion and the changing nature of pacifist norms.
3 Conclusion
                                                   
341 Shinoda, Tomohito, Koizumi Diplomacy: 146.
342 Singh, Bhubhindar, ‘Japan’s Security Policy: From a Peace State to an International State’, The 
Pacific Review 21-3 (2008): 303-325, 311.
343
Cabinet Office Survey 2004 (http://www8.cao.go.jp/survey/h16/h16-gaikou/2-7.html, 1 March 
2010); Cabinet Office Survey, 1991 (http://www8.cao.go.jp/survey/h02/H02-10-02-14.html, 10 
March 2010).
115 
 
development of peacekeeping norms, including those related to use of force, and 
resilience in operational conditions, examined in Chapter Four. UN standards and 
methodologies aided development of JSDF ODO, but it is also clear that operations 
were shaped by other influences. While US and allied pressure was a driver to engage in 
ODO, it dictated little of dispatch or operational forms. 
The crisis of confidence during and after the Gulf War provided the first major 
challenge to Japan’s comfortable Cold War security norms, and as such took time to 
resolve. The mission types, operational duties, and appointment of the JSDF as national 
representatives were the result of extended mediation between sometimes conflicting 
and contradictory influences. The desire to be a full UN member and to assume the 
concomitant responsibilities was one influence in favour of dispatch. The durable 
pacifist and anti-militarist norms throughout society acted as a powerful influence 
against dispatch of combat forces. The nature of the UN, the role it had been ascribed in 
Japanese policy, and the development of peacekeeping into a liberal international 
cooperative norm eased the process of mediation considerably. UNPKO provided a 
policy option with appeal across the fixed lines of dogma, providing an ideal mediation 
vehicle.
The 1990s were unusual in providing a range of LDP and non-LDP administrations, 
all of which influenced this mediation, and yet the results did not vary greatly despite 
the seemingly irreconcilable conflicts of 1990-1992, when navigating between hazards 
appeared more appropriate than mediating interests. Mediation did entail the imposition 
of a restrictive legislative framework around ODO, with strict terms for dispatch, 
‘frozen’ duties, and ‘permitted’ activities. Such measures, however unusual 
internationally, were for the JSDF, further restrictions on management and leadership 
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roles through the ‘civilian control’ culture. Gradually, operational experience, the 
development of confidence in and trust for the JSDF, and a lessening of political 
polarization permitted the relaxation of restrictions, and allowed professional 
operational judgment. At times, the legal instruments lagged behind operational practice, 
as will be seen in Chapter Four.
The primary influences over security issues remained the US alliance and Article 9. 
Japanese society felt largely compelled to live with one, while holding closely to the 
ideals, if not the strict letter, of the other. While not explicitly connected to either, JSDF 
participation in UNPKO provided a means by which Japan was able to balance between 
the seemingly disparate demands of military alliance and state pacifism, to navigate 
around socio-political obstacles, and to mediate disputes.
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Chapter 4 ODO Deployments: Peacekeeping
1  Introduction to JSDF Peacekeeping
As previously stated, the aim of this thesis is to examine and evaluate whether the 
JSDF were effective international actors and representatives of Japan in their overseas 
deployment operations. As stated in Chapter One, many studies of Japanese 
peacekeeping have concentrated upon permanent membership of the UN Security 
Council, or the changing nature of Japan’s political culture and identity. Many early 
works were naturally concerned with the legal and constitutional implications of 
overseas dispatch, and fundamental aspects of peacekeeping with which many were 
unfamiliar.344
One considerable problem, seemingly at odds with high profile and controversial 
operations, is the dearth of information. The JSDF conducted their first ODO in 1991 
and their first UNPKO in 1992, and although there are official histories of each dispatch 
(hakenshi), they are not in the public domain, and often the defence white papers 
contained little information.345 Despite being aided by the GSDF Research Division 
(Rikujoujieitai kenkyuu honbu), and making multiple requests to the MOD, almost no 
information was released.346
Researchers at NIDS expressed sympathy, and wished for the JSDF to publicise their 
                                                   
344 Komuro, Naoki, and Shikama, Rikiuo, Laws of War and Peace for the Sake of Citizens (Kokumin 
no tame no sensou to heiwa no hou) (Tokyo: Sogohorei, 1993).
345 The 1998, 2000, 2001, and 2004 white papers do not mention UNTAC or ONUMOZ.
346 The JSDF dispatch histories have been briefly seen by the author, but only one section was 
released upon appeal, Honduras, 1998, 14 pages, with approximately one-third censored.
Non-publication is based upon the Act on the Protection of Personal Information Held by 
Administrative Organs, Act No. 58 (30 May 2003) (Gyousei kikan no hoyuusuru kojinjouhou no 
hogo ni kansuru houritsu).
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own work, or assistance for researchers to do so on their behalf.347
A UN peace operations (UNTAC, ONUMOZ
From this failure to 
provide detailed information on Japanese ODO it might be assumed that either the 
operations have not been held in high regard, or have included embarrassing episodes. 
However, it appears most likely that there is not considered to be a need to provide 
detailed operational information, as there is less concern in politics and the media with 
operational effectiveness than the general principles of whether they were mounted. 
Despite the professional frustration of some JSDF and JDA/MOD personnel, general 
notions of ODO ‘success’ have come to be defined as not being required to justify 
operational matters. 
A ODO Mission Range
As stated in Chapter Three, UNPKO are one of five main ODO categories:
348
These categories exclude electoral tasks conducted by Japanese civilians, the dispatch 
of JSDF attachés, and chemical disposal specialists to China, and some classifications 
overlap.
)
B Humanitarian Assistance missions (Rwanda/Zaire)
C Disaster Relief missions (Honduras, Turkey)
D Allied Support missions (post-Gulf War minesweeping, Iraq)
E Anti-Terrorism Support missions (OEF-MIO)
349
                                                   
347 Interviews with three NIDS researchers, Tokyo (2004-2010).
348 United Nations Mission in Mozambique (ONUMOZ). 
349 Mulloy, Garren, ‘Japan’s Defense Diplomacy and “Cold Peace” in Asia’, Asia Journal of Global 
Studies 1-1 (2007): 2-14, 11.
The differentiation of D and E are particularly problematic but these 
missions after the 1990s will only be examined in relation to lessons-learned. The first 
three categories will provide the main focus, for their emergence, development, and 
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execution in the 1990s were closely linked within Japan’s IPC activities. In the 2002 
defence white paper, UNPKO were included within, “Response to Disasters and 
Contribution to Building a More Stable Security Environment: Expanding the Sphere of 
SDF Activities In and Outside Japan.”350
The first Japanese participation in a UN peace operation was a single MoFA official 
dispatched to UNGOMAP (United Nations Group of Observers for Monitoring the 
Afghan-Pakistan border) in 1988. Up until 1992, 40 civilians would participate in five
missions. A slow and hesitant start perhaps, but within the cautious culture of Japanese 
policymaking an appropriate and uncontroversial one. These missions were conducted 
under the establishment laws of each ministry, and included training and ‘international 
exchange’ (kokusai koryu) activities. Within imprecise parameters the establishment 
laws could be amended by Cabinet Order but the Diet and CLB pressure prevented 
significant reinterpretation enabling large-scale overseas dispatch.
Such a categorization represents the ethos and 
policy stream within which the operations were conducted, reduces potential objections 
to belligerent deployments, and blends well with non-UNPKO missions, accurately 
representing actual JSDF ODO tasks. This chapter shall focus upon JSDF UN peace 
operations.
B  UN Peace Operations
351
In particular, the dispatch of ‘formed units’ was considered a ‘red line’ issue for the 
JSDF, unless this could be considered a purely limited, training venture, such as MSDF 
international training cruises. Such missions appeared to make the ‘red line’ somewhat 
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Defense of Japan 2002: 209-257.
351 Interview, Hirano, Ryuichi, Director, Secretariat of the International Peace Cooperation 
Headquarters, Cabinet Office, Kasumigaseki, Tokyo (11 June 2009).
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less clear, commencing with the cruise to Midway Island and Hawaii in 1958, and as 
such the principle, “that JSDF units should not go abroad was adjusted many times as 
need and opportunity arose.” 352 Cabinet Orders for the JDA Establishment Law were 
utilised and did provoke some Diet opposition, but little public concern.353 Such was the 
case of the expansion of JSDF overseas defence attaché staff (bouei chuuzaikan seido)
(Chapter Three), and of NPA personnel as de facto police attaché staff.354
The deployment of complete units was a step too far for most Japanese. Eto Jun 
identified the public “respect deficit” following the Gulf War, indicating recognition for 
reform, with even the UNSG declaring Japan should “participate aggressively, not only 
in the financial and technical fields but in peacekeeping operations”.355
                                                   
352 Woolley, Peter J., Japan’s Navy: 49.
353 Woolley, Peter J., Japan’s Navy: 49; Auer, James E., The Postwar Rearmament of Japanese 
Maritime Forces: 121.
354 Interview, Yamazaki, Hiroto, 2009.
355 Fukuyama, Francis and Oh, Kongdan, The US- Japan Security Relationship After the Cold War
(Santa Monica, CA.: RAND, 1993): 32; Boutros-Ghali, Asahi Shimbun (6 February 1992): 2.
While public 
opinion did not seem eager there was recognition of the need to assume a degree of 
burden sharing for international security. While JSDF combative roles would be overtly 
unconstitutional and politically unacceptable, UNPKO had become liberal, international 
security norms, and in some respects resembled JSDF domestic disaster relief 
operations, which more than anything had increased JSDF domestic legitimacy. 
Japan has participated in five UNPKO with JSDF units:
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Table 4.1 JSDF UNPKO (units)
UNTAC Cambodia 1992~93 c.600 troops (x2)
ONUMOZ Mozambique 1992~95 c.50 troops (x3)
UNDOF Golan Heights 1996~present c.40 troops (x28)
UNMISET East Timor 2002~2004 c.680 troops (x3.5)356
MINUSTAH Haiti 2010~present c.350 troops357
The latter two missions were conducted outside the subject decade, but shall be 
considered within operational development terms (Chapter Six). 
C  Assessment of Performance
In assessing the JSDF ODO in the field, an analytical framework is necessary for 
operational analysis and to provide a comparative mechanism between missions. 
Dobson in his study of Japanese PKO adopted a theoretical approach based upon the 
utilisation of elements of traditional IR theory as well as normative patterns, including 
anti-militarism, US bilateralism, and East Asianism, providing a valuable analytical 
comparative for a study primarily concerned with why Japan embarked upon 
peacekeeping and what role the UN (or US) played in determining the Japanese policy 
agenda.358
                                                   
356 JSDF personnel were deployed to UNTAET (UN Transitional Administration in East Timor),
absorbed into UNMISET, 20 May 2002: UNSC Resolution 1410 (2002), (17 May 2002),
(http://www.undemocracy.com/S-RES-1410(2002)/page_1,12 July 2008).
357 MINUSTAH: United Nations Stabilization Mission in Haiti.
358 Dobson, Hugo, Japan and United Nations Peacekeeping.
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Whether constructing or utilizing such innovative frameworks or depending upon 
conventional empirical methods, there are few analyses that have evaluated the 
performance of armed forces in a range of peace operations. Those that do exist have 
tended to be either brief accounts of operations, or on certain aspects of practice.359
Many studies have tended to focus upon single missions, using them as case studies to 
determine the utility of PKO or some particular mission aspect.360 Other scholars have 
attempted an overall analysis of PKO as a policy of international governance, and have 
adopted empirical fieldwork approaches with analytical frameworks incorporating 
elements of political science and sociological theories. The studies of Heinrich et al, and 
Stern, have benefited from the broad range of their contributors’ skills within largely 
empirical-based studies.361
                                                   
359 Krishnasamy, Kabilan, ‘Pakistan Peacekeeping Experiences’, International Peacekeeping 9-3
(2002): 103-120; Kernic, Nitza, ‘The Soldier and the Task: Austria’s Experience of Preparing 
Peacekeepers’, International Peacekeeping 6-3 (1999): 113-128.
360 Nachmias, Nitza, ‘UNIFIL: Where Peace is Non-existent, Peacekeeping is Impossible’,
International Peacekeeping 6-3 (1999): 95-112; Findlay, Trevor, Cambodia: The Legacy and 
Lessons of UNTAC; Fetherston, A.B., Ramsbotham, O., Woodhouse, T., ‘UNPROFOR: Some 
observations from a conflict resolution perspective’, International Peacekeeping 1-2 (1994): 
179-203.
361 Heinrich, L. William Jr., et al, United Nations Peace-keeping Operations; Stern, Brigitte (ed.), 
United Nations Peace-keeping Operations; a Guide to French Policies, (Tokyo: UNU, 1998).
This study follows a similar empirical pattern, yet aims to include substantial 
comparative analysis between the three targeted JSDF UNPKO and non-UN missions, 
and also non-JSDF comparison. Recognising that this could become a cumbersome task, 
an empirical-base analytical framework focusing on four main elements will be applied 
to each JSDF mission to aid inter-mission comparison, inter-military comparison, and 
the understanding of intra-mission operational issues. The main elements of the 
analytical framework are:
123 
 
1 The mission context
2 ODO preparation and logistics
3 JSDF performance
4 Japanese contribution to mission. 
The mission context relates to selection, Japanese involvement with the host country, 
including peace processes, and the security environment: the aspects that affected JSDF 
operations but which were beyond their control.
ODO preparation and logistics include the Japanese survey and processes leading to 
JSDF dispatch, training, the lead-in phase, dispatches, logistical support (including 
Japanese and foreign, civil and/or military), and termination of mission. This section 
also includes analysis of the scale and types of JSDF deployment, assessing both 
quantitative and qualitative contributions.
As stated in Chapter One, JSDF performance is difficult to isolate and analyse, yet 
researchers have utilised post-operational analyses to identify performance indicators in 
operations. R.J. O’Brien’s use of effectiveness, efficiency, and quality to evaluate 
Australian Civilian Police (CIVPOL) performance in Cyprus is an example of what is 
possible, and is appropriate for use in this thesis.362
                                                   
362 O'Brien, R.J., Police as peacekeepers an evaluation of the performance of Australian police 
peacekeeping on Cyprus.
These indicators shall be used to 
evaluate the degree to which JSDF personnel and units carried out their mandated tasks, 
and also the degree to which they were able to adapt to changed circumstances and tasks 
beyond those originally mandated. These performance indicators will necessarily vary 
between missions, as roles and resources varied, but they shall be based on both 
quantitative and qualitative factors. Although far from perfect, and in recognition that 
O’Brien encountered difficulties isolating target-group indicators from those of other 
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national contingents, this approach would appear to be the most appropriate for 
evaluating JSDF operational performance.
The JSDF mission contribution factor is an assessment of how the JSDF contributed 
to the mandated mission, additional tasks, and how their contributions compared with 
those of others. Non-military comparisons exist, but while useful in limited contexts a 
uniform inter-mission comparison shall form the standard basis of analysis. This 
analytical framework will evaluate each mission element in isolation, and in comparison 
with other mission elements, providing comparisons between JSDF and non-JSDF 
performance.
D  Conclusion
The three UNPKO examined in this chapter shall be evaluated by the analytical 
framework, and within the stated limitations an effective evaluation will be possible. 
The first mission, UNTAC, shall be evaluated in greater detail than subsequent missions 
as not only did it set standards for JSDF UNPKO, but also had a decisive influence 
upon political and public opinion concerning the utility and wisdom of JSDF ODO.
2 Cambodia
Introduction
Japanese participation in UNTAC was noteworthy not only as the first deployment of 
the JSDF in a UNPKO, but also as it was part of a long-term Japanese government 
involvement in settling the Cambodian problem. This broader approach to peace 
operations was as innovative as the JSDF mission, and many, such as Takeda Yasuhiro, 
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have noted how the Japanese government made extensive efforts to aid the peace 
process, encourage adherence to the Paris Accords, and sustain UNTAC.363 Japanese 
concern for Cambodia’s peace and stability can be traced to 1970, the extent of efforts 
possibly indicating that Cambodia had become a test-case for the maturity of Japanese 
foreign policy. 364 Furthermore, for the first time it appeared that Japan had implemented 
a strategic approach, with diplomatic, financial, civil, and military elements coordinated 
towards a common goal.365
The UNTAC mission was widely regarded as having been a great success for the 
JSDF, but initial expectations included alarmist language concerning rampaging 
Japanese soldiery ruining Japan’s reputation. Such sentiments were echoed in Asian 
countries, not least in China and Korea as Japan’s Ambassador to Thailand, Ikeda 
Tadashi, described.366 Singaporean Prime Minister Lee Kwan Yew referred to JSDF 
overseas deployments as like handing chocolate liquors to a former alcoholic.367
                                                   
363 Takeda, Yasuhiro, ‘Japan's Role in the Cambodian Peace Process: Diplomacy, Manpower, and 
Finance,’ Asian Survey 38-6 (1998): 553-568.
The 
abiding and enduring images, however, were of diligent personnel doing their best to 
improve the lives of local people. The murder of a Japanese UN Volunteer (UNV) and a 
police inspector emphasized the precarious nature of the peace process, and made the 
JSDF lack of casualties seem all the more noteworthy. Although DG-JDA Nakayama 
Toshio stated after the murder of UNV Nakata Atsuhito “if it becomes clear that a 
widespread armed disruption of the election is in force, we must of course think of an 
364 Press Statement, ‘Joint statement of Foreign Minister Aichi and Secretary of State Rodgers’ 
(Aichi gaimudaiji –Rojaazu kokumuchou kankyou douseimei) (24 June 1970), The Bluebook, (1971), 
(http://www.mofa.go.jp/Mofaj/gaiko/bluebook/1971/s46-shiryou-3-3.htm 9 December 2009).
365 Tomoda, Seki, ‘The Novelty of the Cambodia Assistance Policy’ (Kanbojia enjo seisaku no 
atarashisa), Gaiko Forum 54, (March 1993): 28-34.
366 Ikeda, Tadashi, The Road to Peace in Cambodia (Kanbojia heiwa e no michi) (Tokyo: 
Toshishunpan, 1996): 179-181.
367 Berger, Thomas U., Cultures of Antimilitarism: 191.
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emergency evacuation or a halt in operations” and considerable political pressure was 
placed upon the government, this was an option resisted despite the potential 
implications.368
UNTAC, established under Chapter VI of the UN Charter by UNSC Resolution 745 
of 28
UNTAC is crucial for understanding the development of ODO as it presented a
peaceful, liberal, and constructive Japanese military dispatch and provided an 
operational template for the JSDF. The JDA and MoFA assumed this template 
represented ‘PKO success’, without clearly defining what operational aspects of the 
mission equated to successful ODO. Application of the analytical framework will 
provide a means by which notions of success may be judged, initially by examining the 
mission context of UNTAC.
A  Mission Context
th February 1992, had broad responsibilities to create a stable environment leading 
to national elections, by civilian, police, and military means within 18 months due to 
UN financial problems and fear that the elections could be sabotaged by ‘spoiler’ 
groups.369
Cambodia had failed to avoid involvement in the Vietnam War. Following the 1970 
coup deposing Prime Minister Prince Sihanouk, the Khmer Rouge (KR) Maoist group 
battled the pro-American government, seized control of the capital Phnom Penh in 1975, 
and embarked upon an horrific campaign of de-intellectualisation virtually erasing the 
educated classes, killing more than a million, and creating an agricultural collective. 
                                                   
368 Pringle, James, ‘Japan threatens to pull out its troops; Cambodia’, The Times (10 April 1993): 11.
369 Comments made in response to questions to Sanderson, John, and Akashi, Yasushi, United 
Nations Peace-keeping: Reflections on the Continuing Challenge, UNU, Tokyo, (22 October 1999).
127 
 
Vietnam invaded in 1978, partly to prevent KR border incursions, but the end of the 
Cold War, Vietnamese occupation fatigue, and Cambodian opposition led to preliminary 
negotiations, with the US and China as moderators.
The complex domestic politics involved four main political groupings. The 
pro-Vietnamese SOC (State of Cambodia), led by Hun Sen (Prime Minister), controlled 
the Cambodian People’s Armed Force. FUNCINPEC (United National Front for an 
Independent, Neutral, Peaceful, and Co-operative Cambodia), of Prince Sihanouk and 
his son Ranariddh, and its National Army for an Independent Kampuchea. The Khmer 
People’s National Liberation Front (KPNLF) under Son Sann, controlled the Khmer
People’s National Liberation Armed Forces (KPNLAF), while the KR controlled the 
National Army of Democratic Kampuchea (NADK).370
Following negotiations in Paris, Jakarta, and Tokyo, a Framework Document was 
agreed in September 1990, and the Paris Peace Accords (Comprehensive Political 
Settlement of the Cambodia Conflict) signed on 23rd October 1991. The Supreme 
National Council of Cambodia (SNC) became, “the unique legitimate body and source 
of authority in which, throughout the transitional period, the sovereignty, independence 
and unity of Cambodia are enshrined.” The SNC delegated to the UN, “all powers 
necessary,” to ensure implementation of the Accords, and UNAMIC (UN Advance 
Mission in Cambodia), mandated by UNSC Resolution 717 (1991), 16th October 1991, 
prepared for the deployment of UNTAC.371
The SRSG and military commander were conscious that UNTAC was not an 
enforcement operation.372
                                                   
370 Findlay, Trevor, Cambodia: 1-6.
Despite comments in 1992 by Japan’s non-permanent UNSC 
371
UNTAC Mandate, UNDPKO 
(http://www.un.org/Depts/dpko/dpko/co_mission/untacmandate.html, 19 August 2009).
372 Sanderson, John M., ‘Dabbling in War: The Dilemma in the Use of Force in United Nations 
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representative, Hatano Yoshio, that, in Reinhard Drifte’s words, “it was thanks to Japan 
that force was not used in Cambodia”, it is clear that no UNSC member or contingent 
provider proposed a Chapter VII mission.373
From 15th March 1992, UNTAC absorbed UNAMIC, but mission elements were 
delayed, including SRSG Akashi Yasushi’s staff, infantry battalions, engineers, and 
CIVPOL, and non-compliance escalated, particularly from the KR and the SOC. As 
Berdal and Leifer stated, “the critical problem confronted by UNTAC virtually from the 
outset of its deployment was how to discharge its responsibility for filling a political 
vacuum in the face of obstructive violence by contending Cambodian parties.”374
Lt.-General John Sanderson, the Australian UNTAC Force Commander, believed that 
military contingents “were sent to Cambodia at a rate too slow to seize advantage of the 
dynamics and goodwill prevailing at the signing in Paris, [which] in itself reflects a 
profound lack of understanding of the nature of these undertakings.” 375 Michael 
Harbottle has emphasized how operational experience and rapid deployment have 
elsewhere contributed to forces dispatched for UNPKO being able to rapidly and 
effectively commence duties. The example of UNFICYP peacekeepers being deployed 
to Egypt (UNEF II) in 1973, establishing ceasefire lines within 36 hours, certainly 
contrasted with UNTAC.376
UNTAC was unique in the range and depth of its authority. The SRSG was advised 
by the SNC, but had most agencies/ministries under direct UN supervision or control,
                                                                                                                                                     
Intervention’, in Otunnu, Olara A., Doyle, Michael W., (eds.), Peacemaking and peacekeeping for 
the new century (Lanham, MD.: Rowman & Littlefield, 1998): 145-168, 154.
373 Drifte, Reinhard, Japan’s Quest for a Permanent Security Council Seat: 86-87.
374 Berdal, Mats, and Leifer, Michael, ‘Cambodia’, in Berdal, Mats, and Economides, Spyros, (eds.) 
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established a legal system, including electoral laws and human rights codes, and could 
strike down existing laws that obstructed UNTAC’s efforts.377
While UNTAC’s civilian effort focused upon the election, de-militarisation was under 
military control. Combatants were to withdraw to cantonment areas, with weapons 
under UNTAC supervision. All prisoners and displaced Cambodians would be released, 
mainly through the Office of the UNHCR and the International Committee of the Red 
Cross (ICRC).378
The work of UNTAC proceeded in an atmosphere of increasing tension with the KR 
escalating its spoiling campaign, but the election was held in May 1993 with almost 
90% participation, FUNCINPEC winning over 45% of the vote. While there had been 
problems with the mission, the overall result was as good as could be expected from a 
broad-ranging and innovative operation, conducted in such an atmosphere, often by 
inexperienced personnel.379 The 3600 CIVPOL were notorious for uneven quality, with 
some lacking even basic police skills or any of the UN checklist points, such as driving 
licence or French/English competency.380
The military force (16,000) main tasks were: (1) verification of the withdrawal of 
Vietnamese forces (by the Strategic Investigation Teams); (2) verification of the 
cantonment and disarmament of forces; (3) weapon disposal and control; (4) mine 
clearing and education. 381
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battalions, and with enhanced logistical components each should have comprised a 
highly capable unit of approximately 1000 troops. They were to reinforce the work of 
485 unarmed UN military observers (UNMOs), verifying disarmament, withdrawal, 
weapon-disposal, and mine-clearing. Unfortunately, the 12 battalions, apart from the 
French and Dutch, generally did not have adequate training, logistics, communications, 
transport, or in some cases even cooking equipment.382
Training standards were recognised as a problem, not unique to UNTAC, but the size 
of the mission meant that the most capable units were considerably diluted.
Additionally, the engineering 
units of Thailand, China, and Japan deployed months late. 
383
JSDF participation in UNTAC was highly dependent upon the mediation of a political 
and legal dispatch mechanism in the absence of consensus. The involvement of Akashi 
Yasushi and Ogata Sadako as UNHCR aided this mediation, while the possibility of two 
such prominent Japanese leading UNTAC and UNHCR without Japanese personnel in 
support could have been as potentially damaging as the Gulf War chequebook 
diplomacy debacle. Another major factor encouraging Japanese participation was the 
It became 
clear that Cambodia’s infrastructure was so poor that significant military assets would 
need to be devoted to infrastructure projects. Over 2000 troops provided engineering 
and logistics support through infrastructure projects, the provision of drinking water and 
other sanitary support, and ad hoc support to civil components. It was in this supporting 
role that the JSDF first participated in UNPKO.
B  JSDF ODO Preparation and Logistics
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involvement of MoFA in the Cambodian peace process from 1988, with JSDF 
participation in UNTAC easier to justify than dispatches to Bosnia or Somalia. 
Fujiwara Kiichi is adamant that although security deteriorated, the “civil war was 
brought under control...by multilateral consent...not military intervention” and because 
of its role in this process “other countries positively welcomed Japan's participation”.384
Trevor Findlay has noted that if the UNTAC mandate had been transformed (as the 
military second-in-command desired) “to one of enforcement, the Japanese would have 
been obliged, constitutionally, to withdraw, and would perhaps have been followed by 
the Australians”.385 Akashi attempted to play down the significance of challenges to 
UNTAC, comparing UNPKO to a shop window, easily broken but attracting attention: 
“Therefore...it is an easy task to physically break through it, but quite difficult 
politically and psychologically. Unlike a conventional army, which aims for victory, the 
PKO is based on the agreement of all the conflicting factions”.386
JSDF preparations for UNTAC were complicated by there being no initial legal basis 
for dispatch. A civilian ‘Cambodia survey team’ (Kanbojia kokusai heiwa kyoryoku
chosadan) was dispatched on 1st July 1992, while on 27th July a handful of JSDF 
officers were dispatched to the Swedish Armed Forces UN School for UNMO 
training.387 In August 1992, the DG-JDA, Miyashita Sohei, ordered a second survey 
team including JSDF and CIVPOL representatives to assess the logistical needs of the 
Japanese contingent and the condition of Cambodian infrastructure. 388
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dispatch was confirmed as conforming to the IPCL, and instructed by Cabinet Order 
165 under the IPCL, from 11th September 1992 until 31st October 1993.389
The JSDF deployed with a 600 man GSDF engineering battalion (Shisetsuka butai), 
under Lt.-Colonel Watanabe Takashi, and eight military observers (MO), with 75
Japanese CIVPOL under NPA Superintendent Yamazaki Hiroto, which operated
separately from the JSDF, although both groups were IPCC members.390 Additionally, 
400 MSDF and 120 ASDF personnel provided logistical support and were included 
within the IPCC and the 2000 personnel IPCL limit, but were not assessed as part of 
Japan’s UN contribution, being a national force.391
UNTAC set the pattern for the subsequent GSDF ODO. The commanding officer was 
assigned by Lieutenant-General Uno Shouji GOC (General-Officer-Commanding) 
Middle Army (Chuubu houmentai), under the rotation system. The 4th Engineering 
Brigade, and 3rd, 10th, and 13th (infantry) Divisions provided a composite force, with 
volunteers requested, although interviewees have related how some were selected based 
upon interviews, while others were not interviewed. 392 One (then) junior officer, 
selected commented, “chuutohanppana iranai monoka” (“maybe I was just in-between,
inessential”).393 Two officers were ‘told’ to volunteer by senior officers.394
The first contingent had less than three months between passage of the IPCL and 
dispatch of forces, mostly spent assembling personnel, equipment, and information. 
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UNTAC veterans interviewed explain that there had been time for only the most 
rudimentary language training, mainly English greetings and radio procedure, and that
many struggled to find phrase or guide books for Cambodia, some using guidebooks to 
Thailand. There was also a lack of knowledge about the local situation, other than that 
there had been a conflict, there was a peace agreement, and that the JSDF were to 
conduct engineering and logistical work, mainly road maintenance. One officer 
supporting the GSDF dispatch relates how a MoFA official provided a short briefing for 
officers of the first contingent with information related to the conflict, the factions, the
nature of the UNTAC structure and mandate, and Cambodian society and culture. When 
questioned on security and risks to personnel, the official focused almost entirely on 
heat, disease, and land mines. KR ‘spoiling’ was covered by the statement that all 
parties had signed-up to the Paris Accords. In light of the security climate in Cambodia 
at this time such a briefing would certainly appear to have been less than satisfactory.395
The limitations upon JSDF strategic logistical capabilities were clear during UNTAC. 
The climate of Camp Takeo, south-west of the capital, was not dissimilar to 
late-summer Japan and caused few problems for the first contingent from Kansai. The 
second contingent, from Hokkaido, would suffer far more, but would inherit a fully 
equipped camp to limit the worst effects of the climate on troops arriving from a 
Japanese winter. The main cause of concern was the construction of their camp, part of 
which had been prepared by civilian contractors, but the main part of which consisted of 
tents within the operational area of a French infantry battalion. This had been chosen 
with great care, for JSDF immediate security and as Takeo province was one of the 
safest areas of Cambodia, with ready access to the capital and port. 
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Six ASDF C-130H were utilised for airlift, but with limited load-endurance, staged their 
journeys through Okinawa, the Philippines, and Thailand. The GSDF contingent 
commander arrived on 25th September 1992, with a staff of 29, preceded by three 
C-130H on 23rd and 24th September. As an engineering force, most earth-moving 
equipment, cranes, and trucks were moved by sea, the C-130H being unable to transport 
19 tonne Type-75 bulldozers.396
All vehicles other than Jeep/SUV-types were transported by two MSDF LST (Miura,
Ojika), with a fleet replenishment vessel (AOE Towada). Among 300 vehicles, the 
bulldozers and Type-82 signals vehicles were the only armoured vehicles, and thereby 
the heaviest. Each LST was small, with shallow draft (leading them to pitch and roll 
severely), and limited capacity. They were extremely uncomfortable for the equipment 
specialists attending to machinery and party of journalists, seasickness was common, 
some requiring medical attention, while life-jacket drills were conducted for extended 
periods in rough weather.397 The journey was slow, departing Kure on 17th September 
1992, and arriving in Cambodia 2nd October.398 The majority of the 376 engineering 
personnel arrived by chartered JAL Boeing-747 on 13th October 1992.399
The speed of Japan’s dispatch was criticized, not least by Akashi, who, “noted that 
the effectiveness of UNTAC would have been greatly enhanced if personnel and 
equipment had arrived more promptly.” However, he was also aware of the limitations 
of the legal and political situation, and how the UN budget authorization and 
procurement processes had, “led to delays which affected the perceptions of 
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Cambodians regarding UNTAC’s efficiency.”400 However, as the engineering battalion 
did not arrive in the country until 14th October 1992 it is clear that the Japanese dispatch 
was lacking in alacrity, being among the last major units to fully deploy.401 Indeed, the 
US GAO in its 1993 operational analysis report considered the tardy deployment of 
forces to have allowed dissent and violence to destabilise the peace process.402
The placing of the Japanese contingent in Takeo Province was the result of extensive 
lobbying from Japanese political and bureaucratic sources, but also as SRSG Akashi 
was highly sensitive to Japanese operational limitations. He stated in 2010 that PM 
Miyazawa had urged him to take care of the Japanese.403 As he later asked “what good 
would it have done to have the JSDF operating in a less safe area? They would have 
been able to achieve less.”404 DG-JDA Miyashita “said he would prefer to avoid areas 
where land-mine disposal is the primary job, adding that ideally the troops will be 
where they can go about their duties in calm and quiet.”405
As The New York Times reported, Japan was not the only nation that made special 
demands. French infantry were initially assigned to the jungles of north-eastern 
Cambodia, but following lobbying from Paris were transferred to Takeo and Kompong 
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Som, with “palm-fringed white sand beaches nearby.”406 The French were assisted by 
being one of the largest and most capable contingents, being in Cambodia for 24 months, 
and having Brigadier-General Robert Rideau as military second-in-command, until June 
1993.407
There developed a strong impression among non-Japanese observers that “Japanese 
military personnel were assigned to relatively safe areas with more luxurious quarters 
than other UN troops.”408 The expressions, “luxurious base camp” and “created envy” 
were common in non-Japanese media descriptions of Camp Takeo, but the JSDF first 
contingent found it anything but luxurious, with tented accommodation, no 
air-conditioning, basic plumbing, and few amenities or distractions. 409 When the 
engineering battalion arrived, Camp Takeo was still incomplete, the temperatures over 
40C, and the Nikkei Shimbun reporting that the newly arrived JSDF troops would be 
welcomed by land mines, heatstroke, and homelessness.410 Judy Ledgerwood reported 
that the position of the JSDF “led to resentment on the part of other UN forces and 
affected morale.”411
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esteem.412
The main camp, while eventually well-equipped, was not the only location for 
Japanese forces. The conditions of UNMOs were often dangerous, while transport units
were dispatched for periods to basic Branch Billeting Areas (hakenchi) in Kampot (with 
a French infantry company) and later Sihanoukville, January to September 1993.413
Given the presence of so many Japanese media personnel to watch over the troops, 
particularly during the first contingent phase, there were no shortage of images and 
reports of basic conditions.
These Areas were provided as Japanese personnel were not allowed to drive or venture 
out at night. The emphasis was upon avoiding accidents (traffic accidents being a 
particular danger in UNTAC) and violent incidents, hence the proximity to French 
forces.
414 However, as in any democracy, but particularly one where 
ODO were so controversial, images of great hardship for uniformed Japanese in 
South-East Asia would have been unacceptable. Indeed, the Japanese government took 
such an exception to the negative reporting of the JSDF in The New York Times that 
Suzuki Katsunari, Executive Secretary of the IPCH, responded in an open letter asking, 
“What is the rationale for criticizing a country’s efforts to provide comfort to its 
personnel as they carry out their mission?”415
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The MSDF and ASDF not only transported but also supported the GSDF in UNTAC. 
The MSDF provided a regular supply service of fresh water, food, and other stores from 
Japan, Thailand, and Singapore, via Sihanoukville. The vessels also played an important, 
but unexpected, role in the provision of medical support services, particularly prior to 
Camp Takeo becoming fully operational. The Japanese ambassador to Cambodia during 
UNTAC, Imagawa Yukio, is gushing in his praise of how the MSDF supported the 
material and morale aspects of operations, providing a mini-Japanese recreation centre, 
complete with ‘karee-raisu’ (curry-rice).416 The ASDF provided air-lift support into the 
Pochentong airbase, with six aircraft providing a minimum of a weekly service, via 
staging posts in Thailand and the Philippines.417 Imagawa suggests they were invaluable 
in maintaining Japan’s presence among UNTAC and Cambodian leaders.418
Despite the controversies regarding the GSDF camp, conditions, and media coverage, 
perhaps the least controversial aspect of the mission was the mandated operational 
performance. The engineering battalion was primarily tasked with the repair and 
maintenance of roads and bridges in Takeo Province, particularly those connecting the 
capital and main port, Sihanoukville. They won high praise for their professionalism in 
repairing roads, and replacing or repairing bridges, along Route 2 connecting Takeo 
with Phnom Penn and Vietnam, and Route 3 connecting Takeo to Kampot and 
Sihanoukville to the south-west (see Appendix Two). Despite the limitation of returning 
to base before dusk, which hampered work at distant locations, there was widespread 
C  JSDF Performance
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praise of their technical abilities, state of equipment, and diligence.
The role of the first contingent was initially of ‘dispatch establishment battalion’ 
(haken shisetsudaitai), preparing Camp Takeo, assembling equipment, collecting stores 
and personnel from entry points, and establishing the basic configuration, working 
practices, and security arrangements of the camp and its contingent, including electric 
power, from mains and generator sources.419
Despite the risk-averse nature of the JSDF deployment, the attention to security 
appears, in hindsight, to be limited. Despite widespread belief to the contrary, each 
member of the engineering battalion and associated units was allocated a rifle or pistol, 
although no automatic or heavy weapons.420 These were held in a central storage 
container behind barbed wire, with ammunition held separately. When the second 
contingent was dispatched to Cambodia they also brought their own personal weapons, 
to ensure that within the operational area each JSDF member had a weapon available.421
Weapons were only to be distributed in the event of contingencies, or as part of the 
regular camp guard. This guard comprised one infantry squad (12), supplemented by 
other troops. Use of weapons was regulated by Article 24 of the IPCL (see Chapter 
Three), with tightly limited ROE.422 Watanabe Takashi has pointed out that the clear 
differences between UN and JSDF limitations on use of force, and that the JSDF did not 
officially refer to ‘ROE’, implying a ‘right of belligerency’.423
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As GSDF duties were non-combatant, and Takeo was one of the safest provinces in 
the country, this situation was presumed to be adequate. In the context of subsequent 
events involving other contingents, and the deaths of Japanese, it appears that the fear of 
being considered in violation of the IPCL was a stronger force than the desire to 
maximise security. Camp Takeo possessed no slit trenches, to protect personnel in case 
of attack, or fire trenches to defend the camp. There was no sandbagging or ‘hardening’ 
of any kind, despite such steps being taken at other UNTAC locations. 424 In a 
publication distributed to JSDF families in 1992, the JDA stated that, “there is no 
possibility of the SDF being drawn into an armed confrontation.”425
Unlike ONUMOZ, the GSDF in UNTAC were an integral unit and although daily 
duties entailed division into working parties, it retained unit cohesion. The engineering 
battalion possessed heavy moving and lifting equipment, rollers, cranes and an
impressive array of technology. By contrast, some other units arrived without even the 
minimum UN requirements of tents, cooking and water purification equipment, and 60 
days supplies.
Security planning 
appeared to be equally faith-based.
426
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The Japanese transported large amounts of prefabricated bridging 
equipment which proved invaluable and saved much time compared with repairing 
existing structures. They also transported all of the basic equipment required for road 
repair, such as tarmac layers, being able to operate quite independently of other 
contingents and the local population, other than for security. General Sanderson 
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remarked in 1999 upon how technically capable the GSDF had been in UNTAC, and 
how they shared the ‘can do’ spirit of the best of the other contingents, despite intense 
media and political pressure to succeed.427 He wrote that the “success of UNTAC is 
attributed as much to the retention of the peacekeeping ethos as to any other factor.”428
There was a minor controversy over the role played by three GSDF liaison officers at 
UNTAC headquarters, based upon lack of appreciation of UN staff work. They provided 
a link between UNTAC HQ and the Japanese contingent, to coordinate work 
programmes and changes of duties. While quite innocuous, the controversy in Tokyo 
was that staff duties undertaken might include the planning of military operations, 
including PKF beyond IPCL limits. The government denied any legal conflict, and that 
the officers would not participate in military planning or, “other sensitive activities.”
It would seem that the GSDF, eventually, demonstrated that ethos.
429
Initially, the GSDF engineering work was focused on replacing or repairing road 
surfaces, 40 bridges, and drainage, with poor road surfaces contributing to the high rates 
of traffic accidents in UNTAC.
This episode was indicative of the lack of understanding of operations and the prevalent 
restrictive atmosphere.
430 The GSDF repaired 105km of the 202km Route 3, 
and 70km of the 135km Route 2.431 Also, approximately 50 unexploded ordnance (UO) 
items were disposed of during engineering works.432
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better understood and Japanese capabilities realized, the GSDF were also requested by 
UNTAC to perform a number of additional duties, such as water purification, delivery 
of food and water, and sanitation work. These were confirmed by the Cabinet in 
December 1992.433 The GSDF provided 80 kiloliters of oil and 800 tonnes of water to 
UNTAC contingents, regularly delivering meals for over 1500, and after the elections 
constructed a container yard for processing freight at Sihanoukville.434
Initially tasked with contingent health care, the small medical unit performed 
admirably in difficult conditions after the decision was made to allow the JSDF to treat 
locals and other UNTAC personnel, in February 1993. Ronald Dore suggests that a 
Cabinet Order was required before proceeding with treatment of non-JSDF 
personnel.
This extension of 
duties was significant, as although delivery of stores would not overly exert any 
engineering battalion, the work was large-scale and the container yard construction was 
complex. The reasons for the extension of duties were the poor state of Cambodian 
infrastructure, poor logistical planning by UNTAC headquarters, and the limitations of 
many military contingents. Water purification was a particular niche capability that 
GSDF officers had ensured was readily available. As a natural extension of sanitation 
and water purification, the provision of basic medical care became a significant and 
unexpected mission duty. 
435 The Japanese UNTAC clinical unit, comprising only 17 
personnel-per-rotation, dealt with up to 600 patients a day, approximately 7000 in 
total.436
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20-40 cases per day, indicating that the units worked in extraordinary conditions.437
Almost 10% of patients suffered from malaria, something expected to affect the 
contingent’s personnel more than the local population.438 No contingent members were 
actually affected by full malaria, due to preventative medicine and sanitation.439
Fujii Tatsuya of the JSDF Central Hospital noted how JSDF clinics were unprepared 
and lacked training to deal with large numbers of local people suffering from multiple 
minor ailments with no obvious physical cause. By piecing together patient information 
it became clear that these ailments were largely the result of Post Traumatic Stress 
Disorder (PTSD).
The 
GSDF water purification teams were considered by General Sanderson to be the best he 
had encountered, and made vital contributions to the health of the local population and 
the Japanese and other contingents. 
440
Prior to deployment JSDF staff presumed there would be many deaths among patients, 
but the diligence of the local people in health issues, cooperation of a Swiss Red Cross 
group, and the Indo-German Field Hospital, in a former university hospital, ensured this 
was not the case. The JSDF cooperated with personnel from Australia, India, Holland 
UNTAC organized its medical services into three levels, with the 
JSDF at Level 1, receiving patients. The end point, Level 3, was the Field Hospital 
operated by the German and Indian armies in Phnom Penn. The GSDF clinic was able 
to perform only basic medical services and minor operations under local anaesthetic, 
and concentrated mainly on prevention. More serious cases were transferred to hospital, 
and cases requiring X-rays were air-lifted to Thailand.
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and Canada, and held joint pooling of know-how on dealing with heatstroke and other 
tropical maladies, formalizing short training courses for their respective staff. 
The weaknesses of JSDF medical capabilities in UNTAC were poor understanding of 
PTSD and tropical diseases, and the lack of nursing staff. This was due to being 
predominantly a sanitation unit with medical facilities attached, primarily with 
preventative medical roles and therefore not usually requiring a large nursing staff. After 
UNTAC, the JDA decided to utilize the Tropical Diseases course of Tokyo University to 
broaden the skills base of JSDF medical staff.441
The GSDF also established a dental clinic in a duckboard-floored tent under a palm 
tree, replaced by an air-conditioned pre-fabricated building from December 1992. The 
dental staff comprised only four personnel in each contingent, but performed 
exceedingly well considering their limited establishment, with the JSDF facilities being 
complemented by the dental bay aboard Tokiwa.442 The surprise was that most cases 
treated were Japanese.443
The greatest single performance degrading factor found by JSDF medical staff in 
Cambodia was the effect of living in a tropical climate in a tented encampment. More 
than the ‘hard security’ risks of land mines or attacks, it was the physical environment 
and its effects upon personnel and equipment performance that degraded mission 
effectiveness. This led to a significant investment in pre-fabricated buildings for 
accommodation, stores, and operational spaces complete with air-conditioning units 
(and generators) from December 1992. This investment was effectively ‘lost’, for the 
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JSDF realized that they would not have the logistical ‘lift’ to remove it when the final 
contingent withdrew. Therefore, a virtue was made of the cost by donating the facilities 
to local bodies, thereby earning great praise in Takeo City.
A more significant change affected JSDF duties with the onset of the Cambodian 
election campaign. The initial UNTAC mandate had included a process of 
demobilization, disarming, and reintegration (DDR) in cantonment areas. With the KR 
rejection of this process and the unwillingness of other factions to comply, levels of 
violence increased. These included attacks on UNTAC contingents, with 30 Uruguayan 
troops kidnapped by the KR in December 1992.444 This led the UNTAC command to 
utilise the ‘spare’ DDR-tasked infantry forces for security patrols particularly after the 
KR declared that it would not participate in the election.445 The elections were to be 
held between 23rd and 28th May 1993, but the security situation began to deteriorate 
much earlier, and the UNTAC command was concerned for the safety of the elections 
and its staff.446 The UNTAC force commander requested in March 1993 that all 
engineering units commence patrols to provide enhanced electoral security in their areas. 
The Japanese were the only unit to decline, as the phrase ‘patrol’ (keibi) denoted a PKF 
duty, excluded by the IPCL.447 This provoked an UNTAC HQ staff member to comment 
that it was based on a meaningless differentiation of an ‘O’ and an ‘F’ when the roads 
paved by the GSDF were used by UNTAC infantry.448
The situation further deteriorated when a District Electoral Supervisor, UNV Nakata 
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Atsuhito, 25, was murdered with his local interpreter on 8th April 1993. Nakata, one of 
30 Japanese UNV in UNTAC, was not targeted due to nationality, but by a disgruntled 
job applicant.449 However, while his nationality was an unhappy coincidence, for many 
in Japan it was highly significant that the day before his death the second GSDF 
UNTAC contingent had been dispatched.450 It naturally led to speculation that the IPCL 
five conditions had been breached and that the contingent might be withdrawn, despite 
comments from UNHCR Ogata Sadako that there was no connection.451 Australia was 
also deeply concerned as, in Steven Ratner’s words, “Australia…had made clear its 
unwillingness to see any of its troops involved in hostile operations.”452 Furthermore, 
when Indonesian soldiers were attacked and wounded, “even members of the 
rubber-stamp Indonesian parliament called for the recall of the Indonesian battalion.”453
Sensitivities over contingent security were certainly not limited to Japan, despite the 
critical comments of an UNTAC HQ staff member quoted by the Yomiuri Shimbun that 
only in Japan was a single death treated as the basis for mission withdrawal discussions, 
while other countries simply accepted that this was the nature of PKO.454
The response of the Japanese government was to continue with the mission, with 
Cabinet Secretary Kawano Youhei declaring that even though the events were 
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regrettable, the five conditions remained intact, a point emphasised by Foreign Minister 
Muto Yoshifumi.455 The government, after consideration of previous and consequent 
UNTAC requests eventually broadened GSDF contingent duties. Partly in response to 
the death of Mr. Nakata and the ensuing controversy, not least concerning the 
vulnerability of Japanese UNV in polling stations, the Miyazawa cabinet ordered GSDF 
troops to engage in ‘information gathering’, during the course of their duties, including 
delivering ballot boxes to polling stations. Ambassador Imagawa states that UNTAC 
personnel pushed hard for this expansion of duties, and that the decisive point was 
SRSG Akashi concurring (fearing a Japanese withdrawal), but the extent of cabinet 
agreement is unclear.456
The details of the expanded duties were coordinated between IPCH Director Yanai 
Shunji and JDA Administrative Vice-minister Hatakeyama Shigeru, initially limited to 
two GSDF security specialists visiting each voting station ostensibly to deliver supplies, 
but actually to reassure staff.457 There was reported to have been strong pressure from 
MoFA that not only UNTAC but also ONUMOZ participation could be jeopardised if 
the GSDF did not provide enhanced security, not least for other Japanese. This entailed 
being in the proximity of election staff while delivering food and water as part of their 
previously expanded duties.458 Provision was also made for the JSDF to provide 
accommodation and facilities for other UNTAC contingents, if required.459
Significantly, these further expanded duties were not for GSDF force protection, but 
to extend protection to electoral staff, and by the commencement of ‘information 
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gathering’, de facto security patrols. Whether these activities were actually primarily 
intended to relieve the anxieties of the local population is unclear, but that was certainly 
one consequence. Furthermore, the second GSDF contingent members were also 
provided with weapons, helmets, and protective vests for expanded duties, in a 
significant concession to PKO practice and common sense. Also, the GSDF were able to 
utilise the appearance of their vehicles to good effect, as the Type 82 which looked like 
an imposing APC, supported ‘information gathering’ work.460
Maeda Tetsuo contended that GSDF members, “abandoned road repair work and put 
on helmets and bulletproof vests and began carrying small arms.”461 Maeda does not 
recognise that it might have been wise to carry out core engineering tasks with such 
equipment in the context of KR violence. He was also critical of the expansion of GSDF 
duties for transportation of ballot boxes and the ‘information gathering’, a term he 
referred to as “camouflage” for patrolling.462 Colonel Ishioroshi, the second contingent 
commander, directly refuted Maeda’s claims by placing JSDF PSO duties within the 
overall mission context of supporting the Cambodian election process, initially by 
engineering work, and later by other duties designated by the government.463
Kiroku Hanai, of the Tokyo Shimbun, was in Cambodia as an election monitor, and 
stated that although, “French troops were to protect our polling station, they did not 
protect us. We felt relieved when the SDF visited the station on the pretext of collecting
GSDF 
patrols were undertaken as confidence building for UNV, in a restrained and careful 
manner. It seems that both Maeda and Ishioroshi are correct: patrols were conducted, 
beyond stated IPCL duties, and they contributed to the peace process.
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information. It may be inappropriate for Japanese to be protected by troops of other 
countries while the SDF troops are at hand.” 464 One GSDF Captain in UNTAC 
explained that Japanese troops were very wary, as they not only were nervous of 
provoking an armed response, but that they were very unsure both of their own 
country’s response to such an incident, and to their personal abilities in combat.465 The 
latter point is often overlooked. The Japanese had no operational experience, were 
mainly engineers and technical specialists not infantrymen, with limited local 
knowledge (most had recently arrived), and were faced by experienced and heavily 
armed potential adversaries. A GSDF officer engaged in the planning and command of 
the UNTAC dispatch stated after the operation how he, “had difficulty explaining why 
the Japanese troops could not engage in guard duty although our troops were regarded 
the same as others. As for the use of arms, SDF soldiers felt psychologically burdened 
when told to use their weapons at their own discretion, since the use of weapons is 
usually controlled by superior officers.”466 The IPCL clearly stated that weapons could 
not be used under the orders of commanders, only by individual troops. The use of 
weapons was to be “the absolute last resort” as decided by each force member.467
what is basic common sense for the militaries of nations taking part in PKOs is not 
recognized by Japan. The Japanese military units deployed in Cambodia initially 
Watanabe Takashi keenly felt the gap between UNPKO practice and JSDF UNTAC 
practice:
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confronted the disparity between the Rules of Engagement (ROE) for UNTAC, and 
the Japanese rules...Japanese PKO personnel were only able to defend themselves 
and other unit members in the same area of operation as themselves. Moreover, the 
use of weapons in legitimate defense…was left to the judgment of the individual, 
and appeared to be outside the standards of conduct for troops operating in…a 
military unit.468
Watanabe’s views on the restrictions of dispatch were echoed by Ooishi Akatsuki of the 
Yomiuri Shimbun who reported that in November 1992 the GSDF battalion had been 
requested by a Tunisian infantry unit to help them with the construction of their camp. 
The GSDF felt obliged to refuse the request as it could have been construed as a 
contribution to the PKF.469 General Sanderson was adamant that defence of UNTAC’s 
mandated objective was vital: “Self-defense meant not only an individual's defense of 
himself alone; it also meant collective action.”470
Maeda has indicated that these innovative security efforts by the JSDF constituted a, 
“substantive change,” and that, “the SDF was free to establish new precedents quite 
publicly.” In this he is correct, although not in his contention that the unit, “was 
transformed from an engineering corps into infantry troops.”471
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The GSDF did expand 
their security profile and their security duties far beyond what had been initially 
anticipated, and with the deteriorating security climate in Cambodia, by the letter, and 
indeed spirit, of the IPCL, withdrawal should have been considered. The minimal 
security detail was not intended to extend its work beyond the perimeter wire, or to 
include non-JSDF personnel within security measures. This changed between the 
murders of UNV Nakata in April and Police Inspector Takada in May 1993. The manner 
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in which both the GSDF and government reacted was crucial. Home Affairs Minister 
Murata Keijiro called for the withdrawal of all UNTAC members from dangerous areas, 
echoing calls for complete withdrawal from UNTAC after the death of Inspector Takada, 
including from junior minister Koizumi Junichiro.472
The eight JSDF UN military observers (MO) were deployed along the borders of 
Cambodia, in an integrated manner with their international colleagues. The GSDF MOs 
were selected from those with international experience and language skills, and were 
carefully chosen for their tasks, most being specifically requested to accept such 
duties.
However, the government realised 
that complete JSDF mission withdrawal would be disastrous for Japan and UNTAC, and 
thus modified operational duties and security practices to continue the mission. This 
flexibility and determination (as well as a degree of good fortune) entailed that UNTAC 
was the first of several JSDF ODO rather than a single failed attempt, as with Japanese 
CIVPOL unit dispatch.
a  Military Observers
473 One of the problems however, was the fact that they were essentially left to 
fend for themselves in a country they hardly knew. Major-General Fukui has related 
how as an UNTAC MO he was placed in a team with four other MOs of different 
nationalities in Phnom Penn, given a Toyota Land Cruiser, a Motorola radio, a daily 
allowance of $130, and told to arrange accommodation and domestic affairs. For most 
this would be a significant shock of working culture, but for a professional soldier used 
to home and mess life it was a particular challenge.474
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The life of the Japanese MO was somewhat more complicated than that of battalion 
personnel. Main contingent members were administered by the JDA, while the IPCH, 
responsible for the coordination of data collection, surveys, and all manner of 
pre-dispatch business, had only just been established within the PMO. The Director of 
the IPCH commented upon how difficult the position of JSDF UNMO was within 
UNTAC.475 The MOs were directly responsible to the IPCH, as sources of information 
on the conduct of the mission, as well as to UNTAC HQ. Furthermore, these MO were 
also treated as de facto representatives of the entire Japanese nation, and thus were often 
requested to direct the GSDF engineering battalion, or even MoFA ODA disbursements, 
to areas within their responsibility. This naturally placed strain upon isolated officers. 
Unwittingly, this was made worse in some cases by the attentions of the JDA and MoFA. 
Both wished to keep track of ‘their’ personnel: it being seen as imperative that no 
mistakes were seen to be made by Japanese personnel or any harm come to them. The 
latter threat was pertinent, as the MOs were unarmed and many were stationed close to 
the borders with Laos and Vietnam. Heinrich et al report one JSDF UNMO being 
regularly fired upon while investigating ceasefire violations.476
The GSDF MOs were distributed in poorly supported locations, with only one of the 
first contingent assigned to the capital, the remainder posted as single, unsupported 
observers to the extreme border areas, far from the GSDF battalion and UNTAC HQ. 
Their positions, reliant upon colleagues they did not initially know, in the most remote 
and dangerous areas of the country, dependent upon UN logistical support was in sharp 
contrast to that of the main contingent in Takeo. Japanese participants in other UNMO 
missions have detailed how challenging the work is, even when well-versed in the 
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duties and with language fluency.477 The Japanese MO in UNTAC had at least been 
posted to the Swedish Peacekeeping Training Centre for 16 days’ UNMO training, the 
only JSDF mission-specific training for UNTAC.478 However, in UNPKO the role of 
unarmed and often isolated MOs has been detailed as amongst the most difficult. While 
the situation in Cambodia cannot be compared to that in Rwanda, the roles of MOs in 
both countries often placed them in direct contact with armed groups.479
In assessing Japanese contribution to the UNTAC mission preliminary evaluations of 
effectiveness, efficiency, and quality will be made, but it is also necessary to deal with 
critical comments regarding JSDF performance. General Sanderson, despite generally 
praising the JSDF contribution, also commented on how certain contingents had 
preferred (for domestic reasons) to provide ‘passive’ logistics units, in order to 
emphasize the humanitarian nature of their work, and to avoid risk, thus burdening other 
contingents.
D  Japanese Contribution to Mission
480 “In UNTAC’s case this was true of at least the Japanese contingent, 
which gained a reputation for refusing to take any risks, withdrawing to their base well 
before sunset, for example, in order to avoid possible contact with the Khmer 
Rouge.” 481 Kenneth Pyle reports that UN officials were dismayed by the special 
circumstances of the JSDF in UNTAC, and even Akashi referred to them as 
‘maidens’.482
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Cambodia and finding the personnel seemingly “overwhelmed by their responsibility 
for ensuring that it was a success.”483
Takeo province...was the area of a French infantry battalion. The Force Commander 
of the military component was an Australian Lieutenant General, the Chief of 
Operations was a Dutch colonel, the Chief of Logistics was a Polish colonel, and the 
Chief of Engineering was a New Zealand colonel. The Director of Civil 
Administration for Takeo was an Indonesian civil servant. The SDF had absolutely no 
experience with this type of multinational framework, and I remember how we were 
able to learn a lot from the PKO that the military organizations in other countries 
knew as a matter of course.
There was significant pressure on the contingent, and it remains the most 
media-exposed dispatch, something that provoked jealousy among personnel in 
Mozambique and Golan. The expectations were perhaps unreasonable, and one of the 
prime causes of cumulative and traumatic stress disorders is a gap between an 
individual’s expectations and their own actual experiences. This is further compounded 
by the stress of the expectations of third parties, and being Japanese seemed to raise the 
expectations of the local people who viewed Japan as rich and expected commensurate 
benefits by association. The JSDF were poorly prepared for these forms of stress, and 
had not been particularly well served by the JDA or MoFA briefings. Of the three Forces, 
the GSDF also had the lowest proportion of personnel with foreign language skills, and 
this further complicated the operational ability to contribute to the mission. 
Certainly, the JSDF had limited experience of the diversity of standards, languages, 
customs, and expectations that were found in UNTAC. Watanabe has described how the 
Japanese personnel struggled to adapt to multinational operational practice:
484
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In assessing the JSDF contribution to the mission the three main elements to be 
considered are effectiveness, efficiency, and quality. In assessing the JSDF’s ability to 
conduct the originally mandated tasks, there would appear to be little doubt as to the 
effectiveness of the work of the engineering battalion. UNTAC was chronically short of 
engineering units, with only the Japanese, Thais, and Chinese contributing engineering 
battalions, and among these the Japanese seemed to have the greatest range and scale of 
equipment, and the most comprehensive skill-set. They also demonstrated a great 
degree of diligence in their work, were conscious of unit security and the prevention of 
accidents, particularly involving local people during engineering projects. This latter 
point is important when considering the numbers of children attracted to work projects 
and Camp Takeo. 
The amount of roads repaired or bridges replaced can be easily measured, but it is the 
multiplier effect of this work that is more difficult to assess for the UNTAC mission. 
The roads repaired were mainly those connecting the capital with Sihanoukville and 
Vietnam. To what degree these road and bridge repairs had upon the ability of UNTAC 
to effectively conduct its operations remains unclear, and would seem to be almost 
impossible to accurately assess. It does appear that the local people felt a renewed sense 
of hope and confidence by the JSDF actions, however, as these were the first large-scale
infrastructure projects in the country for decades, and the presence of UN troops 
provided a greater sense of security for people to travel and trade in this environment. 
The later expansion of roles by the JSDF, with delivery of goods and services to other 
UNTAC units and medical services, was certainly highly effective. The Japanese ability 
to purify vast amounts of water was a unique capability in the mission, and would 
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become a hallmark of Japanese ODO, and the transportation role was one taken up as a
main activity in UNDOF. Despite limited medical resources the JSDF provided a great 
deal of health care coverage to a great many people, including UNTAC personnel, and 
won a great deal of praise and trust in the process. These were also the first duties 
expanded beyond those initially mandated.
This health care work, in addition to the engineering work conducted, may have 
contributed to the overall security of the contingent, as Robert McNamara stated in 
1968, “security is development, and without development there can be no security.”485
Nathaniel Fick, in the context of later operations in Iraq and Afghanistan, has argued 
most persuasively that a failure to interact humanely with the local population can have 
serious security disadvantages: “When we retreat behind body armor and concrete 
barriers, it becomes impossible to understand the society we claim to defend.”486
Efficiency within the overall mission is less clear, with peace operations rarely 
regarded as paragons of efficiency. Contingents shipping thousands of tons of supplies 
While 
the ‘information gathering’ later conducted was not seemingly a grander scheme 
combining human and traditional security, the effect was nonetheless positive. Both 
Japanese and non-Japanese electoral staff expressed their sense of security with the 
JSDF.  How effective the overall Japanese mission was in improving the security 
within Cambodia, or even Takeo Province, is perhaps impossible to assess, but it is clear 
that despite such tasks not being overtly mandated, the JSDF did contribute to the 
security of its operational area.
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and equipment into countries only to then remove them upon completion, and failing to 
make use of local markets would appear to be highly inefficient. However, within the 
parameters of a UN mission certain aspects of operations can be assessed for their 
efficiency. As outlined previously, the engineering work of the Japanese was highly 
effective, and given the appalling state of infrastructure in Cambodia and the difficulty 
of sourcing local contractors or heavy plant, it would seem that the contingent’s 
logistical arrangements represented an efficient use of resources, particularly given the 
time constraints. With a hurried dispatch and immediate operational needs the JSDF 
were able to contribute to the mission within weeks of their arrival, the immediate task 
being completion of Camp Takeo. 
Whether it was efficient to build such a camp is a major question of efficiency. The 
time and cost required would appear to indicate it was an inefficient use of resources, 
driven more by political considerations than operational requirements. However, later 
experience in Mozambique indicated that prolonged use of tented accommodation 
significantly affected operational performance. As the prefabricated buildings and air 
conditioners were later gifted to Takeo City, there was potential for the time and money 
to have proved worthwhile, although it seems the installation of Japanese-style large 
bath tubs was certainly an extravagance. Although the main camp building was used as 
a job training centre, 1993-1996, teaching sewing and mechanic skills, it closed due to 
the excessive costs.487
Japanese working patterns were certainly less than efficient. Vehicles were not 
allowed to travel after dusk, and since there were only two locations in which they were 
permitted to halt overnight work often ended early to ensure that troops were ‘home’ 
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well before nightfall. This is an example of overall mission efficiency being sacrificed 
for the specific national goal of minimising risk. Working efficiency was also hampered 
by the poor English skills of contingent members, a constant subject with UNTAC 
veterans. Even though the force was a self-sustaining unit there were requirements to 
communicate with other contingents, not least the French infantry. Watanabe has related 
how on more than one occasion a Japanese NGO in Takeo provided translation 
assistance.488
Until the request to deliver goods and service to other UNTAC contingents there was 
little cooperation with other national contingents, apart from the French, who provided 
the de facto security force for the JSDF.
However, for a country with the resources of Japan it is remarkable that a 
large force was dispatched with such poor communications skills, particularly when 
considering the efforts of the Pakistanis and Bangladeshis (see below). 
489
In assessing the quality of contributions the JSDF made to UNTAC, the engineering 
work was of undoubtedly high quality, as was the provision of health care. The transport 
and supply duties were performed without any difficulties, and satisfaction with JSDF 
work quality was high. While Japan transported 300 vehicles to Cambodia it did not 
There was no consideration made of 
dispatching infrastructure task forces to parts of the province, and then stay as the guests 
of local contingents. The one exception when the JSDF did cooperate with other units 
was in the provision of medical services, particularly the division of responsibilities and 
dealing with tropical diseases. Also, on a cost-performance basis the JSDF medical team 
would surely compare well with any in UNTAC, as it treated 11,000 patient cases with a 
small staff and limited resources. This provided a model for subsequent operations.
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provide helicopters, despite UNTAC being hindered by the lack of helicopter lift, 
having at most 24 available. Japan could have provided a quality airlift capability from 
the more than 500 craft operated by the JSDF, without straining national defence 
capabilities.490
Another aspect of the quality of the Japanese contribution can be assessed by the 
most unmilitary aspects of its work and life in Cambodia. The JSDF personnel like 
those of other contingents made friends with locals, played sports with children, and 
generally attempted to make the lives of the local population better. This was done by 
such enjoyable pursuits as a Takeo Bon Odori festival, with soldiers dressing in 
makeshift versions of traditional summer festival garb and dancing en masse to taped 
music brought from Japan. This and other attempts to provide an insight into Japanese 
culture were the sort of activity that cannot be trained or written into orders but 
develops organically. The French forces, by contrast, were characterised as being cold 
and lacking engagement with locals.
The cargo handling facility at Sihanoukville is a mark of the project 
management and engineering quality that they contributed to the wider mission, as the 
task was of little or no direct benefit to the Japanese mission. The work of UNMO was 
seemingly of high quality, particularly as they were operating in the most difficult 
circumstances of any JSDF personnel in Cambodia. The MSDF were also able to 
provide a quality service for the GSDF, and the level of cooperation was high, while the 
ASDF was limited in what it could contribute simply due to the limitations of its aircraft 
despite the best efforts of the crews. 
491
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The Pakistani and Bangladeshi contingents by 
contrast, despite also being infantry forces, provided English classes and sporting events, 
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with the Pakistanis even establishing an English radio service.492
A further less conventional aspect of quality was the standard of behaviour of 
Japanese troops in Cambodia. Some contingents, the Bulgarian and Uruguayan in 
particular, were noted for their poor treatment of locals, including extortion and sexual 
harassment.493 The Bulgarians started a fire on their homeward flight, from which 100 
knives, illegal drugs, firearms, and a live snake were removed by police.494 The JSDF 
contingents were notable for their ability to resist the temptations outlined by SRSG 
Akashi’s explanation of “hot-blooded soldiers” giving chase to “young beautiful beings 
of the opposite sex.”495 Judy Ledgerwood states that although “21 peacekeepers died in 
Cambodia as a result of hostile action, more than twice that number (47) were 
diagnosed as being HIV-positive - and UNTAC chief medical officer Dr. Peter Fraps 
believes the true figure is probably as high as 150. The German field hospital treated 
more than 5,000 incidents of sexually transmitted diseases.”496
The dispatch of JSDF personnel to Cambodia in 1992 was the most significant 
While no statistics exist 
in the public domain, the JSDF seem to have avoided sexual diseases and the 
mission-wide problems of sexual harassment and increase of prostitution, partly by 
training and discipline, and partly by the institution of recreation breaks for personnel in 
Thailand. 
E  Conclusion
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change in Japan’s security policies and international role in four decades. The dispatch 
of armed forces to an area where Imperial Japanese forces had previously fought was 
significant, but the principle that the state was internationally represented by its military 
was something that many Japanese found deeply unsettling. UNTAC was conducted 
under a cloud of uncertainty, but also in an environment of increased expectation of 
Japanese contributions to international society. Every mission detail was judged by 
criteria determined more by legacies of war and post-war politics than by performance 
standards of efficiency and effectiveness. The JSDF UNTAC deployment thus became 
an inverted mission, where what did not occur was often considered more important 
than operational achievements.
While the JSDF mission was initially limited to a PSO logistics support role, it 
broadened its role much further into human security and PKO/PKF duties. It became a 
direct provider of medical and sanitation services, and through its very presence, 
particularly by its ‘information gathering’ duties, it contributed to providing “freedom 
from fear” and suffering.497
Watanabe considers the 25 years leading to UNTAC as developing deep, strong 
bilateral relations with the US, thereby agreeing with Dobson that this provided a 
bilateral base “enabling the SDF to fulfil its mission in Cambodia in cooperation with 
other countries.” Watanabe asserts that “it can be argued that the Cambodia PKO 
opened the door for Japan and the SDF to move from bilateral to multilateral 
relations.”498
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However, it is clear from operational analysis that the JSDF still had 
significant gaps in its capabilities, of hardware and software, which the US relationship 
had done little to address, and perhaps the over-arching bilateral relationship had 
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stunted greater efforts at multilateral military cooperation.
Domestic media coverage was, for the JSDF, almost wholly positive by summer 1993, 
aided by Watanabe insisting on openness, admitting even critical media into the JSDF 
HQ, including an Asahi TV crew, with rapid alteration of JDA ‘press club’ rules, and 
adroit management of over 300 Japanese media personnel.499 The UNTAC head of 
communications instigated ‘Japan media briefings’ to cope with demand.500 Despite 
fluctuations in polls, the change in opinion upon final return was evident, when even a 
Socialist Diet Member who had ‘ox-walked’ in opposition to dispatch greeted and 
thanked JSDF members for their work.501 However, official follow-up activities and 
research were poor. Less than one and a half pages was devoted to JSDF UNTAC 
activities in the 1994 defence white paper, whereas five and a half pages were devoted 
to MSDF Persian Gulf minesweeping.502 In the 1996 and 1998 White Papers, Cambodia 
was briefly covered, ‘UNTAC’ not being mentioned.503
This is an example of how the effectiveness, efficiency, and quality of the JSDF 
UNTAC dispatch were compromised. The effort expended to mediate the dispatch of
the JSDF, to commence operations, and to adjust to mission requirements under intense 
pressure was a significant feat, and the JSDF performed effectively, to high standards of 
Even more telling was the JSDF 
attitude, with dispatch histories compiled but little used, and very few personnel 
debriefed or engaged to record, analyse, or utilise their experiences for the benefit of the 
Forces.
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quality, and with a significant degree of efficiency. Yet, the failure to follow-through 
with operational analysis, to ‘learn lessons’, meant that much of value was squandered 
and expertise and commitment dissipated, as seen in the next JSDF UNPKO in 
Mozambique.
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3  Mozambique
Introduction
The dispatch of JSDF to ONUMOZ was the second JSDF UNPKO, and was 
dispatched just a month after the second contingent had joined UNTAC. The decision to 
have two concurrent ODO was not the first choice of the Japanese government, but the 
opportunity arose, with the UNSG specifically requesting Japanese participation, and 
MoFA in particular pressing to build upon the momentum gained by UNTAC.504
Participation in ONUMOZ was, however, initially rejected by Chief Cabinet Secretary 
and acting-Foreign Minister Kono Yohei in March 1993, leading to surprisingly 
vociferous denunciations from LDP politicians and MoFA officials, pillorying Kono as 
“a coward” and his decision “comical”.505 The decision was reversed with the 26th
March dispatch of a survey team, and on 27th April the cabinet accepted a UN request 
for participation.506
ONUMOZ was a continuation in the trend of post-Cold War UNPKO from UNTAG 
and UNTAC, providing an all embracing civilian-military mission to promote DDR 
within an electoral process. While the government favoured contributing a contingent it 
encountered personnel limitations (2000) on ODO within the IPCL. This entailed either 
reductions in the UNTAC contribution, a controversial step, or the dispatch of a much 
smaller force to ONUMOZ. In consequence the JSDF ONUMOZ force would be less 
than one-tenth of that dispatched to UNTAC, with less personnel within Mozambique 
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than providing external logistical support, and would be the first non-self-supporting 
JSDF ODO. The contrast between UNTAC and ONUMOZ is notable for the similarities 
in mission and the disparities between the Japanese contributions. This is also expressed 
in the media coverage and research scholarship the missions received. 
A  Mission Context
After Mozambique gained independence from Portugal in 1975, it was plunged into a 
debilitating civil war between the Liberation Front of Mozambique (FRELIMO) 
Government, and the Mozambican National Resistance (RENAMO) supported by South 
Africa. Fortunately, both groups agreed to peace negotiations after the end of the Cold 
War, as in Namibia, whereas Angolan groups continued their civil war until 1994.
As Richard Synge states, the General Peace Agreement (GPA) reached in October 
1992 was the result of over two years of negotiation, “conducted by Italian mediators 
who managed to combine good understanding of the complexities of Mozambique with 
extraordinary patience.”507
ONUMOZ was established by Security Council Resolution 797 (1992) of 16
The GPA was the equivalent of the UNTAC Paris Accords, 
but between the commencement and completion of negotiations the number and scale of 
UNPKO expanded beyond UN financial and personnel resources. A non-strategically 
important part of Africa not being the highest priority, ONUMOZ comprised 
approximately one-third the size and one-quarter the budget of UNTAC, despite being a 
longer mission.
th
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December 1992 to implement the GPA.508 The mandate of ONUMOZ was based upon 
ceasefire and force withdrawal monitoring, DDR, human rights monitoring, refugee 
assistance, and support for the electoral process. It also included, “security arrangements 
for vital infrastructures and to provide security for United Nations and other 
international activities in support of the peace process” which related to JSDF 
activities.509
The main military roles for ONUMOZ were patrolling transport and energy facilities, 
and the provision of humanitarian, logistical, and medical assistance, in addition to 
DDR. The UN did not consider it a dangerous mission, but INTERPOL estimated that 
1.5 million AK-47 rifles were imported during the war by armed groups.
In early 1993, 6500 troops and over 100 CIVPOL were deployed under SRSG Aldo 
Ajello, to implement the GPA through a Supervisory and Monitoring Commission, 
chaired by the SRSG, with FRELIMO, RENAMO, six major powers, and the 
Organization of African Unity (OAU). While it was designed to ease the transition to 
peaceful elections, the main work of the mission became humanitarian assistance to 3.7 
million displaced people, and a DDR programme overseen by 354 UNMOs. UNHCR 
aided the repatriation of 1.3 million refugees, and by mid-1994 some 75% of internally 
displaced people had been resettled and most refugees had returned to Mozambique. 
510
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valuable. 511 Most contingent members believed that disarmament was not their 
responsibility, a Uruguayan soldier commenting that, “active disarming is 
dangerous…ONUMOZ’s mandate is not to send bodybags to Montevideo.”512 Unlike in 
Cambodia, there were no specific ‘spoiler’ groups that rejected the GPA, and
demobilization continued more successfully than disarmament. One area of particularly 
slow progress was the civilian SRSG National Mine Clearance Plan.513
By the time of the elections a new Mozambique Defence Force of former FRELIMO 
and RENAMO troops had been trained with foreign assistance. The elections were held 
in October 1994, with FRELIMO winning the parliamentary and presidential elections, 
the new government and president being inaugurated in December 1994. ONUMOZ's 
mandate ended on 9th December 1994 with most personnel departing by January 
1995.514
Despite the sense of partial mission failure due to DDR and demining problems, the 
UNSG reported in April 1998 that “the United Nations experience in Mozambique 
showed that, in the right circumstances, peacekeeping operations can offer a flexible 
and uniquely adapted means to confront conflict in Africa. Its success testifies to the 
contribution that the United Nations can make as an impartial and legitimate actor for 
peace.”515
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B  JSDF ODO Preparation and Logistics
Despite government approval of an ONUMOZ contribution the ceiling of 2000 
personnel within the IPCL was a severe limitation. This was interpreted as all personnel,
including those who assisted dispatch, even if not directly joining missions. The
conclusion reached was that only 50 troops per ONUMOZ rotation would be possible, 
based upon the calculation of 1220 personnel (total) within UNTAC, plus MSDF and 
ASDF support. The choice of Mozambique suited the desire for an ‘UNTAC-like’ 
mission, and was preferable to Somalia or Bosnia. While many governments provided 
both large contingents and voluntary contributions, the Japanese profile was low, 
contrasting with the largesse in UNTAC. Sweden donated food supplies to quell riots, 
while Italy, Portugal, and Britain contributed additional personnel and money to speed 
DDR and de-mining.516 Japan’s contribution was made upon UN request to boost the 
power of one radio transmitter, while Germany donated an entire radio station.517
The problems experienced by JSDF personnel in ONUMOZ were basically derived 
from their small, non-independent contingent status, and local conditions. These were 
exacerbated by the rush to deploy, which hampered the learning of lessons from 
UNTAC. Indeed, many of the deployed personnel were given a series of 10 vaccination 
injections in the space of less than a month, and had little time to mentally or physically 
prepare for deployment, a situation made worse by a lack of information. There were 
Compared with UNTAC, ONUMOZ was clearly the less-favoured ODO sibling.
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only basic briefings provided to the JSDF, and while the commanding officer sought out 
Portuguese and English instructors, his men were provided with only rudimentary 
language classes. Pre-departure training comprised three elements: basic skills to 
operate as Movement Control Units (MCU), team-work development carried out by 
working and social events to bond a group of disparate volunteers, and language 
training. The contingent commander attended the JSDF Kodaira Foreign Language 
School for some weeks, on his own volition, and worked on simple English and 
Portuguese expressions in his free time. Most of his men had only 2-3 weeks of basic 
training in languages and other related matters, starting from a low base, but local 
knowledge was complemented by briefings provided by trading companies with 
experience of Mozambique. 100 volunteers were trained for the ONUMOZ dispatch 
only the best 48 being selected for the first contingent, unusually composed of a mix of 
GSDF and ASDF personnel. In addition to the MCU, the JSDF also deployed five staff 
officers to act in liaison roles with the ONUMOZ military component headquarters in 
Maputo, the Central Region HQ in Beira, and the Southern Region HQ in Matola. 
The transport of the contingent was by commercial charter container vessel for heavy
equipment, and by chartered Antonov aircraft for vehicles and personnel. The force 
commander, Major Nakano Shigenori, and five HQ staff flew to Maputo via London 
and Johannesburg on scheduled flights, arriving on 13th May.518 Additional personnel 
were flown in on chartered airlines, with all unit members assembled in Mozambique 
by 17th May.519
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One problem was that those who packed and shipped the equipment 
were not the actual users, so that there was a degree of confusion as to what had been 
packed where. 
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The ASDF flew airlift support missions for the ONUMOZ contingent. They were 
hampered, as in UNTAC, by the capabilities of their C-130H aircraft, so that the 
approximately 7,200km one-way flight required four-five days, via five transit 
countries.520 Thereafter, civilian scheduled flights were used to transport most supplies, 
with the ASDF being used for sensitive equipment, VIPs, and New Year presents, such 
as sake and raamen noodles.521 The ASDF used Nairobi as a transport hub, as it would 
for the Rwanda/Zaire dispatch, for two aircraft and 50 personnel (more than the 
ONMUOZ JSDF total). The equipment taken to Mozambique included 20 vehicles, 
specialist loading equipment, and personal weapons (seven rifles, 46 pistols), which as 
in UNTAC were only issued when the security situation was deemed to require it.522
The UN had vetoed the original Japanese suggestion of being housed in a hotel in 
Maputo, not only for the effect upon ONUMOZ morale, but also due to operational 
readiness and security concerns. The UN proposed billeting the JSDF with their ‘host’ 
unit, the Bangladeshi logistics battalion. This was coolly received by the GSDF who 
preferred a ‘western’ host, resulting in their being based with, and dependent upon, 
Portuguese Army ‘hosts’ for most basic services and infrastructure, beyond JSDF 
vehicles, machinery, and tents.
Unlike UNTAC, subsequent contingents arrived in Mozambique in November 1993 and 
June 1994 without weapons, treating them as other equipment, passed from one 
contingent to the next.
523
The problems of tented accommodation were clear from UNTAC experiences, but the 
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lesson was not learned. While the importance of providing pre-fabricated buildings in a 
country with tropical climate and poor infrastructure would result in extensive 
investments in East Timor, the mission to Mozambique was expected to camp. The 
MCU were in tented accommodation, and no pre-fabricated units were provided even 
after UNTAC when more resources could have been provided. Water and electricity 
were rationed, but it seems from interviews that the first contingent had quite basic 
expectations, which were met. The second contingent members apparently expected to 
walk into a fully-functioning African Camp Takeo, and were rudely shocked. This 
difference of expectation seems to have had an effect upon morale, exacerbated by the 
failure to continue ‘vacation’ breaks for troops from UNTAC experience, with only a 
few personnel able to visit Nairobi.
C  JSDF Performance
The main duty was Movement Control (MOVECON), the processing of passengers 
and loading and unloading of freight, and disbursement to the next echelon of transport 
units, working within the operational control of the Bangladeshi Army logistics 
battalion. This entailed the small MOVECON contingent of 48 being split into two 
MCU, between the two main air transport centres of Matola in the south and Beira and 
Dondo in the central region (see Appendix Two). Beira was the main port of the country, 
and for countries to the west of Mozambique, such as Zimbabwe, which had patrolled 
the railway during the civil war.524
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Beira also had an airport to the north, within the 
neighbouring Dondo province. This meant the Japanese working in very small numbers, 
with the central region MCU in Beira/Dondo having only a 10 man ‘platoon’ (squad
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size), with two JSDF staff officers despite being tasked with port and airport movements 
for the central region. The lack of numbers also entailed that they could not provide any 
credible self-defence capability while in transit. The main Japanese MCU based at 
Matola, south of Maputo, consisted of a headquarters platoon (18), and two 
MOVECON Platoons (10 each), and a staff officer in the southern region force HQ. The 
remaining two staff officers were based in the main HQ in Maputo. While structured as 
a company the Japanese contingent had less than half the usual manpower.
The Japanese HQ contained a small medical team, based upon UNTAC practice, 
comprised of three-four medical and two dental staff per rotation who treated 
approximately 600 patients.525 A unit the size of the Japanese in ONUMOZ would 
normally not be provided with a medical team comprising approximately 10% of 
personnel.526
The Beira/Dondo duty was rotated so that troops could return to the main Japanese 
contingent area on a regular basis. However, this required a long journey through unsafe 
areas, the JSDF depending upon Italian or Portuguese escorts, particularly as bandit 
attacks increased during 1994.527 This ‘collective security’ was considered highly 
sensitive, in light of developments in Cambodia and accusations that JSDF PKO were 
breaching legal and constitutional prohibitions, but it quickly became an established 
operational norm that benefited the mission.528
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The security condition within the country deteriorated as the elections drew close. As 
the UNSC Mission to Mozambique stated:
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The country will be going into the elections without a fully constituted and 
properly equipped army. The police are weak, poorly trained and lack the right 
equipment. On the other hand, thousands of soldiers, whose only skill is the use of 
weapons, have been demobilized and are without alternative employment. Armed 
banditry is spreading, especially in the countryside, and the situation may become 
critical.529
The JSDF staff officers were tasked with providing liaison and communications with
the two main JSDF units, and to the IPCH. The general impression is that these staff 
During the mission, 26 ONUMOZ members died, and it is fortunate that the JSDF 
contingent was able to depend so closely upon the Portuguese, Italian, and other 
contingents for security assistance, to a greater extent than the JSDF depended on the 
French in UNTAC. 
The language and general communications situation in ONUMOZ was as poor as in 
Cambodia, but the contingent commander discovered that his younger personnel more 
easily and more enthusiastically learned languages and communicated by non-verbal 
means, easily adapting to challenging environments. He therefore rotated younger 
members in the roles which required the greatest degree of external communications, 
and attempted to utilise the skills of more experienced older men in less exposed ways. 
His frustration was that due to military hierarchies there were always middle-aged 
personnel who were less useful to the mission, exacerbated by the relatively high 
average-age of the JSDF. 
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officers were under-utilised at times, and overworked at others, hampered by a lack of 
transport, and also felt unable to take a more pro-active mission approach due to the 
limited Japanese contribution.530
The staff officers were in stressful roles, in position for one year (first rotation), or 
eight months (second rotation), whereas other personnel rotated every six months. They 
were billeted in private accommodation responsible for their own domestic services, and 
also were on constant call, carrying radios even when off-duty in case of 
contingencies.
The staff officers were, however, able to relieve some 
of the strain of English communication from the MOVECON HQ, particularly by 
providing précis of ONUMOZ documents and technical information, such as security 
alerts and weather reports.
531 They were, in addition to their ONUMOZ duties, also required to draft 
situation reports on the state of the mission for the IPCH and JDA. Colonel Sawada, a 
staff officer in Mozambique, stated that the significance of these reports was that if a 
clear breach of any of the five conditions as proscribed by the IPCL were to be detailed, 
then the entire Japanese mission could be in jeopardy. In that case, the GSDF would be 
required to abandon their duties, including their Portuguese and Bangladeshi hosts, and 
the staff officers were tasked with drafting contingency plans for assembly and 
withdrawal of personnel.532 This was a heavy responsible for relatively junior officers, 
with the JSDF policy being to place Captains and Majors in such positions.533
One significant aid to both staff officers and contingent members was the formation 
of a ‘support team’ within the PMO that communicated effectively with the JDA
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complimented by MoFA in Tokyo and Maputo, and officers felt confidence in being 
able to request information and/or guidance from either of these sources, a particularly 
great help given the limited JSDF resources.534
In assessing the effectiveness, efficiency, and quality of JSDF work in ONUMOZ there 
would appear to be little doubt as to the effectiveness of the work of the MCU, and 
ability to conduct mandated duties. Many duties were routine and administrative, such 
as the processing of air-passengers, while aircraft loading required skill and use of 
specialised equipment. The effectiveness of the work can be judged by the continued 
use of JSDF MCU within the mission, and the length of their dispatch, being 
responsible for the processing of 119,000 passengers and 12,100 tonnes of cargo.
D  Japanese Contribution to Mission
535
Many developed countries reduced their forces before the elections, with the Italians 
largely withdrawing by early 1994, being replaced by African units. 536
While the JSDF arrived six months after the commencement of the mission, this was 
not considered as great a problem for mission effectiveness as in UNTAC. The whole 
mission was delayed in commencing its duties by UN processing delays, particularly 
over the mission budget, described by the SRSG as “pure nonsense”.
JSDF 
MOVECON was the only developed-country contingent to remain constant.
537
                                                   
534 Maeda, Tetsuo, JSDF and PKO Verification: 138-139.
535
Defense of Japan 2003 (Tokyo: JDA/Urban Connections, 2003): 261.
536 Synge, Richard, Mozambique: 92.
537 Synge, Richard, Mozambique: 38.
The MCU 
appeared to experience no capability gaps, as all freight loads could be processed, and 
although the volume of traffic varied, there was no sense of the units being regarded as 
bottlenecks in the supply chain. On the contrary, as a small unit, the JSDF were 
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dependent upon the schedules of arriving and departing ships and aircraft for their 
loading and processing work, and upon the logistical contingents of Bangladesh and 
India to provide trans-shipment. Participants expressed continued frustration with this 
work, as late arrivals would have serious consequences for JSDF work, not least in 
delaying return to camp, and the resulting dangers of night-travel.538
The JSDF contingent worked efficiently, but the commander acknowledged that 
many of their duties could have been completed by civilian personnel, and that the 
JSDF did indeed cooperate closely with civilian units.
This was a serious 
issue not only for safety but also in the effectiveness and efficiency of MOVECON, but 
as a very minor actor within the mission the JSDF had little control over this situation.
Similarly, the roles of staff officers were not outside of the range of the personnel 
dispatched, but as liaison officers for the smallest contingent there was little they could 
effectively contribute to the overall mission outside of making arrangements for the 
MCU, and aiding communications. While their quality was never in doubt, the roles 
assigned, outside the command, control, and communications functions of regular staff 
work, resulted in them being less effectively utilised than their capabilities warranted.
539 They did however illustrate 
their versatility in dealing with arrange of aircraft and vehicle types unfamiliar to 
Japanese personnel, from Mil-8 helicopters to steam trains.540 Balanced against this 
were the additional costs of civilian personnel hired under UN contracts, which 
increased far more than had been anticipated.541
                                                   
538 Maeda, Tetsuo, JSDF and PKO Verification: 137.
539 Maeda, Tetsuo, JSDF and PKO Verification: 140-141.
540 Nakano, Shiginori, ‘Mozambique Duty Roster’ (Mozanbiiku doumuban), Securitarian (October 
1993): 20-25, 21.
541
Financing of the United Nations Operation in Mozambique: Report of the Secretary-General,
UN Document A/51/807 (25 February 1997): 14-15.
JSDF forces were (to the UN) a cheap, 
high-quality capability for 18 months. The footprint of the MCU was certainly light 
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compared to UNTAC, with relatively light equipment, and Japanese ‘bathing’ restricted 
to a three-man folding, canvas tub.542
The JSDF contribution to the electoral role of the mission was purely supportive. 
Unlike in UNTAC there was no contact with any electoral element, and very little 
contact with local communities other than the usual playing with children near the camp 
areas. Despite the UNSG stating in August 1994 that all ONUMOZ military contingents 
would be requested to make greater contributions to the security of Mozambique, 
particularly with patrolling of roads and vital points, the JSDF duties did not expand.
With limited ASDF and no MSDF support, the 
contingent provided a high quality service while imposing few logistical strains on 
either the mission or the JSDF, despite being ‘hosted’ units. The medical services were 
also able to sustain JSDF operations and to assist members of other contingents to a 
high standard.
543
The lack of learning from the UNTAC experience marks ONUMOZ as an example of 
what can happen when operational analysis is neglected, with inadequate language skills, 
pre-dispatch training, and accommodation. Yet the Mozambique case provides an 
alternative example of how the JSDF could participate in ODO, with a niche capability,
light-footprint force, able to conduct technical operations in close cooperation with 
other contingents and civilians, in a far more integrated manner than UNTAC, for longer. 
That this was initially forced upon the government and JSDF by legal restrictions is 
The JSDF units were simply too small to even contribute to the regular security patrols 
or gate guards at their camp areas.
E  Conclusion
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178 
 
clear, but it was continued after the restrictive phase had passed, albeit at the cost of 
hardship to JSDF participants. ONUMOZ provided an example that could be seen later 
in the dispatches to UNDOF and Honduras, acting as a compact ‘force capability 
multiplier’. Although the mission was seen by the Japanese government as resembling 
UNTAC, for the JSDF it was a new form of ODO, making quite different demands on 
personnel, with constant exposure to foreign practice and languages, and not altogether 
a comfortable experience. The JSDF did not appear to suffer from lack of operational 
effectiveness or quality in their work, but whether the ‘light-footprint’ approach was as 
efficient, as it was relatively cheap and simple, is unclear. The efficiency of units was 
affected by their size, inability to subsist independently, and escorting requirements. 
This dependency could have been resource and time consuming for both escorts and 
hosts, and potentially a drain upon the mission. As in UNTAC, while the JSDF could 
certainly claim their operation was a success, good fortune and the cooperation of allies 
played a significant part in achieving this without casualties, and by the nature of 
contingent configuration, ONUMOZ was inevitably dependent upon collective security. 
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4  Golan
Introduction
The contribution to the UN Disengagement Force (UNDOF) in the Golan Heights of 
Syria and Israel is one of the least known and most remarkable Japanese ODO. It 
attracts little attention, and many UNDOF veterans have complained that it is the 
‘forgotten outpost.’ As such, it could be seen to demonstrate the determination of Japan 
to make a meaningful contribution to UNPKO largely divorced from ‘showing the flag’ 
in the media or narrow national interests. It is unusual in that it is not a nation-building, 
‘UNTAC-type’ mission, but a classical ‘blue helmet’ mission. The JDA stated in 2002 
that, “Japan’s participation in UNDOF marks its first undertaking as part of a UN PKO 
in a zone set up to separate the opposing troops of sovereign states that have agreed a 
ceasefire. It thus carries significance as Japan’s human resources contribution toward 
international efforts to build peace in the Middle East.”544 While undoubtedly true, 
interviewees and commentators have conjectured that UNDOF provides a convenient 
example for MoFA to illustrate its commitment to UN burden-sharing. The JSDF and 
JDA/MOD have valued the small but high-value mission as a “PKO School”.545
The Yomiuri Shimbun reported in the months leading up to the deployment of the 
JSDF to UNDOF that 44% of those polled believed that the dispatch of forces to Golan 
was essential, whereas 34% thought that it was not.546
                                                   
544
Defense of Japan 2002: 231.
545 Sato, Masahisa, ‘From the Golan Heights to Iraq: a JGSDF Commander’s Experience in the 
Middle East’ (Golan kougen kara Iraku he shikikan no chuutou keiken), in Military History Society 
of Japan (ed.), Peacekeeping Operations in Historical Perspective: 308-325, 320.
546 ‘Opinion poll on the view after 50 years since the end of the war, defence sense also changes’ 
(Youronchosa ni miru sengou 50nen reisen shuuketsu, boueikan mo henka), 
Certainly it proved much less 
Yomiuri Shimbun (11 August 1995) 
(http://nippon.zaidan.info/seikabutsu/2002/01257/contents/350.htm, 14 April 2008).
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controversial than UNTAC, and the absence of incidents have made it a model JSDF 
mission. The only media attention has been the six-monthly mission extensions in the 
Diet, and the dispatch and return ceremonies for the JSDF participants. UNDOF 
represents quiet and comfortable ODO. As Marrack Goulding stated, “UNDOF showed 
me how effective peacekeeping can be if certain conditions are met.”547
The UNDOF deployment resulted from the Arab-Israeli ‘Yom Kippur’ War from 6
A  Mission Context
th
October 1973, when Syrian and Egyptian forces launched a coordinated attack upon 
Israel and Israeli-held territory. To Israel’s west, Egyptian forces made initial gains, but 
soon outran their missile shields that balanced Israeli qualitative superiority.548 In 
Israel’s north-east, the fighting was intense, with Syrian helicopter assaults capturing 
Mount Hermon in the Golan Heights.549 Control of the Heights was vital for control of 
the Sea of Galilee, water resources, and to prevent Syrian artillery reaching Israeli cities. 
After intense fighting, the UNSC called for a ceasefire on 22nd
On 24
October 1973, which the 
Israelis and Egyptians accepted. President Assad of Syria eventually accepted a truce 
the next day. 
th
                                                   
547 Goulding, Marrack, Peacemonger: 41.
548 Kumaraswamy, P.R., ‘Revisiting the Yom Kippur War: An Introduction’, in Kumaraswamy, P.R. 
(ed.), Revisiting the Yom Kippur War (Abingdon: Frank Cass, 2000): 1-10, 8-9.
549 Dunstan, Simon, The Yom Kippur War 1973: The Golan Heights (Oxford: Osprey, 2003): 14.
October, the UNSC adopted Resolution 339, deploying elements of UNEF II 
as a Disengagement Force, stabilizing the western front. On the northern front, the US 
negotiated an “Agreement on Disengagement” between Israel and Syria, with an ‘Area 
of Separation’, a de-militarized buffer zone under Syrian administration, and two equal 
‘Areas of Limitation of Forces and Armaments’, de-militarized areas, administered by 
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national civil agencies, including police.550 The Agreement and the Protocols for 
withdrawal of forces and establishment of UNDOF were signed on 31st May 1974, with
UNSC Resolution 350 (1974). The mandate was designed to “Use its best efforts to 
maintain the ceasefire between Israel and Syria and to supervise the Agreement and 
Protocol to the Agreement with respect to the Area of Separation and Areas of 
Limitation.”551
To save time, personnel were transferred from UNEF II in Sinai, UNDOF 
headquarters being established in Damascus.552 It has been one of the most stable PKO, 
with low costs, far less controversies than the neighbouring UNIFIL mission, and 
without significant dissent concerning its continuation or mandate. 553
The UNDOF Area of Separation is 80 km long north-south, and between 
approximately 10 km to less than one km across (see Appendix Two). The terrain is 
mountainous, with Mount Hermon being the highest UN position at 2,814 meters. 
UNDOF has two camps, one in Israel and one in Syria, 20 permanently-manned 
positions, and 11 partly-manned observation posts, in addition to a representative office 
in Damascus. UNDOF also provides logistical support for UNTSO which monitors the
borders of Israel. The UNDOF mandate has remained unchanged, to maintain the 
ceasefire, and supervise the disengagement of forces and Areas of Separation and 
There were 
naturally changes in contingents, with the Austrian and Polish infantry battalions a 
constant presence until 2009, often also providing the Mission Head and Force 
Commander, UNDOF being one of the few missions with combined roles.
                                                   
550
Israel and Syria: Agreement on Disengagement, Report of the Secretary-General, S/11302/Add.1 
(30 May 1974) (http://www.un.org/ga/search/view_doc.asp?symbol=S/11302/Add.1, 15 March 
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Limitation.554
UNDOF has had 1342-1047 military personnel, with 39-50 UN and approximately 
100 local staff.555 Despite UNDOF being characterized by host consent, impartiality, 
and the minimal use of force, 43 mission personnel died up to June 2010.556 It was 
designed to prevent a resumption of hostilities, to build local trust, and to support 
peace-building. It has succeeded in its first two duties, while the third has been outside 
its control. Mona Ghali has noted that, “UNDOF’s unambiguous mandate has not 
imposed unrealistic demands on the force. Its functions are important…and relatively 
detached from higher politics.”557 While the mandate appears simple, the peace has 
been carefully managed. Iranian troops (until withdrawal in 1979), and Polish troops
(until Poland recognized Israel in 1990) suffered from Israeli restrictions on their 
movements.558 The Syrian approach has been less restrictive, but sensitivities, such as 
the seizure of Hebrew inscribed articles, caused incidents, particularly as most UNDOF 
fire extinguishers have been serviced in Israel.559
The two main units of the Force have been the infantry battalions of Austria and 
Poland, tasked with complex de-mining and mine-management tasks, patrolling, 
including ski-patrols, and field-liaison activities.560
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UNDOF have included a surprising degree of support activities for the population 
resident within the operational area.561 The Force provides assistance to the ICRC in the 
passing of mail and people through the area and in the provision of medical services 
within the means available.562 It has also provided a base for UN humanitarian relief 
work, including in conflict affected parts of Lebanon.563 The animosity felt for UNIFIL 
among many Israeli troops is not seen as relevant to UNDOF, although numbers of 
UNDOF personnel have been injured by Israeli action.564 Brigadier-General Yuill has 
pointed out that UNDOF provides a small, yet important, means of conveying goods 
and individuals between Israel and Syria, and for liaison officers to build relations.565
Anniversaries provide a focal point for meetings of ambassadors, defence attachés, and 
officials.566 While characterized as a truce monitoring force, it is no small coincidence 
that its presence and its actions have coincided with the approximately doubling of the 
population from the 1973 level.567
Regular courses are held in civic education, especially the danger of landmines, 
especially as most mines are over 35 years old and potentially unstable, and Syrian 
demining teams have cooperated with UNDOF.568 Medical consultations and treatments 
have also been freely provided to local children and mothers, with UNDOF approval, 
and the mission has proved a very flexible one.569
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in key positions in UNDOF, as medical, dental, and administrative staff, seem to have 
helped such efforts.
UNDOF cooperation on postal services with the ICRC is important as 
communications are extremely difficult, with much work going into UNDOF securing 
passage for Druze families. Until the late 1990s there was the phenomenon of ‘family 
shouting’ whereby divided Druze families would gather at points negotiated between 
UNDOF and the IDF, and communicate using loudspeaker systems, which declined 
with the proliferation of mobile phones.570 The UNDOF staff must negotiate with 
various offices of both Israel and Syria, ensure that roads are clear, and often transport 
individuals themselves. The nature of this bizarrely complex process has featured in a 
film by director Eran Riklis, The Syrian Bride.571 A somehow less obvious development 
in 2005 was ‘Operation Apple’, by which the fruit growers of the region were able, 
thanks to UNDOF and ICRC negotiations, to ‘import’ freshly picked apples into Syria, 
via the UNDOF crossing points, in trucks driven by ‘neutrals’.572
Second and third-line logistics support plays an important role in ensuring that 
UNDOF continues to function. First-line logistics of daily supplies are conducted 
integrally by units, whereas second-line logistics move larger items or numbers of 
personnel within the Operational Area. The third line is the connection of supplies and 
communications from outside the Operational Area, especially ports and airports. 
Damascus international airport is the main entry point for UNDOF personnel, 
supplemented by Tel Aviv international airport, air movements directed from force HQ, 
with an UNTSO aircraft available. The main supply ports have been Latakia and 
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Tartous in Syria, although that entails a long and arduous road journey, while the JSDF 
have utilised Haifa Port. 573
The first Japanese contingent (J-CON) to UNDOF in 1996 was the first dispatch to a 
standing rather than ad hoc mission. J-CON worked within the larger Canadian unit, 
replaced from 2006 by an Indian unit, sharing duties and many facilities with J-CON. 
The Japanese government studied the possibilities to send the JSDF to other missions, 
but after a significant time spent studying options, decided that following a survey team 
report in April 1995 that UNDOF would be feasible and not violate the IPCL.
It is in second and third-line logistical and engineering roles 
that the JSDF has contributed to UNDOF.
B  ODO Preparation and Logistics
574 This 
was the first UNPKO dispatch for the Murayama coalition cabinet. Izumi Nobumichi of 
the Nikkei Shimbun suggested in 1995 that the LDP had pressed Prime Minister 
Murayama to participate in the ‘main force’ of a UNPKO, possibly even with infantry, 
thereby requiring the ‘unfreezing’ of IPCL restricted activities, within an overall legal 
review, while Murayama’s Socialists would only accept PKO/PSO missions.575
While JSDF deployment to UNDOF was first raised under Prime Minister Hata in 
1994, and received in a positive manner, the actual deployment took 18 months to 
eventuate, partly due political turmoil and the caution of Murayama.576
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was approved by Cabinet Order 421 in August 1995, from when the IPCH dispatched 
survey teams and commenced discussions with Canada and the UNDPKO.577 The JSDF 
contingent deployed in January 1996, commencing duties from 1st February 1996, with 
two staff officers, a J-CON headquarters, and transport and logistics units totalling 43 
personnel. The initial force deployment was by ASDF C-130H of two GSDF staff 
officers and a vehicle, and later the main force, six trucks, six buses, and associated 
equipment, with 60 ASDF personnel in support (outside UN assessments).578 The 
Japanese arrived with 11 pistols, 32 rifles, and two general-purpose machine-guns 
(GPMG).579
As a regularly constituted mission, there has been less logistical strain on the JSDF as 
unlike UNTAC and ONUMOZ the heavy plant required for operational duties was 
mainly in position and has only required gradual renewal. Most transport vehicles have 
been European left-hand drive designs provided by the UN. As the Japanese were only 
required to provide their own basic unit equipment for their small force, such as 
small-arms, communications equipment, and 12 unit transports, the logistical load was 
J-CON supplementary equipment was consequently transported by air and 
sea, mainly by commercial means, but JSDF C-130H aircraft provided air-lift of 
light-weight supplies. The regular air-support element is a C-130H or U-4 transport 
aircraft every six months, providing a supply link via Damascus, and the U-4 has also 
transported Japanese dignitaries within the region. Most personnel transit on 
commercial airlines via Damascus, with most GSDF UNDOF participants stating that 
they preferred the speed and comfort to ASDF flights.
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light.
J-CON has been small in proportion to the mission. UNDOF averaged 1050 
personnel in 1997, with the Japanese constituting just over 4% of the force, or 2.89% of 
UN-assessed force, due to 12-15 supporting troops being nationally funded.580 Japan 
chose to contribute a small contingent to a small mission with integral infantry 
battalions present, UNDOF being one of the smallest such missions.581 MoFA and JDA 
staff have indicated they were lucky to get the opportunity, as Canada wished to reduce 
its commitments and was happy to have a capable partner.582
Preparation for UNDOF dispatch was unlike that for UNTAC or ONUMOZ, as the 
time available was greater, and the local conditions and roles were far more certain than 
in previous missions. UNDOF was the first operation which aimed to make use of some 
of the experience of  previous ODO experience, and the pre-dispatch training had the 
voices of ‘veterans’ included within the curriculum.
The mission met the 
minimum conditions as outlined in the IPCL, but also the optimum mission profile of 
safety, stability, organic mission security forces (including for the JSDF), and the 
minimal logistical ‘burden’. UNDOF met these requirements, with two infantry 
battalions, and a supporting logistics battalion (LOGBATT), which J-CON could ‘plug 
into’ with little additional equipment. 
583
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later gaining fame as ‘hige no Sato’ (moustache Sato), commanding the first GSDF 
contingent in Iraq.584 The main focus of preparation was on the core transport and 
engineering tasks that J-CON would carry out, volunteers were plentiful, and 
respondents of a survey conducted by Kawano Hitoshi illustrated their high 
motivation.585
Training was initially focused upon operating heavy plant, such as dozers, diggers, 
and rollers, for as in UNTAC, road repair would be a significant J-CON duty, but the 
range of engineering skills required would be greater, and with so few members each 
would be required to multi-task. To this end, multiple-skills training was instituted, as 
well as the driving of unfamiliar, left-hand drive vehicles. Seki et al have illustrated that 
from the end of the 1990s the emphasis on pre-deployment training was systemized into 
three strands: specialist training (engineering/transport), developing team work and a 
group ethos (from disparate volunteers), and the study of language and culture. All 
members were given English and Arabic language training, while lectures explained the 
complexities of the area, particularly about Islam and Judaism.
The first contingent was from the Western Army, with the second from 
the Eastern Army, dispatched on six-month rotations, with staff officers in position for 
one year.
586
Unlike in previous missions, each member trained with the Type-64 rifle, and ROE 
were carefully explained and rehearsed. This would appear to be the first such 
systemized contingency training for a UN mission, even though the basic assumption 
was that the infantry battalions would protect them. The rules of engagement have 
naturally never been made public, but former participants have related how the 
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assumption was that J-CON troops would withdraw to bunkers in the event of hostilities, 
only defending their immediate area within the overall base defence plan. Fire-arms, as 
in previous missions, would not be regularly issued, but stored in a secure armoury.
Most officers were requested to apply for UNDOF service, or were chosen. Other 
members were volunteers, with the main motivations including the desires for 
operational experience, foreign travel, and the chance to represent Japan in an 
international setting. Few accepted that the daily allowance (teate) was a motivating 
factor, but suggested it could be for lower ranks with families.
C  JSDF Performance
The division of responsibilities in J-CON was clear, with two, later three, officers 
assigned to the HQ staff for coordination and public relations duties, and the 
Transportation Platoon (27-30 troops), including engineering support. The Detachment 
Section (12-15 troops) were ‘national force support personnel’ (jitai kanri youin),
providing external third-tier logistical support.587
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UNDOF Comments (Kokuren heiryoku hikihanashikan shitai UNDOF) (Tokyo: MoFA, 2007).
The Japanese contingent formed the 
Transportation Platoon (PLT) of the LOGBATT. The J-CON PLT included the Camp 
Ziouani J-CON HQ, the Transportation Section in Camp Ziouani, and Detachment 
Section at Camp Faouar (see Appendix Two). The J-CON HQ section coordinates with 
UNDOF HQ, LOGBATT HQ, and the IPCH and JDA/MOD, as well as contributing to 
Golan: The UNDOF Journal. The J-CON Transportation Section has conducted 
UNDOF's second-line logistics transportation requirements, utilizing 21 vehicles, from 
cars through to 8 tonne trucks, transporting food, water, laundry, and other supplies, the 
movement of heavy engineering vehicles, as well as providing in-Area staff bus 
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services.
The Japanese have provided approximately one-quarter of the LOGBATT by 
capability, although assurances were sought that the JSDF would not be required to 
transport arms, ammunition, or armed troops. The work has been constant and 
unglamorous, the climate harsh, and the living conditions basic, with shared 
Japanese-Canadian accommodation that was a source of some stress for the J-CON 
during the early part of the mission.588 Partly this was due to the Canadians rotating 
every three months, but commanders describe the stress being relieved by parties.589
This was resolved as part of the UNDOF Force Modernization Programme 2001- 2006,
providing separate accommodation for all contingents.590
J-CON also possessed ‘swing capabilities’ with snow removal, an unglamorous task, 
but the failure to clear snow had previously resulted in broken communications, 
damaged assets, and local hardship. The Austrian Army stated that for their UNDOF 
battalion “the greatest problems for personnel are related to snow and ice” during winter 
patrols.
As the security situation has 
been stable, the mission is lacking in controversy, and has been a low-cost, constant 
reminder of Japan’s UN commitment. 
591 The GSDF had an advantage as most personnel had served in Hokkaido 
where snow removal duties were a regular task, and the second contingent contained 
members fresh from Nagano Olympic duties.592
                                                   
588 Interviewees mention culinary stresses, and communication difficulties. 
589 Karube, Masakazu, ‘UNDOF Round Table Discussion’:27.
590
Golan: The UNDOF Journal, 106 (2006): 23.
The Detachment Section handled this 
task, as well as the other duties requiring specialist, heavy-lifting plant, such as fork-lift 
591
Moderne Alpinausrüstung für die höchste UN-Position der Welt, Austrian Army, 2007 
(http://www.bmlv.gv.at/ausle/undof/artikel.php?id=1815, 12 August 2007).
592 ‘Listening to the Eastern Army GOC’ (Toubu houmensoukan ni kiku), Securitarian (April 1997): 
6-10; MOD UNDOF Data Index August 2009
(http://www.mod.go.jp/gsdf/crf/pa/overseas/undof/undofindex.html, 30 August 2010). 
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trucks, cranes, and heavy trailers. Another ‘swing capability’ was fire-fighting, as not 
only is fire an immediate hazard to UNDOF, but during the summer the area is so dry, 
and winds so prevalent, that any failure to quickly extinguish fire could have serious 
consequences for local communities, with little prospect of external fire-fighting. 
LOGBATT has the primary responsibility and specialized fire-fighting equipment. 
Other roles include road development and maintenance, and emergency vehicle 
recovery and maintenance. It was estimated in 2006 that J-CON had covered 
approximately 2.62 million km, and transported approximately 23,000 tonnes, at a daily 
average of almost 800 km and 48 tonnes of goods transported.593
The Detachment Section must be highly adaptable to changing seasonal and force 
requirements. Detachment Leader Captain Hirayama Yoshito commented in 2009 that, 
“J-CON stands proudly behind the scene, supporting the UNDOF mission for peace and 
stability on the Golan Heights.” The Japanese experience in UNDOF has been mainly 
that, standing behind the scenes. It has attracted little media attention, little scrutiny, and 
little interest among most Japanese, a point of contention with not only JSDF personnel, 
but also Cabinet Office staff posted in support functions.594 Visiting Japanese students 
in 2006 were surprised to meet JSDF troops in Golan. J-CON personnel invited them to 
visit their camp, and ‘Club Fuji’ as honoured guests, and to relieve the frustrations of 
what they considered to be a neglected outpost.595
                                                   
593
Golan: The UNDOF Journal, 106: 14.
594
UNDOF and Japan’s Contribution (Kokuren heiryoku hikihanashikantai (UNDOF) to Nihon no 
kouken), Shinohara, Kenji, (27 August 2004), MoFA 
(http://www.mofa.go.jp/mofaj/gaiko/pko/undof_040827.html, 19 August 2009).
595 Interview, Arai, Mayu, Daito Bunka University, Higashi Matsuyama, Saitama (22 October 2008).
The lack of detailed interest can be 
gauged by the description of UNDOF in a brief report of troops returning to Japan: the 
Asahi Shimbun reported that UNDOF had two main PKF elements, one Polish, the other 
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Australian!596 The IPCH has attempted to counter this ignorance with an impressive 
bilingual online video presentation of the JSDF in UNDOF.597
The tasks listed have been conducted by small numbers of personnel, and it is clear 
that the adaptability and multiple capabilities of J-CON have greatly contributed to the 
mission. The lack of scale appears to have been balanced by the utilisation of equipment 
to the most effective and efficient means possible, even when some has not been of the 
highest standards. The first J-CON commander has contrasted how the limited budgets 
and operational requirements of UNDOF dictated ‘quick-patching’ of roads compared to 
building and sealing of roads in Iraq.598 In 1997, the government shipped vehicles via 
Haifa to replace obsolete UN types for road maintenance and transport duties, as 
‘contributions in kind’ for the mission, primarily to ensure J-CON would be able to 
work as effectively and efficiently as possible.599 The range of equipment that 40 
personnel have to be proficient in the use of is quite extraordinary, as the mission owns
and operates 438 vehicles, most of which the JSDF must be able to operate, and all of 
which it must be prepared to support, including APC, trucks, engineering vehicles, 
ambulances, and 50 buses. 600 Staff officers and contingent commanders received 
comments from their UNDOF peers that the Japanese focused upon tasks to be 
completed, rather than the time taken, particularly with engineering and vehicle 
maintenance tasks.601
                                                   
596 ‘First element of the Middle-East Golan PKO Contingent Returns (Chuutou Goran kougen no 
PKO hakentai, daiichijin ga kikoku), Asahi Shimbun (4 August 1999): 28.
597
In Pursuit of International Peace-PKO Assignment in the Golan Heights, IPCH, video (17 
September 2009) (http://nettv.gov-online.go.jp/eng/prg/prg1908.html, 4 January 2010).
598 Sato, Masahisa, ‘From the Golan Heights to Iraq’: 313-314.
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Defense of Japan 2008: 152.
600 Tortolani, Benjamin C. (ed.), Annual Review of Global Peace Operations 2010: 273.
601 Kojima, Nobuyoshi, ‘Self-Defense Force in the Middle East: An Observation by a Defense 
Attaché’ (Boueichuuzaikan kara mita chuutou to jieitai), in Military History Society of Japan (ed.), 
Peacekeeping Operations in Historical Perspective: 184-204, 186.
While this was initially considered a criticism, it was praise for 
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dedication, with other troops leaving unfinished tasks until the next day in order to dine 
or drink.602
There have been cases where the J-CON has been called upon to cooperate in small 
numbers, fully-integrated into multinational taskforces. One example was ‘Team 
Radome’ in 2004, tasked with the construction of a radome tower (a strong shell 
housing sensitive antennae). J-CON heavy trucks transported containers from Haifa, 
with a heavy lifting crane through mountain roads to Mount Hermon. The need for a 
strong structure was due to the harsh winter conditions, with heavy snow and gale-force 
winds. This was part of the high quality force modernization programme with most 
UNDOF facilities renewed.603
The Japanese contingents have continued this integrated good practice through 
medical work, with three medical and one dental staff per contingent rotation, treating 
an average of 184 cases per rotation, including non-Japanese.604 This represents a large 
medical team, approximately 9% of the total contingent strength, based upon UNTAC 
and ONUMOZ practice.605
The IPCH, JDA/MOD, and MoFA have been reluctant to discuss security concerns in 
UNDOF, particularly during the Iraq dispatch.606 However, UNDOF veterans have 
commented that they were dependent upon others to protect them, despite the official 
denial of collective security. J-CON itself has organic defensive capabilities, as 
previously stated.607
                                                   
602 Karube, Masakazu, ‘UNDOF Round Table Discussion’: 29.
As in UNTAC and ONUMOZ, there was de facto recognition that 
603 IPCH (http://www.pko.go.jp/PKO_E/result/undof_e.html, 18 August 2009).
604 Shirohama, Tatsuoki, Knowledge I wish to put in place: 76.
605 Shirohama, Tatsuoki, Knowledge I wish to put in place: 83.
606 Kojima, Nobuyoshi, ‘Self-Defense Force in the Middle East: An Observation by a Defense 
Attaché’: 199-200.
607 Rafferty, Kevin, ‘Japan sharpens military role,’ The Guardian (22 December 1995): 11.
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J-CON simply did not have the firepower, manpower, or training required to defend 
itself effectively against more than minor incursions. Therefore, as in previous missions, 
it has depended upon the infantry battalions for security, and to act as a contingency 
extraction force. From 1996 the Austrian infantry battalion have played this role, like 
the French in UNTAC, but J-CON has enjoyed the double protection of both infantry 
and its host LOGBATT. In 2002, following a report in the Tokyo Shimbun that the JDA 
was planning to dispatch 10 GSDF troops to form a ‘ready-reserve’ capability, the Chief 
Cabinet-Secretary Fukuda Yasuo denied the reports. As Kyodo reported “40-50 
Canadians form a ready reserve group in UNDOF charged with rescuing UNDOF 
logistic forces in case of a battle.”608
Most LOGBATT units have been engineering units. Since March 2006, the first 
Indian contingent, INDCON, in 2006 was formed around the Poona Horse, a famous 
cavalry regiment, with signalling, engineering, and other specialists seconded.
The scale of the matter was clear: the LOGBATT’s 
small, integral contingency reserve force was larger than the entire J-CON. After the 
controversy had subsided, all rotations included a military police officer and NCO, 
presumably to provide a moderate degree of enhanced security, although security drills 
mainly entail retreating to ‘Stand-Firm’ bunkers (see Appendix Three).
609
                                                   
608 ‘Gov't denies Japan joining U.N. main mission in Golan’, Kyodo News (22 July 2002), 
(
In 
2009, INDCON rotated to 169 Field Regiment, the first Indian artillery unit to serve in 
UNPKO, with specialists attached. The INDCON is therefore a far ‘harder’ military 
force than the J-CON, or preceding Canadian units, and provides an auxiliary combat 
capability to that of the infantry battalions. There have been no known cases in which 
J-CON performance has been compromised by security concerns.
http://findarticles.com/p/articles/mi_m0XPQ/is_2002_July_22/ai_89564178?tag=rel.res3, 16 June 
2008).
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Golan: The UNDOF Journal, 106: 7.
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While there have never been major incursions into the UNDOF area, the territory 
upon which it operates is among the most strategically vital in the Middle East. In May 
1997, two Austrian soldiers were shot and killed while on patrol in the UNDOF area, 
with little media attention.610 Four UNDOF military personnel died, 2005-2008, from 
various causes.611 One Japanese staff member raised the issue of Israeli bombing of 
Syria on 5th October 2003 over-flying the UNDOF Area.612 Even in off-the-record 
conversations with UNDOF veterans, there is a reluctance to discuss such matters, 
beyond the clear statements that UNDOF contingents were dependable in an emergency. 
However, former contingent commanders have stated their concerns over the possibility 
of becoming targets for terrorist groups.613
It would seem that compared to some other contingents, the J-CON have been able to 
maintain good relations with Israeli personnel. The reason is unclear, as Japan provides
ODA to Syria and began significant ODA projects with Lebanon and the Palestinian 
authority from 1996, but may be due to an uncritical approach to Israel’s security 
policies.614 Japan has maintained air links between Tel Aviv and Damascus, and sea and 
land links between the UNDOF area and Israel. One consequence is that the J-CON 
send their mail through Israel, while other contingents utilise Syria.615
The younger generation of JSDF UNDOF member appeared to be more focused on 
Although not 
significant, this illustrates that the J-CON is not only impartial, but also is perceived as 
impartial.
                                                   
610 ‘2 Austrian members of the Golan PKO shot dead on patrol’ (Goran PKO no ousutoriajin taiin, 
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building language skills, and often undertook activities that brought them into greatest 
contact with other contingents and civilians. Examples included the J-CON pages of the
Golan journal, cultural events, such as tea ceremony, calligraphy, origami, and Japanese 
matsuri (festivals). There have also been demonstrations of kendo, judo, karate, kyudo,
and even sumo, particularly impressive for local children, assisted by the JICA mission 
in Damascus, and one UNDOF civilian commented upon the surprising degree Japan 
had such a distinctive profile in UNDOF.616
Personnel policy has evolved with the mission. Major Tokunaga Katsuhiko appointed 
as commander of J-CON in 2004 perhaps epitomized the new generation of JSDF ODO 
personnel. Unusually for UNDOF, he was an infantry officer, completed both Ranger 
training and the GSDF Command and General Staff Course, and the “Humanitarian 
Challenge” and “Human Rights” peacekeeping courses at the Pearson Peacekeeping 
Centre, Canada.
As a standing mission, rather than the 
short-term ODO, the feeling of UNDOF personnel is very much one of making a home 
for the Japanese members, with Club Fuji, and inter-contingent activities. Although the 
rotation is usually six months, there is a sense of permanence, enhanced by the 
construction projects that have benefited J-CON and other contingents. J-CON has 
performed well in the unofficial UNDOF duties, to form good relations within the 
mission, and friendly and trusting relations with the local population.
617
Women joined J-CON since 2004, but have not been a constant presence, mainly 
undertaking administrative and medical duties. Although Sabine Fruhsuck claimed the 
first women joined J-CON in 1996, the first female JSDF members in ODO were 
Previously, very few officers had received any specialist let alone 
PKO training.
                                                   
616
UNDOF and Japan’s Contribution.
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dispatched to East Timor in 2002.618 ASDF and MSDF officers have also served in staff 
roles, as part of a ‘joint’ approach to ODO, the first (MSDF) member being dispatched 
from February 2003.619
The IPCH also provides liaison staff in Tel Aviv and Damascus. These personnel are 
tasked with civil liaison with Israeli and Syrian authorities to assist the JSDF personnel 
in their work. The staff selected for these tasks are also usually those who have a 
significant degree of international experience and good language skills, to complement 
JSDF personnel who may be more limited on these points.620
As previously stated, J-CON has performed well in its duties with UNDOF, has 
operated effectively, and provided high quality logistical, engineering, and other 
supporting services out of proportion to its size. During the seven month deployment of 
the 14
D  Japanese Contribution to Mission
th contingent (2002) the JSDF transported 3700 people and 900 tonnes of freight, 
and covered 110,000 km.621 It has joined integrated team projects, and its skills, 
capabilities, and diligence have been acknowledged during almost 15 years of 
deployment. There have been problems, however, with troops reporting major problems 
with their English ability, explaining that they had to communicate in gestures, and 
being unable to understand simple comments. Many felt embarrassed at their lack of 
abilities, and some wished that they had younger personnel with them to make up for 
their inadequacies.622
                                                   
618 Fruhstuck, Sabine, Uneasy Warriors: 90; NHK report, 7pm television news bulletin (14 January 
2002).
619
Defense of Japan 2008: 272.
620 Interview, Harada, Ryuichi.
621
Defense of Japan 2003: 272.
A staff officer in UNDOF in 1997 stated that he felt the staff 
622 ‘Four GSDF personnel from Kawauchi City report on their return from Middle-East PKO 
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meetings and such gatherings were difficult for JSDF officers, as they were not 
proficient in English, and poor compared with other non-native speakers, such as 
Austrians, while the Canadians could set the agenda through their native English skills. 
Japanese were often ashamed of their shortcomings, and therefore were not vocal in the 
first half of their tours, but the feeling was that with time this situation improved, not 
only through improved English skill, but also increased understanding of UNDOF staff 
roles.623
Despite limits on transporting weapons, J-CON has regularly transported UNDOF 
APC for repairs at the UN facility in Lebanon, involving a 10 hour drive over 250
km.624 There has been no overt comment that Japanese performance and contribution to 
the mission has been compromised by legal or other restrictions.625 With the JSDF being 
such a long-term presence, it was felt by many that the other contingents understood the 
limitations upon the Japanese, and arranged duties to match the (considerable) JSDF 
capabilities. To a greater degree than in any other mission, the JSDF contingent has 
been vital to the functioning of the mission. In ONUMOZ there were other military and 
civilian units capable of covering JSDF duties, but this has not been the case in UNDOF. 
The UNDOF force commander, Wolfgang Jilke, stated in 2009 that the role of J-CON 
was invaluable and that if the JSDF were to withdraw the mission would suffer severely 
as a result.626
The first UNDOF contingent commander stated in his report upon returning to Japan, 
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“I have the feeling that we tried hard to continue to provide steady logistical support to 
middle-east peace. I think that the outcome has been sufficient.”627 It would appear from 
the later UNDOF commander’s comments that JSDF contributions to the mission have 
been beyond “sufficient”. A tangible reward was made to five J-CON members invited 
to participate in the Paris Bastille Day parade of 2007, partly in recognition of services 
provided to the mission.628
While UNDOF has been a small-scale JSDF ODO, the initial media attention rapidly 
faded, and has rarely caught the public’s imagination, it has been in many ways the most 
successful ODO.
E  Conclusions
629 It has demonstrated JSDF competences in a range of diverse PSO 
skills, in harsh climates, and provided significant capabilities to the mission that 
couldn’t otherwise be covered by the small UNDOF budget.630
                                                   
627 ‘Returning PKO contingent report: “continue to provide steady logistical support to Middle-East 
peace”’(PKO hakentai ga kikoku houkoku, “Jimichini chuutou heiwa ni kouken”), Asahi Shimbun
(Miyagi) (30 August 1996): article 333.
The achievement of 
completing the heavy logistical and engineering work of the contingent with the 
minimum of incidents is also no small feat. It has maintained cordial relations with 
Syria and Israel, and helped the development of trust and communications. Perhaps 
most of all the JSDF have built trust among other contingents, and developed 
self-confidence. As Ambassador Kunieda Masaki commented: 
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Japan has sent more than 1000 personnel to UNDOF. Some of them, 
benefiting from their valuable experience...have subsequently served in 
peacekeeping missions in other parts of the world. The relevance of Japan’s 
experience with UNDOF cannot be overstated. When the Japanese Government 
considers dispatching members of its Self Defense Forces...its experience with 
UNDOF is invariably brought up. Indeed, UNDOF is Japan’s point of reference 
in terms of its participation in any UN peacekeeping operation.631
The progression in JSDF UN peace missions is clear. UNTAC provided the 
grounding through nation-building PSO tasks, with large unit and significant logistical 
support. ONUMOZ provided a compact ‘light footprint’ multinational-integrated 
PSO-support role, with substantial logistical train. UNDOF built upon both experiences, 
and developed a high-capability engineering and transport PSO role, with a 
‘light-footprint’ and ‘light-logistics’ load. During four years, the degree of 
lessons-learned was (eventually) significant, and Japan was able to conduct effective, 
high quality, and meaningful operations in diverse environments and missions. Different 
niche skills were demonstrated in each mission, with only medical services being 
constant. The JSDF almost accidentally acquired a diverse mission-range capability but 
not without difficulties. 
The success of UNDOF has indeed somewhat displaced the notion that UNTAC was the 
ideal form of UN ODO mission, as UNDOF has provided a long-term, deeply 
embedded, high-capability alternative model. The mission has also provided a secure 
environment, yet the de facto security arrangements rather raise questions as to the 
sustainability and legitimacy of the de jure restrictions placed on JSDF ODO.
5   Conclusion
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The common problem of language skills was only partly overcome, with external 
help (NGO, MoFA, JICA), and reliance upon younger personnel, UNTAC benefiting
from its low average age among participants. 632 Conflicts between unity and exclusivity 
of UN command and national priorities were unresolved, but the UN appeared to 
acknowledge Japanese legal requirements concerning ‘control’.633 This national ‘control’ 
despite ‘real time’ communications, did not equate to ‘real time’ information or 
decisions, with significant delays in receiving orders and authorisations.634 There were 
also significant differences between UN and JSDF ROE requirements which were only 
resolved by mediation and accommodation at the operational level among professionals
(see Chapter Six). 635
                                                   
632 Ohta, Kiyohiko, ‘A Public Relations Officer’s Experiences in UNTAC’: 177.
633 Watanabe, Takashi, ‘In the Field of Cambodia’: 158-159.
634 Watanabe, Takashi, ‘In the Field of Cambodia’: 164.
635 Watanabe, Takashi, ‘In the Field of Cambodia’: 161-162.
That the JSDF were able to perform professionally within highly restrictive legal and 
political constraints is all the more remarkable, particularly given the expansion of 
duties in UNTAC, yet questions remain concerning the efficiency of certain operational 
points, such as logistical support from Japan, and security issues. The JSDF have relied 
upon ‘practical interpretations’ of legal and political limitations, particularly regarding 
their expanded duties in UNTAC, and collective security restrictions in all operations. 
While such pragmatic flexibility is praiseworthy, it contains the inherent risk of practice 
outstripping policy. The JSDF have been cautious in their approach but also fortunate to 
have avoided casualties
Reliance upon de facto collective security agreements will be one issue examined in 
non-UN missions, but further mission-variant diversity and its evaluation in such ODO
will be the main focus of Chapter Five.
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Chapter 5 ODO Deployments: 
Operations Other Than Peacekeeping
Introduction
Japan’s ODO have encompassed five mission variants. The UNPKO of the 1990s 
have been previously analysed, while anti-terrorism support missions developed in the 
21st
While the same analytical framework shall be applied to these missions as UNPKO, 
there are naturally differences. The most significant is of duration, as the shortest UN 
mission was approximately one year, while the longest non-UNPKO ODO in the 1990s 
was of approximately six months, but with three months spent in transit to the 
operational area (Persian Gulf). The activities of maritime minesweeping in particular 
cannot be easily equated with those of disaster relief, humanitarian assistance, or PSO, 
and therefore the Allied Support mission shall be briefly analysed, as relevant to 
evaluating JSDF ODO capabilities. Similarly, the Disaster Relief and Humanitarian 
Assistance missions can be divided into major and minor. The respective missions to 
Zaire and Honduras involved significant personnel and the treatment of thousands. By 
contrast, the Disaster Relief mission to Turkey entailed the delivery of aid-in-kind, 
while the Humanitarian Assistance mission to West Timor was an ASDF air-shuttle 
service. The emphasis of the operational analysis shall therefore be placed upon the 
century. In the 1990s, the JSDF undertook three non-UNPKO ODO variants:
Allied Support (post-Gulf War minesweeping)
Humanitarian Assistance (Jindou shien: Rwanda/Zaire, West Timor)
Disaster Relief (Kinkyuu enjo: Honduras, Turkey)
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larger missions.
One non-UN mission that the JSDF prepared for was the evacuation of Japanese 
nationals from areas of potential conflict. The Gulf War provided an example of the 
associated difficulties, and former Ambassador Katakura Kunio has commented on the 
obstacles to evacuating Japanese nationals from Kuwait and Iraq.636 A Special Cabinet 
Order was implemented on 29 January 1991 to use ASDF aircraft for evacuations, but 
was not utilised and therefore annulled, but it set a precedent for potential ODO without 
parliamentary legislation.637 The ASDF thereafter trained with MoFA in March 1995 to 
prepare for an emergency evacuation from South-East Asia.638 The first operational 
attempt was far from successful, as Prime Minister Hashimoto dispatched three ASDF 
C-130H aircraft to Thailand on 12th July 1997 (Clause 8, Article 100, SDF Law) in 
anticipation of a potential evacuation of Japanese from Cambodia during civil unrest. 
However, since the aircraft were dispatched after the unrest had subsided they remained 
in Bangkok, Cambodia resented the action and refused the ASDF entry. The mission 
ended in confusion.639
                                                   
636 Conversations, Katakura, Kunio, Daito Bunka University (2003).
637 Hook, Glenn D., Militarization and Demilitarization in Contemporary Japan: 89.
638 ‘ASDF conducts first overseas transport aircraft exercise: For possible international assistance’ 
(Koukuujietai no yusouki ga shonokaigai kunren: kokusai enjo wo nentou ni), Asahi Shimbun (3
March 1995): 33.
639 ‘Analysis: Hashimoto's SDF evacuation attempt backfires’, Nikkei Shimbun (15 July 1997)
The other non-UN missions, however, have been widely seen as successful examples 
of JSDF ODO. In fact, although of little relevance for the specific duties of the mission 
itself, the first such ODO conducted by the JSDF provided an example of JSDF 
capabilities that could be consolidated in UNPKO.
(http://telecom21.nikkei.co.jp/nt21/service/ENGD021/ENGD241?cid=NDJEDB1997071500101388
&madr=TOP&kdt=19970715&dk=106aeb3d&nhpjnl=&reservedtp=ENGD021g6iswkzl&ftrmode=
ENGD031&hltid=206chh6ax4ekw, 8 March 2010).
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1  Allied Support Mission: Persian Gulf
Introduction
As previously outlined, the dispatch of MSDF vessels to the Persian Gulf in April 
1991 was seen as the minimum contribution Japan could make under US pressure. Its 
effectiveness was largely overlooked, despite being the first ODO since the Korean War. 
Unlike 1950, the minesweeping group was escorted by destroyers and aircraft as it
departed, with enormous media coverage. Despite this, many scholars continue to state 
that the dispatch to Cambodia more than a year later was the first JSDF ODO.640
The Japanese had been under pressure to contribute forces to Gulf coalition efforts in 
1990-1991. Having failed to pass dispatch legislation or reinterpret existing instruments 
by the spring of 1991, the Japanese government reverted to the option of minesweeping 
forces. The MSDF Maritime Staff Office had prepared contingency plans following 
1987-1988 Gulf dispatch discussions, and as the US had largely delegated 
minesweeping to the MSDF and its NATO allies, the post-Gulf War effort would be 
largely provided by these navies, including Germany in its first military dispatch outside 
the  NATO area.
A  Mission Context
641
The dispatch was authorised under JSDF Law, Article 99 on 24
The MSDF were able to contribute a niche capability and possessed
extensive overseas experience due to cooperation with the USN. 
th
                                                   
640 Hook, Glenn D., et al, Japan’s International Relations: 384.
641 Woolley, Peter J., Japan’s Navy: 31-32.
April, to ensure the 
safety of the nation’s shipping in international waters, and was made possible by a 
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subtle yet important shift in the government’s interpretation of the law.642 Legal revision 
had been cited by Foreign Minister Fujiyama in 1958 as to why JSDF personnel could 
not be deployed overseas for operations (see Chapter Three).643
The MSDF force had been prepared according to MSDF staff plans, and was ready to 
sail within two days of authorisation. The vessels departed on 26
B  JSDF ODO Preparation and Logistics
th April 1991 on their 
32 day, 13,000 km voyage, consisting of four Hatsushima-class minesweepers, the 
minesweeping support-ship Hayase, and AOE Tokiwa. The transit included visits to the 
Philippines, Singapore, Malaysia, Sri Lanka, and Pakistan, before arriving in Dubai on 
27th May, suggesting that there was no particular urgency in assembling the eight-nation 
minesweeping force. The MSDF role also included provision of services and goods, 
such as fuel, food, and water, to allied ships, an understated yet important precedent.644
The MSDF group began its first box-pattern search routine on 5
C  JSDF Performance
th June 1991, 
discovering its first mine on 19th June.645 Thereafter the pace quickened, with 16 mines 
disposed of on 1st July, with 34 cleared in total.646 The missions were completed without 
loss, injury, or damage to the group. The MSDF vessels departed from the Gulf, 
returned via the same route, arriving in Kure on 30th October 1991 to a fanfare.
                                                   
642 Kawabata, Osamu (ed.), Operation Gulf Dawn: The 188 Day Minesweeper Force Deployment
(‘Wangan no yoake’: sakusen zenkiroku– kaijoujieitai Perushawan soukai haken taino188nichi)
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D  Japanese Contribution to Mission
The MSDF supported allied forces during their mission, providing medical treatment 
for a German sailor before transferring him to a US helicopter, refuelling allied vessels 
and aircraft, as well as visiting Italian and German minesweepers to consult on certain 
munitions. Glenn D. Hook has suggested that as the MSDF cleared only 34 of 
approximately 1200 mines, the dispatch “was of greater symbolic importance than the 
task performed.”647
While not of operational value, the defence diplomacy activities undertaken by the 
MSDF were well received, during port calls, and professional and social events amongst 
the minesweeping groups. One interesting episode was a visit to an Iranian naval base, 
where the MSDF crews were warmly received, and perhaps contributed something to 
lessening tensions.
While the basic facts are clear, naval minesweeping ‘success’ 
depends greatly on the assigned sweep-area and chance, and the MSDF also provided 
mission-enhancing support activities. However, Hook’s emphasis upon the symbolic
value is valid. 
648
The MSDF provided an example of how, with forward planning, a small but effective 
force could be dispatched for complex, multinational duties, positively contributing to 
the overall mission. It was clear that the minesweepers were not the ideal vessels to 
send on long ocean voyages, but without minesweeping helicopters (being introduced at 
the time of the dispatch) there was little option.
E  Conclusion
649
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For the Japanese people and 
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government it provided the first tangible evidence that the JSDF was a professional 
force that could operate effectively under civilian control as a representative in 
multinational security efforts. While not building a bridge to Japanese UNPKO, the first 
ODO was an important step towards establishing JSDF credentials as legitimate and 
effective international actors.
2  Humanitarian Assistance Missions: Rwanda/Zaire and West Timor
A Rwanda/Zaire
Introduction
The dispatch of JSDF personnel to Zaire arose from the horror of genocide that 
overtook the country in 1994. While Japan, like most countries, had done little to 
prevent the slaughter, the government was eager to help the estimated two million 
refugees flooding into the surrounding countries. While money was provided, it was 
also considered appropriate to capitalise upon the achievements of UNTAC and 
ONUMOZ (the latter still on-going), and set a dispatch precedent for Humanitarian 
Assistance duties within the IPCL. The main features of the operation would be the 
difficulty of dispatch, the need for a rapid establishment of services, the brevity of 
mission, the unilateral nature outside of UN control, and security concerns for Japanese 
personnel, given the local security environment. Compared with ONUMOZ, media 
coverage was extensive, and the government seemed particularly keen to emphasise the 
‘non-military’ humanitarian nature of the mission.
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a  Mission Context
Conflict in Rwanda was driven by ethnic divisions between the majority Hutu and 
minority Tutsi ethnic groups through years of civil strife that had led to civil war. The 
1993 Arusha peace process had been signed by the warring parties, and a UN Observer 
Mission for Uganda-Rwanda (UNOMUR) had been established that year to ease the 
path to elections in both countries. The victory of the largely Tutsi Rwandan Patriotic 
Front (RPF) in the elections led to a period of peace and transition from UNOMUR to 
UNAMIR, a small Chapter VI UNPKO.
On 6th April 1994, the aircraft carrying the Hutu presidents of Rwanda and Burundi 
was shot down while approaching the Rwandan capital, Kigali, killing all on board. It is 
suspected that Hutu extremists carried out the act, as within hours Hutu troops and 
militia began to murder and detain Tutsis and moderate Hutus in systematic fashion.
UNAMIR, under Brig-Gen. Romeo Dallaire, was overwhelmed and under-supported by 
the UN, with the result that the murders escalated into genocide. Estimates of the 
casualties are approximately 800,000.650 The slaughter was brought to an end by the 
military success of the RPF, but this prompted the flight of approximately two million 
refugees, including Hutu militia forces, into Zaire, Burundi, Tanzania, and Uganda, 
creating the Great Lakes Refugee Crisis, with cholera and other diseases claiming 
thousands of lives.651
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b  JSDF ODO Preparation and Logistics
The Japanese government had changed tremendously between the 1992 and 1994. 
The LDP had been replaced by a coalition of opposition parties under Prime Minister 
Hosokawa Morihiro, then Hata Tsutomu, before being displaced by a ‘grand coalition’ 
of LDP, JSP, and New Party Sakigake under Prime Minister Murayama Tomiichi (JSP). 
While the government had rejected suggestions that it might contribute forces to the UN 
preventative deployment mission in Macedonia, it approved the dispatch of the JSDF to 
Goma in Zaire, to support the efforts dealing with the massive refugee crisis that had 
engulfed eastern Zaire.652
The Japanese government chose to dispatch the JSDF to Goma, Zaire, rather than 
Rwanda, due to the UNHCR request and as the US, French, Dutch, and even Israeli 
militaries had chosen Goma as their centre for operations. Interviewees have 
commented on the desire to be close to the US as a request had been made for USAF 
logistical assistance, and the French in order to repeat the security ‘cooperation’ of 
UNTAC. The survey team saw these factors, as much as the refugee arrangements, as 
vital for selecting Goma, and the position of the GSDF Billeting Area was dictated by 
both convenience and security, next to the Goma airport runway, protected by wire, and 
convenient for ASDF supply flights (if noisy). It was also close to Zairean Army 
barracks, the Goma General Hospital, the UNHCR office, and the Rwandan border (see 
Appendix Two).
The Japanese were, unusually, directly requested to lend 
assistance by Ogata Sadako, UNHCR. 
653
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of refugees, without the same landmine threat and instability of Rwanda. Ishizuka stated 
in 2002 that Japan, participated in UNPKO through UNAMIR, but this is clearly not the 
case, as the JSDF, like the Israeli and US militaries remained outside UN command.654
The Japanese mission was dispatched under Cabinet Order 295, following reports of 
a survey team in August 1994.655 The 290 GSDF personnel were supported by 180 
ASDF personnel, with four C-130H transport aircraft. The requirements for heavy 
equipment, such as water purification systems, refrigeration, bathing, and washing 
equipment, and a full field surgery hospital, as well as 80 vehicles, including dozers, 
trucks, and Type-82 AFV, entailed commercial airlift provided by an ad hoc ‘wet lease’ 
of Antonov aircraft.656 This was a cause for concern, as Cold War fears persisted and 
providing landing rights to former Soviet Air Force craft and crews did not come 
naturally to the ASDF in Hokkaido.657 The GSDF commander was also concerned as he 
had been informed that USAF aircraft had been requested by the JDA (and refused by 
the USAF). The An-124s provided seemed ‘jinxed’ by operating problems.658
Despite the survey team having reported that the situation in Goma was insecure and 
deteriorating, the recommendation to increase the GSDF component from almost 300 to 
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350, with additional security personnel was rejected by the Murayama government.659
Also, despite GSDF requests to transport two-three machine guns, a political debate up 
to cabinet level was conducted for several nights on Japanese television until a decision 
was made to allow one such weapon, plus a sidearm (76 pistols, 163 rifles) for 
non-medical personnel.660 The spirits of the GSDF Rwanda Refugee Relief Unit (RRU) 
were hardly lifted by newspaper articles on the murder of two Zairean soldiers prior to 
dispatch. 661 Yanai Shunji, has stated that one of the most difficult aspects of 
pre-deployment preparation was negotiating a Status of Forces Agreement (SoFA) with 
the Zairean government. Based upon UNPKO experience and JSDF unilateral status in 
an unstable region, the SoFA was considered vital for security.662
The first ASDF aircraft departed on 16th September 1994, travelling via Thailand, the 
Maldives, and the Seychelles, for Nairobi, Kenya, where the ASDF and 10 MoFA, JDA, 
and JICA staff had established a coordinating office, assisted by the Japanese 
Ambassador, Sato Ginko, and her staff. The coordinating office worked in close 
cooperation with the British who established a command, control, and communications 
(C3) cell to coordinate all aid efforts, essential given the poor infrastructure of Zaire and 
Rwanda, and the numbers of aid aircraft.663 From Nairobi, ASDF aircraft flew to Goma 
International Airport.664
The GSDF RRU advance party with 23 members was dispatched on 21st September 
(by An-124), followed on 22nd by the ASDF support team and three aircraft, the main 
RRU following from 30th
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September. The Unit commander flew commercially via 
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London and Nairobi, while others flew directly to Nairobi.665 They did not deploy as 
one complete unit, but rather as an advance unit to prepare the Japanese camp, and in 
three subsequent ‘waves’, the final ‘wave’ members not arriving until 27th October, 
more than five weeks after first deployment.666
41 RRU clinical and surgical staff treated patients on a ‘turn-up’ basis and on transfer 
from refugee camps, with over 200 support staff. The RRU provided medical care, 
worked to control infectious diseases by disinfecting facilities and providing 
supplements and preventative medicine, as well as approximately 70,000 tonnes of 
filtered water in an exceptional display of Japanese niche capabilities.
c  JSDF Performance
667 However, the 
GSDF purification plant was supplemented by equipment provided by a Swedish NGO, 
both in recognition of the RRU’s skills and as a scale-efficiency: the GSDF possessing
greater pumping and distribution capabilities.668
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Table 5.1 RRU Staff669
Division Personnel Sub-division 
Personnel
In-patients Out-patients
Medical         70 70 2100
Clinical 23
Surgical    18
Hygiene 9
Prevention 16
HQ 4 Combined Daily Average
Security        50
30
Water          43
Administration  68
HQ            29
As during UNTAC, the conditions in tented accommodation in the heat of Zaire were 
harsh, and staff had to adapt to treating rarely encountered ailments. Specialist advice 
was sought in Japan, research was conducted in the field into cholera and malaria, and 
new ways developed to mitigate the risks from HIV.670 The GSDF also provided basic 
infrastructure support, through infrastructure maintenance around the refugee camps, 
and supported the work of the civil Goma hospital, despite having only basic 
engineering equipment, as well as transport services through their large vehicle fleet. 671
The ASDF operated a shuttle service between Nairobi and Goma, with some flights 
into Bukavu south of Goma, for the RRU, UNHCR, and NGO, including evacuating 
sick staff. It was the first case of such direct cooperation between the JSDF, a UN 
agency, and NGOs. Between 2nd October and 20th
                                                   
669 Kamimoto, Mitsunobu, Rwanda Refugee Relief Unit: 16.
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671
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December almost 100 1000 km 
flights were made, transporting approximately 3,400 passengers (900 NGO) and 510
(http://www.pko.go.jp/PKO_E/result/rwanda/rwanda03.html, 17 July 2009)
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tonnes of supplies (210 tonnes UNHCR).672
The first ‘wave’ (120) of the RRU departed Zaire on 15
A total of 22 civilian personnel were dispatched to ensure that at least 10 coordination 
personnel were available, and the relationship between JDA and British staff in Nairobi 
blossomed, directly leading to the first JDA civilian, a Nairobi veteran, being invited to 
the Royal College of Defence Studies (RCDS) course.
th December 1994, the second 
‘wave’ (140) on 20th December, and the third on Christmas Day. 673 Lt.-Colonel
Kamimoto Mitsunobu stated that “the efforts of 260 JSDF members when faced with a 
million refugees can be explained, that we inexperienced people did what we had to do
for international cooperation”, indicating how overwhelming many aspects of the 
mission had been for most RRU members.674
The contribution to the mission of refugee relief was undoubtedly successful by its 
own standards, and of high quality, but it is difficult to gauge either its effectiveness or 
efficiency. The medical and disease prevention work was of a high level, and the 
provision of fresh water appears to have been highly effective, but the number of cases 
treated for the size of the force does not compare well with UNTAC or the later effort in 
Honduras. The difference is that full surgery was being conducted in Goma, as opposed 
to minor clinical and dental work elsewhere. The difficulty of assessment contribution is 
also due to the ‘mission’ being so large and diffuse, being a number of overlapping,
simultaneous efforts by national and transnational bodies. The GSDF cooperated with 
d  Japanese Contribution to Mission
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various bodies, including Japanese NGO, most notably through the Association of 
Medical Doctors of Asia (AMDA). Takahara Takao has stated that opinions of the 
mission were not altogether flattering:
There was great scepticism about the relevance and effectiveness of sending 
the SDF to a refugee camp for just three months. There were also anxieties 
over whether SDF personnel might be put in a situation where the single 
machine-gun which they brought with them had to be used.675
One GSDF participant who had previously served in UNTAC admitted that in 
Cambodia ‘success’ was measured most basically by Japanese personnel not becoming 
casualties, while in Goma the medical staff determined their success by saving lives. 
Another, who worked as part of the translation team of the GSDF, found the difference 
to be greatest in cooperating with the various agencies and NGOs in the immediate 
vicinity, and their very different notions of security. This was brought home to one 
UNTAC veteran who saw Zairean soldiers with their legs blown off at the Goma 
hospital.676
One incident certainly indicated that JSDF contributions were unlike those of other 
units. A British aid worker disappeared in the vicinity of the Goma refugee camps, a 
suspected kidnap victim of Hutu militia. The JDA refused a UNHCR request to search 
for him, as this was considered beyond the parameters of the JSDF mission.677
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Within 
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the Japanese terms of a successful mission, risking JSDF lives for the sake of such an 
activity would be neither an effective nor efficient use of resources, but the view from 
the aid community was somewhat different. The RRU force commander did quietly lend 
assistance to NGO and UNHCR in their attempts to locate the missing man, in rather 
similar ways to how the GSDF aided UNTAC electoral workers.678 Perhaps with this 
controversy in mind, a GSDF soldier risked his life to rescue a Zairean who had fallen 
into a crevice and been badly injured, in what developed into a dramatic if minor 
incident. His commander was initially worried by physical danger, but later was more 
concerned with longer-term Post-Traumatic Stress Disorder (PTSD). 679 The RRU 
commander was naturally aware of the ROE by which personnel were bound, and 
became concerned that working in such close proximity to international NGO and UN 
staff that strict adherence to the ROE could prove dangerously impractical and a 
potential PR disaster.680
Media coverage was extensive, with many TV and print journalists vying to present 
images of the GSDF personnel aiding refugees, eating in the canteen, and even bathing 
in the RRU rotenburo (open-air spa-bath), as well as showing the one AFV with the 
single machine gun.681 This certainly represented a PR achievement for the JDA 
however, the media mood changed with the deaths of the Chief Correspondents of the 
Kyodo News Nairobi Office, Fuji TV Cairo office, and three others when their plane 
crashed between Goma and Nairobi.682
The GSDF had only one French speaker in their entire mission, despite local people 
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speaking both native languages and French.683
There were more fundamental problems with military relief contributions, as these 
were intended to be provided through Government Service Packages (GSPs) to the 
UNHCR, but in Goma, many GSP standards were ignored. The water purification 
provision was conducted by more than a dozen groups, including the JSDF and their 
unlikely Swedish NGO partner. As the Overseas Development Institute stated, although 
“Considerable additional capacity was obtained...the fact that a number of organisations 
were involved...substantially increased the coordination burden upon UNHCR, and 
created confusion that may have reduced the effectiveness of the response.”
The force commander rapidly became 
aware of how this limited RRU efficiency, translation requiring Japanese to English, to 
French, to Swahili, and then reversed, with all the attendant risks of misunderstanding. 
In this regard the NGOs complemented the work of the GSDF and compensated for 
some of their deficiencies. 
684 Oxfam’s 
water purification service, for example, was considered better suited to local conditions 
than the massive US Army system.685 It was estimated that 100 NGO/GRO operated in 
Goma in 1994, producing a highly complex web of organisations, not all with 
sympathetic aims, and not all competent.686 The Care Deutschland aid effort was 
particularly noted for being well-resourced yet inefficient and ineffective.687
Of even more fundamental concern of mission efficiency and effectiveness is the 
blanket critique of the entire relief mission. Dennis C. Jett has illustrated how the 
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UNHCR and other bodies that attempted to relieve the plight of refugees in Zaire may 
have actually exacerbated the effects of the Rwandan conflict, leading in many ways to 
the conflicts throughout the Great Lakes region that claimed millions of lives in 
subsequent years.688
The Indonesian-occupied former-Portuguese province of East Timor selected 
independence in a referendum on 30
While beyond the consideration of this study, this is an issue that is 
pertinent to such assistance missions in all environments.
e  Conclusion
The first JSDF Humanitarian Assistance mission was well conducted in a harsh 
natural and security environment. It does seem, however, to have been dependent upon 
cooperation, the good services of others, and a degree of luck in having avoided 
casualties. Goma in 1994 became one of the least secure places on earth, and the deaths 
from disease and violence were appalling, with the JSDF having only limited influence 
over either. Indeed, so lightly-armed was the RRU that it is questionable if they could 
have defended themselves, let alone anyone else, and the commander was all too well 
aware of the legal limitations on ROE and ‘collective security’.
B West Timor
th
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August 1999 following a period of civil unrest.
Violent revolt by pro-Jakarta militias resulted in the September 1999 intervention of the 
multinational INTERFET (International Force for East Timor), and the flight of many
residents to West Timor, within Indonesia, to escape the conflict. UNHCR requested 
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governments to assist these refugees who were largely without supplies and shelter.689
The Japanese government initially considered a contribution in mid-October 1999, 
and dispatched a civilian study mission, but issued only a discussion paper with further 
IPCH studies from 5th November.690 UNHCR made a formal assistance request on 12th
November, a dispatch plan was formulated by 19th November, and a preparatory group 
dispatched on 22nd November, with the main force two days later.691 113 ASDF 
personnel were assigned to Indonesia from 22nd November 1999 to 21st February 2000 
airlifting relief supplies from Surabaya, Java, to Kupang, West Timor, using four 
C-130H and one U-4 aircraft, delivering 400 tonnes of supplies on 47 flights at an
average of five flights per week. This was a simple, low-risk logistical support operation 
well within ASDF capabilities, and yet highly effective and much appreciated. The only 
weapons carried were two pistols, issued among the 11 (later eight) ASDF personnel 
based in Kupang, West Timor, while the 102 (later 105) in Surabaya were unarmed.692
Considering the urgent humanitarian requirements and media coverage of the 
situation it does seem that the government took an inordinate time to order the 
deployment, particularly considering the speed with which INTERFET and UNHCR 
deployed.693 The mission was effective, and met with the approval of the UNHCR while 
being uncontroversial within Japan.
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3  Disaster Relief Missions: Honduras and Turkey
A  Honduras
Introduction
The JSDF disaster relief mission to Honduras was highly unusual. It was a distant 
mission, of very brief duration, with very light equipment, providing a medical service 
usually associated with Japanese civilian groups, and without the engineering 
capabilities associated with the GSDF. It was also an even further extension of the range 
of missions conducted by the ASDF, albeit in the familiar role of providing shuttle 
services. It was also the first ODO to be completely unarmed and as such raised issues 
of security. Until the mission to Haiti in 2010, the mission to Honduras was also the 
most rapid deployment of JSDF units for ODO, and as such deserves close study.
a  Mission Context
Hurricane Mitch caused devastation across Central America between 27th October 
and 1st November 1998, causing the deaths of at least 7000 Hondurans and rendering 
almost 200,000 homeless. 694 Following a world-wide appeal from the Honduran 
government for aid on 5th November, MoFA consulted with the Cabinet Office and JDA 
and made a formal request to the DG-JDA on 9th November to lend assistance.695
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b  JSDF ODO Preparation and Logistics
The JDA and MoFA that day dispatched a survey team to Honduras and began 
assembling a unit to be dispatched under the provisions of the 1987 Law Concerning 
Dispatch of International Disaster Relief Teams (JDR Law), as amended in 1992.696 The 
JDR Law provides for international relief from natural and man-made disasters other 
than those arising from conflict, but is less restrictive than the IPCL, as JSDF or civilian 
JDRT can be dispatched within 24 hours of a request, and medical teams within 48 
hours.697 One reason for this rapid response is that dispatched personnel are not 
members of the IPCC, or coordinated by the IPCH.698 The survey team reported on 12th
November and on the 13th DG-JDA Nukaga Fukushiro consulted with MoFA and the 
PMO, and issued dispatch orders to the JSDF.699
Various interviewees have commented on the eagerness of the JSDF and JDA to 
participate in JDR operations. The reasons are not altogether clear, with suggestions that 
the JSDF didn’t want to be ‘left behind’, while Sato Yuuji of the Asahi Shimbun
reported an officer stating that the JDA had “a chance to dispense with its shame” for 
not having conducted a JDR mission in the six years following the legal amendment.700
The Forces were perhaps motivated by 39 civilian JDRT having been dispatched during 
the preceding decade.701
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(4 December 1998: Nagoya): 30.
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Honduras, a 16 member JDRT was dispatched to Nicaragua by scheduled JAL flight. 
The scale of damage in Nicaragua was not as bad, with approximately 30% of the 
deaths and displaced as in Honduras, but the government’s financial aid was slightly 
greater than that for Honduras.702
The six C-130H (five operational, one reserve) departed from Komaki on 13
Perhaps with half the ASDF C-130H force engaged in 
the support mission for Honduras a parallel JSDF mission in Nicaragua was considered 
unsustainable.
th
November 1998 to deploy GSDF equipment and to provide a shuttle service between 
Honduras and the US. The route flown was via Andersen Air Force Base (AFB) Guam, 
Bucholz Army Airfield Kwajalein Atoll, Marshall Islands, Hickam AFB Hawaii, Travis 
AFB California, and Kelly/Lackland AFB, Texas (16th November), before departing US 
airspace for Honduras.703 The USAF provided full refuelling and services en route, as 
well as detailed information on the situation in Honduras, while GSDF personnel 
rendezvoused with the ASDF contingent in Honduras, having arrived on JAL flights 
from Narita on 15th November.704 The ASDF flew into Toncontin Airport near the 
capital Tegucigalpa on 17th November, from where the GSDF offloaded their 20 tonnes 
of equipment.705
                                                   
702 Honduras: aid-in-kind ¥15.96 million, aid-in-grant US$800,000. Nicaragua: aid-in-kind ¥19.89 
million, aid-in-grant US$500,000. Dispatch of Japan Disaster Relief Team to Nicaragua for 
Hurricane Disaster, MoFA (11 November 1998) 
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c  JSDF Performance
The ASDF commander, Colonel Fujikawa, had 105 personnel, including an unarmed
security complement.706
By contrast, the GSDF contingent had only 80 personnel (Middle Army), but was
able to commence duties from 17
The ASDF established their shuttle service between Toncontin 
Airport/Soto Cano airbase and Kelly/Lackland AFB.
th November, aided by 20 MoFA and JICA staff.707
These duties were emergency medical assistance, and disease-prevention work through 
disinfectant spraying, the provision of medicine, and distribution of sanitary supplies, 
rehearsed by Middle Army for over a year.708 The GSDF continued this work for two 
weeks until 30th November.709 The equipment they transported was required to be as 
light as possible, due to the need for rapid dispatch, precluding sealift, and the limited 
load-endurance abilities of ASDF aircraft. Only one light truck was dispatched, with 
two field medical equipment sets, and six disease-prevention spraying sets, as well as 
medical supplies and communications equipment. As the ASDF unit only transported 
the minimum amount of their own equipment, for communications and base preparation 
equipment, such as tents and food, it was a ‘logistics-light’ force, which nonetheless 
treated huge numbers of patients.710
The GSDF contingent comprised a medical treatment unit (chiryoutai), a disease 
prevention unit (boueikitai), and supporting units.711
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The GSDF medical treatment team 
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had three specialists in internal medicine (naika), two in surgery (gaika), and one in 
paediatrics (shounika), mainly dealing with airway obstructions, digestive disorders, 
and other internal maladies, while cuts, fractures, and injuries were less common and 
less serious.712 It is estimated that approximately 70% of patients treated were women 
and children with minor external injuries but significant internal illnesses, resulting in 
the single paediatrician being overloaded with cases.713
Table 5.2 Honduras Mission Staff714
Division Personnel In-patients Out-patients
Medical         23 0 4031
Daily Average
Prevention 15
288
Support        42
One way in which the GSDF were able to augment their capabilities and overcome 
shortages of personnel was by using their advanced communications equipment to 
cooperate with the JSDF Central Hospital and the GSDF School of Field Medicine. This 
became known as ‘Tele-medicine’ (tere-medisun), with approximately three hours 
required between referral and receipt of diagnosis and suggestions for treatment based 
upon video examination.715
                                                                                                                                                     
completed’.
712 Shirohama, Tatsuoki, Knowledge I wish to put in place: 75-77. Asahi Shimbun reported there 
were four GSDF Internal Medicine specialists in Honduras: ‘JSDF Dispatched to Honduras Disaster,
Groping for the Path to Disaster Relief’ (Saigai Honjurasu haken norikuji, kinkyuu enjo ni aratana 
michi mo saku), Asahi Shimbun (24 November 1998): 3.
713 Shirohama, Tatsuoki, Knowledge I wish to put in place: 77.
714
Handbook for Defense 1999: 679.
715 Shirohama, Tatsuoki, Knowledge I wish to put in place: 77.
The GSDF personnel were also able to rely upon MoFA and 
JICA staff for translation assistance, as well as local medical students who had been 
attempting to provide basic assistance to local people with ‘appropriated’ medicines and 
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equipment.716
Evaluating the quality and efficiency of the JSDF contribution to the mission in 
Honduras is not as difficult as evaluating the effectiveness of the unilateral mission. For 
such a small force so lightly deployed for such a short time, the numbers of patients 
treated was certainly impressive. There also seems to have been a genuine appreciation 
among the local population, despite the fleeting nature of the Japanese involvement.
d Japanese Contribution to Mission
717
Certain operational problems can be identified, however. The lack of vehicles was 
one, with the single light truck being pressed into service as an ambulance, despite 
having no medical or siren equipment.718 JICA and MoFA staff assisting with the JSDF 
operations were housed in hotels but had to travel in requisitioned school buses or other 
vehicles.719 There are also suggestions that the security situation was not as calm as the 
JSDF had expected from MoFA briefings, a situation repeated in other missions, and the 
JSDF had to rely upon the Honduran military to assist them, despite being busy with 
their own disaster relief duties.720 An Asahi Shimbun report stated that armed Honduran 
troops and unarmed GSDF personnel were conducting combined night-time patrols, 
only partially denied by MoFA representative Sakaba Mitsuo.721
The mission was completed by 9th
                                                   
716 ‘Record of Experience in the International Disaster Relief Team, Honduras’ (Hondurasu kokusai 
kinkyuu enjotai taikenki), Securitarian (May 1999): 46-48. 
717 Interview, Mendez, Ruben, Tsukuba University (12 March 2001).
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719 ‘JSDF Dispatched to Honduras Disaster’, Asahi Shimbun.
720 Sato, Yuuji, ‘Strong Expression of International Aid by the JSDF, First Honduras Dispatch is 
completed’.
721 ‘JSDF Dispatched to Honduras Disaster’, Asahi Shimbun.
December 1998, with JSDF personnel and 
equipment returning to Japan via the same routes as the original dispatch. Despite their 
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good work, there were suggestions that by the time the JSDF had arrived the real 
priority had passed from emergency medical relief to the rebuilding phase, and that 
construction was the more desirable Japanese asset.722
As a demonstration of a capability for rapid deployment in a disaster relief role the 
Honduras dispatch would appear to have been a successful mission. The former head of 
the GSDF Research Division has commented on how the mission was wisely kept short, 
as the effectiveness of such small forces, operating at a high tempo rapidly deteriorates 
in the operational area, while the natural inclination of force commanders is to stay as
long as possible and do as much as possible.
Without heavy airlift, or the 
much slower option of sealift, it is difficult to see what more significant contribution the 
JSDF could have made to the post-disaster recovery efforts.
e  Conclusion
723
A large earthquake struck Turkey on 17
The command and conduct of the force 
were obviously of a high quality, even if the logistical, rather than technical, ability of 
the ASDF to support such operations with C-130H aircraft is questionable. For the JSDF, 
it seems the most significant lesson of this ODO was to demonstrate a disaster relief 
mission capability.
B Turkey
th August 1999 near the northern city of Izmit, 
thought to have killed at least 18,000 people, leaving many more homeless and lacking 
in basic supplies.724
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723 Interview, Lt.-Gen. Yamaguchi (2007).
The response of the Japanese government was extremely swift, 
724 Marza, Vasile I., On the Death Toll of the 1999 Izmit (Turkey) Major Earthquake, European 
Seismological Commission (2004) (http://www.esc-web.org/papers/potsdam_2004/ss_1_marza.pdf,
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dispatching two mixed DRT of Fire, Coastguard, MoFA, and JICA officials scheduled to 
arrive on 18th August.725
Upon receiving a request from the Turkish government for aid on 3rd September, 
MoFA requested the JDA to prepare a JDR implementation plan on 10th September.726
The MSDF dispatched three ships, the Oosumi and the minesweeper support-ship 
Bungo carrying relief supplies and 500 prefabricated accommodation units, with the 
AOE Tokiwa providing force replenishment. The force departed Kobe on 23rd
September, arrived off Istanbul on 19th October, departed 23rd October, returning to 
Japan on 22nd November 1999.727
While the speed and generosity of the Japanese government’s response are not in 
question, the dispatch of the MSDF may be challenged. For efficiency, a chartered 
merchant vessel would have been able to travel as fast, as far, and without the need for 
support vessels. A conventional container ship would also have been more suited to the 
load than the two MSDF ships, which piled it up on their flight decks, and had difficulty 
in loading and preventing their damage in transit.728 As a defence diplomacy and 
training exercise it was doubtless effective, being the longest journey by the MSDF, and 
perhaps replaced scheduled training exercises, but it does not appear to have been an 
efficient use of resources, no matter how ultimately effective.729
The five operations detailed and analysed in this chapter illustrate the degree to which 
4  Conclusion
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JSDF ODO developed through the 1990s. The initial ODO to the Persian Gulf was 
specific and seemingly limited to clearly defined military tasks, but was actually a
broader multilateral cooperative exercise than many Japanese realised. The ODO to 
Zaire and Honduras provide examples of cooperation between the ASDF and GSDF for 
distant operations with a less specifically military character, aimed at assisting civilians
recover from conflict and natural disaster. These missions also entailed a great deal of 
multilateral cooperation, with other militaries, UNHCR, and NGOs, which brought their 
own problems as well as learning opportunities. In each case, the Forces had to plan 
carefully, and also innovate in the operational area, and in each case they proved highly 
professional and adaptable.
The missions supported by the ASDF have demonstrated how limited is Japan’s airlift 
capability and how this forces the ODO units to be either as small and light as possible 
(Honduras) or to rely on mixed Japanese and foreign, including commercial, airlift 
(Zaire). The former option limits mission capabilities and endurance, while the latter 
increases reliability and availability concerns, and probably cost. ASDF airlift proved to 
be a significant bottleneck, despite the best efforts of the ASC. The missions in Zaire 
and Honduras also illustrate the somewhat tenuous security situations of JSDF units in 
ODO, and the degree to which they have depended upon the good offices of others and 
good fortune to prevent them being compromised. The airlift bottleneck, combined with 
restrictive security capabilities could have led to a significant problem if any mission 
had been compelled to withdraw from its mission, due to conflict in the operational area. 
With weak airlift, no ‘extraction force’ to relieve and allow a withdrawal of dispatched 
forces, and little self-defence capability, the JSDF were placed in potentially highly 
exposed positions. 
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While the missions were successful in performing professionally and effectively, 
there are question marks over some aspects of efficiency and the approaches towards 
force security. The non-UN ODO of the 1990s did, however, provide invaluable 
unilateral and multilateral experience in a wide variety of missions which the JSDF 
were able to build upon in the 21st century.
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Chapter 6 Evaluation of Performance
Introduction
In evaluating JSDF ODO in the 1990s, the fundamental question to be answered is 
“were the JSDF effective international actors?” This is an evaluation of operational 
performance, yet it is also clear that in wider society operational details are deemed less
significant than general assessments of ‘success.’ Such appreciations are common, and 
should be addressed, but cannot be allowed to deflect attention towards overall 
assessments of entire missions, beyond JSDF responsibility, and dependent upon a 
range of institutional, environmental, and psychological factors. 
As previously stated, effectiveness, efficiency, and quality have been the focus points 
for ODO assessment in the target decade and in this chapter shall be analysed in a 
comparison of missions. The analytical framework of mission context, preparation and 
logistics, operational performance, and contribution to mission provides the means to 
assess these three qualities, with comparisons between ODO and the JSDF and other 
actors. 
In evaluating performance, there will also be reference to non-JSDF comparisons. 
These shall be of forces in the same or similar missions, performing similar roles, 
except where the variation of roles and missions can aid understanding. 
1 Evaluating ‘Success’
What makes for a successful ODO or PKO? It is clear that the answers greatly vary 
due to the respective positions of mission actors and observers. The UN intervention in 
Somalia in the early 1990s is widely seen as being a failure, but such images are 
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dominated by US and US-media perceptions of the operation in which US troops were 
murdered and humiliated, while elsewhere, other contingents and NGO conducted 
successful human security work. As noted, Japanese governments have often identified 
successful ODO as being without incident, demonstrating burden sharing yet avoiding 
risk, which became one indictment of the JSDF in UNTAC. Performance and ‘success’ 
in ODO have received mixed coverage of evaluation. There is a body of scholarship 
focused on this area, and the UN has developed criteria for evaluating performance and 
success in missions.
A Academic Literature
Paul F. Diehl and Daniel Druckman have evaluated definitions and analyses of 
success in PKO. They have been highly critical of “largely atheoretical” operational 
analysis (OA), regarding most efforts as little more than ‘what works’ lists for future 
practitioners, rather than scientific analysis of causes and variations.730 As such, they 
have also been critical of OA efforts, such as “units in the United Nations and national 
armies dedicated to “lessons learned,” as if what occurred in one conflict is 
automatically portable to others.”731 They have been particularly critical of the neglect 
of the operational conflict environment, as “scholars have provided little help, 
distinguishing conflict environments only by the types of participants in the conflict 
(e.g., civil v. interstate wars) and without regard to a range of other elements.”732
While no doubt valid, these are criticisms of leading scholars almost two decades 
                                                   
730 Diehl, Paul F., and Druckman, Daniel, Evaluating Peace Operations (Boulder, CO.: Lynne 
Rienner, 2010): 4.
731 Diehl, Paul F., and Druckman, Daniel, ‘Dimensions of the Conflict Environment: Implications 
for Peace Operation Success’, Journal of International Peacekeeping 13 (2009): 6–44, 7.
732 Diehl, Paul F., and Druckman, Daniel, ‘Dimensions of the Conflict Environment: Implications 
for Peace Operation Success’: 7.
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beyond the first JSDF ODO. They have been able to use these decades’ OA experiences 
as the foundations for complex analyses. Institutions in the early 1990s simply did not 
have the operational experience upon which to build ‘theoretical learning’, nor usually 
the capabilities, being overburdened with operational imperatives. Diehl’s own 
assessment of peacekeeping success in 1988 was limited to preventing a renewal of 
hostilities and facilitating peaceful resolution, illustrating the importance of 
experience.733
Virginia Page Fortna has attempted to analyse how mission characteristics and 
policies affect operational effectiveness, utilising a causal theory of peacekeeping to 
evaluate task-effectiveness, such as the value of engineering tasks to both ‘peacekeepers’ 
and ‘peacekept’.
Diehl and Druckman also focus upon ‘mission success’ rather than ‘actor 
performance’, with consequently limited application to the evaluation of a military’s 
effectiveness, efficiency, or quality in operations. 
734
Thomas Szayna, Preston Niblack, and William O’Malley, have analysed military 
PKO-capability based upon seven categories: education, proficiency, discipline, 
leadership, equipment, language-proficiency, and PKO-training.
However, although aiding understanding of certain factors, this 
analysis remains above the level of individual actors, and is of limited value in 
evaluating JSDF performance.
735
                                                   
733 Diehl, Paul F., ‘Peacekeeping Operations and the Quest for Peace’, Political Science Quarterly
103-3 (1988): 485-507, 485. 
734 Fortna, Virginia Page, Does Peacekeeping Work?: Shaping Belligerents' Choices after Civil War
(Princeton, NJ.: Princeton University, 2008): 91, 105.
735 Szayna, Thomas, Niblack, Preston, and O’Malley, William, ‘Assessing Armed Forces’ 
Deficiencies for Peacekeeping Operations’, International Peacekeeping 3-3 (1996): 77-91.
These are useful for 
improving training, but are less relevant to the specific study of one military within 
operations, and some categories have little relevance, such as PKO-training for relief or 
minesweeping missions. Duane Bratt similarly proposed four measures of “operational 
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success”: mandate performance, conflict resolution, conflict containment, and limiting 
casualties.736
Evaluation of performance leads to assessing ‘professional capacity’, outlined by 
Samuel P. Huntington as encompassing expertise, responsibility, and ‘corporateness’.
Only the first and last would be directly relevant to JSDF ODO, and 
limiting casualties is a contentious measure of operational performance.
737
Huntington contends that military professionals share common skills and sensibilities, 
yet the diversity of responses in PKO would appear to contradict such assertions. 
Muthiah Alagappa has contended that Huntington over-emphasises the effects of 
military professionalism on civilian control and operations.738
While scholarship has much to offer, no single model is sufficient for this thesis, or 
preferable to the examples presented in Chapters One and Four, focused directly upon 
individual force performance in PKO, particularly the work of R.J. O’Brien.739
Jean-Marie Guéhenno, Under-Secretary-General for Peacekeeping Operations, stated 
that UNPKO in the 1990s had proved to be such great achievements that the UN 
“seemed to be the panacea for resolving the scourge of internal conflict.”
B UN Standards
740
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As the main 
PKO management institution, the UN develops guidelines, doctrine, best practice, and 
evaluation criteria, aided by establishment of the UNDPKO in 1993, and its later 
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expansion. The 2008 “Capstone Doctrine” denoted success as maintaining “the basic 
principles of consent, impartiality and the non-use of force except in self defense and 
defense of the mandate.” Also that “operations must also be perceived as legitimate and 
credible...[with] the need...to promote national and local ownership, in order to 
contribute to the achievement of a sustainable peace.”741
One standard constant since the 1970s has been of unified mission command and 
control, not least for security. The 1980 UN Field Security Handbook stipulated that 
“with respect to United Nations peacekeeping operations, military and civilian 
personnel are under the exclusive jurisdiction of the Special Representative of the 
Secretary-General and/or Force Commander or Chief of Staff, as applicable.”742 The 
UNDPKO 2001 Command and Control policy states that “operational authority over 
such forces and personnel is...transferred to the United Nations” with “full authority to 
issue operational directives.”743 Furthermore, the UNSG reported in 1994 that “it is 
impermissible for contingent commanders to be instructed by the national authorities to 
depart from United Nations policies, or to refuse to carry out orders”.744 Restated in 
2003, failure to meet such standards would be considered a mark of degraded 
performance. This situation has persisted in ODO, and a UNDPKO official stated that 
“[W]e bend over backwards for Japan” but that “rules are halfway met”, concluding that 
in practice “reality has to adapt to Japan, and not the other way round.”745
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A further Japanese deviation from UN standards was ROE. The UN position is that 
“mission-wide ROE...will clarify the different levels of force that can be used in various 
circumstances...and any authorizations that must be obtained by commanders”.746 ROE, 
as stated in Chapter Three, are complicated by not only significant national and 
institutional variations, but by differences of definition of what constitute ROE. UN 
ROE are long, complex, detailed, and flexible tactical outlines (including weapon use), 
with GSDF senior officers claiming that, by comparison, the JSDF does not possess 
such ROE.747 UK ROE by contrast are brief, clear, and with direct legal implications.748
They correspond to NATO concepts of ROE as “Directives issued by competent 
military authority which specify the circumstances and limitations under which forces 
will initiate and/or continue combat engagement with other forces encountered.”749
JSDF rules in the 1990s, despite explanations to SRSG prior to dispatch, remained in 
breach of UN General Guidelines for Peacekeeping Operations, for “an attack on any 
one of its members or subunits engages the right of self-defence of the operation as a 
whole.”750
The UNDPKO states that after security, “logistics is the area of activity where the 
military component makes its greatest contribution to peacekeeping operations.”
Japan has failed to square the circle of its de jure legal limitations, despite its 
de facto operational efforts.
751
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Also, 
that, “units, such as engineer squadrons or companies, transport units, hospitals and 
evacuation units, aircraft loading and movement control teams, supply units, 
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maintenance units and others are expected to integrate their work with UN personnel 
and private contractors to make the best use of resources available to support all 
components of the mission.”752 JSDF contributions are closely linked with these points. 
The UNDPKO clearly states that expectations of unit performance exceed basic 
competence, also including integration with similar and dissimilar units and broader 
mission contribution. In contrast to practice in the 1990s, the 2003 UNDPKO Handbook
lists “the direct delivery of humanitarian assistance” as a “civilian task”, with 
implications for JSDF ODO.753
After the Brahimi Report and Capstone Doctrine, standards for evaluating 
performance and ‘success’ have naturally changed. Benchmarks were proposed in 2009 
to guide and measure unit performance, although with the recognition of the need to 
“distinguish the core benchmarks for which peacekeepers are responsible from broader 
targets which reflect wider progress in peace consolidation and rely on the performance 
of others” while distinguishing between short, medium and long-term targets.754 More 
fundamental, was the perception that “a multi-dimensional United Nations 
peacekeeping operation must be informed by the need to support...national capacity. 
Accordingly, any displacement of national or local capacity should be avoided wherever 
possible.”755
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The JSDF in Cambodia did not displace local capacity, while in other 
missions they complimented capacities, and increasingly integrated into multinational 
and multi-agency efforts. A further UN innovation was the recognition that “gender 
mainstreaming is a crucial element of a successful peacekeeping operation with 
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sustainable results” and that “targeted efforts may need to address gender 
inequalities.”756
While UNDPKO has been actively developing mission guidelines, doctrine, and 
standards, these have not been universal views. Stuart Gordon states that UNDPKO has 
downplayed the “military encroachment upon humanitarian space”, with OCHA and the 
UN Development Programme (UNDP) often more critical of military involvement in 
operations.
In this, the JSDF have lagged, but made some innovations.
757 Andrew Collins has commented how development professionals often 
regard military relief efforts as counter-productive.758
Military dispatches can be driven by significant domestic forces. JSDF ODO were 
clearly driven by external pressures, with the government being required to mediate 
legal reform through complex domestic opposition, yet one unintended consequence 
was the increased support for and acceptance of the Forces, and their ODO roles. 
Opinion polls conducted in 1993 and 2002 illustrate that while support for JSDF 
UNPKO increased from 48% to 70%.
C Wider Recognition
a  Domestic 
759
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After UNTAC, there was no significant 
domestic opposition to JSDF ODO until the Iraq dispatch, largely due to Iraq’s security 
environment and the operational morality and legality, rather than the principle of JSDF 
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ODO.
Unusually, many JSDF personnel have themselves neglected operational details in the 
definitions of success, particularly in early missions, with Kawano’s survey of JSDF 
ODO veterans providing insights into how personnel perceived their own performances, 
and also how they were perceived by their JSDF peers.760
Recognition for peacekeeping efforts is a strong motivator for contributing nations, 
such recognition can be considered ‘successful’ detached from operational 
considerations. For some, this recognition can take diffuse forms, such as the building 
of reputations, or as a quid pro quo, such as membership of an institution. Ishizuka 
Katsumi has illustrated the range of motivations that affected Irish peacekeeping 
dispatch policies, while concluding that the desire to bolster UN authority outweighed 
reputation or recognition.
b  Foreign
761 Other nations have often had overtly neo-realist or 
utilitarian motivations, with Japan’s ODO efforts often linked to the desire for UNSC 
permanent membership, partly in parallel to German efforts.762
Kabilan Krishnasamy has differentiated between ‘declared’ and ‘actual’ recognition, 
the former being largely praise while the latter constitutes tangible gain, such as UN 
appointments, with great disparities between those who provide most funding and most 
personnel for UNPKO.763
                                                   
760 Kawano, Hitoshi, ‘The Positive Impact of Peacekeeping on the Japan Self Defense Forces’, in 
Parmar, Leena (ed.), Armed Forces and the International Diversities (Jaipur: Pointer, 2002): 
254-283.
761 Ishizuka, Katsumi, Ireland and International Peacekeeping Operations 1960-2000 (London: 
Frank Cass, 2004).
762 Drifte, Reinhard, Japan’s Quest for a Permanent Security Seat: 79-82.
763 Krishnasamy, Kabilan, ‘’Recognition’ for Third World Peacekeepers: India and Pakistan’, 
International Peacekeeping 7-4 (2000): 56-77, 65-67.
Bellamy, Williams, and Griffin contend the Brahimi Report 
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supported professionalism divorced from national recognition, but this remains an 
unrealised goal.764
Japan seems to be particularly sensitive to overseas views and comparisons of its 
ODO. A 2009 MoFA presentation compared Japanese contributions with those of 
Germany, China, and Korea, but by all indices Japan’s contribution was small.765 A
former Japanese ambassador expressed “84 shock” at Japan’s lowly 84th position in 
UNPKO national personnel-contribution rankings, while a former GSDF General stated 
Japan was failing to “equal China” on a 10:1 population ratio.766 It is clear that while 
the Japanese troop levels of 1998 were slightly higher by 2009, Japan’s ranking had 
dropped 40 places.767
While troop numbers relatively declined, Japan’s financial contributions were 
particularly conspicuous, being the second greatest provider throughout the 1990s for 
the UN peacekeeping budget, and, unlike the US, was a relatively prompt payee, despite 
being regularly cited as a ‘debtor’ due to Japanese budgetary processes (see Appendix 
One, Graph 3).768 MoFA contributions to UNPKO increased from $26.8 million in 1990 
to $484.1 million by 1994, and Japan’s overall UN assessment from 11.4% in 1989 to 
20.57% by 2000.769
                                                   
764 Bellamy, Alex J., Williams, Paul, and Griffin, Stuart, Understanding Peacekeeping, (2010): 130.
Japan also provided great amounts of voluntary contributions to 
missions, as noted in Chapter Four for UNTAC, in 1993 comprising over 60% of 
765
UNPKO, Political Mission Dispatches: Comparison of China, Korea, Germany (KokurenPKO, 
seijimisshonenohaken: chuugoku, kankoku, doitsunohikaku) (Tokyo: MoFA, 30 September 2009) 
(http://www.mofa.go.jp/mofaj/gaiko/pko/pdfs/m_haken_ckg.pdf, 7 July 2010). 
766 Seminars, Temple University, Tokyo (November/December 2009).
767 Drifte, Reinhard, Japan’s Quest for a Permanent Security Seat: 91 (Table 2.3).
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Controller tells budget committee 2006 financial indicators ‘mixed’, UNGA GA/AB/3767 (2 
November 2006) (http://www.un.org/News/Press/docs/2006/gaab3767.doc.htm, 17 September 
2010); Unpaid budget assessments, UNGA GA/AB/3771 (9 November 2006) 
(http://www.un.org/News/Press/docs/2006/gaab3771.doc.htm, 17 September 2010).
769 Heinrich, L. William Jr., et al, United Nations Peace-keeping Operations by Japan: 80; Asahi 
Shimbun, Japan Almanac 1998 (Tokyo: Asahi Shimbun, 1998): 60.
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Cambodia’s total aid income, and extending to cancellation of foreign debts (with 
France).770 MoFA has been forthright in its assertion that the scale of contributions is 
evidence for the need for UNSC reform, and has particularly highlighted that Japan’s 
assessed UNPKO contribution for 2004 (Appendix One, Graph 1) was significantly 
greater than the combined totals of Britain, France, China, and Russia.771
Binyam Solomon has estimated that in 2003, Bangladeshi UNPKO receipts 
outweighed contributions by $31.3 million compared to net losses for developed 
countries.772 By 1999, JSDF monthly basic salaries varied from ¥155,600 (trainee, 
private), to almost ¥500,000 (Major), plus extensive allowances and bonuses, including 
ODO specific ‘daily allowances’ (teate) (see Table 6.1).773 UNPKO disbursements of 
$1000 per month, per-assessed-person have covered little of the actual cost, and JSDF 
supporting personnel were not included within UN assessments. In UNDOF, 
approximately 30% of JSDF personnel are unilateral, ‘non-assessed’. UNPKO 
reimbursements have been estimated by JSDF personnel as covering approximately 
one-third of Japan’s costs, while in Finland the estimate is 50%.774
                                                   
770 Green, Michael J., Japan’s Reluctant Realism: Foreign Policy Challenges in an Era of Uncertain 
Power (Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2003): 176.
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772 Solomon, Binyam., ‘Political Economy of Peacekeeping’, in Sandler, Todd, and Hartley, Keith, 
(eds.), Handbook of Defense Economics: Defense in a globalized world, Volume 2 (Amsterdam: 
North Holland, 2007):741-774, 750.
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Table 6.1: ODO Daily Allowance (Yen)
Mission Max. Min. Monthly (Max.)
UNTAC 20,000 4,000 600,000
ONUMOZ 16,000 4,000 480,000
Zaire 20,000 4,000 600,000
UNDOF 12,000 4,000 360,000
West Timor 8,000 3,000 240,000
If the idealist goals of UN-commitment are accepted, then Japan’s ODO in the 1990s 
are best viewed as a partial success. While appreciated, tangible recognition through 
numbers and status of appointees is unclear (Akashi and Ogata’s appointments
pre-dating ODO). A utilitarian stance on JSDF ODO would ultimately be recognised by 
the achievement of UNSC permanent membership, but that seems unlikely, and for 
reasons unrelated to ODO. 
While attempting to evaluate success in this manner, there is a natural tendency to 
view lack of success as failure, but this is not the case. Partial success, in achieving 
recognition for JSDF ODO provided Japan with both idealist and utilitarian advantages. 
It was increasingly seen as a loyal UN-member, and a loyal US-ally, with ODO 
providing evidence of Japan’s liberal, internationalist soft-power, and its willingness to 
utilise hard-power devices to demonstrate commitment to international security norms, 
despite the limitations of its domestic security norms. In Hugo Dobson’s terms, it 
demonstrated both US-Japan bilateralism, and UN-centric liberalism.775
                                                   
775 Dobson, Hugo, Japan and United Nations Peacekeeping: 166. 
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2  Evaluation of JSDF ODO: Comparison of Missions
Introduction
The analytical framework utilised in this thesis allows for the comparison of 
operational elements in UN and non-UN JSDF ODO, as well as with non-JSDF 
operations. The basic elements of evaluation are the four sections of mission context, 
preparation and logistics, performance, and contribution to mission, while the basic 
criteria are effectiveness, efficiency, and quality. 
As stated, few studies have evaluated performance in ODO, R.J. O’Brien’s 2001 
study being unusual in focusing upon the effectiveness, efficiency, and quality of a 
single force’s contributions. O’Brien denotes effectiveness in UNPKO as whether the 
force achieved its objectives, in terms of resources devoted (inputs) to tasks, and in 
terms of the completed tasks (outputs) resulting in the projected ‘outcomes’ (results).776
Efficiency in O’Brien’s study is based upon the ratio of inputs to outputs (and by 
extension, outcomes), with the additional factor of time required to achieve the outputs 
and outcomes.
This could be characterised as the JSDF repairing roads, building bridges and 
supporting polling stations (inputs and outputs), with effectiveness based on whether the 
local population felt secure using the facilities (outcomes). In Cambodia, they did, and 
thus the JSDF mission could be termed a ‘success’ in input, output, and outcomes, and 
thereby effective. 
777
                                                   
776 O'Brien, R.J., Police as peacekeepers: 177.
777 O'Brien, R.J., Police as peacekeepers: 182-183.
Continuing the UNTAC example, did the building of bridges involve 
an inordinate amount of personnel, resources, or time for the given outcome of allowing 
people to travel to the polling station? To this should also be added resources, primarily 
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cost. It would seem the GSDF managed to cover many tasks, fairly quickly, with great 
effect, and therefore with a degree of efficiency. Furthermore, O’Brien acknowledges 
the interplay of efficiency and effectiveness, and how they have an effect upon each 
other and are affected by, and affect upon, quality. 
Quality is determined by how much the work satisfies the client, and how the force 
works beyond minimum client requirements.778
Effectiveness, efficiency, and quality shall be evaluated within the analytical 
framework, and it is the framework that provides the contextual base by which JSDF 
ODO can be most effectively judged, as the context of operations, as Diehl and 
Druckman assert, is a vital factor in operational performance.
For the JSDF, ‘clients’ could include the 
UN, local population, host government, and IPCH (the ‘dispatcher’). If force members 
were instructed to repair a road, and did so but failed to ensure that road-side ditches 
were clear of landmines, then some clients could be dissatisfied, despite the task having 
been completed.
779
Comparison of the mission contexts of JSDF ODO provides an insight into the 
challenges faced. Those missions with the least stability were undoubtedly the most 
challenging, with UNTAC, ONUMOZ, and Zaire all having stability problems, with 
socio-political tensions and firearm proliferation. A significant Japanese civilian 
presence in Cambodia aided the JSDF, as well as the long-term engagement by the 
Japanese government and a large and relatively well-resourced mission. Mozambique 
provided a contrast, with minimal Japanese presence and commitment, and a relatively 
A Mission Context
                                                   
778 O'Brien, R.J., Police as peacekeepers: 183-184.
779 Diehl, Paul F., and Druckman, Daniel, Evaluating Peace Operations: 6-10. 
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poorly-resourced mission, but the election process was not affected by ‘spoiler’ groups. 
Zaire had more instability factors, lacking the relative stability that a UN mission 
provides, with most refugees in insecure and barely sanitary conditions.
UNDOF provided possibly the most stable environment of any JSDF ODO, despite 
the latent mission dangers. Honduras was the most devastated mission host, but as a 
stable civil-society posed no significant threats to personnel, and the JSDF were 
received with genuine warmth by the local people.
B Preparation and Logistics 
All JSDF ODO were dispatched following survey missions and consultations with 
relevant groups, delaying dispatch, this should have provided a sound base upon which 
to assess needs, requirements and roles, and the security environment. The main factors 
to assess were pre-dispatch training, dispatch, and logistical support.
The first two UNPKO were affected by a lack of pre-dispatch training, with language 
training and familiarization with local conditions being the most obvious aspects of 
compromised operational effectiveness. The compressed periods between decision to 
dispatch and departure entailed that little more could have been done for the first 
contingents, but did not explain the general poverty of GSDF language training. The 
relative lack of training invested in subsequent contingents is more difficult to 
understand, unless training facilities were unavailable, or authorities considered such 
training as either unnecessary or distracting from ‘mainstream’ duties. While facilities 
existed for training, the latter points of reluctance may be valid. The degree to which the 
UNDOF mission was enhanced by extensive training in languages, background, and 
technical aspects, and how that training evolved during contingent dispatches, illustrates 
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what could be achieved. 
While units were not provided with mission-specific training, it was provided for 
JSDF UNTAC MO, in Sweden, and in observer duties during a 1991 study-tour of 
Cyprus.780 Observer duties were considered to be so atypical of JSDF service that such 
training was essential, although the Swedish suggestion that civilians could be equally 
effective was not taken up.781
For UNTAC and ONUMOZ, the initially mandated duties were familiar to the JSDF, 
and there was little need for ‘mission-specific’ technical training, despite being 
composite units. The technical nature of ONUMOZ is illustrated by the far higher 
proportion of officers dispatched, compared with other operations.782
In the non-UN missions, the minesweeping skills of the MSDF were clear, and it is 
difficult to imagine how these could have been further enhanced. The same could be 
said of sanitation and medical staff in all missions, apart from the degree to which 
The only major 
compromises were the cautious security approach limiting working times and locations. 
The UNDOF mission tasks were certainly within JSDF capabilities, but the diversity of 
equipment and duties for such a small group necessitated technical training. The 
extended duties within UNTAC were mainly of familiar types, such as food and water 
provision, but the ‘information gathering’ (patrolling) activities were not skills that most 
personnel had conducted since basic training, nor were they particularly confident in 
their abilities.
                                                   
780 ‘Defense Agency to send PKO team to Cyprus’, Nikkei Shimbun (28 August 1991) 
(http://telecom21.nikkei.co.jp/nt21/service/ENGD021/ENGD241?cid=NDJEDB1991082800101507
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781 ‘Swedish minister briefed on Japan's future PKO efforts’, Nikkei Shimbun (23 May 1991)
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&madr=TOP&kdt=19910523&dk=2c3f63bc&reservedtp=ENGD021g6iskv47&ftrmode=ENGD031
&hltid=206chh4opa2e0, 10 March 2010).
782 Kawano, Hitoshi, ‘The Positive Impact of Peacekeeping on the Japan Self Defense Forces’: 261.
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paediatrics and tropical disease specialisation would have been valuable, yet these were 
scarcely envisaged pre-1992. The Zaire mission should have benefited from a greater 
emphasis upon lessons-learned from UNTAC and ONUMOZ, regarding PTSD and 
malaria treatment. By 1998, however, the Honduras contingent had been training for a 
year, rehearsing disaster relief roles, and had established a highly innovative 
‘telemedicine’ facility to augment their capabilities prior to dispatch. 
Rehearsal is a form of training that has seen widespread application becoming more 
intricate during the Second World War, with life-size replicas of emplacements 
constructed in the Egyptian desert as an expanded version of ‘sand-box’ training, still 
used in academies and training centres.783 PKO centres across the world progress from 
sandbox to ‘as-real-as-possible’ rehearsals, from checkpoint and command-post 
exercises, through to conflict reduction with local population exercises. The ICRC 
conducts similar exercises in unarmed negotiation and conflict resolution with armed 
groups, while the British Army standardised its pre-dispatch training for Northern 
Ireland with ROE-specific exercises, including cars approaching checkpoints, and 
civilian crowds throwing petrol bombs.784 British forces had ‘Ulster specific’ training 
grounds constructed in the UK, Germany, and Gibraltar (yet not for UNPKO in the 
1990s). The JSDF did not utilize such rehearsal training for ODO until 1997, with the 
sanitation and medical units for disaster relief, and did not construct model training 
facilities until the dispatch to Iraq in 2004, with ‘mini-Samawah’ facilities constructed 
for mission-specific pre-dispatch training.785
                                                   
783 Parker, John, Desert Rats From El Alamein to Basra: The Inside Story of a Military Legend 
(London: Headline, 2004): 65.
784 Interview, Farnoudi, Bijan, ICRC Communications Co-ordinator, Kabul: Tokyo (14 October 
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785 NHK, ‘Evidence: 900 days of GSDF Iraq Dispatch’, Close-up Gendai. 
However, UNDOF personnel in the late 
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1990s were rehearsing not only their technical skills but also security drills for response 
to contingencies, an example of lessons-learned albeit from a low base.
The greatest degree of comprehensive pre-dispatch training was provided for UNDOF, 
based upon unique mission requirements (multi-tasking with unfamiliar equipment), 
extended pre-dispatch lead-in period, and long-term mission commitment. This was 
based upon operational experience in the 1990s and has become the model for JSDF 
ODO training.
Since 1994, the UN has reported on members’ contributions to the Standby 
Arrangements for Peacekeeping, based on UNSC request S/PRST/1994/22. By 2000, 87 
states had pledged 147,500 personnel to UNPKO deployment “in principle”.786 The 
Arrangements assisted the UNDPKO in matching resources to missions, aiding 
rapid-deployments, but remained an imbalance between pledged infantry and “force 
multiplier” engineering and logistical units.787 While “Japan supports the concept of the 
Standby Arrangements...it is unable to join...under the present legal framework which 
necessitates thorough scrutiny of legal requirements...before it decides to contribute its 
personnel to a peace-keeping operation.” 788 Similarly, although PM Hashimoto 
supported the concept of the UN Rapidly Deployable Mission Headquarters (RDMHQ) 
in 1996, MoFA subsequently stated that “Japan is not prepared to hold a position in the 
Headquarters at the moment”.789
The quickest dispatch was Honduras, requiring one week from request to arrival, 
whereas the RRU required six weeks, which constitutes ‘rapid-dispatch’ compared to 
                                                   
786
Progress Report of Secretary-General on Standby Arrangements for Peacekeeping, UN Doc. 
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UNPKO, delayed due to political mediation requirements. The JSDF contributed to the 
delay by assembling composite ‘volunteer’ Regional Army units, with only the 
minesweeping and Honduras dispatches conforming to prepared contingency plans. The 
danger of contingencies planning not provided for by law was demonstrated by the 
leaking of MSDF plans for Indonesia relief prior to dispatch in 2005.790
                                                   
790 Hall, Rosalie Arcala, Civil-Military Cooperation in International Humanitarian and Civil 
Emergency Activities by Japanese Security Forces in Indonesia, Conference Paper, (Bangkok: 
Chulalongkorn University, 5 August 2008): 8 
(
The obvious logistical problems in dispatch were moving personnel and heavy 
equipment great distances. Sea-lift was barely adequate until 1998, and airlift depended 
upon chartered, particularly Russian, aircraft, a point of contention. The need for 
multiple-staging for ASDF flights, even to Cambodia, was a significant handicap, and
the JSDF were fortunate in being able to utilise allied base facilities in the Philippines, 
Kenya, the US, and elsewhere. If rapid reinforcement, evacuation or other contingency 
needs had arisen the field forces could easily have been compromised. Only UNDOF 
and the missions to Turkey and West Timor were not affected by these strategic 
weaknesses.
Logistical support in UNTAC was greatly enhanced by the provision of the MSDF 
AOE, and it is significant that this was not provided for ONUMOZ nor any other MSDF 
resource, despite operating in port areas. In UNDOF and UNTAC the JSDF were, or 
became, providers of logistical support to other contingents, and did not have significant 
problems in securing or transporting supplies.
http://humansecurityconf.polsci.chula.ac.th/Documents/Presentations/Rosalie.pdf, 2 September 
2010).
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C Performance
As noted, JSDF personnel tended to perform up to or beyond mission expectations in 
ODO, and their diligence has become a recognisable characteristic of missions. 
However, there were problems with aspects of performance. These included the ability 
to travel and work beyond dusk, prohibited in UNTAC and avoided in ONUMOZ, 
limited by security concerns, accentuated by the legal restrictions, and fear of 
constitutional infringements. UNMO and ONUMOZ staff officers were limited by their 
lack of support. ONUMOZ staff officers and the Honduras medical team were severely 
limited by their lack of transport, inadequate for such a high-intensity mission as 
Honduras.
In UNTAC, the GSDF repaired roads and bridges at an average rate of one bridge and 
over 4km of road per week, with 22 tonnes of water and over 2 kiloliters of oil delivered 
each week from December 1992.791
The medical performance of all JSDF dispatches was impressive. Even the smallest 
This is without the additional duties of food 
delivery and electoral support, container yard construction, or medical services, 
illustrating that its capacity was high despite limiting factors. Similar performance 
indicator figures can be taken from ONUMOZ and UNDOF, with similar results, but the 
scale of the UNTAC dispatch and the ‘heaviness’ of its engineering work made it 
exceptional in the 1990s. It was also the only JSDF ODO to experience greatly 
expanded duties, and in ways that few envisaged. Extended engineering-logistical duties 
were well within their scope, but patrolling duties, even though moderate by 
international standards, were a potential hazard that they coped with professionally and 
without incident.
                                                   
791 Handbook for Defense 1999: 616-619; Takeda, Yasuhiro, ‘Japan's Role in the Cambodian Peace 
Process: 561-562. 
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missions included disproportionately large medical establishments which performed 
well. The UNTAC dispatch was particularly impressive as the scale of medical service 
demand was so unexpected, while the Honduras dispatch provided an example of a 
‘light force’ treating almost 300 patients a day. The Zaire dispatch treated one-tenth of 
that daily figure, but was in-country for longer, with problems of sustaining 
high-intensity operations, and performing complex medical procedures, including major 
surgery.
D Contribution to Mission
The previous details of performance would suggest that the JSDF contribution to 
mission was a given, with high quality work diligently conducted. While largely 
accurate, such a depiction fails to appreciate exactly how contributions succeeded or 
failed in improving mission performance.
The overall effect JSDF dispatch on each mission is difficult to evaluate, but certain 
results are clear. The MSDF contributed significantly to the minesweeping operation, 
and assisted the navies of other countries in their work. The ONUMOZ and UNDOF 
contingents contributed technical niche skills not readily available to the UN from other 
members. In UNTAC, the JSDF contributed greatly to mission capabilities, and directly 
to the electoral process, as well as providing impetus to the rebuilding efforts of 
Cambodian people. The Honduras and Zaire dispatches are less easily evaluated, not 
being within allied force structures, although the RRU did contribute to 
water-purification efforts by cooperating with NGO, and indirectly with other military 
forces.
Question marks, however, remain, over net contributions, as JSDF personnel have 
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been dependent upon others for their general security, and in ONUMOZ for most 
services, the JSDF contingent diverting security resources from other tasks by its escort 
requirements. UNDOF and UNTAC security dependency did not significantly impose 
additional daily duties on other contingents. The JSDF have also been reluctant to 
conduct certain tasks beyond those originally mandated particularly when suggesting 
association with the ‘PKF’, such as assisting infantry camp construction, transporting 
foreign troops, or searching for missing personnel. While duties were expanded in 
UNTAC, this was all the more surprising given the rather inflexible attitude towards 
‘extensions’ in other missions.
E Effectiveness
Based upon the four sections of the analytical framework the effectiveness of JSDF 
ODO can be evaluated in context. As stated, effectiveness is measured by how the force 
achieved its objectives, by resources devoted (inputs) to tasks, and completed tasks 
(outputs) resulting in projected outcomes.792
The objectives of the JSDF in ONUMOZ were for a second contribution to UNPKO 
to build upon the success of UNTAC, yet at significantly lower cost and risk. The 
objectives set for the mission were therefore much more limited, being based upon 
regular tasks of movement control, within the capabilities of personnel, in designated 
locations, in relative security. While the ‘inputs’ were indeed limited, with a half-sized 
‘company’ little and small budget, it also was a low-profile mission, and the personnel, 
It might be considered that the more 
limited the objectives the greater prospects of achieving effectiveness. Although a 
logical supposition, this does not seem to have necessarily been the result.
                                                   
792 O'Brien, R.J., Police as peacekeepers: 177.
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although avoiding any negative incidents were also unable to make greater contributions 
to the mission, or to operate independently. By contrast, UNTAC had been expected to 
provide strong and reliable engineering support for the mission, in a large-scale, 
high-cost dispatch, but which expanded beyond those minimal standards, providing 
greater logistical support than envisaged, with electoral-support and even 
security-enhancement duties. While welcome for the UN, these developments were also 
highly valued by a Japanese government anxious about security following Japanese 
casualties in Cambodia. By providing greater ‘inputs’ Japan was able to not only 
produce more ‘outputs’, but also to have a greater influence upon ‘outcomes’. The 
ONUMOZ contingent had little influence over mission ‘outcomes’.
The UNDOF contingent combined qualities of both UNTAC and ONUMOZ. It is 
small-scale and low-cost, but has an immense range of capabilities for its scale, and 
contributes so many mission capabilities that it is highly valued within the mission and 
the UN, a welcome non-operational ‘outcome’ for the government. By supporting a 
stable mission in this way effectiveness is also ensured, as long as the mission remains 
effective.
The Honduras and Zaire dispatches were set different objectives and their 
effectiveness must be evaluated accordingly. Being non-UN missions, for humanitarian
assistance and disaster relief they were ostensibly pro-idealist missions directly 
contributing to human security, by the saving of life and prevention of suffering. Even 
with minimal ‘outcomes’, the objectives would appear to indicate effectiveness (if not 
efficiency), but the operational results appear to have been highly effective. There were 
critical comments regarding the timing of the dispatches, and concerning an 
unsustainable refugee policy in Zaire. Thus ‘time’ factors have a potentially great 
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variable influence on evaluating effectiveness, for at what stage is the outcome to be 
assessed? The same criticism could be levelled at UNTAC, for the Japanese contributed 
to a mission that failed to provide a thoroughly stable democratic Cambodia, as seen in 
later political crises. For this thesis, however, overall mission success is not an 
evaluation factor, and time reference shall be taken as immediately adjacent to JSDF 
ODO.
F Efficiency 
Efficiency in O’Brien’s study is based upon the ratio of inputs to outputs (and by 
extension, outcomes), with the additional factor of time required to achieve outputs and
outcomes. As O’Brien states efficiency “occurs when fewer inputs produce the same 
number of outputs or the same amounts of inputs produces more outputs.”793
Evaluating efficiency in military operations is inexact, but certain results can be 
determined, particularly whether the results (‘outcomes’) of operations match 
expectations and the resources (‘inputs’) applied. In ODO, the resources are those of
personnel, equipment, services, institutional support, and budget. Personnel and 
equipment are tangible assets, easily counted and compared between missions and 
countries, but requiring further qualitative evaluation, while other resources are less 
easily assessed. Budgets should be easily evaluated, but few countries compile and 
publish detailed figures relating to overseas dispatch. JDA budget allocation figures 
have been published, but certain missions have been provided with additional funding, 
There is 
also an inevitable relationship between efficiency and effectiveness, and both influence 
quality.
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particularly in initial stages through individual mission enabling bills, while disaster 
relief operations have had little information released. Rosalie Arcala Hall contends that, 
“it is considered taboo in government circles to discuss cost effectiveness of such
operations” as they may compare unfavourably with JDR civilian efforts.794 Few 
governments provide such operational cost-analysis, with UK efforts, balancing 
cost-benefits of civilian-military resources, proving an exception.795
Budget for ODO is provided by three main sources: extraordinary supplementary 
budgets, the IPCH, drawing upon budget reserves (yobihi), and the JDA/MOD which 
initially utilised annual budget allocations, with supplementary budgets requests 
appended the following year.796
                                                   
794 Hall, Rosalie Arcala, Civil-Military Cooperation in International Humanitarian and Civil 
Emergency Activities by Japanese Security Forces in Indonesia: 7.
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The Response of the UK, House of Commons, Select Committee on International Development 
Fifth Report (19 April 2000)
The IPCH ODO budgets have included dispatch of 
IPCH staff, and establishment of support and communications offices within operational 
areas, with JSDF-specific items limited to dispatch of UNMO to PKO training centres, 
and initial survey team costs. Most JSDF training, mission-specific procurement, 
transport, logistical support, ODO bonuses, and insurance costs have been met from 
defence budgets, with adjustments made by MoF for extraordinary expenses.
(http://www.publications.parliament.uk/pa/cm199900/cmselect/cmintdev/326/32606.htm, 8 October 
2010).
796 ‘Defense Agency estimates PKO costs at 8 bln yen’, Nikkei Shimbun (8 September 1992)
(http://telecom21.nikkei.co.jp/nt21/service/ENGD021/ENGD241?cid=NDJEDB1992090800101530
&madr=TOP&kdt=19920908&dk=23993e6b&reservedtp=ENGD021g6ir2iik&ftrmode=ENGD031
&hltid=206chh4opa2e0, 10 March 2010).
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IPCH ODO expenditure was far less than JDA:
Table 6.2 IPCH ODO Disbursements (¥million)
Mission/Year 1992 1993 1994
UNTAC 690 740
ONUMOZ 230 300
Zaire 200
Table 6.3 JDA ODO Budgets (¥million)
Year/
Mission
1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999
UNTAC 7518 2929
(38)
ONUMOZ 1000* 254
(74) (46)
UNDOF 246
(72)
217
(59)
217
(59)
223
(72)
Total 
(billion)
7.5 4 0.3 0 0.3 0.3 0.3 0.3
Defence 
Total 
(billion)
4551 4640 4683 4723 4845 4941 4929 4920
% 0.16 0.09 0.006 0 0.006 0.006 0.006 0.006
Amounts in parentheses are additional non-operational expenditures on training, tropical medicine 
research, and preparations.797
The cost for the Zaire/Rwanda dispatch (¥5.7 billion) despite chartered air-lift
appears high for a much smaller force than UNTAC, dispatched for only 80 days.798
                                                   
797 * Indicates figure (without sources) from Heinrich, L. William, Jr. et al, United Nations 
Peace-keeping Operations: 81; JSDF Equipment Yearbook 1993: 528; Defense Yearbook 1995: 487; 
JSDF Equipment Yearbook 1997: 567; JSDF Equipment Yearbook 1999: 583.
798 Heinrich, L. William, Jr. et al, United Nations Peace-keeping Operations, 1999: 81; ‘JSDF 
effective? ¥5.7billion required to operate from Goma’ (Jieitai, Goma kara tesshuukaishi 57okuen 
kaketa ga koukawa?), Asahi Shimbun (16 December 1994): 8.
The 
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ASDF operation in West Timor was budgeted at ¥8 million which appears surprisingly 
low.799 The Honduras JDR dispatch budget is not available, yet based upon the brevity 
and scale of the mission it would probably have cost less than UNDOF, yet significantly 
more than the West Timor mission, with ¥100 million an appropriate estimate. For 
comparison, the 2001 defence diplomacy budget was six times that for UNDOF.800
While there are hidden costs of JSDF ODO, such as equipment degradation, there are 
also hidden benefits, such as training value and capability-multiplying effects. 
Nonetheless, it is clear that the costs of ODO in the 1990s were intrinsically low, but 
particularly so when considered as below 0.16% of defence budgets. They also did not 
depend upon an extensive infrastructure of PKO training centres or mission-specific 
training (prior to UNDOF), being constituted from existing force capabilities. The costs 
are also significantly smaller than those incurred for government contributions to 
international missions, Japan’s UNTAC UN-assessed contribution being $240 million 
with a further $630 million voluntary contribution.801
As stated, the Honduras dispatch was able to treat a great many patients, in an 
effective manner, and was much appreciated by the local population. Being a ‘light’ 
dispatch with a small footprint, it could be seen as highly efficient. However, R.A. Hall 
has contended that the JSDF tends to have “a disproportionate distribution (80%-20% 
rule) of support versus actual responders in its contingent” and that as they “need to be 
independently housed and fed, the logistical requirements...makes any kind of 
The defence budget costs of 
UNTAC, by comparison, were less than $100 million.
                                                   
799
JSDF Equipment Yearbook 2001: 574.
800
Defense Yearbook 2000 (Boueinenkan2000) (Tokyo: Boueinenkankankoukai, 2000): 420.
801 ‘Japan's PKO help to top one bln dollars’, Nikkei Shimbun (22 February 1992)
(http://telecom21.nikkei.co.jp/nt21/service/ENGD021/ENGD241?cid=NDJEDB1992022200101098
&madr=TOP&kdt=19920222&dk=503171b3&reservedtp=ENGD021g6isa2vd&ftrmode=ENGD031
&hltid=206chh4opa2e0, 10 March 2010).
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deployment preparation complex and lengthy.”802
The UNDOF contingents clearly possessed the ‘efficiency of flexibility’ through 
This could be seen in the Zaire 
dispatch, with surgical ‘output’ requiring extensive ‘input’ of supporting personnel and 
equipment, but the quality of the work performed must be taken into account. Honduras, 
by contrast, provides an example of how relatively low-cost and rapid dispatch could 
rapidly result in a large volume ‘output’ of satisfied clients. While of high quality, it was 
high-intensity, high-volume work that lends itself to efficiency studies.
Context must be appreciated when evaluating the efficiency of the JSDF in UNTAC, 
for it was a large mission with long and heavy logistical support train, and the most 
expensive ODO of the 1990s. In terms of time required for ‘outputs’, the late dispatch 
and construction of Camp Takeo would degrade its efficiency, but the condition of 
Cambodian infrastructure, and the political environment and degree of mediation 
required to enable the dispatch entailed a cautious and logistics-heavy approach. Also, 
the expansion of duties and deterioration in security both impacted upon contingent 
efficiency in its original tasks. While the scale and speed of the contingent would appear 
to cast doubt upon its efficiency, it must be wondered what alternatives were available? 
It is highly unlikely that civilian contractors would have been able or willing to conduct 
equivalent project work for the cost, or that other nations would have provided 
equivalent forces. Although the JSDF demonstrated their effectiveness in UNTAC 
primarily by their engineering ‘outputs’, it was perhaps the non-engineering 
‘swing-capabilities’ that clearly demonstrated their efficiency, as high quality flexibility 
is a prized asset in any operation. The JSDF were able to greatly increase their range of 
‘outputs’ with the same degree of ‘inputs’.
                                                   
802 Hall, Rosalie Arcala, Civil-Military Cooperation in International Humanitarian and Civil 
Emergency Activities by Japanese Security Forces in Indonesia: 6. 
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extensive multi-tasking and role as core force-multipliers. For minimal ‘inputs’ the 
mission was able to maximise ‘outputs’ and ‘outcomes’. As with effectiveness, the 
relatively low-cost, small-scale model of JSDF ONUMOZ contingents does not appear 
particularly efficient compared with UNDOF. ‘Inputs’ were fixed, as were ‘outputs’, as 
the unit was lacking in sufficient scale to independently affect its output. The limited 
‘input’ in ONUMOZ also affected their working efficiency, as working from tents in 
tropical conditions, while cheap, was not necessarily efficient.
One limiting factor on flexibility and therefore efficiency was the ability to 
communicate. Veterans have stated how they relied upon basic phrases and gestures,
and while this may have been immediately sufficient it raises questions about overall 
operational efficiency. Few translators were dispatched, and mission personnel were 
fortunate that NGO, JICA, and JSDF staff officers were occasionally available to 
facilitate communications. One lesson would appear to be to increase the proportion of 
young, enthusiastic members of contingents to help bridge this communication gap.
The most obvious input-output disparity in JSDF ODO has been in the provision of 
airlift support, with half the ASDF C-130H fleet required to support some missions. The 
range-payload problems detailed ensured that a large number of aircraft and personnel 
were utilised for limited end-effect. The shuttle services provided between Thailand and 
Cambodia, and Honduras and Texas, were effective roles for such aircraft, but the 
multiple-stages and resources required to transit into theatre suggests a disparity of 
output to input. Chartered aircraft resources would probably have provided more 
efficiency, while helicopters would have provided a more flexible aviation resource 
within Cambodia, and could easily have been transported by ship or air-freighter, as 
they were, twice, to Pakistan.
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G Quality
Quality in ODO is determined by how the force satisfies the client, and how the force 
is able to work beyond the client’s minimum requirements. ODO ‘clients’ refer to the 
UN, host governments, the local population, and the Japanese government. Criticisms of 
UNTAC were mainly due to slow JSDF dispatch, Camp Takeo, and refusal to conduct 
certain duties, extenuated by a lack of understanding of JSDF operational legal 
restrictions. However, quality also has reference to the details of effectiveness and 
efficiency, as clients are impressed by them, but may accept lesser efficiency resulting 
from greater effectiveness. 
Host governments and populations have appreciated Japanese engineering and 
logistical contributions in UNDOF and UNTAC, as they were tangible tasks performed 
in public, as were JSDF medical services. Duties conducted far from media and public 
attention received correspondingly less appreciation. The mission SRSG, however, 
would have a different view, with the JSDF in ONUMOZ and particularly UNDOF 
regarded as important force capability-multipliers.
The UN has appreciated Japanese participation in UNPKO, and pressed hard for 
Japan to join missions in 1992-1993. This appreciation was driven not only by 
operational considerations for what the JSDF could contribute, but also the political and 
financial contributions the Japanese government could make to UNPKO. Despite 
Japanese pressure during UNTAC, this appreciation has largely been enhanced by 
operational experience.
For the Japanese government, as both client and provider, the most important issues 
of appreciation and satisfaction have been the avoidance of embarrassments and risks, 
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and support for Japan’s IPC goals. That no JSDF have been killed or seriously injured in 
operations conducted in challenging natural and security environments is certainly a 
matter for great satisfaction, and the problems that arose in Cambodia with the deaths of 
two Japanese further emphasised the quality of JSDF efforts.
3 Comparative Evaluation of JSDF and non-JSDF ODO
A Non-Japanese Operations
Comparisons between national militaries are natural but not always instructive. 
Qualitative comparisons are difficult, while quantitative comparisons provide little 
substantial understanding. For the examination of JSDF ODO, military performance in 
overseas operations would be the main focus of any comparison, and mainly of a 
qualitative nature. The most useful comparisons would be of similar forces in the same 
or similar missions, and also of militaries that emerged as ODO participants during the 
1990s, as well as with countries with more extensive operational experience. 
Operational performance is the obvious area of comparison, but preparation of forces 
for dispatch is also of obvious value. 
a Operational Comparison
UNTAC provides the most obvious operational comparison for JSDF ODO, as it was 
large and has been the subject of extensive media and academic coverage. The Thai and 
Chinese engineering battalions conducted similar work to the GSDF, but NIDS 
researchers have stated that neither was as effective as the GSDF. Trevor Findlay 
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comments that the Thai battalion were alleged to have opened a (profitable) restaurant 
in Battambang.803
Among other contingents, performance seemed variable, as was morale. Normally 
dependable peacekeepers (Irish, Australians) withdrew their labour over bonus 
disparities.
The Chinese appeared to have been unlucky in being targeted by KR 
forces, with two troops killed in May 1993, yet were otherwise unremarkable. Neither 
force offered the capabilities of the JSDF.
804 Attitudes towards ‘spoilers’ varied, as Pakistani and Bangladeshi 
contingents strongly defended their bases, Indonesian and Uruguayan troops did not, 
while the French, and Dutch, were particularly ‘robust’.805 UNTAC was the first 
large-scale dispatch of Pakistani forces for 30 years. They demonstrated a keen 
understanding of PKO roles through community relations, establishing English classes, 
and a radio service.806 Kabilan Krishnasamy claims that Pakistani commitment was 
motivated to, “exert an influence in the international system in competition with India”, 
a more overtly utilitarian approach than Japan’s comparisons with China, but not 
explaining operational effectiveness.807
A contrast of the JSDF with their ‘neighbours’ was the French tendency to operate as 
if in “a French fiefdom, rather than as part of a multinational operation.”808
                                                   
803 Findlay, Trevor, Cambodia: 140.
804 Findlay, Trevor, Cambodia: 141.
805 Findlay, Trevor, Cambodia: 132-133.
806 Krishnasamy, Kabilan, ‘Pakistan Peacekeeping Experiences’: 110-111.
807 Krishnasamy, Kabilan, ‘Pakistan Peacekeeping Experiences’: 114.
808 Findlay, Trevor, Cambodia: 141.
They used 
force to evict Cambodians from their camp surroundings, in sharp contrast with 
Japanese attitudes, where small huts were established by locals near the gate selling 
food and drink, providing an international meeting place. Despite some of these 
establishments being run by attractive women, their role much more closely resembled 
262 
 
that of the Japanese ‘mama’ bar-owner than the more insidious establishments 
frequented by many UNTAC personnel. 809 One incident involved the French shooting 
in the air to disperse Cambodians ‘stealing’ discarded French plastic water bottles. The 
GSDF noticed this phenomenon and decided to wash and collect them for distribution to 
local people.810 Kurashina Yuko has suggested that the JSDF, despite having, “failed to 
increase legitimacy,” through ODO activities, nonetheless, “developed highly 
constabulary, less masculine, and civilianized identities.”811
In Zaire, the JSDF unit cooperated closely with allied militaries, and provided the 
most effective water purification facilities. In both Zaire and Honduras the ODO forces 
Although the “failure” 
could be challenged, Kurashina may have identified a trait that made the GSDF appear 
weak to some and yet apparently appealed to Cambodians with whom they interacted. 
Like the Pakistanis, the JSDF arrived in Cambodia with notions of roles and behaviour 
somewhat at odds to certain contingents.
The JSDF contingent in UNDOF can only be compared with its host logistics 
battalions from Canada and India. The differences of security considerations has been 
noted, the Canadians providing dedicated contingency units, while the Indian forces 
have been non-engineering specialist and relatively ‘hard’ formations ideally configured 
to support Japanese security. However, it is worth also noting that 30 Canadian troops 
were replaced by 43 Japanese, with 12-15 of these being funded nationally in a small 
but significant augmentation of mission resources, particularly considering the 
multiple-skill capabilities of each JSDF member.
                                                   
809 Miyajima, Shigeki, Ah, Magnificent JSDF: 128-142.
810 Kurashina, Yuko, Peacekeeping Participation and Identity Changes in the Japan Self Defense 
Forces: Military Service as ‘Dirty Work’, PhD Thesis (College Park, MD.: University of Maryland, 
2005): 207-208.
811 Kurashina, Yuko, Peacekeeping Participation and Identity Changes in the Japan Self Defense 
Forces: 2.
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relied upon host militaries for security assistance, and the cooperation appeared to work 
successfully. The medical elements of all missions worked closely with their military 
peers, and Japan certainly contributed to enhancing medical care, through cooperation 
and the airlifting of serious cases to third countries. Even the MSDF minesweeping 
involved allied medical assistance. However, a direct comparison between the JSDF 
RRU and the British dispatch to Rwanda (UNAMIR) provides a less positive 
impression. The British deployed a month earlier, with far more equipment, and 595 
troops, conducted similar medical and water-supply duties, as well as infrastructure 
repairs and infantry patrols, treating over 125,000 (out-) patients in three months. 
Quality, effectiveness, and efficiency appear to have been significantly greater than the 
JSDF, with contingent scale, homogenous-training (5 Airborne Brigade), and logistics 
important contributory factors, and with an extraction force on stand-by for 
contingencies.812
Comparing early JSDF ODO with the UK may appear unfair. Germany and Korea 
more closely resembled Japan, cautiously commencing ODO, albeit with differing 
results. Korea joined the UN in 1991, and three times (1991-1993) was requested to 
contribute forces to operations in Somalia, each time the government stating that due to 
the need for Parliamentary approval dispatch was not possible. The first dispatch came 
with an engineering ‘Evergreen Unit’ to Somalia, 1993-1994, with another to Angola, 
1995-1996.813
                                                   
812
The United Kingdom’s Role in UN Peacekeeping Operations (London: MoD/FCO, 1995): 18-19.
813 Hong, Kyudok, ‘South Korean Experiences in Peacekeeping and Plan for the Future’, in Caforio, 
Giuseppe (ed.), Advances in Military Sociology: Essays in Honor of Charles C. Moskos, Part A
(Bingley: Emerald Group, 2009): 173-187, 175-176.
Kyudok Hong is critical of performance due to slow deployments despite 
800 troops being assigned to the UNSAS standby system since 1995, and as civilians 
have played little operational role. Korea also lacked ODO legislation with operations 
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conducted on an ad hoc basis.814 There was opposition to Korean ODO due to left-wing 
opposition to supporting US wars, and nationalist feeling that Koreans should focus 
more on Koreans, north and south. 815 One significant dispatch was October 
1999-October 2003, when over 3500 troops were dispatched to East Timor, with the 
first infantry ODO since Vietnam.816
Korean operational progress would appear to outstrip Japanese, but Korea had less 
legal and social restrictions on military overseas dispatch. The case of Germany is 
closer to that of Japan and illustrates similarities and disparities in the 1990s. Germany 
dispatched forces to the Eastern Mediterranean and Middle East in 1990, despite 
significant legal and social obstacles, including strong anti-militarist norms (despite 
conscription). German forces flew aid into northern Iraq and joined MSDF 
minesweepers in the Gulf in 1991. Hartwig Hummel has illustrated how the German 
constitution and political environment were less restrictive for overseas deployments 
than in Japan.
Korean mission performance appears to have been 
highly effective, and in East Timor there was the first cooperative effort with the JSDF, 
the Japanese dispatching two Korean speakers. 
817
Thereafter, 150 German military medical personnel were dispatched to Cambodia 
supporting, but separate from, UNTAC, and provided high quality medical work, 
despite first media impressions being somewhat negative.818
                                                   
814 Hong, Kyudok, ‘South Korean Experiences in Peacekeeping and Plan for the Future’: 186
815 Hong, Kyudok, ‘South Korean Experiences in Peacekeeping and Plan for the Future’: 174, 182.
816 Hong, Kyudok, ‘South Korean Experiences in Peacekeeping and Plan for the Future’: 177.
817 Hummel, Hartwig, The PKO-Debate in Japan and Germany in Comparison, Conference Paper 
(Sapporo: Hokusei Gakuen University, 1 October 1996): 8.
The death of one UNTAC 
member came during the unhappy German Somalia dispatch, a 1700 force including 
infantry, prompting opposition that culminated in the 1994 Federal Constitutional Court 
818 Von Terzani, Tiziano, ‘UNTAC is the new God’ (Untac ist der neue Gott), Der Spiegel (1 June 
1992) (http://www.spiegel.de/spiegel/print/d-13688669.html, 17 August 2008).
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ruling. This stated that Article 24 of the German constitution allowed German 
participation in collective military activities of U.N., CSCE, and NATO, provided that 
the government gained parliamentary approval.819 German ODO rapidly expanded 
through air-monitoring missions over Bosnia, and from July 1995, 2000 troops with
naval and air forces, which conducted air-strikes from August.820 This was repeated 
over Serbia and Kosovo in 1999, with the German Defence Minister stating that “with 
Tornados the Bundeswehr went into combat for the first time” despite significant 
minority opposition.821 By 2005, German forces had engaged in combat with insurgent 
forces in Afghanistan, sustained casualties, and provided commanders for ISAF and in 
Kosovo.822
While Korea, Germany, and Japan were embarking on ODO during the 1990s, other 
Germany has been held up as an example of what Japan has failed to achieve, but as 
stated previously, German efforts have been within strong multilateral institutions, with 
less inherent distrust of German forces. Also, the anti-war and pacifist norms present in 
German society were somewhat less rigid than those in Japan, partly due to institutional 
security architecture and ‘NATO-militarisation’ within Germany during the Cold War. 
The submission to the Constitutional Court provided moral and legal legitimacy that the 
Japanese government has avoided seeking. While not matching the strategic 
expeditionary capabilities of Britain and France, Germany’s evolution as a 
broad-spectrum ODO actor was developed from the flawed operations of the 1990s.
                                                   
819 Philippi, Nina, ‘Civilian Power and war: the German debate about out-of-area operations 
1990-1999’, in Harnisch, Sebastian, and Maull, Hanns W., (eds.), Germany as a Civilian Power: The 
Foreign Policy of the Berlin Republic (Manchester, Manchester University Press, 2001): 49-67, 61.
820 Hummel, Hartwig, The PKO-Debate in Japan and Germany in Comparison: 11.
821 Scharping, Rudolf, ‘A New Roadmap for Germany’s Armed Forces’, Interavia, (July/August 
2000): 18.
822 Koelbl, Susanne, ‘Germany's Bundeswehr Steps out on the Global Stage’, Der Spiegel (17 June 
2005) (http://www.spiegel.de/international/spiegel/0,1518,360869,00.html, 17 August 2008).
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countries were consolidating, withdrawing, or pausing. Canada in the 1990s faced 
stringent defence spending cuts, and crises of confidence in traditional peacekeeping 
roles. In Bosnia, traditional PKO doctrine and practice had proved unsuitable and 
dangerous, while in Somalia Canadian Airborne forces tortured and murdered a Somali 
boy, leading to battalion disbandment and disgrace.823 ODO did not meet expectations, 
and the forces, public, and government were dissatisfied in an example of critically 
reduced efficiency, effectiveness, and quality. 824 Canada reduced its UNPKO 
commitments, devoting more resources to NATO-led operations, a path also followed 
by Dutch forces, where the failure at Srebrenica became an issue of national shame, and 
of dispute for where responsibility lay.825 Of veteran peacekeepers, Finland is a high 
quality, low-budget, relatively low-profile provider of stand-by and operational forces 
(over 10,000 within UNFICYP) and training facilities (since 1969), within a 2000
person legal ODO-limit, which has also commanded UNPKO.826
The JSDF have not assumed command or control duties in ODO. By contrast Britain 
and Australia have developed niche capabilities for commanding and coordinating 
multilateral operations (Kenya, 1994, East Timor, 1999). Germany has commanded 
large-scale operations in Bosnia, Kosovo, and Afghanistan, and Austria, Finland, and 
the Philippines have commanded UNDOF. JSDF capabilities in this high-prestige task 
seem limited by insufficient operational command experience, and a lack of confidence 
based upon the narrow spectrum of JSDF duties and (possibly) competences.
                                                   
823 Franke, Volker, C., ‘Resolving Identity Tensions: The Case of the Peacekeeper’, The Journal of 
Conflict Studies 19-2 (1999): 124-143, 3.
824 Bland, Douglas L., (ed.) Canada Without Armed Forces, Claxton Papers 4 (Kingston, Ontario: 
Queen’s University, 2003).
825 Spijkers, Otto, ‘The Immunity of the United Nations in Relation to the Genocide in Srebrenica in 
the Eyes of a Dutch District Court’, Journal of International Peacekeeping 13 (2009): 197–219.
826
UN Training Centre, Peace-keeping Division (Helsinki: Ministry of Defence, 1994); Finland in 
Peace-keeping Activities; Interview, Mattila, Satu, Minister-Counsellor, Embassy of Finland, Tokyo
(1 August 2001).
267 
 
It is clear that basic military and UNPKO competences are not sufficient for effective 
ODO, but a flexible approach to operations and constant innovation and reference to 
developing hardware and software is required, with both experienced and ‘new’ 
peacekeeping nations facing daunting challenges. One of these was suitably preparing 
forces for ODO.
b Force Preparation Comparison
Force preparation for ODO relies upon the development of clear guidelines for 
personnel, usually through doctrinal publications, providing bases for 
mission/role-specific training.
Doctrine can be defined as “a framework of principles, practices, and procedures, 
understanding of which provides a basis for action”, or as a “formal expression of 
military knowledge and thought …which covers the nature of current and future 
conflicts…and the methods of engaging in them to achieve success”.827
There is no UN handbook or guide to peacekeeping; the policy of the 
The JSDF 
entered into peacekeeping without any explicit PKO doctrine or Field Manual. While it 
is easy to criticize, in this respect Japan was typical with only the most experienced and 
dedicated of peacekeepers having developed such resources. The countries which 
devoted resources to PKO training centres were those which developed accompanying 
doctrines, although there were many countries which later developed doctrines without 
dedicated centres, such as the UK. In 1973, Michael Harbottle decried the lack of a 
‘PKO manual’:
                                                   
827
The Fundamentals of British Maritime Doctrine, BR1806 (London: Royal Navy/HMSO, 1995): 
12.
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Secretariat has never been to publish evaluations or commentaries based on 
past experience of peacekeeping operations and missions. It is difficult to see,
therefore, how the small member states can acquire the information they 
seek.828
As Richard Connaughton and Rod Thornton have pointed out, British difficulty in 
developing general and ODO-specific defence doctrine continued throughout the 1990s, 
as the evolution of doctrine through debate, decision, and execution became trapped by 
personal and institutional jealousies, and as the debate struggled to keep pace with 
operational events, although eventually succeeding.829
The increasing scale and complexity of operations and the emergence of a new 
generation of peacekeeping nations necessitated doctrinal innovations by international 
and national institutions. The US Army Field Manual FM 100-5, 1993, was the first US 
manual to include PKO doctrine, just one page within Chapter 13 “Operations Other 
Than War” but was significant as the first official indication that ‘PKO’ and OOTW 
doctrine would be of importance.830 Japan based much of its ODO preparation upon 
hearsay from other peacekeepers, such as US forces’ experience in the Sinai 
Multinational Force.831
Aoi Chiyuki has stated that understanding “the doctrinal perspective of peace support 
operations today is critical for Japan, particularly given that the country is at a 
crossroads regarding its future involvement in international peace support and 
                                                   
828 Harbottle, Michael, ‘Lessons for UN Peacekeeping’: 549.
829 Connaughton, Richard, ‘British Peacekeeping Doctrine: a critique’, in Gordon, D.S., and Toase, 
F.H., (eds.), Aspects of Peacekeeping (London: Frank Cass, 2001): 199-212, 200; Thornton, Rod, 
‘The Role of Peace Support Operations Doctrine in the British Army’, Gordon, D.S., and Toase, F.H., 
(eds.), Aspects of Peacekeeping: 41-62, 52-55.
830
US Army Field Manual FM- 100-5 (Washington DC., Department of the Army, 1993): 13-17.
831 Interviews, GSDF Research Office (July 2007).
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reconstruction operations.” 832 NATO militaries have the advantage of multilateral 
institutions able to take advantage of the niche skills and experiences of peacekeeping 
veteran nations, examples including NATO Civil-Military Cooperation (CIMIC) 
Doctrine.833 However, there is also danger in attempting to adapt doctrine for ODO, as 
using classic counter-insurgency doctrine, ‘take, hold, develop’, would be inappropriate 
for most missions. Such ‘cherry picking’ does not produce cohesive doctrine, as the 
British discovered in Malaya and Northern Ireland, with cogent British PKO-specific 
doctrine not emerging until frustrations in Bosnia, the British developing doctrine by 
force of failure.834
Development of Japanese doctrine was greatly hampered by the absence of dedicated 
lessons-learned institutions, until the establishment of the GSDF Research Headquarters 
in 2001, providing a single-service development resource.835 The Research Office was 
not, however, a PKO/ODO training centre, such a facility only established in 2008.
Even in 2010 Japan is not associated with the International Association of Peacekeeping 
Training Centres (IAPTC), and has no facilities listed. Germany has four institutions 
listed, Hungary three, and the DPRK one.836
Proper training is indispensable to ensure a uniform level of personnel quality. 
The effectiveness and cost of cooperation in training...should be carefully 
In 1997, MoFA stated that:
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834 Woodhouse, Tom, ‘The Gentle Hand of Peace? British Peacekeeping and Conflict Resolution in 
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Establishment of the GSDF Research Office (rikujoujieitai kenkyuuhonbu settei) Securitarian 
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studied. At this stage, it would be useful, in addition to utilizing existing PKO 
training centers, to urge the establishment of training centers and to send UN 
training assistance teams to various countries.837
It seems that MoFA’s wishes and defence policy were not quite unified as investment in 
such training was limited. However, gradually JSDF and JDA/MOD personnel were 
increasingly encouraged to study with official support, and opportunities for foreign 
study were increased.838 Yamaguchi Noboru has stated that from the late 1990s, JSDF 
officers were increasingly encouraged to study overseas and at Japanese universities, 
and to undertake foreign language studies.839 However, Japan has no equivalent of a 
standardized PKO training programme, other than mission-specific training for UNDOF, 
unlike the Austrian “FIOP” (Forces for International Operations) arrangement of regular 
and reserve units trained for ODO tasks as a ‘dispatch contingency capability’.840 Japan 
also lacks the degree of integration that provides performance and capability goals for 
militaries. NATO’s Partnership for Peace (PfP) programme, and the European Rapid 
Reaction Force (ERRF), have provided doctrinal, educational, and training support to 
achieve such goals, and have been identified as critical in building capability and PKO 
performance in large and small militaries.841
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Military Professionalism in Asia: 35-46, 38-40.
The GSDF rotation system and ODO as 
non-primary missions effectively stunted development of training in the 1990s, but the 
UNDOF and Honduras preparations demonstrate what could have been achieved.
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While other countries have developed joint practices for ODO, this has been weak in 
the JSDF, and Japanese progress in 2010 remains limited. The UK, Australia, and 
Canada have closely integrated forces within ODO as cost-saving and 
capability-enhancing measures. Less prominent countries have also developed niche 
capabilities, such as the Argentine Air Force, which with limited resources, and a small,
old fleet of C-130s, has dispatched a containerised civilian-military field-hospital for 
ODO, and was the only hospital operating after the 2010 Haiti earthquake. 842
Furthermore, despite limited resources, Argentina added KC-130 tankers as a 
‘capability-multiplier’ and was thus able to deploy the hospital to ONUMOZ and other 
distant operations.843 The Royal Air Force operates similar joint medical and evacuation 
assets, British military helicopters have since 1999 operated under a Joint Helicopter 
Command, and most British military medical personnel are reservists in 
joint-operational facilities. 844
JSDF operational performance was affected by UN administrative mechanisms, 
Japanese concepts of ‘joint operations’ effectively 
constitute ad hoc short-term operational cooperation, with single-service ‘stovepipes’ 
degrading training and operations and no equivalent of the UK JDCC/DCDC.
4 Non-JSDF Factors in Performance
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mandates, and the actions of local actors beyond the control of the Japanese government 
and JSDF. However, institutional support had a significant effect upon ODO 
performance and should be considered in detail, in addition to the previously stated 
legal limitations and restrictions.
A Institutional Support
JSDF ODO have been supported by a broad range of institutions, the primary bodies 
being the PMO, the Cabinet Office and Secretariat, the IPCH, initially within the PMO,
later the Cabinet Secretariat, the JDA/MOD, and MoFA. 
The IPCH has been the main coordinating office for ODO (other than JDR), 
dispatching survey teams, compiling reports, and managing dispatches. In UNTAC, 
some IPCC personnel dealt directly with the PMO, and PMO staff were considered 
well-connected and helpful, but the IPCH has a greater scale and range of specialists to 
support ODO.845
The IPCH has greatly expanded, with career and seconded (mainly MoFA) staff, and 
short-term Project Assistants, usually young researchers with overseas experience. The 
role of the IPCH includes the provision of goods and services required for ODO, and 
usually IPCH staff are either attached to the contingent liaison office (Zaire), or with the 
local Japanese embassy (UNDOF). The work of the IPCH has been important but 
limited by its role as a coordinating and liaison agency. It is not a command and control 
body, and has no authority over JSDF personnel, only responsibility for their IPCC
service. The diversity of IPCH staff, seen as a weakness in some agencies, appears to be 
                                                   
845 Interviews, Yamazaki, Hiroto (2009); JDA official, Tokyo (July 2008).
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an advantage as there are multiple informal lines of communication with ministries and
agencies.846 It has attempted to interact more with external researchers and JSDF 
personnel to establish greater ODO analysis capabilities, and to improve contingent 
mission briefings, partly to make them less MoFA-dependent.847
MoFA provided most of the pre-dispatch information for JSDF ODO, and despite the 
excellent work of MoFA personnel in host countries, it is the nature of mission briefings 
that interviewees regularly reiterate, with overly optimistic portrayals of security and 
local conditions as the main criticism. MoFA briefings assured JSDF UNTAC and Haiti 
contingents that weapons would not be required, with no significant problems envisaged. 
Cambodian threats were downplayed, while Haitian police capabilities were emphasised, 
despite being practically non-operational. Taoka Junji of the Asahi group characterised 
the government in the wake of UNTAC as “an unsettled JDA and PMO, compared with 
a lively MoFA.” 848 The impression is that dispatch itself was the prime MoFA 
motivating factor, demonstrating international burden sharing. Few bodies have 
sufficient local knowledge to challenge MoFA statements, but there is a widespread 
feeling that the Ministry’s agenda is to promote dispatch for a utilitarian agenda almost 
regardless of actual conditions. MoFA embassy staff, however, have proved highly 
supportive, not least in UNTAC where Japan, Germany, and veteran UNPKO countries’ 
missions formed an ‘extended UNSC-P5’ (EP5) that provided invaluable political 
support.849
The JDA/MOD has limited intelligence capabilities, few personnel overseas, and 
                                                   
846 Interview, Hirano, Ryuichi (2009).
847 IPCH seminars, Tokyo (2009-2010).
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defence attaché staff restricted in their abilities to directly communicate. This does not 
indicate that MoFA-JDA/MOD relations are chronically impaired, as they cooperated 
closely through the Nairobi coordination centre. However, the JDA/MOD has often felt 
that it has provided ODO forces on false premises, and that preparation of such forces 
has been consequently compromised. 
In addition to public bodies, there have been a number of other groups which have 
supported JSDF ODO. These include construction and trading companies preparing
camps and shipping equipment, airlines transporting personnel, and companies with 
local knowledge have even been invited to brief contingents on local conditions. NGO 
have not played a prominent role in supporting ODO, as they have had a minor profile 
in overseas missions with many staff being opposed to military dispatch.850 However, 
the experience of JICA and the JSDF cooperating with NGO in UNTAC, and 
particularly Zaire, prompted establishment of the ‘Japan Platform’ (tokutei 
hieirikatsudou houjin) from 2000. Japan Platform is an information and concepts 
exchange process between NGOs and MoFA, incorporating the JSDF and JDA/MOD,
and providing a unique channel for cooperation.851 In Cambodia, one of the most 
successful civil projects was ‘Radio UNTAC’, established by MoFA, JICA, and 
Japanese NGO, broadcasting and distributing thousands of free radios that became the 
primary Cambodian news and election information source, greatly helping UNTAC
achieve its goals and overcome political propaganda. As Trevor Findlay stated, “Voters’ 
education was critically dependent upon Radio UNTAC.” 852
                                                   
850 ‘Japan to improve refugee aid under tie-up with NGOs’, Nikkei Shimbun (25 May 1997)
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between ODO, ODA, and NGO has been within Mark Duffield’s characterization of 
merging development and security issues in the 1990s.853
Japan has a limited voluntary sector, and a small think-tank community, with such 
bodies as RIPS, the Institute for International Policy Studies (IIPS), and foundations 
providing the few institutions for security-related research and discussion. Many 
universities shunned security studies, and the few Japanese equivalent bodies to RUSI, 
IISS, or RIIA in the UK that exist, such as RIPS, are small and starved of funds, thus 
limiting specialist support for JSDF ODO.854
The JSDF have conducted ODO within a highly restrictive legal framework. Certain 
normative peacekeeping tasks were not allowed, certainly until 2001, with restrictive 
ROE. The IPCL provided limited leeway for the government to interpret and sanction 
additional duties. There was the additional fear that JSDF actions could be interpreted as 
being unconstitutional, rather than illegal: being considered as breaching the pacific 
intent of the constitution and its associated norms. Captain Goto stated that service in 
UNDOF “made me proud to serve as an SDF officer…but it also put me on my guard as 
a representative of Japan not to engage in any activity that might bring disgrace to our 
flag.”
B Legal Issues
855 Watanabe Akio is one of the few specialists to suggest that it might be “high 
time for Japan to make a more “fruitful” use of its peace constitution for the furtherance 
of peace enforcement, peacekeeping, and peacemaking through the UN?”856
                                                   
853 Duffield, Mark, Global Governance and the New Wars: The Merging of Development and 
Security (London: Zed, 2001).
854 Royal United Services Institute, International Institute for Strategic Studies, Royal Institute of 
International Affairs.
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856 Matthews, Ron, and Matsuyama, Keisuke (eds.), Japan’s Military Renaissance? (New York: St. 
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has frequently stated that rather than being a restrictive and inhibitive force, the 
constitution should be used as a unifying principle in the rejection of war, and thereby 
promoting pro-active efforts for securing peace, such as JSDF ODO.857
The JSDF were fortunate that the government chose to reinterpret the IPCL and 
assign additional duties during the UNTAC dispatch, as previous refusals to conduct 
tasks associated with the PKF had produced negative impressions. However, the refusal 
to reinterpret the rejection of the right to collective-defence has placed JSDF ODO 
practice in a precarious position. In each operation in the 1990s, the JSDF were 
dependent upon other contingents to provide security in the Japanese base area, in 
ONUMOZ even extending to armed escorts. The JSDF were not permitted to conform 
to UN practice (mission defence), and yet JSDF commanders were not allowed to 
manage unit defence until 1998. This double restriction of collective-security and ROE 
severely compromised security, and, as previously stated, the Forces were fortunate that 
they were not directly challenged. The danger in the 1990s was that practice was 
moving ahead of law. 
5 After the 1990s: Building Upon Experience
A Continuity and Improvement: 21
st
From 2002, the largest JSDF ODO was dispatched to East Timor. UNMISET was a 
highly innovative mission despite repeating much of the UNTAC/UNDOF high-quality 
engineering and logistics duties. It was the first to include female JSDF members from 
inception, it included a much bolstered security detachment, 17 personnel for the 
Century ODO
                                                                                                                                                     
Martin’s Press, 1993): 47.
857 Conversations with Watanabe, Akio (2002-2010).
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UNHQ staff, and interpreters to build relations with the Korean engineering contingent. 
The JSDF trained locals to use engineering vehicles many of which were donated upon 
withdrawal.858
It also faced unusual challenges. There were anti-Japanese demonstrations in Dili 
based upon war-legacy issues and NGO activities. Also, despite the excellent record of 
personal behaviour, amid the imperfections of UNTAC, there were allegations during 
UNMISET of sexual harassment by JSDF personnel towards local orphans, resulting in 
strict curfews.
In many ways, UNMISET provided a model for the dispatch to Iraq in 
2004.
859 While no official confirmation has been published, and seemingly little 
evidence, the accusation remains. As previously stated, attitudes to women in the JSDF 
have been mixed, a 1999 report stated that 18% of JSDF and JDA female personnel had 
experienced sexual harassment.860
                                                   
858
Defense of Japan 2004: 288-289.
859 Koyama, Shukoku, and Myrttinen, Henri, ‘Unintended consequences of peace operations on 
Timor Leste from a gender perspective’, in Aoi, Chiyuki, de Coning, Cedric, Thakur, Ramesh (eds.), 
Unintended Consequences of Peacekeeping Operations: 23-43, 37.
860 ‘SDF sex harassment affects 18% of its women’, The Japan Times (14 January 1999)
UNMISET, despite these negative aspects, developed into the culmination of JSDF 
ODO experience. It was the first UNPKO mission launched since the unfreezing of ‘six 
tasks’ and the 1998 IPCL reform, and the confidence in contingent abilities was obvious, 
based upon a decade of experience. It also was such a large mission that there was 
significant recycling of personnel from previous ODO. Among the most striking 
differences from UNTAC was the attention to security matters, with a company-strength 
infantry presence actively patrolling the JSDF camp and operational areas. Based upon 
Japan Platform experience, Japanese NGO and JICA projects were supported, and there 
was a greater degree of cooperation with other contingents, not least the Koreans.
(http://search.japantimes.co.jp/cgi-bin/nn19990114b1.html, 12 March 2010).
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UNMISET was based upon learning from the ODO practice of the 1990s, and, in 
modified form, would be taken as the basis for the 2004 Iraq dispatch, with the obvious 
enhancement of security personnel and armoured vehicles, and concomitant reduction 
of PSO capacity. This was an evolution of practice, a lessons-learned process of 
operational performance, but could not be considered an inevitable policy process of 
escalation of military dispatch.
B New practice:
The experience of the 1990s and new security challenges of the 21st
To complement such developments, from 2002, JSDF officers were dispatched to US
Central Command, Tampa, Florida, as Liaison Officers, for OEF-MIO and Iraq related 
duties. Officers have stated their sense of honour and duty in their role as 
representatives, and that they have been a little surprised in how well they have bonded 
with overseas colleagues.
century led to the 
development of new JSDF ODO practices, such as the GSDF Research Office and Iraq 
pre-dispatch rehearsal training. UNMISET, the Iraq dispatch, OEF-MIO, and the JSDF 
joint disaster relief operation in Indonesia in 2005 are examples of development and 
innovation at the operational end-point. 
861 This provides further evidence that JSDF ODO were 
supportive of and complimentary to US-Japan bilateralism, and broader multilateral 
cooperation. The GSDF attempted to publicise its ODO roles through its Public 
Relations Center (Rikujoujieitai kouhou sentaa) from 2002.862
One of the most important innovations was the systematic assessment of JSDF 
                                                   
861
Defense of Japan 2004: 281-284.
862 ‘The Opening of GSDF Public Relations Centre’ (Rikujoujieitai kouhou sentaa ga oopun), 
Securitarian 5 (2002): 37-39.
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personnel mental health before, during, and after operations. This was a badly neglected 
field in most militaries, despite PTSD being first diagnosed in 1974 among US Vietnam 
veterans, and was not accepted by the UK MoD during the Falkland or Gulf Wars.863
The first UNPKO-specific mental health research was in 1979, based upon Norwegian 
experience in UNIFIL, and despite slow progress the 1990s brought the issue into the 
mainstream of training considerations.864 The reported incidences of PTSD in UNPKO 
have ranged from 11.4% of US forces in UNOSOM I, to 8% of Canadian troops and 2% 
of Norwegians in UNROFOR. The UNPROFOR figures cannot be reconciled by 
single-cause explanations, but PTSD awareness training appears to have proved vital in 
reducing incidences.865
US studies indicated fear of the unknown in UNPKO as a stress elevating factor, 
while JSDF personnel found pre-UNDOF dispatch training to be highly stressful, with 
less apparent stress during operations, with a strong link between hurried dispatch and 
high stress levels.866 Lars Weisaeth suggests that NATO-PKO produced less anxiety 
among personnel than UNPKO possibly due to perceptions of NATO as a ‘natural’ 
leader.867
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proximity to traumatic incidents, but in the perceptions of subjects’ ‘natural roles’: 
‘warrior’ perceptions leading to greatest trauma.868 The JSDF have been unwittingly 
well-protected, having relatively ‘soft’ perceptions of their power and ODO roles, 
well-embedded in human security policies and rhetoric. By contrast, a US Army officer 
in Bosnia stated, “We were taught how to sneak around these tanks quietly, surprise the 
enemy and destroy...But here we are supposed to stay out of combat by being obvious. 
To me, it's like teaching a dog to walk backwards.”869
JSDF ODO missions have not included atrocities as in Rwanda or Bosnia, but 
Japanese personnel have had to deal with other stress issues. One UNDOF officer 
described “the ‘weight of the flag’ that hangs heavily on the SDF” as a positive 
motivating point, yet it is also a potential stress inducer. 870 Marrack Goulding’s 
comments regarding GSDF troops appearing “overwhelmed” by their responsibilities 
(Chapter Four) is related to such stress inducement. Studies of UNPROFOR and other 
UNPKO with significant landmine threats also suggest that these ambient threats 
elevated stress more than gun and shell-fire, all JSDF UNPKO in the 1990s having 
taken place in heavily mined areas. Perhaps the nature of JSDF units, as logistical 
support forces, helped them cope with mission stresses, as Thomas Britt has suggested, 
as they were able to immediately see the human benefits of their actions.871
The initial measures that may have relieved PTSD among JSDF personnel, such as 
leave periods (UNTAC) and a range of sporting and cultural events (UNDOF), were not 
designed for such purposes. The UNMISET dispatch was the first to have a psychiatric 
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nurse attached, and for Iraq psychiatric health staff were dispatched, and 
‘de-compression’ pre-repatriation leave (two weeks in Kuwait) was instituted to allow 
personnel to talk through their experiences with their peers before being confronted by
families and other ‘uninitiated’. 872 Sawamura has suggested that the Japanese in 
UNDOF remained very stable, despite stress, most likely due to the pre-dispatch mental 
health awareness training conducted since 2002.873
The JSDF were effective international actors in ODO, considering the constraints of 
laws, constitution, and socio-political norms within which they operated. The 
effectiveness of the missions was directly related to the scale of dispatch, the duties 
The by now ‘traditional’ roles of JSDF ODO in the 1990s have continued, with 
engineering, logistics, water purification, and medical services, but they have been 
complemented by a range of measures designed to enhance their performance. 
Investments in hardware, such as APC and ships, are tangible measures but it is 
investment and innovation in software, such as mental health provision, enhanced 
language training, and overseas education opportunities that act as more enduring 
capability-multipliers in JSDF ODO.
Conclusion
As this chapter initially stated, the fundamental question is “were the JSDF effective 
international actors?” By an examination of the four factors within the analytical 
framework, and the consequent application of the criteria of efficiency, effectiveness, 
and quality, this question can be answered.
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assigned, and the restrictions imposed. In UNTAC, the JSDF had the greater scale, 
range of duties, and the greatest expectation to contribute to human security and the 
operational range of the mission, while in UNDOF theirs was a specialist niche role 
with slender resources. The UNTAC contingent performed to the required mission 
standards, but when requirements changed and further duties were requested, it was able 
to perform up to the increased standards by having both the scale and loosening of 
restrictions to allow it to effectively perform its duties. The ONUMOZ contingent could 
not extend its operational range as its effectiveness was restricted by its scale. 
The ability of the UNTAC unit to extend its range of outputs, results of work, without 
any increase in resources (inputs) increased its efficiency. Likewise, UNDOF and the 
Honduras dispatch were both compact, light ODO, but were able to demonstrate 
tremendous efficiency. Overall efficiency was certainly impaired by the strategic 
abilities of the Forces, particularly the ASDF, with ill-suited resources devoted en masse 
to operations, but the overall cost-performance of JSDF ODO appears to have been 
efficient. 
The quality of JSDF ODO was clear, as mission clients appeared satisfied. The UN 
and those working closely with the Forces appreciated the quality of the work 
completed, and in the larger missions, the local population could not have hoped for 
much greater provision of services. UNDOF provided an example of a small but highly 
capable contingent providing such a broad range of capability-enhancing services that 
its performance has been considered vital to the mission.
It is also clear that in wider society the operations were regarded as successful, 
regardless of whether government motives are regarded as utilitarian or idealist. The 
ODO were compared favourably with those of other nations, within the same mission or 
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elsewhere. UNTAC produced such a variation of actor performance that it was perhaps 
not surprising that the JSDF efforts were so well received. Other operations have been 
better balanced, and yet JSDF ODO have been seen as a benchmark of high operational 
performance, albeit within a relatively narrow range.
JSDF performance degrading issues have been noted, such as strategic lift, language 
skills, and pre-dispatch preparation. Also, the lack of investment in training centres and 
doctrine meant that a great deal of responsibility was shifted onto individual contingent 
commanders, most of whom had little or no overseas experience, and only modest core 
staffs to assist them. That the training and preparation proceeded smoothly says much 
for their professionalism and foresight. Civilian support was forthcoming, but briefings 
and language-study support proved far from satisfactory, and led to efforts by the JSDF 
and IPCH to develop and enhance their own capacities to complement those of MoFA.
ODO in the 1990s provided not only legal and political precedents for the expansion 
of operations in the 21st century, but also proved invaluable for operational experience. 
Without the experience of diverse missions in varied security environments, dealing 
with actual and imagined restrictions, while conducting PSO activities, the deployments 
to East Timor, Iraq, and Aceh would have been far more hazardous and much less 
effective. Dirk Nabers has illustrated how the Japanese government’s response to 9/11 
was to emphasize the unity of the international community, and to increasingly place 
Japanese security within a “single international community with the same values,”874
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Shinoda Tomohito illustrates how Prime Minister Koizumi acted with startling alacrity 
in response to the events of 9/11, but that the “swift response was inspired largely by 
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lessons Japan had learned during the 1990s.”875
                                                   
875 Shinoda, Tomohito, Koizumi Diplomacy: 91.
By 2001, the kudos accruing from 
demonstrating its capabilities in ODO had also resulted in the JSDF being more trusted 
and less shackled within ‘civilian control’. The Defense Policy Bureau and the Air, 
Ground, and Maritime Staff Offices of the JSDF were able to offer professional advice 
based upon operational experience, and influence the operations selected for dispatch. 
Without significant further legal reform, constitutional revision, or political mediation, 
the ODO of the 1990s had produced a settled notion of JSDF performance, 
professionalism, and effectiveness as an international actor.
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Chapter 7 Conclusion
Introduction
This thesis has focused on Japanese ODO, and whether the JSDF proved themselves 
to be effective international actors. In order to answer that question, other questions also 
require addressing, carefully avoiding entanglement in the much broader issues related 
to overall utility and ‘success’ of each multinational operation, well beyond JSDF 
control. Other relevant questions are what tasks did the JSDF perform overseas? Were 
these operations conducted effectively, efficiently, and to high quality standards? What 
factors contributed to JSDF performance? Were the JSDF immediately able to perform 
to the required standards, despite their lack of operational experience? Also, how did 
JSDF ODO performance compare to that of other national militaries? By answering 
these questions it shall also be possible to provide insight into what JSDF performance 
in the ODO of the 1990s signified for national security policy, and for alternate 
academic studies of Japan in international relations. In essence, what were the broader 
implications of JSDF ODO in the 1990s? 
This thesis has thus far provided answers to the initial range of questions while also 
providing a unique evaluation of JSDF operations in the broader context of evolving 
Japanese security policy. No other study has provided a comprehensive overview of 
JSDF operational effectiveness, or considered operational efficiency and quality in 
systematic terms. As stated in Chapter One, most studies of JSDF ODO have 
concentrated upon the strategic, multinational levels, or the domestic Japanese 
socio-political levels. Despite the great controversies of 1990-1992 regarding the 
advisability or utility of dispatching the JSDF overseas, there was little follow-through 
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research on those very points, apart from minor single-operation reports. That 
opponents of dispatch were less than flattering in praising the Forces is perhaps natural, 
but the systematic failure of the JSDF and JDA to complete post-operational analyses 
highlighting achievements while learning from short-comings is quite extraordinary. 
Since the 1990s, the JSDF have failed to adequately publicise their own considerable 
achievements, and place material in the public domain for researchers. Thereby, this 
thesis is the first systematic evaluation of JSDF ODO of the 1990s ever undertaken, 
despite a lack of basic material, and dependent upon extensive meetings with current 
and former JSDF members and officials. In this, the author was, counter-intuitively, 
aided by being non-Japanese, thus seen as largely neutral (or ignorant) regarding 
contentious political issues, and by having British Army experience. The latter point, 
seemingly irrelevant to a study of the JSDF, proved vitally important. JSDF personnel 
often seem more comfortable when talking of operational or training issues with people 
who ‘speak the same language’ and can understand implied criticisms, faint praise, or 
omissions of comment. This development of relations extended into the broader public 
and private security-related communities, of officials, think-tanks, and academic 
societies. This thesis was written without recourse to the as yet restricted ODO ‘dispatch 
histories’, but would have been quite impossible to complete without the time spent 
with JSDF, JDA, MOD, IPCH, and MoFA personnel, and the small security-studies 
academic community.
The following sections shall re-examine the findings of each chapter and evaluate 
how they answer the primary and secondary research questions, what we can learn from 
this evaluation, and what implications these findings have had for Japan and the JSDF 
beyond the subject decade.
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1 Effective Actors?
Chapter Two provided the context of the origins of the JSDF and their maturation 
from limited police-support and ordnance-disposal forces to technically accomplished, 
highly professional armed forces. They developed, however, within a socio-political 
environment dominated by anti-militarist norms, yet dependent upon US military 
guarantees, and struggled to gain legitimacy amidst “two mutually incompatible spheres 
on Japan’s political scene.” 876
The first ways in which the effectiveness, efficiency, and quality of the Forces was 
demonstrated was through civil support in domestic disaster relief operations, 
conducting themselves with discipline and dignity as national actors. Doubts concerning 
the constitutionality of the Forces continued, but few doubted their professional 
qualities in such roles, the GSDF alone annually conducting an average of 380 such 
The effects of this context of socio-political 
incompatibility were to ensure that the Forces were tightly restricted in their roles, 
communications, and responsibilities as national actors, with a profile so low that it 
negated public consciousness of their duties and characteristics. Despite their expansion 
and increasing sophistication during the Cold War, when they became more appreciated 
by the United States than their own population, the fundamental position of the JSDF 
changed little. Despite operating complex equipment and training to high standards the 
greatest priority appeared to be strict civilian control to prevent ‘reversion’ to martial 
ways, dragging democratic, liberal, pacifist Japan back to Imperial belligerency.
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operations.877
Quite apart from the significant domestic socio-political obstacles to dispatching the 
JSDF overseas, there were also significant questions regarding core capabilities. The 
Forces had no operational experience other than emergency relief, rescue tasks, and 
ordnance disposal. They had no significant joint-working experience, in contrast to 
combined-working experience with US forces, and no joint command structure, in fact, 
little command structure at all, with civilian control resulting in extensive 
bureaucratisation of the JSDF and JDA. Intelligence resources were limited, few force 
members possessed language skills, and those with overseas experience were 
concentrated in the MSDF, while the GSDF would conduct most operations. The ASDF 
and MSDF had slender resources by which to deploy and support the GSDF due to 
concentration upon ‘defensive defence’ and cutting-edge combat forces, and the Forces 
With time, increased realisation of Japan’s security relationships and 
problems, and the increased codification of state-pacifism as restraints upon
militarisation, through GDP-budget limit, arms export ban, and policies for peaceful use 
of space and nuclear power, the JSDF came to be viewed in less negative terms. They 
constituted the most tangible and effective contribution to Japan’s other prevalent norm, 
national security attached to the axis of the US alliance, which uncomfortably coexisted 
with the pacifist norm. JSDF capabilities as effective international actors within the 
supposedly crucial international commitment to the United Nations would be shaped by 
these formative experiences, in both negative and positive ways. Their opportunity to 
perform in UN missions would require global security transformation and consequent 
internal and external pressure upon Japan’s security norms.
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were under-strength, with a small civil support staff, and no usable reserve. It is clear 
that these capability gaps in ‘hardware’ and ‘software’ would affect the ability of the 
JSDF to undertake ODO.
There is no sense in which JSDF ODO in the 1990s were a natural progression from 
previous duties or relationships, and it would take a dislocation of Japan’s stable 
security environment during the Gulf War for overseas dispatch to be given serious 
consideration. The faults of the Forces were largely overcome during these first 
operations in the Persian Gulf and Cambodia but not eradicated, as became more 
obvious in later ODO. It was clear in the decade, however, that limited resources were 
being devoted to ODO capabilities in both ‘software’ and ‘hardware’ support. Capability 
gaps in air and sea-lift were gradually filled, if at all, and doctrine and intelligence were 
neglected well into the 21st
Japan in the 1990s was a ‘narrow spectrum’ actor, able and willing to undertake only 
a limited range of the operations characterized as UNPKO and OOTW, but it was 
equally a multi-role actor. The JSDF conducted PSO functions within UNPKO, and also 
allied support, disaster relief, and humanitarian operations in distant regions with little 
supporting infrastructure or narrow national interest. While Japanese IPC and human 
century despite ODO providing the only operational arena in 
which the JSDF could act as Japan’s primary international actors. 
From 2007, steps were taken to improve training in the skills most likely to be 
utilised in ODO, including language skills, and the ability to at least interpret doctrine in 
operational situations, if not actually to develop doctrine. The need for such 
ODO-focused training and doctrine was all the more urgent due to the political, legal, 
and constitutional restrictions within which the JSDF have operated, requiring flexible 
and imaginative responses to stressful operational situations. 
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security policies provided the context for ODO, the dispatches were initially directed by 
stronger influences of alliance pressure and cooperation. UN commitments provided 
both an apt forum for and a convenient means by which to advertise the 
liberal-internationalist character of such policies, despite being undertaken primarily to 
placate criticism and strengthen the military and political alliance with the US. As Chris 
Hughes states “Japan often appears to be borrowing the language and concomitant 
legitimacy of UN PKO, and precedents for dispatch of the JSDF established under UN 
mandates, as a means to push forward incrementally enhanced US-Japan alliance 
cooperation.”878
The crisis of confidence triggered by the Gulf War provided the first major challenge 
to Japan’s Cold War security norms. With little strategic direction, mediation between 
competing interests and aims became the political imperative as external drivers, 
primarily US pressure to assume part of the ‘international burden’, gradually began to 
outweigh the domestic resistance provided by latent pacifism and natural caution. 
UNPKO provided the requisite balance of ‘hard-power’ commitment to international 
security, and ‘soft-power’ liberal appeal to a population with deep pacifist sentiment. 
The operations, roles, and designated representative actors were the result of this 
extended mediation. The ‘harder’ aspects of UNPKO were softened by the inclusion of 
police and civilians within the IPCC, the restricted PSO nature of JSDF ODO, the 
combination with international relief and support duties, and potential parliamentary 
veto. The image of the UN in Japan, the seemingly central role it occupied in policy, 
and the emergence of UNPKO as a liberal-international security cooperation norm 
This should not, however, detract from actual operational performance, 
and the motivations behind many, later JSDF ODO.
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eased the mediation process between the previously fixed lines of Cold War ideology. 
Despite stone-wall opposition up to 1992, after UNTAC, resistance to JSDF ODO 
ebbed, but the range of policy and operational issues requiring mediation transformed 
rather than vanished.
The 1990s, often described as a ‘lost decade’, were years of great political 
opportunities. Coalition administrations exchanged power affecting ODO mediation but 
with little of the rancour of 1990-1992. As a highly restrictive ODO framework was in 
place, with the ‘five conditions’, six ‘frozen’ duties, and permitted activities, the issues 
at stake were of relative scale, degree, and cost rather than fundamental principle. 
UNPKO were dispatched by different governments, but as with UNEF, the first 
dispatch, UNTAC, set the general principles for those that followed, with differences of 
scale and timing requiring relatively mild mediation.
These highly restrictive practices, management, and leadership of Japanese ‘civilian 
control’ appeared unusual to other peacekeeping nations, but had become common 
practice since the post-war period. Operational and alliance requirements during the 
Cold War had slightly loosened the control restrictions, but JSDF performance in ODO 
would provide for a greater and more rapid transformation of the civil-military 
relationship. The perceptions of success and responsibility of the JSDF in overseas 
operations, and a lessening of domestic political polarization, allowed for the 
incremental relaxation of restrictions, expansion of duties, and professionalization of 
operational command. However, it was and remains a cause for concern that legal 
conditions were exceeded by operational practice. The military and political reliance 
upon collective security within operations, juxtaposed with the political rejection of the 
right of collective security, placed JSDF ODO in a potentially hazardous position, 
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where they remain. This is a powerful example of the legacy of pacifist norms 
overriding operational and legal concerns.
The primary influences over security issues in the 1990s remained Article 9 and the 
Japan-US alliance. Most Japanese respected the principles and ideals of Article 9, but 
also desired the security provided by the US alliance. Rather than ‘hedging’ or 
‘balancing’ this seeming contradiction constituted a natural desire to retain core
principles through processes of political mediation to also consolidate security. JSDF 
ODO was initially embarked upon as a mediation device between the demands of state 
pacifism and military alliance.
The demands of state pacifism and the mediation process for the IPCL entailed that 
JSDF ODO were defined by their limitations, and it is these that many observers have 
focused upon. This thesis has focused upon what was achieved within those limitations, 
and how operational practice developed through experience, the main subject of 
Chapters Four and Five. The three UNPKO undertaken have not usually been analysed 
as very different missions, even within JSDF studies, but the diversity within a short 
time-frame is striking.
The prototype, UNTAC, was a nation-building, PSO mission, with large contingent 
and significant logistical support, in an area of significant Japanese interest with civilian 
support present. ONUMOZ provided a compact ‘light footprint’ 
multinational-integrated PSO-support role, with substantial logistical train, with limited 
civilian support, in an area of limited Japanese interest. UNDOF built upon both 
experiences, developing as a high-capability engineering and transport PSO role, with a 
‘light-footprint’ and ‘light-external-logistics’ load, in an area of great strategic concern, 
but little immediate Japanese interest. These three operations demanded diverse skills 
293 
 
and resources, even though all were PSO within UNPKO. The later missions 
particularly demanded a degree of intimate, daily multinational working that the JSDF 
had not experienced prior to the 1990s. The lessons-learned capability gaps were 
obvious, particularly between UNTAC and ONUMOZ, but these were later remedied, 
and the Forces were able to conduct effective and meaningful operations in diverse 
environments, with only medical services as a constant capability. The JSDF, seemingly 
by chance and driven by political imperatives, began to acquire diverse (if narrow) 
multi-national mission capabilities. 
The achievements accomplished within highly restrictive legal and political 
constraints were commendable, and the expansion of duties for the UNTAC contingent, 
with little prior notice or training, provided an apt demonstration of the latent 
professional capabilities of the JSDF. The Forces were able to rapidly respond to 
political directives, adapt to new roles and an evolving security environment, provide a 
great range of operational capabilities to the UN mission, and contribute to the human 
security of the local people at a time of significant stress. This was achieved without any 
force increase or significant adjustment of resources. The extremely small numbers of 
personnel in ONUMOZ contributed to the mission with niche capabilities, acting as 
‘capability multipliers’ at potentially problematic logistical ‘choke points’, contributing 
to the UN mission out of proportion to their numbers or media profile. The UNDOF 
contingents have provided a broader ranging niche ‘capability multiplier’ role, 
providing an extensive range of logistical support services than in either UNTAC or 
ONUMOZ, and integrated closely within the UN mission to a far greater degree than in 
UNTAC.
Despite the obvious achievements questions remain concerning the efficiency of 
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certain operational points, such as logistical support, and security issues. The logistical 
‘bottlenecks’ of sea and particularly air-lift became obvious capability limiting factors, 
partly ameliorated by MSDF and ASDF efforts, by commercial means, and by limiting 
the ‘footprint’ and ‘load’ of dispatches. The JSDF have relied upon ‘practical 
interpretations’ of legal and political limitations, particularly regarding their expanded 
duties and five conditions in UNTAC, and collective security restrictions in all 
operations. While operational pragmatism is praiseworthy, it risks practice outpacing 
policy, and this has contributed to GSDF reluctance to contribute large units to UNPKO 
since the 1990s without a clear exposition of roles and security standards in a ‘general 
law’ of dispatch. In UNPKO, the Japanese have been generally cautious regarding 
missions selected, tasks undertaken, and rules imposed upon personnel. The disregard of 
certain operational standards for security, such as the scale of ONUMOZ forces, divided 
between locations, travelling on insecure roads, and incapable of providing even 
immediate self-defence, was based upon a political imperative, to rapidly participate in 
a second UNPKO, and an interpretation of IPCL personnel limits. The optimistic 
briefings provided prior to ONUMOZ dispatch were evidently adhered to in various 
parts of the Japanese government. However, the GSDF also demonstrated a relaxed 
attitude to security at Camp Takeo, despite the worsening security conditions and 
stringent limitations upon working hours and evening travel, which seemed to indicate 
either a disbelief in the dangers, or an implicit reliance upon the French infantry to 
provide for Japanese security.
The GSDF were both fortunate and judicious in avoiding casualties in UNTAC. The 
Japanese UNV and CIVPOL were neither as fortunate, nor as able to judiciously avoid 
the dangers of certain locations, and such hazardous duties as establishing voting 
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stations or patrolling. Their roles dictated their exposure and relative isolation. The 
JSDF were far more easily able to benefit from their association with non-Japanese 
contingents and from their role as the most prominent Japanese international 
representatives in Cambodia. In Mozambique, the degree of reliance on non-Japanese 
contingents was almost complete, and this can be seen as both a positive aspect, to be 
fully integrated into the UN-multi-national mission, and as a negative consequence of 
neglect of operational requirements in order to satisfy political desires and legal 
requirements. UNDOF, as in other matters, appears to have distilled experience into a 
well-balanced synthesis of reliance and independence, as distinct Japanese units, 
operating closely within the multi-national mission. In security terms, the JSDF 
UNDOF contingent is much ‘harder’ and more unified than in ONUMOZ, while relying 
upon a greater number of more concentrated non-Japanese security providers.
Reliance upon de facto collective security agreements was also an issue examined in 
non-UN missions, but further mission-variant diversity and the evaluation of 
effectiveness, efficiency, and quality in such ODO was the main substance of Chapter 
Five, with reiteration of previous logistical concerns. The initial MSDF ODO while 
seemingly limited to narrow military tasks encompassed a broad range of multilateral 
cooperative tasks, from minesweeping to defence diplomacy and regional security 
building. The Zaire and Honduras missions provided examples of cooperation between 
the ASDF and GSDF for distant operations with a largely non-military operational focus 
for relief missions. These missions also involved broader and deeper multilateral and 
multi-agency cooperation with militaries, UN agencies, and NGOs. Despite some 
interface during UNTAC, these were the first significant cases of the JSDF cooperating 
with such non-military groups. The experience was neither as daunting as might be 
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imagined from the lack of operational experience, nor as discomforting as the 
experience of many other militaries when faced with multi-agency partners in the 
1990s.879
The non-UN operations did, however, provide invaluable unilateral and multilateral 
experience in a range of missions the JSDF could perform effectively and efficiently, to 
high standards. These would be integrated into joint operations in Indonesia in 2005, 
and into UNPKO practice with the dispatch to Haiti in 2010. The non-UN missions of 
In this, the JSDF were aided by their several decades experience in domestic 
civilian support tasks, and possibly by their perceptions of identity as less ‘elite warriors’ 
than specialised public servants, as previously illustrated by Kurashina. Also, the largely 
medical nature of the missions provided a professional level of communication not 
always easily achieved by personnel with more military-specific specialisations. 
These missions also reiterated the limitations of Japan’s airlift capability and how the 
ODO units were required to be configured as ‘lightly’ as possible, as in Honduras, or to 
rely on commercial resources. Either option had its limitations, but the ASDF did not 
seek to provide a more innovative solution, such as the procurement or leasing of airlift 
resources, or seeking cooperation with allies, other than the US. ASDF airlift continued 
to represent a ‘capability reducing’ factor, despite the best efforts of the ASC. The 
missions in Zaire and Honduras also illustrated the reliance upon host nations to provide 
security for the JSDF in non-UN ODO, highlighting the importance of SOFA and good 
communications. Airlift problems, combined with limited on-site security capabilities, 
and the lack of an ‘extraction force’ to facilitate a potential withdrawal of dispatched 
forces, could have placed JSDF personnel in positions of greater risk than in any 
UNPKO. 
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the 1990s provided an alternative and complementary base of operational performance 
in which the JSDF were able to demonstrate proficiency and build upon the experience 
into the next century, not least in an understanding of the operational imperative for 
joint planning.
By examining the four factors of the analytical framework, and applying the criteria 
of efficiency, effectiveness, and quality, the evaluation of JSDF operational performance 
was finalised in Chapter Six. The JSDF proved to be highly effective international 
actors in ODO, within their operational constraints. The effectiveness of the missions 
was directly related to the scale of dispatch, the duties assigned, and the restrictions 
imposed. In UNTAC and ONUMOZ, the former mission had the greater scale and range 
of duties, and the greatest expectation, to contribute to the human security of the 
country and operational range of the mission, while the latter dispatch was a specialist 
niche role with slender resources. The UNTAC contingent was able to perform up to the 
required standards for the mission, but when requirements changed and further duties 
were requested, the large force was able to complete its tasks to the revised standards 
due to its scale and loosening of restrictions. The ONUMOZ mission could not extend 
its operational range, as it lacked scale, and also could not provide unilateral security to 
complete its core tasks. As such, its effectiveness was restrained. The UNTAC 
contingent, conversely, could be regarded as having performed more effectively when 
the security environment worsened, as the range of tasks it successfully completed was 
expanded.
Furthermore, the ability of the UNTAC unit to extend its range of ‘outputs’, without a 
concomitant increase in resources (‘inputs’) significantly increased its efficiency. The 
other missions, with more stable task assignments, cannot claim such a degree of 
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‘efficiency escalation’, with the possible exception of the use of ‘telemedicine’ in 
Honduras to greatly expand its level of expertise beyond that possessed by members of 
the contingent. The UNDOF and Honduras dispatches were both compact and relatively 
‘logistics-light’, but were able to demonstrate tremendous efficiency by the sheer 
number of cases or roles covered by limited personnel. Overall efficiency was certainly 
impaired by the strategic capabilities of the Forces, particularly the ASDF application of 
large numbers of ill-suited aircraft resources requiring a large infrastructure outside the 
operational area, and highly dependent upon foreign basing and refuelling facilities. In 
ONUMOZ, the ASDF detachment significantly outnumbered the operational contingent. 
Despite such operational-logistical imbalances, the overall conduct of JSDF ODO 
would be characterised as efficient, and the cost-performance, within the context of the 
overall defence budget, and the amount spent on procuring combat systems, despite 
incomplete data, would seem to reinforce this finding.
The quality of JSDF ODO as measured by the satisfaction of mission clients would 
seem to have been assured, despite some critical comments. Both UN and non-UN
missions, large scale and small, those working with the JSDF appreciated the quality of 
their work, as niche service providers, and as highly capable multi-tasked units. The 
engineering work appears to have been up to the highest standards, as were the 
logistical, medical, sanitation, and election-support tasks completed. In UNTAC and the 
relief missions, the scale and quality of medical services provided was in many ways 
beyond what the local population could have expected, given the condition of the local 
infrastructure. The unexpected nature of the medical service provision in UNTAC marks 
that out as a further extension of duties during the mission which met with the 
satisfaction of locals and made a significant contribution to human security. UNDOF 
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provided an example of a small but highly capable contingent providing such a broad 
range of capability-enhancing services that its performance was considered vital to the 
mission in the eyes of its commander.
It is also clear that in the media and wider society the operations were regarded as 
successful, regardless of whether the motivations of the Japanese government are 
regarded as pro-idealist or pro-realist. This broader perception of success for UNTAC 
would appear to be less widespread, as there were foreign media critical of the JSDF 
mission, particularly related to the state of Camp Takeo and safety of Takeo province, 
contrasted with conditions for most Cambodians and contingents. This image was 
further denigrated by Japanese reluctance to commit resources to the ‘main body’ of the 
mission, the PKF, even in supporting roles, while benefiting from the security provided 
by French PKF troops. Even the Force Commander had some critical comments for 
countries that preferred to offer ‘supporting forces’, but the clear evidence from 
UNTAC is that the mission was short of engineers, logisticians, medical staff, and well 
trained police, not infantry. The media coverage of the JSDF in Cambodia was 
replicated to some extent in Zaire, Indonesia, and Iraq, but most other missions were 
neglected. The smaller and further removed a mission from core Japanese national 
interests, the less exposure it received, with the result that the ONUMOZ, UNDOF, and 
Honduran missions were perhaps regarded as less ‘successful’. In political terms, 
despite being high quality missions, one client, the Japanese government, could reap 
less political goodwill from them, even though the host nation client (and UN mission) 
needs had been well met. The UNDOF contingent, uniquely, provides a low-media 
profile of great value to the government. As a standing force of 14 years it demonstrates 
a high capability, long-term commitment to the UN, while being low-cost, 
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low-maintenance, and low-risk.
JSDF ODO in the narrow operational sphere compare favourably with those of other 
nations. UNTAC included uneven military actors even among usually dependable 
countries, and engineering and other PSO capabilities were so few that it is not 
surprising that JSDF efforts were well received. Although later operations were better 
balanced JSDF ODO remain as a benchmark of high operational performance. UNDOF 
is the clearest example of a small contingent providing a significant mission 
contribution, and the Honduras dispatch contrasts as a brief, high-intensity operation, 
with the expensive, longer-term naval taskforce contribution of the UK, although in 
Rwanda/Zaire British performance outshone Japanese.880
What is clear, however, is that other nations which began peacekeeping and other 
ODO at the same time as Japan have been seen to have ‘moved on’ to more mission 
variants, more varied duties, and, critically, more dangerous deployments. This is the 
case with Germany, China, Korea, and Slovakia, both in UN and non-UN missions. 
While the European countries have the support of NATO and the EU, the cases of China 
and Korea are perhaps more relevant to Japan, particularly the latter as a neighbour and 
US ally. The JSDF have learned from the lessons of the 1990s and developed their ODO 
into the 21st
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RMA-roles. The JSDF, particularly the GSDF, remain surprisingly committed to 
‘defensive defence’, mirroring the general risk-aversion of the Japanese government and 
people. This parallel risk-aversion and ODO development expresses the broader 
character of Japanese security policy development, and has proved puzzling to 
researchers looking for signs of ‘normalisation’, ‘remilitarisation’, or of reversion to a 
pacifist norm, and is an issue that shall be addressed below.
JSDF performance degrading issues have been stated, such as strategic lift, language 
skills, lack of doctrine, and hurried dispatch. Contingent commanders and their 
supporting JSDF, JDA, and IPCH colleagues managed well in the circumstances, 
displaying professionalism and dedication, although pre-dispatch briefings were 
inadequate, prompting efforts to develop independent research capabilities. Gradually, 
operational experience emphasised the importance of joint working practices, and the 
requirement for a professionalization of ODO training which came to fruition in 
following decade.
2 Effective Experience
JSDF ODO in the 1990s proved decisive in prompting change in the post-war and 
Cold War security norms of Japan. Despite pacifist norms remaining defining elements 
in security discourse, neither the norms nor the pacifism would be regarded as absolute 
standards, rather as guiding principles. While Japan did not ‘remilitarise’, in the sense of 
a great expansion of military power or of inflated military consciousness within society, 
the ODO changed perceptions of Japan, its role in the world, and the JSDF. Chris 
Hughes asserts that this process of extending the JSDF ‘operational reach’ in the 1990s 
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did indeed contribute to Japanese ‘remilitarisation’.881 By contrast, Takao Yasuo in his 
study of remilitarisation makes few references to operations in the 1990s, inferring that 
the earlier ODO experiences were, in terms of considering socio-political considerations, 
quite different from later Indian Ocean and Iraq dispatches.882
This thesis examines the issue of remilitarisation in Section 4 of this chapter, 
‘Implications for Studies of Japanese Security’, but it contends that the experiences of 
the 1990s provided the precedent for the expansion of ODO in the 21st
Progress in the 1990s had been dramatic, within a Japanese context, but limited in 
comparison to that of other ‘emergent peacekeepers’. There was a palpable sense that 
most Japanese, including political and military leaders, considered that they had 
completed the bulk of the hard work in gaining acceptance for the principle as well as 
the actuality of JSDF overseas dispatch operations. The realisation, after a decade of 
ODO experience, that further external pressures were being placed upon Japan to act in 
ways ever further removed from the Cold War pacifist norms came as a rude shock that 
few were willing to directly address. However, unusually for Japan it had a leader who 
century. 
However, it also maintains that the global security environment changed more rapidly 
than Japan’s policies, practices, and norms, thereby proving frustrating for those who 
had expected the actuality of dispatch to have sated appetites and reduced external 
demands for further action. Having overcome obstacles to dispatch based upon the Gulf 
War prompting fundamental revision of past practices and standards, Japan found itself 
in 2001 faced with further turmoil and change and, vitally for the JSDF, raised 
expectations. 
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was actually eager to seize upon such challenges. Nabers, Shinoda, and Hughes have 
separately illustrated how PM Koizumi did not so much mediate between domestic and 
foreign pressures as navigate a new, direct course for the ship of state with little 
reference to passengers or crew, utilising the reformed, centralised powers of the PMO 
and Cabinet Office.883
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Thus, JSDF deployments to the Indian Ocean, East Timor, and 
Iraq were authorised, and ‘steamrollered’ through cabinet, the Diet, and the country by 
the force of Koizumi and despite clear opposition. However, they were only 
operationally possible due to the experiences and clear demonstrations of effectiveness 
during the 1990s. Without PMO reforms, these missions could have been possible, but 
without UNTAC, ONUMOZ, UNDOF, and the non-UN mission experiences and 
perceptions of success it is unlikely that they would have eventuated in the forms they 
took, nor have been conducted with such limited operational problems. The experiences 
of the 1990s allowed Japan to participate in ‘second generation JSDF ODO’, 
characterised by US rather than UN leadership within ‘coalitions of the willing’. While 
this development may well be regarded as a significant security policy shift, it required 
relatively little operational change from the previous decade’s operational patterns. The 
tasks performed were expanded, but in technical breadth rather than significant depth, 
such as maritime and air logistics in the Indian Ocean and Middle East. The particular 
‘character’ of JSDF ODO and most of the legal limitations remained unchanged from 
1999 and the Forces were able to be characterised as being less belligerent and more 
constabulary than many of their allies’ contributions. Indeed, in the absence of ODO 
doctrine, it could be said that the legal limitations came to assume a guiding role for 
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JSDF modes of operational deployment.
One of the ways in which the missions of the 1990s proved valuable for the JSDF 
was in the way they altered the self-perceptions of the Forces. Kawano Hitoshi has 
stated how JSDF personnel felt energised by ODO, and many younger members had a 
sense of personal fulfilment, providing an example of post-modern or self-oriented 
motivation, in contrast to value/institutional or money-oriented feelings.884 There was a 
clear generation gap, with older members of higher rank having a stronger ‘corporate’ 
loyalty to the institutions and aims of the JSDF, and, as Yamaguchi Noboru has pointed 
out, the JSDF reflect Japanese society in being older than most militaries.885 Kawano 
discovered that many JSDF members viewed UNPKO as an ‘Olympic meeting’ of 
militaries, and that despite initial anxieties, particularly for UNTAC, most members 
gained great satisfaction from having participated, even those initially unenthusiastic. In 
contrast with combat troops of other nations exposed to wider-ranging operational 
deployments, for the JSDF these missions constituted the ultimate operational 
experience and proving ground of their capabilities, with the highest figures of wishing
to repeat ODO experience registered by UNDOF veterans.886 It would appear that the 
“constabulary ethic” of minimal use of force, and caring for ‘community’ members, has 
been “embodied in the Japanese armed forces”.887
The increased confidence and professional satisfaction also had significant 
institutional consequences. The JSDF, first under Prime Minister Hashimoto, and later 
Koizumi, were given greater scope for directly advising political leaders. The JSO and 
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Force Staff Offices could proffer professional advice based upon operational experience, 
and begin to gain enhanced influence over ODO selections and roles. From 2002, 
US-Japan bilateral cooperation through the ‘two-plus-two’ meetings of the respective 
defence and foreign affairs officials, provided the JDA and JSDF with equal status to 
MoFA countering some fundamental assumptions of tight ‘civilian control’ practice.
Yamaguchi Jiro, writing in 1992, saw the progression towards UNPKO and an 
increasing professional role for the JSDF as unsatisfactory as the “problem of how to 
arrive at the compatibility between an army and democratic principles remains 
unresolved. In that sense, we must call modern-day Japanese democracy incomplete.”888
While the JSDF and JDA/MOD gained increased influence over certain aspects of 
operations, this does not indicate that Japanese foreign policy became increasingly 
militarised. While the range of missions completed was impressive, Japan remained a 
‘narrow spectrum’ actor, and the scale and intensity of dispatch budgets, personnel 
levels, and operational stresses remained far lower than in many other countries. The 
numbers of personnel engaged in UNPKO declined after 1995 and only grew 
significantly from 2002. For its dispatches to East Timor, New Zealand used its entire 
C-130H, helicopter, infantry, and armoured forces, and relied heavily upon reservists for 
later operations.
While incomplete, the process had advanced during the 1990s due to demonstrable 
operational effectiveness.
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The British armed forces, smaller than the JSDF, in April 1999 
experienced a relative lull in operational deployment (between Bosnia and Kosovo), and 
yet, 36% of the army, 20% of the navy and 9% of the air force were training for, 
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deployed on, or recovering from operations, equalling over 30,000 army personnel 
alone.890 At this time, JSDF ODO commitment was 43 personnel in UNDOF, and 
Shimizu Hirofumi and Todd Sandler are dismissive of Japanese efforts, with a sharp 
decline in JSDF contributions after 1995. 891 Even the resumption of large-scale 
multi-mission dispatches from 2002 with UNIMSET, OEF-MIO, Iraq, and Indonesia 
dispatches rarely approached the 2000 personnel ceiling. Despite the modest scale and 
intensity, MSDF and ASDF resources were seen to be stretched by the ‘unexpected’ 
operational tempo.892 Also, despite the seemingly combative appearance of the GSDF in 
a highly unstable Iraq, their roles were strictly PSO, with de facto collective security 
provided by allies, and with the norm-driven restrictive practices still in place. As 
domestic support for the Iraq dispatch deteriorated during 2004-2005, PM Koizumi was 
forced to admit that the JSDF would not transport arms or ammunition for other forces, 
and that they would withdraw if local security deteriorated.893
This continuity is also evident in the investment patterns in hardware and software of 
the JSDF. While evidence was provided in Chapter Two for the investments made by 
the GSDF and MSDF in resources easily usable in ODO, these constituted minimal 
efforts at the periphery of significant budgets, while the ASDF efforts in this regard 
have been even more frugal. In the negotiations undertaken in Washington for the 
revision of the US-Japan Guidelines, the Japanese JSDF and JDA representatives 
strongly pressed the US side for inclusion of US assistance for Japanese IPC efforts, 
While much had changed 
since UNTAC, the degree of continuity was also striking.
                                                   
890
Ministry of Defence Performance Report 1998-99
(http://webarchive.nationalarchives.gov.uk/+/http://www.mod.uk/publications/performance1998/com
mitments.htm, 8 September 2010).
891 Shimizu, Hirofumi, and Sandler, Todd, ‘Peacekeeping and Burden-Sharing, 1994-2000’, Journal 
of Peace Research 39-6 (2002): 651-668, 658.
892 Interview, MSDF Captain (July 2006).
893 Takao, Yasuo, Is Japan remilitarising?: 117, 140.
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particularly in logistics, to help make up for the ASDF capability gaps. The US had 
performed such air-lift provider roles for peacekeepers in Rwanda and East Timor, but 
in 2004 when the JSDF requested assistance in the air-lift to Iraq, USAF quoted a price 
double that of a JAL charter service, itself double that of the winning tender for the 
service, to the disappointment of many Japanese.894 The GSDF flew into Kuwait by 
Phuket Air, much to the confusion of allied officers.895
While such commercial means have been found to bridge the ‘air gap’ they continue 
to present operational problems, such as the effects upon rapid deployment capabilities, 
the contingency of urgent operational requirements, and the limitations of rapidly 
extracting forces. The latter point is most poignant, as the JSDF have operated under 
supposedly strict conditions of dispatch, entailing a withdrawal if conflict escalates and 
the JSDF contingents are in danger of belligerent action. While other countries such as 
Britain and France would deal with such situations by the rapid introduction of forces to 
stabilise the mission, as the British did in Sierra Leone in 2000, the Japanese would 
surely be forced to withdraw. The air-lift capability gap would be a major obstacle, not 
only for provision of rapid force retrieval lift, but also as withdrawal from hostile 
contact is an extremely difficult and dangerous procedure. The safe completion of the 
procedure would entail insertion of an ‘extraction force’, designed to hold a perimeter, 
regulate traffic, and provide local intelligence to the extraction commander. With 
limited intelligence and air-lift capabilities, such an operation would have proved 
difficult to mount in the 1990s, compounded by the fact that the first unit designated as 
possible extraction force providers were the airborne forces within the CRF from 2007. 
Hence, Japan had no capability to undertake one of the main provisions of the IPCL, 
                                                   
894 Interviews, GSDF Major-General (August 2004), and PMO Policy Adviser, (March 2005).
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entailing de facto JSDF reliance upon collective security and allied cooperation in the 
event of such contingencies.  
The use of aviation in ODO has also been uneven in the provision of helicopter 
resources, with the GSDF utilising their extensive helicopter fleet in disaster relief 
missions in Pakistan (twice) and Indonesia, but despite UN requests, and clear 
operational needs, they have not been dispatched to UN missions. The UNSG twice 
requested Japanese helicopters in 2010, but a proposed dispatch to Sudan was rejected 
on logistical grounds.896 Takao has suggested that “Japan appears to have acted as a 
self-interested cost-minimiser” in defence budget terms, and this could also be applied 
to certain aspects of ODO.897 It is certainly the case that the Japanese government does 
not see any inherent dilemma in the provision of JSDF assets for humanitarian aid, as 
the helicopter dispatches demonstrate. This is despite the increasing doctrinal shift 
within the UN towards the ‘de-militarisation’ of such aid, and a growing body of 
opinion among aid and development specialists. 898
                                                   
896 ‘Ban seeks SDF copter dispatch’, Kyodo/The Japan Times (26 September 2010)
The place of the JSDF within such 
missions is seen as legitimate within Japan, based upon the evolution of Force roles, and 
the development of IPC duties. The character of the Forces was strongly influenced by 
roles in direct and immediate service of civilians affected by natural disaster, developing 
institutional, technical, and cultural means by which to accommodate and effectively 
complete such duties in parallel with ‘conventional’ defence tasks. As Kawano and 
Kurashina have demonstrated, this has led to the JSDF being able to undertake ODO 
with a sympathetic human face, not always the case of militaries in ‘unconventional’ 
(http://search.japantimes.co.jp/cgi-bin/nn20100926a6.html, 26 September 2010).
897 Takao, Yasuo, Is Japan remilitarising?: 19.
898 Hofmann, Charles-Antoine, and Hudson, Laura, ‘Military responses to natural disasters: last 
resort or inevitable trend?’ Humanitarian Exchange Magazine 44 (2009) 
(http://www.odihpn.org/report.asp?id=3030, 12 February 2010).
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roles.899
The effectiveness, efficiency, and quality of JSDF ODO were clearly demonstrated in 
3 Summary of Evaluation
In answering the primary research question, whether the JSDF proved to be effective 
international actors, the answer is positive. The professional qualities of the Forces 
overcame the lack of specific training and experience, resource and logistical obstacles, 
and surmounted the real and imagined restrictions and pressures of undertaking 
prominent missions without national or international consensus. That the JSDF were so 
capable in familiar tasks is of little surprise, but the way in which the Forces contended 
so well with expanded duties, new pressures, and diversified mission roles is worthy of 
note. 
In examining what tasks the JSDF performed overseas, they were not confined to the 
‘UNTAC pattern’ assumed to be the operational panacea for JSDF ODO even within 
official circles. They ranged from highly complex, technical support duties closely 
integrated into UN missions to largely ‘unmilitary’, unarmed human security aid roles 
directly dealing with local people. The latter roles were familiar due to domestic disaster 
relief duties, although not the attendant environmental and linguistic novelties of 
overseas operations. The former roles were not unfamiliar, but such intense 
multi-national integrated working was certainly new to the JSDF, and prompted a 
review of Force structures and working patterns, leading to an eventual, if seemingly 
marginal, increase in JSDF ‘jointery’. 
                                                   
899 Kawano, Hitoshi, ‘The Positive Impact of Peacekeeping on the Japan Self Defense Forces’;
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all missions, with some, such as UNTAC, providing a broad dynamic range of 
capabilities, due to the resources allocated and the nature of the evolution of the mission. 
Others were from inception efficient and capable, and delivered high quality 
‘end-products’, as in Honduras, Zaire, and UNDOF, while even the limited deployments, 
such as ONUMOZ, Turkey, and West Timor were able to fulfil their mission 
requirements to the fullest extent without reinforcements or enhancements. Efficiency 
and effectiveness were compromised by logistical support and pre-dispatch preparation, 
but the personnel in operations found ways to overcome such handicaps.
The scale of these missions made a contribution to their performance, with greater 
resources naturally leading to greater effectiveness, but not always efficiency, as seen by 
the comparison of medical services in Zaire and Honduras. The ability of the JSDF to 
depend upon other mission contingents proved vital, for all support services in 
ONUMOZ, and for security in other operations. The Japanese units could not be seen in 
isolation, regardless of their size, as they depended upon allied, and often commercial, 
assistance. Civilian assistance to the JSDF was critical in many operations, from NGO 
assistance in aid missions, to commercial air and sea lift. Despite criticism of 
pre-dispatch briefings, the personnel of the IPCH and MoFA, as well as JDA and JICA 
staff performed capability-enhancing field roles in support of JSDF ODO despite their 
small numbers and limited resources.
In comparing JSDF performance with that of other national militaries, the Forces 
generally compare well to operational comparisons in similar and dissimilar roles, 
particularly in PSO tasks in contact with civilians, but tend to compare poorly when 
judged by broader criteria. Japan devoted few personnel and relatively slender resources 
to its ODO, and the JSDF invested little during the 1990s to enhance its performance in 
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such operations. The JSDF were able to develop their capabilities, but as they developed 
within national socio-political and legal restrictions they could not match the 
developments being undertaken by equivalent nations. Japan may be regarded by such 
countries as an ‘under-performer’ in ODO, but the JSDF should be more correctly 
regarded as a ‘narrow spectrum’ yet ‘deep capability’ actor. Criticisms of Japan have 
often be expressed within comparisons, particularly in relation to German ODO, and the 
breadth and depth of German experiences throughout and beyond the 1990s indicates 
what standards the JSDF will be judged by. It is highly unlikely that the JSDF will 
match such performance, particularly in assuming multinational command roles, and for 
all its resources this remains the most significant remaining capability gap for their role 
as an effective international actor.
Critical commentators, such as Gavan McCormack, have noted that the JSDF appears 
to be a richly resourced military, and thereby conclude that Japan has ‘remilitarised’ and 
thus is likely to behave as other such ‘military states’.900
One troubling aspect of this cautious approach has been what Peter Woolley has 
Such comments do not readily 
withstand scrutiny, for ‘military states’ have performed all manner of operations since 
1990, with the UK and US being cast among the more belligerent, but Sweden, Italy, 
and Germany, as noted have also greatly expanding their security responsibilities 
through multinational military operations. The evidence of this thesis is that the 
resources provided for the JSDF are not so vast, the martial nature of the JSDF is far 
less than might be imagined from afar, and that the operations conducted in the 1990s 
can be characterised by their cautious, diligent approach, aptly embedded within the 
International Peace Cooperation policies of Japan. 
                                                   
900 McCormack, Gavan, ‘Remilitarizing Japan’, New Left Review 29 (2004): 37.
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termed “incremental interpretavism” by the government to circumvent opposition and 
mediate competing interests, thereby allowing increased freedom of dispatch and 
operational action.901
Despite such continuing socio-political problems, and resource deficiencies, the 
experience of the JSDF as national representatives has been far more positive than could 
While this thesis has clearly stated that the constitutional limits on 
military forces and their actions has only been considered among many factors affecting 
JSDF ODO performance, the overall effect of pacifist norms in society, founded upon 
war experiences and the constitution, have proved an effective restraint upon further 
expansion of JSDF roles. This is one significant way in which Japanese and German 
experience has diverged. 
What is perhaps unsettling is the nature in which reinterpretation, of the constitution, 
laws, and norms, has been used as a utilitarian mediation device by government to allow 
for JSDF ODO to move closer to standard operational procedures found in UNPKO and 
other multinational operations. While laudable in many ways, it has been utilised as a 
risk reduction device to avoid domestic political controversy which has conversely 
placed the JSDF in positions of potentially increased operational risk with little apparent 
legal, political, or operational support. Reliance upon de facto collective security, by 
dependence upon non-Japanese forces and tight restrictions upon national forces, while 
publicly denying this right does not provide a stable base for future operational 
developments, and helps explain GSDF reluctance to embark upon further large-scale 
UNTAC or Iraq-type missions. What is also apparent from this thesis, however, is that 
despite these challenges and restrictions, the JSDF has proven its adaptability in new 
roles and expanded duties when required to do so.
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have been imagined during the volatile debates of 1990-1992. The ‘ox-walking’ 
opponents of JSDF dispatch have been partly calmed by the actuality of operational 
performance. The experience of the 1990s has demonstrated that the character of JSDF 
members is well-suited to the limited peace support tasks they have effectively
undertaken as international actors. 
4 Implications for Studies of Japanese Security
Setting the operational performance of the JSDF within the ODO context answers 
one array of questions, but naturally raises others within broader contextual patterns. 
What do the missions of the 1990s indicate about the trajectory of Japan and its security 
beyond 2000? What do JSDF ODO indicate about the nature of the JSDF, the 
government, and Japanese society, and should Japan’s neighbours and allies be 
concerned about the implications for global security? Did the experiences of JSDF 
ODO help ‘militarise’ Japan? Indeed, do Japanese citizens see their country as one that 
has become a ‘military power’, and do they recognise that Japan has been 
fundamentally changed by the experiences of the 1990s? 
These questions shall be addressed by examining Japanese military tolerances, the 
factors of normalising and militarising, and the internal and external policy drivers that 
have led to re-evaluations of Japanese strategy and security.
A Japanese Military Tolerance
Paul Midford, in a recent, thorough study of Japanese public opinion on security 
issues, has contended that the supposed Japanese adherence to or observance of 
pacifism has been greatly exaggerated, and that “many of the public’s security attitudes 
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were not necessarily inconsistent with some forms of realism, especially defensive 
realism.”902 In his definitions of pacifism, Midford, like Thomas Berger, clarifies the 
differences between latent anti-militarism due to the excesses of the Imperial period and 
the disdain for or complete rejection of the notion of use of arms for any purpose.903
Almost a decade earlier, Michael J Green had referred to Japan’s ‘reluctant realism’ in a 
similar vein.904
This thesis has clearly identified that it agrees with Midford’s contention that 
Japanese public opinion has been both tolerant of, and increasingly demanding, 
effective national defence provision. While this ‘military tolerance’ could be 
characterised as ‘defensive realism’, it could also be characterised as one of the 
risk-averse qualities of broader Japanese liberalism, as expressed by Yoshida. It was 
also a feature of Ashida’s liberalism prior to Yoshida and the subsequent normative 
institutionalisation of the Yoshida Doctrine, as outlined in Chapter Two.905
The Yoshida approach was a delicate balancing act, with a realisation that Japanese 
society’s ‘military tolerance’ was fragile, and only gradually strengthened. Midford 
states that if Japanese public opinion had been tolerant of “attitudinal offensive realism” 
then Cold War commitments would have been made to the defence of Korea, Taiwan, 
and possibly even Vietnam, which it clearly was not.
This broadly
liberal approach aimed to reduce threats, lessen tensions, and mediate a path between 
outright pacifism and an embrace of re-militarisation in Cold War alliance with the US. 
906
                                                   
902 Midford, Paul, Rethinking Japanese Public Opinion and Security: From Pacifism to Realism
(Stanford, CA.: Stanford University Press, 2011): 15.
903 Berger, Thomas U., Cultures of Anti-militarism.
904 Green, Michael J., Japan’s Reluctant Realism.
905 Ueda, Makiko, “An Idea of Postwar Japan: Hitoshi Ashida and Japanese liberalism”, Japanese 
Studies (2011: 2): 31-48.
906 Midford, Paul, Rethinking Japanese Public Opinion and Security: 49-50.
However, true ‘defensive 
realism’ would also surely have been far more tolerant of higher defence spending,
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which it was not.
In Japan, there was an increasing appreciation of the need to both develop minimal 
military capability for defensive duties and to develop alliance relations with the US, 
limited by the prevalent social norm of ‘pacifism’. Thereby, any notion of Japanese 
‘defensive realism’ was, and has continued to be, highly conditional and nuanced, and 
would surely be more accurately depicted as ‘limited defensive pragmatism’.
JSDF ODO in the 1990s did much to provoke a public re-evaluation of the JSDF, 
with a greater appreciation of their capabilities and identity separate from that of the 
imperial-era military, much as domestic disaster relief missions had done. However, 
unlike domestic disaster relief and other civil support operations, there was a possibility 
that success of JSDF ODO could have led to an increasing ‘militarisation’ of Japanese 
security policy, such as that experienced by the UK after the intense military 
deployments of the 1990s. However, domestic and overseas operations have 
re-emphasised the strongly ‘constabulary’ identity of the JSDF, and have, if anything, 
improved the JSDF image by making them appear less militaristic. Despite massive 
investment in war-fighting technology, the only operational deployments have been 
largely non-military in character and completely non-combative in execution, even 
including the most ‘military’ appearing ODO thus far, in Iraq. The counter-intuitive and 
counter-Realist result of increased prominence of military aspects within Japanese 
security and foreign policies has therefore been a re-affirmation of the 
‘not-quite-military’ character of the JSDF.
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B Normalising and Militarising
Such detailed evaluations of JSDF ODO characteristics have not prevented 
commentators from deducing that ODO activity has equated to overt expressions of 
‘normalisation’ or ‘(re)militarisation’. As noted in Chapter One, Hook, Berger, and 
Maeda have been among the most prominent critics of JSDF overseas missions, not for 
their avowed purposes of supporting UN nation-building, or humanitarian relief, but as 
unwelcome symptoms of the increasing military character of Japan. In this context, 
JSDF ODO have been occasionally considered to be inherently or potentially insidious 
developments in an emergent strategy that has consciously or otherwise reconnected 
Japanese foreign policy to military policy. The implicit subtext is often indicated to be 
that this ‘normalisation’ is equivalent to ‘remilitarisation’ and is therefore a significant 
step towards ‘reversion’ and the imperial-era implications thus represented.
There is little consensus on what ‘normalisation’ comprises or represents, and thus 
the concept is difficult to evaluate against policy developments. Eyal Ben-Ari has 
identified five forms of ‘normalisation’ of militaries within societies, and these provide 
a comprehensive focal point for such an evaluation, while acknowledging numerous 
alternative definitions. The first involves legalising and formalising the actions of the 
armed forces. The second stresses the indispensability of the military as ‘guardians’ of 
national security. The third involves returning from a condition of abnormality. The 
fourth relates to a ‘ritual cycle’ of connecting ceremonies and rites with wider social 
ritual structures. The fifth form of normalisation entails conforming to a socially 
constructed standard, such as an internationally accepted military model.907
It will be clear from this thesis that while the initial two forms could be identified 
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(Tokyo: 14 July 2011).
317 
 
within Japan, the latter three could not. The ‘abnormal’ position of the JSDF within the 
constitution is something that most Japanese, in Chapter Three, indicated they preferred 
to maintain, and thus no other international military model would suite the Japanese 
case. There is also little sense of the ceremonial rituals of the JSDF having been 
embraced by society, despite the widespread, deep appreciation of JSDF assistance 
following the March 2011 triple crisis of earthquake, tsunami, and nuclear accidents.
Chris Hughes, as already indicated, has tended towards such concepts in his analyses 
of the JSDF and broader Japanese security, but his perspective of gradual ‘normalisation’ 
of Japanese policy, while remaining highly critical of creeping militarisation, has a less 
universally negative approach to the dispatch of the JSDF. His work does, however, 
retain much of the scepticism of previous authors’ studies regarding Japan’s military and 
the drivers of many aspects of military policy (see below, for an assessment of such 
drivers).908 Hughes has also been somewhat overly critical in the analysis of JSDF ODO 
within the broader frame of Japanese policy, tending towards a view of ODO as 
equating to a post-modern form ‘expansion of power’ by expansion of military reach, 
regardless of the benign form, limited size, brief duration, and international liberal 
character of the operations undertaken.909
Sugawa Kiyoshi, as noted in Chapter Two, identified three approaches among 
politicians and researchers regarding the JSDF in Japanese security policy: Alliance 
Supremacists, United Nations Believers, and New Realists. The Alliance Supremacists 
could well point to the JSDF Iraq and Indian Ocean dispatches, as well as ODO 
Even the expanded operations, 2001-2009, 
would be difficult to portray in such Realist terms.
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throughout the 1990s, to validate their position, and certainly the Japanese and Korean 
dispatches to Iraq were seen as demonstrations of loyalty, bolstering respective US 
alliances for East Asian security. However, such views have been tempered by the 
acknowledgement that such loyalty has provided little beneficial result for other US 
allies, such as the UK, as well as illustrating the obvious US-dependency of such an 
approach. There is also an inherent risk that US alliance dependency could hinder 
development of East Asian security relations, as occasionally expressed by Japanese 
politicians, such as Hatoyama’s 2009 Yuuaigaikou (‘fraternal diplomacy’).910
UN Believers are naturally handicapped by the institutional problems of the UN and 
the fickle allegiance of the US and other UNSC members. They are perhaps further 
limited by the vociferous exposition of UN-Centricity by Ozawa Ichiro as an alternative 
to US Alliance dependency.911
Sugawa regards the New Realists as probably having the greatest likelihood of 
gaining advantage, for they can hedge between other external policy drivers, such as the 
predominant US alliance ‘pragmatic-realism’ and the UN-loyalist ‘liberal-idealism’. At 
the same time, he sees the desirability for Japanese leaders to identify specifically 
Japanese “enlightened national interests”, including those related to international liberal 
cooperation, and thus predicts the emergence of “selective engagement” with UN and 
US military operations.912
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C Policy Drivers: The Search for ‘Normal’ Strategy
Samuels, Pyle, Woolley, and Dobson, as previously stated, have all utilised JSDF 
ODO within varied studies related to issues of the US-Japan bilateral relationship, and 
have tended to be less judgemental as to issues of normalisation as relating to JSDF 
ODO. They have, however, stressed the increasing role of military issues in policy 
considerations, and the emergence of what has been termed ‘Japanese Strategy’. 
Samuels explains that most Japanese doubt that Japan has ever had effective national 
strategy, often describing it as “naive” and “sterile”, while Korean and Chinese scholars 
tend to see Japan as having ‘stealthy strategy’, with a hidden, military-revisionist 
agenda.913 Samuels identifies the emergence of ‘strategic convergence’ as the ‘ideal’ for 
many Japanese strategic thinkers, whereby Japan can participate in an East Asian 
economic and political community with security elements, while also becoming a key 
element in a global US security system. In this, however, he acknowledges that the 
attitudes of Korea and China toward Japan would seem to make this little more than an 
Alliance-alternate fantasy. Neither country appears willing to cooperate more actively 
with Japan in overseas politics and military operations.914
Pyle has gone so far as to assert that the Koizumi-LDP administration’s emerging 
strategy initiated “a steady incremental remilitarization” in response to the post-9/11 
security situation. This subsequently altered alliance demands of the US administration, 
as Japan “began to remilitarize and become a stronger and more engaged ally, and in 
this way carved out a new activist foreign policy.”915
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As part of this assumed strategy, 
non-UN PKO military operations assumed a vital role, both as part of the bilateral 
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commitment to the alliance and as part of a broader commitment to international 
security interests. Hence, the Iraq, Indian Ocean, and Gulf of Aden operations in the 
first decade of the 21st
Pyle has identified four institutional changes that have been part of this process: 
constitutional revision, political leadership and control of policy, the raft of 
security-related legislation from 2001, and the creation of the MOD.
century assumed great prominence being considered to be part of 
a more conventional, as some would state ‘normal’, and potentially ‘security realist’ 
strategic approach. The ODO of the 1990s had set the precedent for such dispatches, 
had allowed prevalent norms to be partly overcome and partly circumvented, and had 
provided JSDF operational experience. 
916
The suggested institutional drivers of JSDF ODO policy within this thesis are clearly 
both external (primarily the US) and internal. Of the latter, the efforts of MoFA and 
other agency and ministry pressure to participate in missions have primarily aimed to
raise national profile, particularly with respect of the efforts directed towards the 
long-term goal of securing permanent UNSC membership. Internal drivers for ODO 
However, in 
assessing policy drivers, as opposed to policy effects, only increased political control 
over policy would appear to be of great significance. As previously identified, under 
Hashimoto and Koizumi, Japanese politicians increasingly influenced and controlled 
policy, aided by the concentration of key functions within the Prime Minister’s Office 
and Cabinet Secretariat. The creation of the MOD has the potential to provide an 
alternative policy driver for ODO, and possibly to assert greater influence over Japanese 
strategy, with attendant implications for civilian control, but there have been few such 
signs.
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efforts were thereby directly related to external calls for increased Japanese burden 
sharing. 
Within a supposed pattern of ‘remilitarisation’ it would be assumed that the military 
itself would be pressing hard for increased overseas dispatch. The fact that the GSDF in 
particular has been so reluctant to become engaged in such efforts is one indication of 
the lack of substance behind such remilitarisation concerns. In addition, the ASDF and 
MSDF have been limited in their eagerness, with the MSDF regarding the dispatches to 
the Indian Ocean and Gulf of Aden primarily as valuable allied cooperation and training 
opportunities, and to re-establish MSDF primacy after a decade of ‘responsibility
conflicts’ with the JCG. It has been noted, in Chapter Two, that ODO had been seen to 
have not only bolstered the confidence of the JSDF, and the public’s perception of the 
Forces, but also have to helped foster a degree of “excessively self-confident” and 
“arrogant” attitudes.917
Other than Maeda, most Japanese researchers who have studied the detail of JSDF 
operations have tended to be largely sympathetic, and at times perhaps overly 
enthusiastic of Japanese military performance.
This may be so, but with defence budgets being reduced since 
1998, there appears little military drive for expansive overseas operations.
918 Criticism, so prevalent prior to the 
UNTAC dispatches became noticeably muted and nuanced. This has also occasionally 
been the case with non-Japanese researchers who have perhaps not been as critical as 
they might otherwise be with their own nation’s armed forces.919
Among Japanese researchers, Sebata Takao has contended that normalisation of 
Japanese civil-military relations, with an increasingly ambitious and confident civilian 
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and military defence administration, depended not only upon the enhancements to JSDF 
and JDA/MOD images provided by ODO, but also was due to the enhancement of 
JSDF-USFJ and JDA-Pentagon relations in the 1990s. Sebata regards the willingness to 
join US-led military operations since 2001 as indicating one aspect of ‘normalisation’, 
and as being intrinsically tied to the centrality of the US-Japan alliance in Japanese 
strategy. Furthermore, Sebata asserts that “Japan might even become a major player in 
Asian security to supplement United States forces since the United States-Japan 
Security Treaty now covers the entire Asia-Pacific region” and that passing “a 
permanent law that could dispatch the SDF overseas at any time, Japan might not need 
to change Article 9 since such a law in itself would enable Japan to exercise the right to 
collective self-defense”. He acknowledges that such a ‘normalised’ Japan “might cause 
instability in East Asian security, particularly with China and both Koreas. In the future, 
Japan might...threaten to use the SDF to defend national interests over territorial issues 
or natural resources with China or South Korea as other states use armed forces to 
defend their national interests.”920
Japan’s ODO in the 1990s were initially driven by the results of post-Gulf War 
criticisms and fear of international isolation, combining both UN Believer and Alliance 
Supremacist priorities to mollify international partners. However, the search for strategy 
was also driven by a post-Cold War sense of uncertainty regarding previous policies, 
and increasingly during the 1990s and beyond by the two emergent regional security 
Such regional issues and the search for security will
be addressed in examining Japan’s search for security.
D Policy Drivers: The Search for Security
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threats seemingly posed by China and North Korea.
Reinhard Drifte has illustrated how the 1996 US-Japan Security Guidelines, and the 
muddled approach of both parties to the issues of Taiwan and missile defence, helped 
sour Sino-Japanese relations, and how Japanese efforts to redefine policies or build 
bridges largely failed. Increasingly, China came to be seen as a threat to the Japan-US 
alliance, and China came to regard alliance enhancement efforts as de facto containment 
policies. Japanese Liberal and Realist perspectives of strategy could coalesce around the 
attempt to develop a “soft containment” approach to China, whereby regional and 
extra-regional partners could be cultivated in order to engender a sense of responsible 
action in Chinese policymakers.921
Michael J Green has been a leading critic of Japanese security policy, and particularly 
its somewhat ambiguous attitude towards the US. He has identified ‘five rings’ as the 
key determinants of future security stability in East Asia, and while nationalism, 
democracy, proliferation, and economic interdependence involve most of the region’s 
actors, it is the first ring, Japan-China relations, that is most immediately relevant. 
Green, like Samuels, Pyle, Scalapino and many other specialists, by the end of the first 
decade of the 21
The connection between such a policy and ODO can 
be seen through Japanese efforts to develop comprehensive security relations with 
Australia, and JSDF, JCG, and police bilateral efforts towards India, Malaysia, 
Indonesia, and other Asian states.
st century had predicted that Japan had developed a sense of strategic 
purpose and was developing an increasingly coherent strategic pattern of security 
policies.922
                                                   
921 Drifte, Reinhard, Japan’s Security Relations with China since 1989: 101.
922 Green, Michael J., ‘Future Visions of Asian Security: The Five Rings’, Asia Policy 3 (January 
2007): 19-24.
However, unlike Drifte, Green and many other ‘strategic’ commentators 
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have tended to focus on military ‘hard’ security issues while failing to appreciate the 
value of ‘softer’ issues, such as trade, maritime relations, historical legacies, and human 
interaction. Among these could also be placed the failure to develop functional relations 
during ODO.
Pyle has stated “the Chinese have no wish to see Japan embark on a strategically
independent course or deviate from long-established limits on its defense policy.”923
Japan equally wishes to avoid China becoming a major naval power able to threaten
Japanese sea-lanes. Both parties have regarded each other’s ODO efforts with suspicion, 
mainly for what precedents they may set for the future. Chinese military analysts are 
concerned that Japan’s defence is shifting from a local to a regional basis and “from 
passive to active defense”, and that anti-Japanese sentiment in the PLA “at all levels is 
palpable.”924
North Korean security issues are less directly connected with JSDF ODO, but both 
Japanese and Korean Iraq dispatches were seemingly partly driven by a desire to prove 
loyalty to the US at a time when there was speculation regarding US military 
commitments to Korean defence. Concerns over the DPRK have helped lower Japanese 
sensitivities regarding defence-technology exports for missile defence, and have 
contributed to a somewhat more emollient attitude towards the controversial Okinawa 
This combines fears that Japanese strategy is focused upon both unilateral 
regional power projection and bilateral global power projection with the US, and has 
deepened mistrust of any unilateral or multilateral JSDF ODO efforts. In this ‘strategic’
context, water purification in UN PKO and Iraq appear inextricably linked with missile 
defence and Taiwan issues, and the future global balance of power. 
                                                   
923 Pyle, Kenneth B., Japan Rising: 339.
924 Shambaugh, David, Modernizing China’s Military: Progress, Problems, and Prospects
(Berkeley: University of California, 2002): 300-301.
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base issue, despite the initial blundering electioneering efforts of Hatoyama Yukio in 
2009.
It is disappointing that ODO have not resulted in greater levels of unit cooperation 
among Japan, China, and Korea, and have even resulted in a mild form of competitive 
dispatch. Perhaps UNTAC was too early in the respective JSDF and PLA learning 
cycles for cooperation in Cambodia, but this does not explain the failure to cooperate in 
East Timor or Haiti. The example of Korea is even more easily characterised as a 
wasted opportunity, for Japan did make efforts to cooperate with RoK forces in 
UNMISET, but these were limited, and were not followed through beyond 2004. Both 
countries dispatched similar types (if not sizes) of units to Iraq, but they were posted to 
opposite ends of the country. Similarly, RoK naval vessels have cooperated in the allied 
anti-piracy task force in the Gulf of Aden, but without any particular ‘East Asian’ 
common identification.
The possibilities of such functional cooperation with East Asian neighbours have 
been neglected, yet at the same time the equivalent cooperation with British and 
Australian forces in second generation JSDF ODO has contributed to burgeoning 
security relationships with both countries, particularly Australia. Both Canberra and 
Tokyo appear to share the enthusiasm of smaller US allies broadening their functional 
cooperative scope beyond UN and US-centric operations. As yet the logical inclusion of 
the RoK has been resisted.
This thesis has aimed to contribute to understanding of JSDF ODO performance, and 
what this indicates for Japanese and international security. While the competing claims 
of renowned scholars may seem dissonant, they have contributed to this enhanced 
understanding, even while some assertions, such as Japanese ‘remilitarisation’, have 
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been declined. This examination has clearly indicated the need for further companion 
studies of related issues by other scholars.
5 Opportunities for Further Research
With such a study as this, there naturally remain outstanding questions, and this thesis 
has aimed to provide a base upon which scholars may conduct further research projects.
These can be largely categorised as operational-functional types, or policy-strategic 
types.
This thesis provides numerous opportunities for further research on the effectiveness 
of the JSDF as national armed forces, taking the ODO of the 1990s as an operational 
case study to be compared with how the JSDF have adapted to changing security 
demands in the post-Cold War period. This could examine efficiency of resource 
allocation, or ‘transformation’ and how adaptive the JSDF and JDA/MOD have proven. 
As Nishihara Masashi has stated of the 1990s, looking “at Japanese defense issues from 
year to year, it doesn't change much; it's pretty boring,” but “if you look at it over a 
five-year period, there's a big difference” and an examination of this incremental change 
would be most instructive. 925 This could be further expanded with a broader 
examination of the US-Japan defence relationship, particularly in light of ‘Operation 
Tomodachi’, the combined US-Japan military relief effort following the 11th
In assessing the 2011 JSDF relief and recovery efforts, there would naturally be an 
March 
earthquake and tsunami. 
                                                   
925 Strom, Stephanie, ‘Japan Beginning to Flex Its Military Muscles’, The New York Times (8 April 
1999) 
(http://www.nytimes.com/1999/04/08/world/japan-beginning-to-flex-its-military-muscles.html?scp=
96&sq=Japan%20peacekeeping&st=cse&pagewanted=2, 10 May 2008).
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examination of civil-military relations, and how the Forces appear to have become 
closer to the civilian population than at any other time, intensified by the use of 
reservists and the stationing of 100,000 personnel in affected areas. There are significant 
opportunities for comparison of JSDF ODO with non-military actors, particularly 
Japanese CIVPOL in UNTAC. There are also opportunities to compare specific PSO 
and human-security work conducted by the JSDF and civilian bodies, such as UNHCR, 
JICA, ICRC, and NGO. The Japanese government has avoided direct comparisons, but 
an evaluation based upon effectiveness, efficiency, and quality would appear to be of 
great interest and utility in a period of shrinking budgets and increased domestic and 
overseas human security prioritisation.
There are many possible operational comparisons with ‘new peacekeepers’ (Germany, 
Korea, China), focusing upon their respective operational performance, and measuring
Japanese, and other nations’ performance in meeting international operational standards.
Within this context, the Japanese partial ‘abdication’ from UN command and control 
and ROE standards could be closely examined. 
As international actors, effectiveness is also dependent upon how the JSDF have 
represented Japanese policy and broader values embodied therein. Researchers could 
examine Japanese abilities to utilise functional ODO cooperation to build broader 
multilateral and bilateral security relationships, such as with Australia, the UK, Korea, 
and India. This could be founded upon the premise of security ‘hedging’ for multiple 
and unpredictable security challenges, or the absence of strong security institutions 
within Asia, beyond the US alliance. A study of Japanese efforts to widen its 
international security options would certainly be of value, and could be assessed within 
emergent Japanese strategy.
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Such a study would naturally lead to the development of alternatives to bilateralism, 
and an evaluation of whether such options are either viable or desirable to the Japanese 
and other governments. This would also entail studying the degree to which the US may 
wish for Japan to develop such alternative relationships and strategies, with Samuels 
having commented that elements of JSDF ODO development in the 1990s were 
encouraged by Washington, while others provoked consternation. 926
                                                   
926 Strom, Stephanie, ‘Japan Beginning to Flex Its Military Muscles’, The New York Times.
The JSDF 
operations of the 1990s could be used as a base to study the OEF-MIO and Iraq 
dispatches within this context, and to what degree bilateralism was a powerful driver?
This thesis has filled a gap in the understanding of JSDF overseas dispatch 
operational issues, and as such has made a unique contribution to knowledge in 
international relations and Japan studies. It is for other scholars to utilise the 
opportunities provided and extend the possibilities raised by this body of work. It is 
hoped that many will rise to the challenge.
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